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SUMMARY
AF EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL STUDY OF HUSBANDS AND WIVES LABOUR
SUPPLY.
The study i s  an a n a ly s is  of the  d ec is io n s  reg a rd ­
ing  weekly hours worked made by m a r i ta l  p a r tn e r s .  Chapter 1 p rov ides  a 
c r i t i c a l  review of the  r e le v a n t  l i t e r a t u r e ,  in  economics, in  o rder to  lo c a te  
the s tudy in  i t s  a p p ro p r ia te  co n tex t ;  the  end of the  ch ap te r  summarizes the 
f in d in g s  of prev ious r e s e a rc h .  Chapter 2 develops the id e a  t h a t  supply 
d e c is io n s ,  in  the  fam ily , depend on the bargaining: s t r u c tu r e  adopted as  well 
as the. impact of r e l a t i v e  wages. Types of b a rga in ing  s t r u c tu r e  a re  review­
ed, The chapter ends with the  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of observable  de te rm inan ts  of 
ba rga in ing  s t r u c tu r e .
Chapter 3 e x p la in s  the  s t a t i s t i c a l  model used and the d a ta  on which i t  
i s  t e s t e d .  The d a ta  a re  1965 p a i r s  of both working husbands and wives taken 
from the 1974 G eneral Household Survey.
Chapters 4-7 use these  d a ta  to  in v e s t ig a te  the  model o f  labour supply 
d e c is io n s  fo r  sub-samples chosen by age, s t a t e  of h e a l th ,  co lour,  le n g th  of 
w ife ’ s working week, and s o c ia l  c l a s s .  These r e s u l t s  a re  summarized and 
d iscussed  in  Chapter 8 ,
The r e s u l t s  show a g re a t  dea l of v a r i a t io n  ac ro ss  groups in  the  e s t im a t­
ed impact of o f fe re d  w ages,education , age and o th e r  v a r ia b le s  on hours of 
work chosen by m a r i ta l  p a r tn e r s .
Two general conclusions  emerge:
( i )  husbands’ supply response to  own wage r a t e s  i s  p ega tive  w h ils t  wives' 
i s  g e n e ra l ly  p o s i t iv e .
( i i )  economists ought to  pay more a t t e n t i o n  to  non-wage de term inan ts  of 
labour supply as th ese  seem to  be of g re a t  s ig n if ic a n c e  -  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
age, s o c ia l  c la s s  and c h i ld re n .







1970 ( a l l  percentages ' 
38.8
30-9 35.8 40.6 42.6
40-9 38.9 47.9 53.9
50-9 32.8 43.3 47.7
60-4 15.3 21.3 23.7
Note; Above f ig u re s  obtained by d iv id in g  T ota l Working Popu la tion  fo r  each 
group (from Department of Employment’ s Annual' Employment Survey) by the  
group popu la tion  (from the R e g i s t r a r  G enera l’ s Mid-Year P opula tion  E s t im a te ) .











25-34 40 44 52 52 55 51
35-44 58 64 66 68 70 69
45-54 57 63 67 68 68 69
55-59 47 48 49 50 55 54
60-4 2& 25 26 26 25 21
Source: OPCS MONITOR Ref. 
N,B, Table 1 .1  and Table
GHSJ82/1 
1 .2  are
1 /6 /82
no t comparable as’ the b a s i s  of c o l le c t io n
, coverage, and d e f i n i t i o n s  d i f f e r .
INTRODUCTION
T his  b r i e f  in t ro d u c t io n  i s  in  two p a r t s -  p a r t  
I r iv e s  some d e s c r ip t iv e  background to  the  phenomenon being in v e s t ia g a te d  
and p a r t  I I  o u t l in e s  the  co n ten t  of the  fo llow ing  ch ap te rs  and d is cu s se s  some 
connec tions  w ith e x i s i t i n g  work which would have req u ire d  excessive  r e p e t i t i o n  
i f  d e a l t  w ith  in  the  t e x t ,
I
The p re se n t  work i s  a study of labour supply d e c is io n s  in  f a m i l ie s  
where bo th  husbands and wives work. As anyone knows, most m arried men work 
-  f a l l s  in  the  male p a r t i c ip a t io n  r a te ^  are  almost s o le ly  due to  an in c re ase  
in  the s tay in g  on a t  school r a t e .  T ables  1 and 2 in d ic a te  the  growth in  
post-w ar B r i t a in  of the p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e  fo r  working wives (most of the  
growth in  Table 1 i s  accounted fo r  by m arried  women). Table 2 shows t h a t  in  
the  ages 35-54, housheholds w ith  a non-working wife a re  a ty p i c a l .  Good 
t im e - s e r ie s  on the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of m arried  women*s hours a re  n o t  a v a i l a b l e -  
the  study by Hunt(1968) showed th a t  the  g re a te r  p o r t io n  of working wives
worked n o n -n e g l ig ib le  workweeks i . e .  in  excess of 20 hours pe r week. From
2
the  d a ta  used! in  the  p re se n t  study we have c a lc u la te d  an average of 2715 
hours pe r veek worked by married women with husbands p re s e n t  and working. 
The importance of female labou r i s  s e l f - e v id e n t  given the  h igh  inc idence  of 
working wives and the  considerab le  time they spend in  the  lab o u r  market w hil­
s t  working. This  importance can be gauged through the  w ives’ c o n t r ib u t io n  
to  family income- in  our data  the  annual earn ings  of wives average 37.5% of
1, Those a t  work and o f f e r in g  to  work d iv ided  by the  a v a i l a b le  supply of work­
e r s .
2. 1974 General Household Survey Tapes.
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those  of husbands,
I I
Chapter one i s  a l i t e r a t u r e  survey; i t  w i l l  be e v id e n t  t h a t  i t
does n o t  fo llow  the  form at of expounding n e o - c la s s ic a l  th eo ry  followed by
a comparison of r e s u l t s  w ith  the  p re d ic t io n s  ( f o r  such a s tudy  of la b o u r
supply e s t im a te s  in  genera l see K il l ing 'sw orth (l98 l)  and the  appendix by
McElroy f o r  the  same approach to  j o i n t  husband-wife labour supply >, t
Space i s  given to  the  l i t e r a t u r e  on t im e - s e r ie s  study of female
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  as i t  was through t h i s  avenue th a t  economists f i r s t  came to  
in c o rp o ra te  fam ily  elements in  lab o u r  supply models. Due to  the  u n reso lv ­
ed in a d e q u a c ie s .o f  t h i s  e a r ly  work I  e s tim ate  a model b e liev ed  to  be f r e e  
from the  o b je c t io n s  in  chap te r  one; t h i s  model i s  re p o r ted  in  Appendix 1 ,
As pu re ly  ’ economic’ approaches f a r e  poorly  in  e x p la in in g  -Tfamily la b o u r
1
suoply behaviour the  p re sen t  study a ttem p ts  to  focus on i s s u e s  o ther  than  
the mere contem plation of income and s u b s t i t u t io n  e l a s t i c i t i e s .  -
In  l i n e  w ith  t h i s  the  end of c h a p te r  one devotes space to  th e  c o n s id e ra t io n  
o f  e s tim ated  responses  to  non-pecuniary  v a r ia b le s  r a th e r  than  g iv ing  a c a ta ­
logue of e l a s t i c i t i e s  (such ca ta lo g u es  a re  to  be found in  K i l l in g s w o r th ) .
As f a r  as  comparisons with o th e r  s tu d ie s  go the  c lo s e s t  b e la te d  work would 
appear to  be th a t  of G.V,Brown (ed .)  (1981) a lthough t h i s  i s  c h ie f ly  concern­
ed with the  e f f e c t s  of t a x a t io n  on lab o u r  supply- one ch ap te r  i s  on fam ily  
models b u t  the  m a tte r  of fam ily  decision-m aking i s  no t  prominent in  the  
r e s t  of th e  book, 7
I t  i s  b e l iev ed  by the  p re se n t  w r i te r  t h a t  th e re  i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t
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support f o r  any paradigm in  the  a n a ly s is  of the  fam ily ’ s economic behaviour 
fo r  one to  be s t r i c t l y  enforced in  em p ir ica l  work. Accordingly Çhapter 2 
develops in  a taxonomic fa sh io n  some p o s s ib le  t h e o r e t i c a l  fo u n d a tio n s ;  the  
development of the  n e o - c la s s i c a l  approach with in te rd ep en d en t u t i l i t i e s  i s  
n o t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  r ig o ro u s  ( f o r  a s tro n g e r  t rea tm en t see Brown (ed ,)  1981) 
The b a s ic  p o in t  of the  chap ter  i s  t h a t  c e r t a in  forms of d e c is io n ­
making regime are  im p l i c i t l y  assumed in  em p ir ica l  work w ithou t the  conseq­
uences of f a l s i t y  of the assumption being made c l e a r .
Chapter 3 d e a ls  w ith  the  d a ta  c o l l e c t io n  and some econometric 
m a t te r s .  The p r in c ip a l  problem with the  d a ta  i s  the  measurement of the  
supply of labou r v a r i a b le .  We use weekly hours in s te a d  of annual as  the  
q u es t io n s  asked a re  on normal hours w h i ls t  i t  i s  u n l ik e ly  t h a t  people 
p ick  weeks to  a d ju s t  a c tu a l  to  d e s ired  hours . The embodied assumption i s  
t h a t  normal hours r e p re se n t  a lo n g -ru u  eq u il ib r iu m  achieved by choice of 
job e t c .  Unlike Brown e t  a l ,  we do n o t  exclude those who worked l e s s  than 
8 hours as  t h i s  does n o t  seem j u s t i f i e d  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  a lthough  i t  would 
have improved R square e tc .  I m p l i c i t l y  we exclude those who work zero  
hours hence igno ring  the  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  d e c is io n s  -  much of th e  advanced 
re sea rc h  in  t h i s  a rea  reg a rd s  t h i s  as invo lv ing  sample s e le c t io n  b ia s  in  
the e s t im a te s  of the  wage and income param eters . This view only makes 
sense i f  we t r e a t  the  non-working as a l ik e  to  the  working; the  view taken  
of the  fam ily  h e re in  i s  t h a t  households with both p a r tn e r s  working a re  
d i s t i n c t  ( in  r e s p e c t  of t a s t e s  e t c . )  from those w ith one or none working 
hence the  samples a re  l o g i c a l l y  separa te  and no b ias  i s  invo lved .
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F u l l  hours r a t h e r  than  normal hours a re  used -  t h i s  r a i s e s  th e  prob­
lem of m u lt ip le  wage r a t e s  and segmented budget c o n s t r a in t s .  We igno re  t h i s  
problem ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  as we a t  no s tage  wished to  e s t im ate  u t i l i t y  fu n c tio n s )  
by simply adding a l l  ea rn in g s  and hours per person to  a r r iv e  a t  an average 
p r ic e  of labour market tim e. The presence of p ro g ress iv e  income ta x a t io n  may 
make wage r a t e s  endogenous -  we have no t  a d ju s ted  fo r  t h i s  in  any way as the  
complexity of the  U.K. ta x  system ( e s p e c ia l ly  the  option  f o r  both working 
couples of f i l i n g  as j o i n t  or s in g le  ta x  u n i t s )  renders  i t  l i k e l y  t h a t  any 
ad justm ents  w i l l  make th in g s  worse r a th e r  than b e t t e r .  What we have to  hope 
i s  t h a t  w ith in  samples most of the members do no t face  k inks  or d i s c o n t in u i t ­
i e s  in  th e re  budget c o n s t r a in t s .
Other problems e x i s t  w ith  the  wage v a r i a b l e -  i t s  c o n s t ru c t io n  makes 
i t  endogenous so t h a t  two market demand 'wage o f f e r '  eq ua tions  have to  be 
generated  . This g ives  us a fo u r -eq u a t io n  model- two supply fu n c t io n s  fo r  
husbands and wives and two wage o f f e r  fu n c t io n s  with the p re d ic te d  v a lu es  
from the  l a t t e r  s u b s t i tu te d  f o r  the  ' a c t u a l '  wage r a t e s  in  the  form er. 
I d e n t i f i c a t i o n  i s  a c h ie v e d , i f  i t  i s  ach ieved , through the  employers' demands 
being  t r e a t e d  as h o r iz o n ta l  and th e re  be ing  a p p ro p r ia te  covariance r e s t r i c t ­
ions  on the  e r ro r s  of the supply equations  in  a r e c u rs iv e  model or s u i ta b le  
exc lus ion  r e s t r i c t i o n s  in  a n o n -rec u rs iv e  model. I t  i s  b e l iev ed  t h a t  (on 
the  b a s is  of chap ter  2) a re c u rs iv e  s p e c i f i c a t io n  ought to  be t r i e d  w ith­
ou t i t  being  a p r i o r i  p o s s ib le  to  say which p a r tn e r  has the  r e c u rs iv e  
eq ua tion .
C hapters  4-7 r e p o r t  the  model e s t im ated  fo r  samples r e s t r i c t e d  by 
socio-economic groups , c o lo u r ,  h e a l th ,  age of wife , and employment s ta tu s  
( p a r t  or f u l l  time) of w ife . These r e s u l t s  a re  reviewed and compared with
-6 -
aggregate  equation  in  Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER ONE : A REVIEW OF RELEVANT RESEARCH
The p re s e n t  work i s  a study of households where both husbands and 
wives work. Dependents a re  exluded from view f o r  s im p l i f ic a t io n ;  d e sp i te  
t h i s  evasion  we b e l ie v e  th a t  the husband and wife both working model should 
be dominant in  labour supply re sea rc h .
Where a j o i n t  ea rner  model has been used i t  has been the n e o - c la s s i c ­
a l  p a rab le  where th e re  are  th re e  demand equations  -  one each fo r  p a r tn e r s '  
l e i s u r e  and one fo r  the  composite good. Even when t h i s  i s  extended to  
a llow  fo r  m u ltip le  goods the  fam ily  i s  s t i l l  em asculated by the  assuming 
away of a l l  problems of c o n f l i c t  and r e s o lu t io n  in  decision-m aking. These 
m a tte rs  a re  addressed in Chapter ‘-2. .
For a long time economists have been re s e a rc h in g  in to  the  labour  
fo rce  p a r t i c ip a t i o n  decison t h i s  probably being in s p i re d  by the  d ram atic  
r i s e s  in  the  r a t e s  fo r  married women. This l i t e r a t u r e  r e l a t e s  to  our study 
of the  both  p a r tn e rs  working fam ily  in  two ways. One i s  q u i te  simply th a t  
in c reased  p a r t i c ip a t io n  w i l l  make the both p a r tn e r s '  working fam ily  a s o c ia l  
'n o rm '.  The o ther i s  th a t  contem plation of the p a r t i c ip a t io n  d e c is io n  has 
fo rced  economists to  b r in g  back some of the f e a tu r e s  of the  fam ily  in to  
labour supply models. There has been no a ttem pt to  i n t e g r a t e  these  f e a t t .  
u res  in to  the theo ry  of labour supply or the e s t im a tio n  of th ree  equation  
demand systems. Attempt has been made to i n t e g r a t e  these  f e a tu re s  i n to  the 
theory  of time a l lo c a t io n  bu t as  we, h o p e fu lly ,  show in  Chapter Two t h i s  i s  
h igh ly  dubious. The lack  of in te g r a t io n  i s  probably  due to  the  t rea tm en t 
of so -c a l le d  ' non-economic' f a c to r s  as anomalies which can be handled by 
ad hoc spur of the  moment assum ptions.
Due to  the importance of p a r t i c ip a t i o n  r a t e  s tu d ie s ,  much of t h i s  
chap ter  i s  devoted to  them.
A. HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF PARTICIPATION RATES.
Three broad ex p lan a tio n s  are  u s u a l ly  o ffe re d  fo r  observed movements 
in  female p a r t i c ip a t i o n  r a t e s ; -  emancipation whereby women valuec market 
work as improving t h e i r  s t a t u s  p o s i t io n  w ith in  the  fam ily and so c ie ty  and 
e x e r t  e f f o r t s  in  o rder to  o b ta in  i t ,  s h i f t s  in  comparative advantage and 
improvements in  p ro d u c t iv i ty  in  the home i . e .  i f  women's wage r a t e s  r i s e  
r e l a t i v e  • to  men's and innova tions  in  the  p roduction  of goods used in  ’ 
housework occur then the household w i l l  f in d  i t  more l i k e l y  to  be b e t t e r  
o f f  from having a working w ife , i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  -  changes in  the  comp­
o s i t io n  of job types and t h e i r  geographica l lo c a t io n  may favour the  empl­
oyment of women a t  some s tag es  of economic development r e l a t i v e  to  o th e r s .
In  the absence of the above f a c to r s  i t  has u su a l ly  been f e l t  t h a t  
women a re  ' secondary' workers whose p a r t i c ip a t io n  r a t e  w i l l  f lu c tu a te  with 
the  b u s in ess  cyc le .
I t  i s  v i r t u a l l y  im possible  to  d is c e rn  the f a c to r s  c i t e d  above in  
d a ta  fo r  c r o s s - s e c t i o n s ,  or spanning a few bu s in ess  cy c le s ,  in  one country . 
D i f f i c u l t i e s  remain in  using  h i s t o r i c a l  or in t e r n a t io n a l  comparisons none­
th e le s s  th e se  form a u se fu l  s t a r t i n g  p o in t  fo r  our survey.
I t  might be thought th a t  the te ch n o lo g ica l  p rogress  of the n in e te e n th  
and tw e n t ie th  c e n tu r ie s  would la y  the  b a s is  fo r  emancipation through reduc­
ing the  e x te n t  of p h y s ica l  s t re n g th  rq u ire d  fo r  most jo b s .  This seçms to  be 
c o n trad ic ted  by the  f a c t  t h a t  (see  James (19&2) Table I I I )  the  female p a r t ie -
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i p a t io n  r a t e  rose  only s l i g h t l y  in  G reat B r i t a in  in  the  pe riod  1910-50 
and a c tu a l ly  f e l l  in  F ran ce ,Belgium, and Sw itzerland  to  a considerab le  deg­
r e e .  Leser(l955) argues t h a t  th e re  was a r i s e  in  the p ro p en s i ty  to  seek 
work by married women in  G reat B r i t a in  in  1881-1951 but t h i s  was emasculat­
ed by an in c rease  in  the  share of age-groups with lower p r o p e n s i t i e s .  He 
c i t e s  f iv e  f a c to r s  re sp o n s ib le  fo r  the  r i s i n g  p ro p e n s i t ie s  to  p a r t i c ip a t e  
w ith in  age-groups most of which can be considered as f a l l i n g  under the 
broad ex p lana tions  o th e r  than em ancipation. The f a c to r s  a r e ; -
( i )  Family p lanning -  so a g re a te r  percentage of the  c h i ld -b e a r in g  age- 
groups were w ithout ch ild ren
( i i )  Smaller average family^ s ize
( i i i )  Wider job o p p o r tu n i t ie s
(iv )  Reduced sex d i f f e r e n t i a l s  in  wages
(v) More favourable  tax  p o l ic y .
C le a r ly  ( i )  and ( i i )  may re p re se n t  the consequences of emancipation 
bu t they may r e p re s e n t  the consequence^ of o ther th in g s  as w e ll;  a lso  th e re  i s  
the  problem of re v e rse  causa tion  -  women who work, fo r  whatever reaso n , may 
f in d  themselves l im i t i n g  t h e i r  fa m il ie s  in ,o r d e r  to  cope with ro le  c o n f l i c t .  
In  the  postkl945 period  most developed n a t io n s  have shown a s t ro n g  
in c rease  in  female p a r t i c ip a t i o n  r a t e s  even w ithout a d ju s t in g  fo r  demograph­
ic  s h i f t s .  This problem has plagued re g re s s io n  s tu d ie s  of p a r t i c ip a t i o n  
r a t e s  (see  next sec t io n )  which have simply found themselves ex p la in in g  
most of the  v a r i a t i o n  through a trend  term . R o thsch ild  (1980) a ttem p ts  to  
show s t a t i s t i c a l l y  t h a t  the in c rease  in  women*s p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e s ,  which
-10-
econoraic models have been unable  to c ap tu re ,  i s  due to  em ancipation.
He compares l6  c o u n tr ie s  -  A u s t r i a ,Belgium,Denmark ^F in land ,F rancg , 
Germany, I c e la n d ,  I r e la n d ,I ta ly ,N o rw a y ,  P o r tu g a l , Spain , Sweden,United Kingdom, 
U nited S ta tes ,C anada; of th e se ,  only G e rm an y ,I ta ly ,I re la n d  and A u s t r ia  exp­
e r ien ced  a f a l l  in  the  female p a r t i c ip a t io n  r a t e  in  the  p e r io d  1965-75 w ith 
a l l  the  o th e rs  showing dram atic  in c re a s e s .  R o th sch ild  p u ts  forward a ta x ­
onomic approach to  the labour supply d e c is io n .  His taxonomy p re se n ts  ind ­
i f f e r e n c e  curves fo r  d i f f e r e n t  types of women; e .g .  m arried  women ..who a re  
committed to  fam ily  o b l ig a t io n s  to  a g re a te r  e x te n t  th an  they  are  committed 
to  the lab o u r  fo rce  and 'emancipated* women who a re  determ ined to  pursue a 
c a ree r  whatever t h e i r  m a r i ta l  o b l ig a t io n s .  I t  must be presumed th a t  th ese  
women a r e ,  i f  m arried , matched!with husbands who accep t t h e i r  wives* work 
o r i e n ta t io n  as th e re  i s  no d iscu ss io n  of in t r a - f a m i ly  d e c is io n  making in  the  
a r t i c l e .  I l l u s t r a t i v e  re g re s s io n s  a re  rep o rted  w ith female p a r t i c ip a t io n  
r a t e s  as the  dependent v a r ia b le  and the  t o t a l  number of c h i ld re n  aged 0-9 
d iv ided  by t o t a l  number of women aged 20-9 and the  secondary school a t te n d ­
an ts  as a percentage of the  12-17 y ears  old p o p u la t io n  as  independent v a r­
i a b l e s .  The former of these  i s  supposed to  r e p re s e n t  ' f a m i ly  o b l ig a t io n s '  
and the l a t t e r  'E ducation  and e m an c ip a tio n '. According to  the  author 
* our two in d ic a to r s  'explain* around th ree  q u a r te r s  of the  in te r - c o u n t r y  
d i f f e r e n c e s  in  female p a r t i c ip a t io n  r a t e s  a t  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  le v e l  o f  s i g n i f ­
icance.** The c h i ld re n  v a r ia b le  i s  n e g a t iv e ly  signed and the  school a t te n d ­
ance v a r ia b le  p o s i t i v e ly  signed.
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B. STUDIES OF PARTICIPATION RATES FOR SINGLE COUNTRIES
In  t h i s  s e c t io n  we s h a l l ,  in  g e n e ra l ,  r e s t r i c t  o u rse lv es  to  s tu d ie s  
fo r  the  U.K. and the  U.S.A. A b r i e f  comment on the economic theory  under­
ly in g  p a r t i c ip a t i o n  r a t e  s tu d ie s  i s  in  o rder before  we survey the f i e l d .
A number of s tu d ie s  u s in g  aggregate  t im e -s e r ie s  d a ta  are  almost ' 
t o t a l l y  b e r e f t  of convincing t h e o r e t i c a l  support w h ils t  those  u s in g  in d iv ­
id u a l  (o r  c ro s s -s e c t io n )  d a ta  have tended to  use the  conventional microec­
onomics of con s tra in ed  choice w ith the s o p h is t i c a t io b  of t h i s  growing as 
advances in  e s t im atio n  technique have been made.
Since the p u b l ic a t io n  of the volume e d i te d  by Phelps (1970) th e re  
have been two a ttem pts  to c a s t  the  p a r t i c ip a t i o n  d ec is io n  in to  the  mould of 
job  search theory . (Uhler and Kunin (1972) ,P i s s a r id e s ( l9 7 6 ) ) . Apai't from 
th ese  the  theory  of labour fo rce  p a r t i c ip a t io n  has ignored the  problems of 
the  ex istences of the labour market a l to g e th e r .
The elements of the search  theory  approach are  the expected u t i l i t y  
from a j o b , i f  found, the  c o s ts  of search and the temporal pa th  of job o f f e r s ,  
From such in g red iien ts , i t  i s  easy to  a r r iv e  a t  the  conclusion th a t  secondary 
workers, i . e .  those  who can f a l l  back on o th e rs '  income fo r  support,  w ith  
t h e i r  lower ea rn iag s  p o te n t i a l  w i l l  show a h igher p ro p en s ity  to  q u i t  the  
labour fo rce  in  response  to  a given f a l l  in  aggregate  demand, re p re se n t in g  
inc reased  c o s ts  of search , than primary workers,
A f u l l e r  in q u iry  in to  microeconomic a sp e c ts  of search  and p a r t i c i p ­
a t io n  r e q u i re s  c o n s id e ra t io n  of l i f e t im e  u t i l i t y  maximisation in  which the  
l i f e  i s  made up of v a r io u s  p e r io d s -  w o rk , le i s u re ,s c h o o l in g ,s e a tc h  which 
, a re ,  in  the  l i t e r a t u r e  on l i f e  cycle  behaviour, u su a l ly  regarded  as mu-
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t u a l l y  exc lus ive  f o r  the  purposes o f  s im p lify in g  a n a ly s is  belongs p ro p e r ly  
to  the  end of t h i s  chap te r  and to  the nex t one. We w i l l  now d is cu s s  the  
em p ir ica l  work under th ree  headings: ( i )  T im e-se ries  s tu d ie s  ( i i )  C ross-
sec t io n  s tu d ie s  ( i i i )  s tu d ie s  us ing  d a ta  on in d iv id u a ls .  In  each heading 
American s tu d ie s  w i l l  be d iscussed  f i r s t  as i t  i s  g re a te r  in  amount and 
s o p h i s t i c a t io n  than B r i t i s h  work which i s  mostly a r e p e t i t i o n  of approach­
es used in  e a r l i e r  American s tu d ie s  with B r i t i s h  d a ta .  Surveys of the  . 
American l i t e r a t u r e  a re  a v a i l a b le  in M incer(I966) and (o f  t im e - s e r ie s  work 
only) Bowen and Finegan (1969 ; Appendix to  Chapter 16); th e re  i s  a l s o  a 
review of the American re se a rc h  in  Bowers(l975) d e sp i te  i t s  m isleading  
t i t l e .  B r i t i s h  work i s  surveyed in  Bowers (1975) and Byers (1976).
( i)  T im e-se r ies  s t u d i e s .
These s tu d ie s  have tended to  fopus on th ree  r e l a t e d  q u es t io n s  which 
could be c h a ra c te r iz e d  as:
i s  the  movement in  the  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e  of a secondary (meaning o ld e r  
workers and ( e s p e c i a l l y  m arried) women) labour fo rce  group p ro - c y c l ic a l?  
wh%t a re  the  r e l a t i v e  magnitudes of 'added ' and 'd isc o u ra g e d ' worker 
, e f f e c t s  contained in  any n e t  p r o - c y c l ic a l  movement?
what s iz e  i s  the ' r e s e r v e '  o f  labour supply  con tained  in  the  secondary 
labou r fo rce?
The l a s t  q u es t io n  i s  answered by a r b i t r a r i l y  d e f in in g  a ' f u l l  employment' 
r a t e  and us ing  the  labou r fo rce  p a r t i c ip a t io n  equations  to  p r e d ic t  the  
o f f e r  of labour supply  t h a t  would be forthcoming a t  th a t  r a t e  fo r  each 
period in  the time s e r i e s .  S u b trac t in g  t h i s  f ig u re  from the  a c tu a l  o f f e r  
of labour supply g ives  us the  reserve  of lab o u r .
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The e a r l i e s t  American s tu d ie s  by Long (1958) and W.L,Hansen (1961) were no t 
o f  an econometric n a tu re .  Long^vwas'concerned w ith  the f a c t  th a t  growing 
per c a p i ta  r e a l  income lead  (ap p a ren t ly  so fo r  t h i s  casual and d i f f i c u l t  to  
prove or d isprove hypothesis)  to  f a l l i n g  weekly hours accompanied by r i s ­
ing female p a r t i c ip a t io n  r a t e s .  I t  i s  p o ss ib le  to  exp la in  t h i s  on the 
grounds th a t  w ives' own s u b s t i t u t io n  e f f e c t s  outweigh the income and c ro ss ­
s u b s t i t u t i o n  e f f e c t s  from genera l  growth in  r e a l  wage r a t e s .  Aside from 
other ad hoc p ro p o s i t io n s  about job o p p o r tu n i t ie s  (see p a r t  A, of t h i s  ch­
ap ter)  , Long proposes th a t  lab o u r-sav in g  innova tions  have f ree d  housewives
from work in  thb-home so tha,t_Jhey can unde r ta k e  marke t  wo rk .  -
Hansen merely examines the numerical magnitude of flows in to  the  l a b ­
our fo rce  in  order to  e s t a b l i s h  th a t  the  secondary labour fo rce  p a r t i c i p ­
a t io n  r a t e s  move p r o - c y c l i c a l l y .
Two a r t i c l e s  by T e l ia  (1964,1965% re p re se n t  the f i r s t  published  
a ttem pts  to  in v e s t ig a te  econom etr ica lly  the th ree  q ues tions  l i s t e d  above. 
The 1964 a r t i c l e  add resses  only  the f i r s t  q u es t io n  using annual d a ta  fo r  
1948-62 on males over 14 females over 1 4 .and f in d s  p o s i t iv e   ^ . s i g n i f ­
ic a n t  p r o - c y c l ic a l  responses  in  the  shape of the  estim ated  c o e f f i c i e n t s  on 
a v a r i a b le ,  which the p a r t i c ip a t i o n  r a t e s  a re  reg ressed  on, re p re se n t in g  the 
a v a i l a b i l i t y  of jo b s .  T e l i a ' s  second a r t i c l e  uses many more sub-groups of .
1. Long's study i s  no t confined to  American experience ; he compares d a ta  . 
for a wide range of c o u n tr ie s .
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the popu la tion  and s u b s t i t u t e s  q u a r t e r ly  da ta  fo r  the annual s t a t i s t i c s  
used in  the  e a r l i e r  a r t i c l e .  He p resen ted  e s t im a te s  of the  labour re se rv e  
but d id  no t a ttem p t to  d isen tan g le  encouraged and discouraged workers from 
the gross f lu c tu a t io n s .  The b as ic  model i s  unchanged from the  f i r s t  " 
a r t i c l e  and can be rep re sen ted  as fo llow s:
(2 .1 )  ( ( L + A)/P ) t  = a + b ( ( E  + A ) / P ) t - l  + c log  T
where L i s  the  c i v i l i a n  labour fo rc e ,  E i s  c i v i l i a n  employment, A i s  the
Armed Fo rces , P i s  the  n o n in s t i t u t i o n a l  p o p u la t io n ,  and T i s  a time t re n d .  
This model i s  f i t t e d  to  14 age-sex  groups us ing  sea so n a lly  a d ju s ted  d a ta .  
For a l l  these  groups the valued of b i s  p o s i t iv e  and s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f ­
i c a n t  a t  conventional l e v e l s .
A number of c r i t i c i s m s  have been d i r e c te d  a t  these  r e s u l t s  by Bowen 
and Finegan. They argue th a t  re p la c in g  the employment r a t i o  by i t s  lag g ­
ed value ( as done here) does no t remove the problem th a t  the  parameter 
e s tim ate  fo r  b i s  b iased because the v a r ia b le  which i t  i s  a t ta ch e d  to  i s  
c o r re la te d  with the e r ro r  term^. This argument i s  p resen ted  h e u r i s t i c a l l y  
w ithout any recourse  to econometric term inology or concepts; expressed  in 
these  terms i t  b o i l s  down to the f a c t  t h a t  B and F (we shallL r e f e r  to  Bow­
en and Finegan in  t h i s  way from mow on) a s s e r t  t h a t  the lagged va lues  are  
no t ap p ro p r ia te  fo r  use as an in s tru m en ta l  v a r ia b le  w h i ls t  T e l ia  has u 
assumed th a t  they a re .  The lo g ic a l  th in g  to  do would be to  c a r ry  ou t a 
t e s t  on the  s u i t a b i l i t y  of the  chosen ins trum en t bu t n e i th e r  the  o r ig i n a l  
au thor or h is  c r i t i c s  appear to  have thought of t h i s .
1 . T e l ia  and B and F 's  p re s e n ta t io n  of t h i s  model appears n o t to  have a
d is tu rb a n ce  term.
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B and F go on to  c r i t i c i z e  T e l i a ' s  e s t im a te s  of the labour re se rv e  as 
being im plaus ib le  because o f  the choice o f  f u l l  employment unemployment 
r a t e s  and the aforem entioned b ia s .  The t o t a l s  a re  bound to  be overestim ­
a ted  as the b ia s  of b i s  in  the same d i r e c t io n  as i t s  |?ypothesized re s p ­
onse.
The two papers  by Dernburg and Strand ( D and 3 ) r e p re se n t  the f i r s t  
a ttem p ts  to  e s t im a te  the s iz e  o f  d iscouraged and added worker e f f e c t s ;  
they a ls o  a ttem pt to  answer the  o ther q u es t io n s .  The second paper (D and 
S, 1966) uses d isag g reg a ted  groups eq u iv a len t  to those in  T e l i a ' s  
second paper whereas the f i r s t  s tu d ie s  the  whole popu la tion  over I 4 years  
o ld . The b as ic  equation  used i s :
(2 .2 ) (L /P ) t  = a + b (E/P) t  + c (X /P )t  + 2  + d ( l / P ) t  + e (P o /P ) t
+ Ut
which i s  estim ated  in  both a r t i c l e s  fo r  the period  November 1952 to  Decem­
ber 1962. V a r iab le s  with id e n t i c a l  names are  e q u iv a len t  to  those in  T e l ia  
' s a r t i c l e ,  a appears  to  be 12 seasonal dummies X i s  new unemployment ■ 
compensation exhaustions  and Po i s  the popu la tion  of the group being e s t ­
imated, u i s  the conventional d is tu rb an ce  term. D and S argue th a t  b w i l l  
r e p re s e n t  the  d iscouraged worker e f f e c t ,  c w i l l  r e p re se n t  the  added worker 
e f f e c t  (presumably because o f an increased  incidence  o f  fam ily  h a rd s h ip ) .  
The au th o rs  g e n e ra l ly  ob ta in  the expected r e s u l t s  fo r  b and c ( i . e .  bo th  
p o s i t iv e )  and f in d  them to  be s ig n i f i c a n t  a t  the 1% le v e l  although the  
r e s u l t s  fo r  males 25-34 and males 35-44 are  t o t a l l y  i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  B and 
F argue t h a t  t h i s  i s  a t o t a l l y  spurious re g re s s io n  as E/P . i s  such a la rg e  
component of L/P and X/P lead  two months i s  h ig h ly  c o r re la te d  with U/P the
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o th e r  component of L/P, They argue ( p . 623) t h a t  i f  U/P was s u b s t i tu te d
2
fo r (X/P) t+2 we would have a t a u to lo g ic a l  reg re ss io n  with R = 1 ;  the
p
f a c t  th a t  D and . f in d  an R o f 0 .88 i s  then simply a r e f l e c t i o n  o f  the  
e x ten t  to; which the  tau to lo g y  i s  reduced by s u b s t i t u t i n g  a h ig h ly ,  bu t not 
p e r f e c t ly ,  c o r r e la te d  v a r ia b le  fo r  p a r t  o f the  i d e n t i t y .  Accepting t h i s  
i t  i s  n o t  s u rp r i s in g  t h a t  an im plaus ib le  degree o f s e n s i t i v i t y  i s  found 
in  the e s t im a te s  o f  b and c (a ls o  the  high ' t ‘ s t a t i s t i c s  produced a re  
m eaningless when so many of the co n d it io n s  o f  the  standard  model have 
been v io la te d  ) and th a t  absurd e s t im a te s  of the  labour re se rv e  w i l l  
r e s u l t .
These e a r ly  s tu d ie s  d is p la y  a n e g le c t  o f  the  need to  develop a th e o r ­
e t i c a l  b a s is  fo r  the e s t im a tin g  equations  and an i n a b i l i t y  to  cope w ith  
the econometric problems involved in  o b ta in in g  c o n s i s te n t ,  unbiased e s t ­
imates o f  the param eters of i n t e r e s t .  Such an i n a b i l i t y  w i l l  o f course 
r e s u l t  in  in a cc u ra te  guesses a t  the labour  r e s e rv e .  There have been some 
s tu d ie s  which continued in  the vein of the above w ithout much re finem en t 
of method; B arth (l968) made an unsuccesfu l a ttem p t to  i s o l a t e  the encour­
aged ( i . e .  added) and discouraged worker e f f e c t s  while Vroman (1970) and 
B u tle r  and Demopoulos (1972) provide up-dated  r e - e s t im a te s  of the lab o u r  
r e s e rv e .
The most s a t i s f a c t o r y  s tudy of the o lder  type i s  t h a t  o f  Black and 
R u sse l l  (1970). This a r t i c l e  c l e a r ly  recogn izes  t h a t  the L/P r a t i o  must 
be in te r p r e te d  as  the  p r o b a b i l i ty  of an in d iv id u a l  chosen a t  random;being 
in  the labour fo rce  in the se le c ted  time in t e r v a l  as t h i s  v a r ia b le  can 
not p o ss ib ly  bear any 'f lo w ' supply i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  An OLS
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re g re s s io n  using L/P as the  dependent v a r ia b le  i s  th e re fo re  a l i n e a r  
p ro b a b i l i ty  fu n c tio n  where the value o f L/P i s  c o n d i t io n a l  on the va lues  
of the independent v a r i a b le s .  The au th o rs ,  from here  on r e f e r r e d  to  as B
and R f i t  two r e g re s s io n s ,  one fo r  a l l  women and o ld e r  men ( the  secondary
labour force) and one to  the  primary labour fo r c e ,  to  the  fo llow ing  model:
(2 .3) (L/P) t  = a + bD + cT + d (E /L )t-1  + e (Em/E) t  + u ’
v a r ia b le s  with the same symbols are  eq u iv a len t  to  T e l ia  and D and S’ s.
T i s  a l i n e a r  time tre n d ,  D i s  a dummy v a r ia b le  inc luded  fo r  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
re a so n s ,  and Em i s  the  r a t i o  of manufacturing to  t o t a l  employment. The 
expected s igns  a r e ,  p o s i t iv e  fo r  c, p o s i t iv e  fo r  d , and neg a tiv e  fo r  e 
in  the  secondary equation . Secondary workers a re  p o s i ted  to  respond to  
job o p p o r tu n i t ie s  , i . e .  (E/L) t - 1 ,  as per the e a r l i e r  s tu d ie s ,  and they 
a re  expected to  be l e s s  l i k e l y  to f in d  jiobs in  m anufacturing  than in  serv­
i c e s .  The s ig n i f i c a n t  f e a tu re  of t h i s  model i s  t h a t  the  job  o p p o r tu n i t ie s  
v a r ia b le  i s  b ia se d ,  by c o n s tru c t io n ,  a g a in s t  i t s  expected! sign r a th e r  
than, as in  o ther a r t i c l e s ,  in  favour of i t .  Because of c o r r e la t io n  be­
tween (E/L) and (Em/E) the  au tho rs  use an a u x i l i a r y  equation :
(2 .4) (Em/E)t = a + bT + c (E /L )t
and re p la ce  the o r ig i n a l  Em/E s e r ie s  in  (2 .3) w ith  the p re d ic te d  s e r i e s  
from t h i s  equa tion . This proceedure reduced the es tim ated  s e n s i t i v i t y  of 
the c o e f f i c i e n t s .
There i s  an i n t e r e s t i n g  way of a ttem p ting  to  overcome the d i f f i c u l t i e s  
of f in d in g  added and d iscouraged worker v a r ia b le s  which a re  no t c o r re la te d  
with the d is tu rb an ce  term which has no t been t r i e d  in  the  B r i t i s h  or the 
American l i t e r a t u r e .  This i s  simply to  use the f ig u r e s  fo r  some o th e r  age
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-se x  group or fo r  a l l  o the r  age-sex groups aggregated in  p lace  of own 
f ig u re s  fo r  the troublesome v a r ia b le s .  Kuch and S h a r ir  (1978) fo llow  
t h i s  proceedure by f i t t i n g  the fo llow ing equation:
(2 .5 ) PRt = a + bERt + cOERt + dT + eT^ + -, Ut
to sea so n a l ly  a d ju s ted  monthly da ta  from the Canadian lab o u r  force survey 
fo r  the period  January  1953 to December 1974. A ll  equations  are  e s t im a t­
ed by Cochrane- O rc u t t  i t e r a t i o n  hence assuming the presence o f  f i r s t -  
o rder a u to c o r re la t io n  in the e r ro r  term; untransformed equations  a re  
no t re p o r te d  and the p o s s i b i l i t y  th a t  low Durbin-Watson s t a t i s t i c s  in  
these  d is p la y s  m is s p e c i f ic a t io n  of the  o r ig in a l  equation  i s  no t counten­
anced. PR i s  a g ro u p 's  p a r t i c ip a t i o n  r a t e ,  a i s  the i n t e r c e p t ,  ER i s  a 
g ro u p 's  employment-population r a t i o ,  OER i s  the employment-population 
r a t i o  of a l l  o th e r  groups aggregated . The value of b i s  the  d iscouraged 
worker e f f e c t ,  and the value of c i s  the  added worker e f f e c t .  In  p ra c t ic e  
(see  p . 114) ERt-3 i s  used as an ins trum en t fo r  ERt; OER e s s e n t i a l l y  cons­
t i t u t e s  an ins trum en t fo r  the unemployment exhaustions  v a r ia b le  in  the  D 
and S study rep o r ted  e a r l i e r .  These ins trum en ts  a re  no t t e s t e d .
The r e s u l t s  a re  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s a t i s f a c to r y  and the a u th o rs '  genera l  
f in d in g  of a n e t  d iscouraged  worker e f f e c t  appears  more p la u s ib le  than 
the opposite  f in d in g  re p o r te d  in  e a r l i e r  Canadian s tu d ie s  which were in
c o n f l i c t  with U.S.A. s tu d ie s .
A s t r i k in g  fe a tu re  of a l l  the above s tu d ie s  i s  t h a t  they  i m p l i c i t l y  
embody n o n -n e o -c la s s ic a l  no tio n s  of the labour market; lab o u r markets do no t
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c le a r  a t  a l l  times th e re  be ing  some workers who would take a job i f  th e re  ' 
was one a v a i l a b le .  Markets a d ju s t  through q u a n t i ty  s igna l#  i . e .  the job  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  measure with the  added worker proxy re p re se n t in g  co n stra in ed  
household consumption. A ll the s tu d ie s  reviewed have been s t r i k i n g l y  b e r e f t  
o f  any r e a l  wage v a r ia b le s  w ithout any words o f  exp lan a tio n  being o f f e re d .
The culm ination  o f  the above type o f model occurs in  an a r t i c l e  by 
Alban and Jackson (A and J) which develops a formal theory  o f the  responsd
of labour fo rce  p a r t i c ip a t io n  to  the s t a t e  of excess demand in  the lab o u r
market; fo llow ing Hansen (1970) they show th a t  the vacancy-unemployment 
r a t i o  i s  a t ransfo rm ation  o f  the excess de-rand fo r  labour. A and J  f i t  the 
fo llow ing  model;
(2 .6 )  Log (L /P ) t  = Log a + b Log (V/U)t + c Log (P) + dD
where symbols are  as in  e a r l i e r  equa tions  ; the  V/U r a t i o  i s  fo r  manufact­
u r in g  in  t o t a l  only and hence i s  no t a t o t a l l y  a ccu ra te  r e f l e c t i o n  o f  the 
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  of f in d in g  a job faced by the nine age-sex groups fo r  whom eq­
u a t io n s  a re  e s t im ated .  D i s  a dummy v a r ia b le  fo r  seasonal v a r i a t io n s ;  i t  i s  
equal to  1 irr J u n e ,J u ly ,  August and to  0 e lsew here. The d a ta  used a re  : 
monthly fo r  A pril  1969 to March 1973 as t h i s  i s  the  period  fo r  which Bureau 
o f Labor S t a t i s t i c s  vacancy f ig u re s  are  a v a i l a b le .  An e r r o r  term i s  n o t  sp­
e c i f i e d ,  no; reasons are  given fo r  the m u l t ip l i c a t iv e  fu n c t io n a l  form used 
or fo r  the  absence of a time trend  employed in  a l l  p revious s tu d ie s .  The 
a u th o rs ’ main concern ( p .4-19) i s  with the  ’ su cc e ss ’ of the V/U v a r i a b le ;  i f  
t h i s  i s  to  be decided on the ’ t ’ va lues fo r  V/U then only about h a l f  the  gr­
oups give a convincing r e s u l t ,  f u r th e r  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  support even these  
as they a re  computed on the b a s is  of an assumed normal d i s t r i b u t i o n  f o r  the
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om itted  e r r o r  term, t h è ï - i s  no D-W s t a t i s t i c  given to v a l id a te  the assump­
t io n  o f  temporal independence of the d is tu rb a n c e s .  In  the absence o f  a T 
v a r ia b le  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  t e l l  i f  the  V/U i s  simply r e f l e c t i n g  a common 
trend  with L/P (groups with low ’ t '  va lues  f o r  V/U may simply not have a t r ­
end in  t h e i r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e s .
A s e r i e s  o f  a r t i c l e s  by Wachter (1972, 1974,1977) have developed a 
n e o - c la s s i c a l  approach to  the t im e -s e r ie s  a n a ly s is  of the labour fo rce  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  d e c is io n .  Wachter dubs the fo rego ing  ana ly ses  'unemployment' 
models and develops h is  own approach in  o p pos it ion  to them. W achter 's  an­
a l y s i s  i s  no t n e o - c la s s ic a l  in  the sense th a t  he develops a f u l l y  sp ec if ie d  
model of supply and demand with f u l l  ad justm ent . There a re  no supply and 
demand models in  the t im e -s e r ie s  l i t e r a t u r e ;  we must w ait f o r  c ro s s -s e c t io n  
s tu d ie s  before  we encounter them. The n e o - c la s s i c a l  f lav o u r  o f  the a n a ly s is  
l i e s  e n t i r e l y  in  i t s  emphasis on the importance of wages ; we s h a l l  d iscu ss  
the  tre a tm en t o f  wages in W achter 's  1973 a r t i c l e  before d ea l in g  with h is  emp­
i r i c a l  work.
I t  i s  im portan t to  note a t  the o u ts e t  th a t  Wachter breaks w ith the
t r a d i t i o n  of reg a rd in g  L/P as a p ro b a b i l i ty  o f  a random worker being in  
the  labour fo rce ;  he shows i t  in  a diagram (see  p . 142, F igure  1 ) ,  perhaps 
i l l e g i t i m a t e l y ,  as r e p re se n t in g  an i n d i v i d u a l ' s  supply of labour chosen " 
on the b a s is  of income and s u b s t i t u t io n  e f f e c t s  from movements in  r e a l  
wages. Two c o n f l i c t i n g  th e o r ie s  are  then pu t forward to  account fo r  the 
slope of t h i s  supply curve. The 'Permanent Wage Theory' says th a t  I n c r ­
eases, in  r e a l  wages have a n e t  e f f e c t  on labour supply composed of a pos­
i t i v é  s u b s t i tu t io n  e f f e c t  and a negative  income e f f e c t  . The c o r r e c t
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w a y  to  de fine  wages as an argument in  a labour supplÿ curve, i s  accord­
ing to  Wachter, 'perm anent r e a l  wages' as  the supply curve i s  an e q u i l ­
ibrium concept. T re a t in g  W* as the permanent wage, the 'd i s e q u i l ib r iu m  
t r a n s i t i t o r y  wage e f f e c t '  can be t r e a te d  as W/W^  where W i s  the  c u r re n t  
r e a l  wage. The term W/W^  in  an equation  i s  supposed to  be a pure sub­
s t i t u t i o n  e f f e c t  as permanent wages (o r  income) w i l l  be held co n s tan t  
by the  in s e r t i o n  o f  W* High values o f  W/W* should then le ad  to  i n ­
creased  labour  fo rce  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  as "workers time th e i r  lab o u r market 
a c t i v i t y  to  co incide  w ith p e r io d s  when the  c u r re n t  wage, W, i s  high 
r e l a t i v e  to  the permanent wage W* ." (Wachter, '1972, p. 14-3) .
The 'R e la t iv e  Wage Theory' says t h a t  W/W* may be a proxy fo r  to ­
day' s s tandard  of l i v i n g  compared to  t h a t  of the  p a s t .  High va lues  of 
W/W* a re ,  th e re fo re ,  supposed to  lead  to  decreased  labour fo rce  p a r t ­
i c ip a t io n  as secondary workers are  supposed to  p re fe r  l e i s u r e  or 
household p roduction  to  market work when W i s  h igh r e l a t i v e  to  i t s  
expected value from p a s t  experience . The sign on W/W^  i s  thus  expect­
ed to be the  opposite  of what i t  was in  the  p rev ious  th eo ry .
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  be sure th a t  th e re  are  r e a l l y  two d i s t i n c t  
th e o r ie s  be ing  p resen ted  r a th e r  than the  jigsaw  p iece s  o f  an incom plet­
e ly  sp e c i f ie d  model as  Wachter does no t s e t  down any o b je c t iv e  fu n c t -
•  ; . : . -  ; '
1." I t  i s  claimed t h a t  W^. i s  a reasonable  proxy fo r  permanent income 
because workers’ sav ings a re  small ; t h i s  seems debatab le  on a number  ^
of groundsi • r
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io n ,  c o n s t r a in t s ,  or ex p ec ta t io n s  forming p rocess  fo r  the  f a m il ie s  to  
which h is  model i s  meant to  apply .
The equation  he e s t im a te s  i s :
(2 .7 )  (L /P ) t  = a + b W*t + c (W/W^)t + d (P/P*) + e Ut + U(dum)t 
with a l l  v a r ia b le s  in  lo g a r i th m s . Data used i s  q u a r t e r ly  unad justed  
da ta  fo r  194^-68 (seasonal dummies a re  used in  the  r e g r e s s io n ) .  The 
equation  i s  f i t t e d  to  nine age-sex  groups which a re  thought to  be the  
'seco n d ary ' labour fo rce .  Symbols have e q u iv a le n t  meanings to  t h e i r  
e a r l i e r  usage w h i ls t  Udum t  i s  a dummy s e t  equal to  0 in  p e rio d s  of 
'low ' unemployment and equal to  the urnemployment r a t e  in  p e r io d s  of 
'h ig h '  unemployment ( i t  i s  no t used along with Ut i t s e l f )
and p /p " i s  the a c tu a l  p r ice  l e v e l  over the  perceived  p r ic e  l e v e l ;  t h i s  
i s  used to  t e s t  fo r  the presence o f  money i l l u s i o n .  The s e r i e s  fo r  U, 
W*, and P* have la g s  b u i l t  in  to  them through the  use o f  the  Cagan 
technique (modified) in  t h e i r  c o n s tru c t io n .
W achter 's  model performs b e t t e r  , in  terras o f  fo r e c a s t  e r r o r ,  than 
the 'unemployment' models he seeks to  r e p la c e . .  The c o e f f i c i e n t s  b & 
e g e n e ra l ly  have overwhelmingly s i g n i f i c a n t  ' t '  v a lu es ,  d i s  a lso  u s ­
u a l ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  but t h i s  ought no t to  be taken as conclusive  evidence 
of money i l l u s i o n  as  the v a r ia b le  could be proxying a number o f o m it t ­
ed v a r ia b le s .  Wachter reco g n ises  th a t  t h i s  i s  the  case bu t he does no t  
in v e s t ig a te  i t  by experim enting with the in t ro d u c t io n  o f s e r i e s  to  re p ­
re s e n t  these  v a r i a b le s .  The most i n t e r e s t i n g  r e s u l t s  a re  t h a t  the /tw o 
groups fo r  women aged 20-34 have s ig n i f i c a n t  n ega tive  c accompanied by 
s ig n i f i c a n t  p o s i t iv e  b . This p a t te rn  does no t  appear fo r  any o th e r
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age-sex  group. These being the  peak ages fo r  c h i ld -b e a r in g  we would
tend to  accep t the  r e s u l t s  as confirming W achter 's  second wage hypothes-
. . .  -  \
i s .  W achter(1974) e s t im a te s  labour re se rv e s  from h is  model. In  c lo s in g  
th i s  phase of our d iscu ss io n  i t  i s  im portan t to  note t h a t  a f t e r  drawing 
diagrams with continuous labour supply fo r  an in d iv id u a l  ( i . e .  im p lic ­
i t l y  hours o f  work) Wachter im p l i c i t l y  s h i f t s  to  a p r o b a b i l i s t i c  i n t ­
e r p r e ta t io n  (see the e a r l i e r  q u o ta t io n  on ' t im in g '  of labour fo rce  e n t ry  
) when moving towards the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of h is  r e s u l t s .__________________
B r i t i s h  work d i f f e r s  i n i t i a l l y  in th a t  i t s  d a ta  problems a re  g r e a t ­
e r .  b o s t  o the r  c o u n tr ie s  have labour fo rce  surveys covering long time 
periods  whereas the  only long run of B r i t i s h  p a r t i c ip a t i o n  r a t e s  a re  
r e a l ly  p s e u d o -p a r t ic ip a t io n  r a t e s  co ns truc ted  by adding employment to  
r e g i s te r e d  unemployment. S ho r te r  runs which a re  f e a s ib le  f o r  s t a t i s t i c ­
a l  study have been constructed  using the Family Expenditure Survey d a ta  
(see  E l i a s , 1980) and i f  the General Household Survey i s  no t  te rm ina ted  
by the  government i t  w i l l  ev en tu a l ly  be capable of s im i la r  u se . I t  
must be s t r e s s e d ,  however, t h a t  these  a re  not labour fo rce  surveys and 
t h e i r  coverage and d e f in i t i o n  of those o f f e r in g  themselves fo r  work 
d i f f e r s  and i s  no t on a b a s is  c o n is to n t  with any th e o r e t i c a l  view of 
p a r t i c ip a t i o n  r a t e s .  The r e a l  problem with the Department o f  Employm— 
G ^t 's  s e r ie s  fo r  unemployment ( a p a r t  from the  non-compar­
a b i l i t y  of both s e r i e s  a f t e r  1970 with pre-1970) i s  t h a t  the  propens­
i t y  to  r e g i s t e r  fo r  employment v a r ie s  over time and amongst groups.
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Thus we have a very  se r io u s  problem of an e r ro r  in  the dependent v a r ia b ­
le  which can no t be t r e a te d  as random and might be s y s te m a t ic a l ly  r e l a t e d  
to  a number of inc luded  or excluded v a r ia b le s .  This problem w i l l  nature- 
a l l y  be exacerbated fo r  the secondary labour fo rce  groups w ith which the  
labour force p a r t i c ip a t i o n  re sea rch  i s  c h ie f ly  concerned. Survey re se a rc h  
w i l l  always give h igher unemployment f ig u re s  fo r  these  groups as those  who 
do not q u a l i f y  fo r  b e n e f i t s  a re  inc luded ; surveys undertaken by Dex(l978) 
in d ic a te  t h a t  the  aforementioned surveys underestim ate  the  ' t r u e '  f ig u re  
fo r female unemployment. The tro u b le  w ith t h i s  a r t i c l e  i s  t h a t  i t  does 
not add ress  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  the p e ren n ia l  problem of d e f in in g  unemployment 
which r e q u i r e s  a p r io r  d e f in i to n  of the  vec to r  o f  wage r a t e s  and employ­
ment p ro sp ec ts  e t c .  (see Bowers (1973) fo r  an adep t d is cu s s io n  of these  
p rob lem s).
Due t o  t h e  p r o b l e m s  o f  t h e  d a t a ,  ' m o s t  B r i t i s h  r e s e a r c h e r s  hav e  b e e n  
c h a r y  o f  c o n s t r u c t i n g  p s e u d o -  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e  f i g u r e s  an d  have  c o n c ­
e n t r a t e d  i n s t e a d  on t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  em ploym en t  an d  u n e m p lo y m e n t  
f i n d i n g  a  n e t  d i s c o u r a g e d  r e g i s t e r e d  w o r k e r  e f f e c t .  The o r i g i n a l  work  o f  
t h i s  t y p e  was c a r r i e d  o u t  u n d e r  t h e  a u s p i c e s  o f  t h e  NIESR (see  G o d l e y  
and S h e p h e r d  ( 1964) ,  S h e p h e r d  ( 1 9 6 8 ) ,  Anyanwu ( I 969) ,  Webb (1 9 7 0 )  ) .
These papers a re  a l l  v a r i a n t s  of the  f i r s t -m en t io n ed  paper which r e ­
gressed employment s tan d a rd ised  to a co n s tan t  composition labour fo rce  on 
unemployment and time t re n d s .  The c o e f f i c i e n t  on unemployment was s i g n i f ­
ic a n t  negative  and g re a te r  than two implying n e t  discouragement o f_ r e g is ­
te red  unemployed. Data used was aggrega tes  fo r  1951-64. D iffe ren ces  in  
the es t im ates  of discouragement in  the o the r  s tu d ie s  have a r i s e n  m ostly
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from the ex tens ion  of the t im e - s e r i e s ' in to  the period  a f t e r  1965 when a 
number of i n s t i t u t i o n a l  changes took p lace  which may have a l t e r e d  the  pro­
p e n s i ty  to  r e g i s t e r .  T a r l in g  (1976) and Jo sh i  (1981) have updated and imp - 
roved these  s tu d ie s .  Jo sh i  uses the N ational Insurance  Card count d a ta  f a r  
1961-74 (q u a r te r ly )  which i s  no t pub lished  a lthough i t  forms the b a s i s  fo r 
published  e s t im a te s .  She e s t im a te s  the response of t h i s  to  employment by 
Seemingly U nrela ted  Regression (SUR) fo r  a number of secondary age-sex  g r­
oups u s ing  F u l l - In fo rm a t io n  L ikelihood as  the method of e s t im a tio n  . The
I '
major f in d in g  o f t h i s  a r t i c l e  i s  th a t  the 2:1 r a t io ,  g e n e ra l ly  p e r s i s t s .
C le a r ly  i f  r e g i s t r a t i o n  i s  re sponsive  to  employment the  use of the 
p s e u d o -p a r t ic ip a t io n  r a t e  d a ta  to  answer any of the th ree  q u es t io n s  we out­
l in e d  a t  the s t a r t  of t h i s  sec t io n  i s  p rob lem atic . N onetheless some au th ­
ors  fo llow ing  Corry and R oberts  (1966) have done so.
The au thors  (C and R) accep t ' the  Robbins(l930) 
incom e-le isu re  continuous choice model as  the b a s is  of t h e i r  work and do 
no t l a t e r  s h i f t  to  a p r o b a b i l i s t i c  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  so t h a t ,  as  Bowers (1975) 
p o in ts  o u t ,  t h e i r  a rgum en ts ’.are in v a l id .  They a r r iv e  a t  the  'unemployment' 
model by a somewhat s trange  ro u te ;  they  argue th a t  " . . . .  the u sua l spec­
i f i c a t i o n s  of the  c l a s s i c a l  supply fu n c tio n  would appear to  imply a fu n c t­
io n a l  r e l a t i o n s h ip  between r e a l  wages and the a c t i v i t y  r a t e "  (op. c i t .  
p . 180) and then go on to say th a t  "We have taken the view as a f i r s t  app­
roxim ation th a t  a r i s e  in  unemployment i s  e q u iv a len t  to  a f a l l  in  r e a l  
wages, i . e .  to  a f a l l  in the opportun ity  co s t  o f  l e i s u r e  and unpaid' work" 
(op. c i t .  p . 180). Somehow they manage to  go on from t h i s  to  a r r iv e  a t  an 
equation  of the form:
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(2 .8 ) Ai = a + bUi + cT + u
where i  i s  the group being es tim ated ; r e g re s s io n s  are  c a r r ie d  out us ing  
pooled c r o s s - s e c t i o n ,  fo r  10 U.K. re g io n s ,  and t im e - s e r ie s ,  fo r  1951-66 
(an n u a l) ,  d a ta .  A i s  the p a r t i c ip a t io n  r a t e ,  a i s  the c o n s ta n t ,  U i s  
the unemployment r a t e  and T i s  a time t re n d ,  u i s  the conventional d i s t ­
urbance term. Most r e s u l t s  a re  rep o r ted  in  t a b le s  by reg io n  fo r  a l l  ' 
males and females although d is sa g g re g a t io n s  by age are  a lso  c a r r ie d  ou t.  
There a re  a number of ©bvious problems with th i s ;  the model i s  ev id en t­
l y  supposed to  be o f  sh o r t- ru n  responses  to  c y c l i c a l  f lu c tu a t io n s  which 
we would ha rd ly  expec t to  be picked up in  annual d a ta .  The s p e c i f ic a t io n  
a lso  walks head on in to  the  problem of b iased  e s t im a te s  which has beget 
t h i s  a re a  s ince  T e l i a ' s  f i r s t  a r t i c l e .  For reasons j u s t  in d ic a te d  the  
problem i s  worse here than in  the U.S.A. as i t  i s  no t simply the case 
t h a t  U i s  a la rg o  p a r t  of A but that" A has a c tu a l ly  been obtained by add­
ing  U to E as t h i s  i s  not survey d a ta .  By c o n s tru c t io n  b would be b ia s ­
ed upwards i f  U was unemployment; U being the unemployment r a t e  t h i s  
means(E + U ) /P  i s  being reg ressed  on U/$] + uj p lus  tren d  and co n s tan t .  
This i s  ano ther sem i-tau to logous re g re s s io n  and i t  i s  n o t c le a r  what i t  
u l t im a te ly  s i g n i f i e s ;  the degree of tau to lo g y  i s  b lu rred  as (ap p a ren t ly  
as the  Appendix on d a ta  i s  s in g u la r ly  unen ligh ten ing) U in  A i s  a mid­
year f ig u re  w h i ls t  U on the r ig h t-h an d  s ide  i s  an annual average of 
monthly unemployment t o ta l»  d iv ided  by the mid- year f ig u r e s  fo r  E and 
U used in  the c o n s t ru c t io n  o f  A. The c o e f f i c i e n t  fo r  b i s  i n s i g n i f i c a n t
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in  the aggregate maje equation  fo r  most reg io n s  bu t i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  in  the  
female equation fo r  most re g io n s .  The au tho rs  t r y  a number o f  s p e c i f i c a t ­
ions; the double-log  form, r a t e  of change of A re p la c in g  A, and the use of 
lagged A as an independent v a r ia b le  (w ith  the Durbin-Watson t e s t  re p o r te d  
in s tead  o f D u rb in 's  ' h' s t a t i s t i c )  w ithout r e a l l y  ad d ress in g  the  problems 
of i n t e r p r e t i n g  b which a r i s e ' f r o m  the way the equation  was e s t im a ted .
C and R p re se n t  e s t im a te s  of the labour re se rv e  d e r iv ed  from t h e i r  eq­
u a t io n .  A second paper ( Corry and R ober ts ,  1974) i s  b a s i c a l l y  an update 
o f  the f i r s t  u s ing  1951-70 d a ta ^ a p a r t  from the f a c t  th a t  i t  p re se n ts  e s t ­
im ates co rrec ted  fo r  f i r s t ,  second, . t h i r d ,  and fo u r th  o rder a u to c o r re la t -  
ion  u s ing  the  RALS program. Two c r i t i c i s m s  have been d i r e c te d  a t  the  0 : 
and R p ap ers .  The f i r s t  a r i s e s  from the f a c t  t h a t  t h e i r  e s t im a te s  of the 
labour re se rv e  a re  remarkably high compared with those prepared  by the 
Department o f  Employment. Ormerod (1976) has challenged] the  Or and R 
e s t im a te s  and has re -e s t im a te d  the la b o u r  r e se rv e s  in  such a way th a t  they 
appear c lo se  to the ' o f f i c i a l '  e s t im a te s .  I f  0 and R 's  model was m isspec- 
i f i e d ,  in  p a r t i c u l a r  i f  b i s  b iassed  upwards we would h a rd ly  expect p lau ­
s ib le  e s t im a te s  of the labour fo rce  to r e s u l t  from them.
Berg and D alton(1977, B and D) argue t h a t  American re s e a rc h  has 
shown the s u p e r io r i ty  of W achter’ s model to  the  'unemployment' models 
(which C and R appears to be a v a r ia n t  of) and hence should be used on 
B r i t i s h  d a ta .  They f i t  C and R equations  and Wachter equa tions  to  U.K. 
d a ta  fo r  1947-73 s e p a ra te ly  fo r  a l '  males and a l l  fem ales. This i s  an : 
i l l e g i t i m a t e  use of d a ta  as the  f ig u re s  fo r  1971-3 a re  no t comparable 
with those fo r  the e a r l i e r  period  because o f changes in  the  o f f i c i a l  
p re p a ra t io n  of them. B and D 's e s tim ated  C and R equation  makes 
 ^' This can hard ly  be a c r i t i c i s m  of the au th o rs  as the  ' h' t e s t  was nrot in  
c i r c u la t io n  a t  t h i s  time.
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more sense économet r i c a l l y  than the  o r ig in a l  C and R equation  as they
use the o v e ra l l  unemployment r a t e  in  p lace  o f  a g ro u p -sp e c i f ic  one (how­
ever t h e i r  reasons  fo r  so doing , p .266, f n .2 ,  a re  no t econometric ones) .  
The e s t im a te s  B and D p re se n t  a re  a l l  a d ju s ted  ( by an u n sp ec if ie d  meth­
od) fo r  f i r s t - o r d e r  a u to c o r re la t io n  and r e s u l t  in  e s t im a te s  o f  the la b ­
our r e se rv e  which a re  even h igher  than G and R 's  hence they are  in  con­
f l i c t  w ith  Ormerod's r e - c a l c u l a t i o n s .  There i s  no re fe re n ce  to  t h i s  
conundrum d e sp i te  the  f a c t  t h a t  the Ormerod a r t i c l e  appeared only one 
year e a r l i e r  in  the  same jo u rn a l .
The Wachter equation  has t o t a l l y  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s u l t s  f o r  the ' t '  
t e s t s  on a l l  i t s  'economic' v a r ia b le s  (on ly  a log  time tren d  i s  s i g n i f ­
ic a n t )  when ap p lied  to  a l l  U.K. males. For a l l  U.K. females B and D 's  
Wachter equation  adds to  the  ex p lan a tio n  of the  v a r i a t i o n  in  the  
p a r t i c ip a t io n  r a t e  by t h e i r  (double-log) C-R equation . I f  we accep t 
th a t  P* does no t proxy o th e r  v a r ia b le s  to  the  e x te n t  of be ing  meaning­
l e s s  then t h e i r  r e s u l t s  show money i l l u s i o n  in  the female ' supply ' eq­
u a t io n .  The c o e f f i c i e n t  on W/W* i s  n eg a tiv e  w h i ls t  t h a t  on W i s  p o s i t ­
iv e ;  t h i s  accords w ith  W achter 's  r e s u l s t s  fo r  U.S. women aged 20-34 and 
i t  i s  probab le  t h a t  d is sa g g re g a t in g  the U.K. da ta  would show an in c re a se  
(from B and D 's  r e s u l t s )  in . the  above p o s i t iv e  andi n eg a tiv e  c o e f f ic ­
ie n t s  fo r  th ese  groups combined with i n s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s u l t s  f o r  the  o th e r  
age-groups.
E l i a s  ( 198O) has used Family Expenditure  Survey da ta  to  r e p l i c a t e  
the Wachter model fo r  sub-groups o f  the U.K. labour fo rce  and ; has 
found b road ly  s im i la r  rp u u l t s  in c lu d in g  the f a c t  t h a t  the model ou t­
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performs the i m p l i c i t  q u a n t i ty - c o n s t r a in t  models, Grice (1978) has dev­
eloped C and R type equations  fo r  the female lab o u r fo rce  d is sag g reg a ted  
in to  the m arried  and unmarried. B r i t i s h  t im e -s e r ie s  re se a rc h  i s  hampered 
in  i t s  p o s s ib le  development by the l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  the  d a ta ;  in  p a r t i c u l a r  
i t  seems r e q u i s i t e  t h a t  we use q u a r t e r ly  da ta  as most o f  the  models a re  
framed in  sh o r t - ru n  terms. In  an appendix to  the p re sen t  work we r e p o r t  
some a t tem p ts  to  e s tim ate  a q u a n t i ty -B onstra ined  model fo r  the  U.K. us ing  
1951-70 d a ta .
( i i )  C ro ss -se c t io n  s tu d ie s
The f i r s t  c ro s s - s e c t io n  study o f  lab o u r  fo rce  p a r t i c ip a t i o n  r a t e s  
was t h a t  o f  B elloc  (1950) who used Standard M etropolitan  S t a t i s t i c a l  Ar­
eas in  the U.S.A. popu la tion  Census to  es tim ate  an equation  r e l a t i n g  f e ­
male lab o u r  fo rce  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  to an index of the  'fem ale ' jobs a v a i la b ­
i l i t y  r e l a t i v e  to  o th e r  re g io n s .  E v id en tly  t h i s  has to  be in te r p r e te d  
in  the  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  vein  req u ire d  fo r  most v a r ia b le s  in  t im e - s e r ie s  
models; the p ro b a b i l i ty  th a t  a randomly chosen, wbmep w i l l  be seeking 
work w i l l  be c o n d it io n a l  on her ex p ec ta t io n  of f in d in g  a job  in  the a rea  
of the lab o u r  market she reg a rd s  as her search zone, B elloc  o b ta in s  the  
expected p o s i t iv e  s ign  on the v a r ia b le  bu t i s  wary of a t ta c h in g  too much 
importance to  t h i s .  Although subsequent work has used such a v a r ia b le  
w ithout too much comment on what i t  s i g n i f i e s  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  , su sp ic ion
i s  e v id e n t ly  the  c o r r e c t  a t t i t u d e  as th e re  would be an obvious s irau ltane-
tv
ous equations  problem with t h i s  v a r ia b le*  The e s ta b l ism e n t  o f  'fem a le '  
jobs i s  su re ly  c o n d it io n a l  on the ex p ec ta t io n  of f in d in g  female workers 
to f i l l  them and hence any c o e f f i c i e n t  on the job a v a i l a b i l i t y  v a r ia b le
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os b ia sed  upwards.
System atic  in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  c ro s s - s e c t io n  v a r i a t io n s  in  U.S. 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e s  begins in  the m id -60 's  (see  Cain (1965, 1967), K ost- 
e rs  ( 1967) ) .  Apart from an i n t e r e s t  in  income and s u b s t i t u t io n  e f f e c t s  
these  works a re  no t  n o t ic e a b ly  t h e o r e t i c a l  being con ten t to  choose a  ^
l i s t  o f  v a r ia b le s  from a v a i la b le  d a ta  which a re  p la u s ib le  in f lu en c es  on 
an _ad hoc l e v e l  o f  reason ing . For the  sake o f  b re v i ty  we w i l l  focus on 
C a in 's  1967 a r t i c l e  before  moving on to  the voluminous work by Bowen and 
Finegan.
Cain uses  I 96O Census d a ta  fo r  SMSA's to  e s t im a te  the fo llow ing  mod­
e l :
(2 .9 )  L = bo + b l  Y + b2 W + b3 U + b4 dP + b5 dMG + dN + b7 IS 
.u
where, L i s  a g ro u p 's  p a r t i c ip a t io n  r a t e ,  Y i s  the  median household in c ­
ome excluding  p a r t i c ip a n t s  in . th e  gpoup, W 'is th e  median earn ings  being  a 
proxy fo r  the  group wage r a t e ,  U i s  the  male unemploj^eTit r a t e ,  v a r i a n t s  
o f U are  t r i e d  ( i . e .  d i f f e r e n t  d u ra t io n s  and age -g ro u p s) ,  dP i s  the  
percentage  change in  an SMSA's popu la t io n  during  1950-60, dMG i s  the  p e r ­
centage o f  the popu la tion  g re a te r  than f iv e  y ea rs  o ld  who moved in to  the 
a rea  w ith in  the l a s t  f iv e  y e a r s ,  dN i s  the percen tage  change in  t o t a l  
n o n -a g r ic u l tu ra l  employment, IS i a  an " i n d u s t r i a l  s t ru c tu re "  v a r ia b le .  
C a in 's  a t t e n t io n  i s  confined mostly to  married women. The IS v a r ia b le  
i s  e q u iv a le n t  to  the v a r ia b le  f i r s t  used by B e lloc  in  i t s  in te n t io n  and 
so b7 i s  expected to  be p o s i t iv e .  The v a r ia b le s  a t ta ch ed  to  b l ,b 2 ,b 3  
are in s e r te d  on f a m i l ia r  grounds of economic th eo ry ;  Cain d iscu sse s  the
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i s s u e  r a i s e d  b y - M i n c e r ( l 9 6 6 )  of b ia s  i n  es t im a tin g  b3; - i n - t h i s  case o
the b i a s  i s  p o s i t i v e  i . e .  a g a in s t  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  p r o p o s e d .  dP,  dMG, and 
dN a r e  ' d y n a m i c '  v a r i a b l e s  which e f f e c t i v e l y  c o n s t i t u t e  demand ' s h i f t '  ' 
v a r i a b l e s  i n s e r t e d  i n  a  s u p o l y  fu nc tion . Most  o f  C a i n ' s  v a r i a b l e s  have
t h e  expected s i g n  end a r e  s ig n i f i c a n t  a l t h o u g h  dN performs p o o r l y .
Bowen and Finegan(l9&9) p ro duced  a massive work w h i c h , s t r i c t l y  sneak­
ing, b e l o n g s  a lso  i n  t h e  o t h e r  sec t io n s  of t h i s  c h a p t e r  a s  i t  i n c l u d e s  
t i m e - s e r i e s  work using q u a r te r ly  averages o f  m o n t h l y  d a t a  f rom t h e  C u r r ­
e n t  Population S u r v e y  f o r  1949-65 ( the P and F a p p e n d i x  c i t e d  e a r l i e r  
a r i s e s  from t h e  need to r e c o n c i l e  t h o i r  r e s u l t s  w i t h  the D and F and 
T e l i a  e s t i m a t e s )  and  a l s o  work uring  i n d i v i d u a l  d a t a  ( t h e  1 i n  a  1 , 0 0 0  
sample  f rom t h e  I 9 6 0  Census). however as t h e  g r e a t e r  p a r t  of the work 
bs on aggregate c ro s s -s e c t io n  data we concen tra te  on t h i s .
The a u t h o r ' s  give an e x c e l l e n t  d e sc r ip t io n  o f  the d a t a  sour-ce u s e d
( a l l  reg re ss io n s  a r e  carr ied  o u t  on a g e - s e x - r o l o u r  g r o u p i n g s  f o r  t h e  
1940, 1950, and 196c  C e n s u s e s )  and t h e  b i a s e s  i n h e r e n t  i n  i t s  scope 
and d e f i n i t i o n .  They o m i t  a l m o s t  t o t a l ' y  any fo r m a l  conside ra tion  of t h e  
t h e o r y  o f  l a b o u r  s u p p l y  w h ich  i s  p r e s u p p o s e d  ( i f  t h e  work i s  a  ' m o d e l '  
and n o t  an  e l a b o r a t e  piece of d a t a  d e s c r ip t io n ) ;  t h i s  h as  been  c r i t i c ­
i z e d  by F l e i s h e r  (19 71 )  as reducing t h e  u s e f u l n e s s  o f  t h e  inqu iry .
As o u r  i n t e r e s t  i s  p r in c ip a l ly  wi t)i t h e  ec o n o m i c s  o f  t h e  f a m i l y  we 
p a u s e  only t o  consider C h a p t e r  6 which fe a tu re s  t h e  " I n t e r c i t y  R e g r e s s ­
i o n s "  f o r  m an - l e d  women. B and F ' s  d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  by 
p r e s e n c e  ( - 1 )  o r  a b s e n c e  ( =C) i n  t h e  l a b o u r  f o r c e  (employed p l u s  u n e m p l ­
oyed and s e a r c h e r s )  during t h e  c e n s u s  week.  This i s  r e g r e s s e d  on t h e
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f o l l o w i n g  l i s t  o f  v a r i a b l e s  ( e x p e c t e d  s i g n  i n  b r a c k e t s ) :
Unemployment  i n  a r e a  ( ) i n d e t e r m i n a t e  i n  s i g n  a s  r e s u l t  o f  n e t  a d d e d / d i s ­
c o u r a g e d  w o rk e r  e f f e c t .
I n d u s t r y  mix (+)  i s  t h e  B e l l o c  -  t y p e  v a r i a b l e
Female  e a r n i n g s  (=+) th e  s u b s t i t u t i o n e e f f e e t  i s  e x p e c t e d  t o  d o m i n a t e .  
S u p p ly  o f  f e m a l e s  ( ) r e p r e s e n t s  c o m p e t i t i o n  f o r  j o b s .
Wages o f  d o m e s t i c s  ( - )  i s  su p p o sed  t o  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  c o s t s  o f  r e p l a c i n g  
d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c t i o n  l o s t  due  t o  t h e  move i n t o  m a r k e t  work.
Income o f  husband ( - )  due t o  c r o s s - s u b s t i t u t i o n  e f f e c t s .
O t h e r  income ( - )  due to  an income e f f e c t .
Wives '  s c h o o l i n g ( + )  p r e s u m a b l y  t h i s  i s  an i n c r e a s e d  t a s t e  f o r  work ( a s  
most  Amer ican  l a b o u r  ec o n o m ic s  r e s e a r c h  seems t o  v iew  e d u c a t i o n  i n  t h i s  
way, s e e ,  e . g .  K n i e s s n e r  ( 1 9 7 6 ) )  a l t h o u g h  we m i g h t  more l o g i c a l l y  e x p e c t  
t h a t  a s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h i s  v a r i a b l e  i s  p i c k i n g  up p e r m a n e n t  
income e f f e c t s  i f  t h e s e  a r e  n o t  a d e q u a t e l y  c o n t r o l l e d  f o r  by  o t h e r  v a r ­
i a b l e s .
Female m i g r a t i o n  ( - )
P e r c e n t a g e  o f  n o n - w h i t e  w iv e s  ( t )  t h i s  s i g n  i s  e x p e c t e d  a s  B and F fo und  
t h r o u g h  o u t  t h e i r  work t h a t  c o l o u r e d  women d i s p l a y e d  a h i g h e r  p r o p e n s i t y  
t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  (when a l l  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  a r e  c o n t r o l l e d )  t h a n  w h i t e  women. 
P r e s e n c e  o f  c h i l d r e n  ( - )  c o s t s  o f  p r o v i d i n g  f o r  c h i l d r e n  a r e  e x p e c t e d  n o t  
t o  be so l a r g e  a s  t o  o u t w e i g h  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  demand on t h e  w i v e s '  home 
p r o d u c t i o n  t i m e .
V a r i a b l e s  d i s p l a y  t h e  e x p e c t e d  s i g n s  and a r e  g e n e r a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t .
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The v a r i a b l e s  f o r  labour m a r k e t  cond itions  d i s p l a y  a  d o m i n a n t  r o l e  i n  
explain ing  v a r i a t i o n  . R e s u l t s  d i f f e r  f o r  a g e  g r o u p s ,  t h e  1 4 - 2 4  ag e  gr­
oups do n o t  p r o d u c e  t h e  e x p e c t e d  r e s u l t s  and t h e i r  c o e f f i c i e n t  on t h e  
B e l l o c  t y p e  v a r i a b l e  i s  much l a r g e r  t h a n  a v e r a g e .  The b e h a v i o u r  o f  
t h i s  v a r i a b l e  i s  o f  some i n t e r e s t ;  i t  d e c l i n e s  t h r o u g h  t h e  a g e - g r o u p i n g s  
c o n t i n u a l l y  from 24 to 39 and t h e n  r i s e  in  t h e  4 0 - 9  r a n g e .  T h i s  su g g ­
e s t s  t h a t  t h e  femaleness o f  jobs i s  m o s t  im portant to women w i t h o u t  fam­
i l i e s  and t h o s e  who hav e c o m p l e t e d  them and w i s h  t o  r e - e n t e r  t h e  l a b o u r  
fo rc e .
An o v e r w h e l m i n g  discouraged w o r k e r  e f f e c t  i s  p r o d u c e d  which accords 
w i t h  Ù  p r i o r i  exp ec ta t io n s  an 1 a g r e e s  w i t h  o t h e r  c r o s s - s e c t i o n  work and 
t i m e - s e r i e s  work w h ich  a v o i d s  t h e  problems e x p l a i n e d  e a r l i e r  i n  t h i s  
c h a p t e r .
R and F ' s  basic  method o f  e x t r a c t i n g  c o n c l u s i o n s  f rom t h e i r  work i s  
t o  compare  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  i n  t h e  1 940 ,  50 , and 60 
r e g r e s s i o n s .  A l l  t h e  v a r i a b l e s  k e e p  t h e i r  e x p e c t e d  signs a c r o s s  t h e  
periods b u t  t h e  own wage r e s p o n s e  o f  women r i s e s  f rom 1940 t o  1950 and 
t h e n  f a l l s  t o  I 9 6 0  ; t h e  a u t h o r s  p r o v i d e  an ad hoc ' s o c i a l '  e x p l a n a t i o n  
a s  t h e y  c o u l d  h a r d l y  r e - w o r k  t h e  p r o b l e m  i n  t h e  'm o d e l '  a s  t h e y  have n o t  
p r v i d e d  one.
T h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  a r t i c l e s  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  t h e  B and F book ( F l e i s h e r ,  
op .  c i t . ,  A s h o n f e l t e r  and Heckman ( 1 9 7 4 ) ,  and F i e l d s  (1976). I t  i s  
c o n v e n i e n t  i f  we d e a l  w i t h  t h e s e  i n  l o g i c a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  c h r o n o l o g i c a l  
o r d e r  b e f o r e  b r i e f l y  commenting on B - F ' s  methodology.
F i e l d s  p r o v i d e s  a s i m p l e  u p d a t e  o f  t h e  B-F  r e g r e s s i o n s  d i s c u s s e d
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above us ing  1970 Census d a ta .  This ex e rc ise  shows th a t  the exp lana tory  
power of the equation  f a l l s  n o t ic e a b ly .  F u r th e r ,  the v a r ia b le s  fo r  non- 
white wives, e d u ca tio n ,  and supply of women become in s ig n i f i c a n t ,  and the 
v a r ia b le  fo r  c h i ld re n  under 6 becomes.' p o s i t iv e .  Unemployment i s  much 
more powerful th%n in  the e a r l i e r  yea rs ;  the response to  i t  i s  g r e a te s t  
in  the  14-24 age groups. A general argument of B and F ’ s was th a t  as 
married women in c reased  t h e i r  labou r fo rce  p a r t i c ip a t io n  they would be­
come a ’prim ary’ r a th e r  than 'secondary ' labour fo rce  group and hence 
would e x h ib i t  a d im inished response to  c y c l i c a l  f lu c tu a t io n s .  F ie ld s '  
r e s u l t s  appeat to  c o n t r a d ic t  t h i s  as responsiveness  tm labour market con­
d i t io n s  appears to  in c re a se .  Th» p o s i t iv e  response to ch ild ren  under 6 
i s .  F ie ld s  s u g g e s t s , & proxy ( in  an aggregate  equation) fo r  w i f e 's  age; 
i t  becomes nega tive  when age i s  co n tro l le d  fo r  b u t i s  l e s s  than in  the 
e a r l i e r  y e a rs .  This complies w ith the idea  of an in c re a s in g  attachm ent 
to the  primary labour fo rce  as t h i s  would lead to  methods o f  circumvent­
ing  the time c o n s t r a in t  of the presence of young c h i ld re n .
Aside from c r i t i c i z i n g  the lack  of a t h e o r e t i c a l  b a s is  in  B and F 's  
work, F le is h e r  (op. c i t . )  contends th a t  t h i s  has lead  to i n a t t e n t io n  to  
the  choice of dependent v a r i a b le .  P a r t i c ip a t io n  re p re se n ts  a d ec is io n  
to  devote some f r a c t io n  of a v a i la b le  hours to working in  the  paid la b ­
our market. In  B and F 's  work th i s  i s  rep re sen ted  by the p r o b a b i l i ty  of 
an in d iv id u a l  being in  the lab o u r  force in the census week. F le ish e r  
uses sp e c ia l  survey da ta  on males, aged 45-59, c o l le c te d  by in te rv iew ing  
done by the  United S ta te s  Census Bureau in  June 1966. Using t h i s  he 
compares re g re s s io n s  fo r  1965 with a B-F denendent v a r ia b le  with those 
using  annual weeks in  the lab o u r  force divided by 52 as the  dependent 
v a r ia b le .
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F l e i n h o r ' s  m a j o r  c o n c l u s i o n  (p .1 / ,6 )  i s  t h a t  u s i n g  a n n u a l  weeks  a s  
t h e  d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  y i e l d  much l o w e r  e s t i m a t e s  o f  t h e  wage e l a s t ­
i c i t y  t h a n  u s i n g  t h e  B-F m e a s u r e  a s  the  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e .
The p r o b l e m  o f  which d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  t o  u s e  i n  c r o s s - s e c t i o n  and 
i n d i v i d u a l  s t u d i e s  h i n g e s  on t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  t h e o r e t i c a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
f o r  t h e  e s t i m a t i n g  e q u a t i o n s .  The work by A s h e n f e l t e r  and Heckman ( A 
and H) u s e s  t h e  B-F c r o s s - s e c t i o n  d a t a  b u t  e x a m i n e s  i t  r i g o r o u s l y  u s ­
i n g  mixed e s t i m a t i o n  w i t h  r e s t r i c t i o n s  d e r i v e d  f rom m i c r o e c o n o m ic  a n a l y ­
s i s  o f  t h e  h o u s e h o l d .  The a u t h o r s  u s e  3BLS ( T h r e e - S t a g e  L e a s t  S q u a r e s )  
fo e s t i m a t e  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  t h e  l a b o u r  s u p p l y  e q u a t i o n s  o f  h u s b a n d s  and 
w i v e s .  To A and II t h e  B-F p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a h n  m eas u r e  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  
a l l o c a t i o n  o f  a f r a c t i o n  o f  a v a i l a b l e  l i f e t i m e  h o u r s  t o  m a r k e t  work.
To a p p r o x i m a t e  t h e  c o n t i n u o u s  s u b s t i t u t i o n  i n  wh ich  t h e  f o r m a l  model  i s  
w r i t t e n  t h e y  u s e  v a r i a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  mean a s  t h e  d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i n ­
s t e a d  o f  th e  a c t u a l  p e r c e n t a g e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e .  I t  i s  p e r h a p s  q u e s ­
t i o n a b l e  w h e t h e r  t h i s  i s  j u s t i f i e d ;  on s t a t i s t i c a l  g r o u n d s  i t  seems t o  
be m e r e l y  a  way o f  w e i g h t i n g  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n .  A andH  t r e a t  t h e  ' s o c i a l '  
v a r i a b l e s  i n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  d a t a  a s  a  s y s t e m a t i c  com pon en t  o f  t h e  d i s t u r b ­
an c e  t e r m  and t h e y  d r o p  t h e  'demand s h i f t '  v a r i a b l e  (o n t h e  r e a s o n a b l e  
g r o u n d s  t h a t  t h e s e  a r e  s u p p l y  f u n c t i o n s ;  t h e y  l a t e r  t e s t  t h e  p o s s i b l e  
i n f l u e n c e  o f  dem and) .  They f i n d  t h a t  h u s b a n d s '  l a b o u r  s u p p l y  i s  wage 
i n e l a s t i c  and t h a t  t h e  h u s b a n d s '  income e f f e c t  i s  n o t  s i g n i f i c a n t  
w h i l s t  t h e  w i v e s '  income e f f e c t  i s  n e g a t i v e  and s i g n i f i c a n t  and t h e '  
w i v e s '  l a b o u r  s u p p l y  f u n c t i o n  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  a  p o s i t i v e  wage e l a s t i c i t y
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Two m a j o r  c r i t i c i s m s  can be  d i r e c t e d  a t  A and  H ' s  work c o n c e r n i n g  . th­
e i r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  a n d  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  o f  
t h e  t h e o r y  w h ic h  t h e y  d ra w  on t o  s p e c i f y  t h e i r  m o d e l .  On t h e  f i r s t  ■
p r o b l e m  i t  seems  q u i t e  s i m p l y  t o  be  i m p r o b a b l e  t h a t  c r o s s - n a t i o n a l
v a r i a t i o n s  i n  t h e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e s  o f  p r i m e - a g e  m a l e s  w i l l  be  a d ­
e q u a t e  t o  i d e n t i f y  a n y  f u n c t i o n  f o r  t h e  l i f e t i m e  s u p p l y  o f  a v a i l a b l e  
h o u r s .  T h i s  c r i t i c i s m  d o e s  n o t  a p p l y  t o  r e s e a r c h  w h ic h  we w i l l  c o n s ­
i d e r  i n  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n  w h i c h  u s e s  i n d i v i d u a l  d a t a  t o  l o o k  a t  l i f e  
c y c l e  p a t t e r n s .  We m i g h t  t h e n  c o n s i d e r  A and  H ' s  work t o  be a f i r s t  
a p p r o x i m a t i o n  t o  + h e s e  s t u d i e s .  The s e c o n d  p r o b l e m  i s  t h a t  A and H
i m p l i c i t l y  s h i f t  t o  t h e  s t u d y  o f  t h u  f a m i l y  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l
w i t h o u t  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h ‘^  p r o b l e m  o f  f a m i l y  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g ;  we c o n s i d e r  
t h i s -  p r o b l e m  i n  d ^ ^ a l l  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  n s x t  c h a p t e r .
The o r i g i n a l  l i s t  o f  v a r i a b l e s  r n  ' " ' - F ' s  mod el  seems t o  h a v e  b e e n  
dttX'ived • on  t h e  b a s i s  o f  w h a t  h a p p e n e d  to  be a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  C e n s u s  
t h a t  c o u l d  be n l a u s i b l }  be i n t e r ;  r e t^ ^ l  i n  some way i f  i t  t u r n e d  o u t  
t o  be s i g n i f i c a n t .  The a r g u H .e n ts  g i v e n  on p . 35 h a v e  b e e n  m o s t l y  f i l l e d  
i n  by us. on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  t h e  f a m i l y  a r i s i n g  f rom  B e c k e r  
( 1965) and a r e  n o t  t a k e n  f rom t h e  o r i g i n a l  t e x t  w h i c h  c o n c e n t r a t e s  on 
r o s t - h o c  b e h a v i o u r a l  a r g u m e n t s .  As s h o u l d  be  c l e a r  no model  i j  a c t u a l ­
l y  s p e c i f i e d  by i n  wh ich  c a s e  i t  i s  v e r y  d i f ' i c u l t  t o  i n t e r p r e t  t h e  
f i n d i n g s  i n  t h e  way t h a t  t h e y  ( a n J  F i ' 7  1s) t r y  t o  do a s  we e n c o u n t e r  
t h e  n i o b i u m  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h u  w ^ l l - k n o w n  t h e o r e m (  p u b l i s h e d  
p r o o f s  a r e  h a r d  t o  come by b u t  s e e  Hh^ymcs (1 9 7 C ) )  t h a t  a n y  v a r i a b l e  
w i t h  a t - s t a ' i j t i c  g r e a t e r  t h a n  1 w’ l l  add t o  R s q u a r e d  a d j u s t e d
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whether or not i t  'o u g h t’ to  be in  the r e g re s s io n .  The se r io u s  of t h i s  
problem in c rease s  ( i . e .  how do we ev a lu a te  the 's u c c e s s '  o f a p iece of 
re sea rch  on fam ily labour supply?) when we tu rn  to  the use of in d iv id ­
ua l da ta  as what i s  perhaps the  same methodology i s  used under the  d i s ­
guise of a pseudo-model.
The c ro s s - s e c t io n  U.S. re s e a rc h  has, by and l a r g e ,  neg lec ted  the 
problems faced by in d iv id u a ls  (housewives in  p a r t i c u la r )  in  f in d in g  a 
job w ith  the  a p p ro p r ia te  v e c to r  of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  e .g .  hours of work, 
s h i f t s ,  t r a v e l  to  work e t c .  An exception  to t h i s  i s  the a r t i c l e  by King 
(1978) which focuses on one of these  problems by re g re s s in g  reg io n a l  
p a r t i c ip a t io n  r a t e s  on the u sua l v a r ia b le s  p lus an es tim ate  of the  v a r­
iance o f  hours o f fe re d  in  jobs  in  the reg ion ; King recognizes  the  econ­
ometric problem in  using  . an hours v a r ia b le  derived from d a ta  on
married women (as  t h e i r  p a r t i c ip a t i o n  r a t e  i s  the dependent v a r ia b le )  
and uses male d a ta  to  de rive  an ins trum en t.  The expected r e s u l t s  are 
ob ta ined , i . e .  the  g re a te r  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  v a r ia b le  hours encourages 
married women to  p a r t i c i p a t e .
F le i s h e r  and Rhodes (1976,1979) c a r r ie d  out the f i r s t  simultaneous 
equation  supply and demand re se a rc h  us ing  U.S. d a ta  ( the  f i r s t  such 
study in  the  world i s  by N e i ld ,  fo r  New Zealand, (1973)) on p a r t i c i p ­
a t io n  r a t e s .  We consider here the  1976 work by F le is h e r  and Rhodes 
(F-R) which e s t im a te s  the fo llow ing  th ree  equation  model;
2 .10a; -  Y lt  + BI3 (Y3t) + A12 (Z2t) + AI3 (Z3t) + ..........A18(Z8t)
+ A19 = U lt
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(2.10 b) -  Y2t t R14 (Y3t) + A23 (%3W t A24 (Z4t) f ..........A27 (Z7t)
+ A29 = U2t
(2.10 c) B31 (YTb) + B32 (Y2t) -  Y3t t A31 ( Z lt) + A39 = U3t
where  ( 2 . 1 0  a) i s  t h e  male  ( m a r r i e d )  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e  ^ , ( 2 . 1 0 b )  i s  
t h e  m a r r i e d  f e m a l e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e  and ( 2 . 1 0 c )  i s  th e  a d j u s t m e n t  e q ­
u a t i o n  f o r  unem ploym en t .  The f i r s t  e q u a t i o n  i s  e x a c t l y  i d e n t i f i e d  w h i l s t  
t h e  o t h e r  two ai-e o v e r - i d e n t i f i e d ;  e s t i m a t i o n  i s  c a r r i e d  out u s i n g  
2SLS on t h e  s o r t  o f  C ensus  d a t a  u s e d  i n  e a r l i e r  s t u d i e s .  The t h r e e  
en d o g e n o u s  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  Y1, p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e  of m a r r i e d  women, Y2, 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e  of m a r r i e d  men, Y3, unemploym ent  i n  t h e  l o c a l  l a b ­
ou r  market. The ex o g e n o u s  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  Z 1 , t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  chan ge  i n  
employment i n  the r e g i o n  i n  1 9 6 8 - 7 0 ,  Z2,  t h e  w i v e s '  ' n o r m a l '  wage r a t e ,
Z3, f a m i l y  n o n - l a b o u r  income , Z4, w i v e s '  s c h o o l i n g ,  Z5 husbands' s c h -  
'■•oling, Z6,  perccui tage o f  women who are non -w hi  t e  i n  t h e  r e g i o n , Z7,  I s  
t h e  usual ' i n d u s t r y  mix* ( B e l l o c ,  B-F) v a r ia b le ,  Z8,  i s  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  
o f  women with a  c h i l d  u n d e r  6 ,  A 1 9 , 2 ^ ,3 9  a r e  t h e  co n stan ts ,  t h e  u ' s  a r e  
c o n v e n t i o n a l  d i s t u r b a n c e  terms. A l l  v a r ia b le s  have  t h e  e x p e c t e d  s i g n s ,  
we s h a l l  n o t  d w e l l  on t h i s  s a b c  to s a y  t h a t  the above  model  i s  not a r r ­
i v e d  a t  t h r o u g l i  any g r e a t e r  conside ra tion  o f  t l ie n a t u r e  o f  s i m u l t a n e i t y  
i n  the f a m i l y  than i s  g i v e n  i n  A-B and i n  n e o - c l a s s i c a l  eco n o m ic s  g e n e r a l ­
l y .  I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  n o t e  t h a t  the p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  Y2 might a p n e a r  
i n  e n u a t i o n  ( 2 . ICa) i s  n o t  coun tenanced , t h e  same b e i n g  true  f o r  t h e  i n ­
s e r t i o n  o f  Y1 i n  e q u a t i o n  ( 2 . 1 0 b ) .
F-R * s- major f i n d i n g  i s  t h a t  t h e  impact o f  Unemployment  i n  b o t h  
s u p p l y  e q u a t i o n s  i s  g re a t ly  r e d u c e d  i n  comparison w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t s  f rom
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s i n g l e  e q u a t i o n  s t u d i e s .  T h i s  h a s  o b v i o u s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  l a b o u r  
r e s e r v e  e s t i m a t e s  d e r i v e d  f rom t i m e - s e r i e s  s t u d i e s .
We now c o n s i d e r  U.K. c r o s s - s e c t i o n  work.  As m os t  o f  t h e  work i n v o ­
l v e s ,  i m p l i c i t l y ,  t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  ' t a s t e s ’ d i f f e r e n c e s  a c r o s s  r e g i o n s  
a r e  p i c k e d  up by c o n t r o l  v a r i a b l e s  i n  t h e  d a t a  we f a c e  c e r t a i n  p r o b l e m s  
i f  c e r t a i n  p o p u l a r  b e l i e f s  a b o u t  t h e  U.K.  r e g i o n a l  p ro b le m  a r e  t r u e . * T h e  
p ro b lem  can be s p l i t  i n t o  t h r e e  r e l a t e d  p a r t s :
(1)  The r a n k i n g  o f  r e l a t i v e  unem ploy men t  r a t e s  by r e g i o n  e x h i b i t s  a  good 
d e a l  o f  s t a b i l i t y  i m p l y i n g  t h a t  t h e  u s e  o f  t h e  unem ploym en t  r a t e  a s  a 
'demand s h i f t '  v a r i a b l e  i s  i n v a l i d a t e d  b e c a u s e  o f  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  p r o b l e m s
(2)  I t  i s  t h o u g h t  ( s e e  D a v i e s  (1 9 6 7 ) )  t h a t  e m p l o y e r s  b a s e  t h e i r  l o c a t i o n  
d e c i s i o n s  on th e  p o o l  o f  a v a i l a b l e  f e m a l e  l a b o u r  henc e  i n d u s t r y  mix v a r ­
i a b l e s  a r e  b i a s e d  a s  a r g u e d  e a r l i e r  on a p r i o r i  g r o u n d s .
('3) I t  i s  f u r t h e r  t h o u g h t  t h a t  t h e  ab o v e  m e n t i o n e d  p o o l  i s  l a r g e l y  a  r e f ­
l e c t i o n  o f  ' c u s t o m '  o r  s o c i a l  f a c t o r s  ( v i z ,  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  a t t i t u d e s  
o f  women i n  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t s  o f  t h e  U .K .)  w h ic h  in  p a r t  depend on 
' t r a d i t i o n '  i n  th e  a r e a  ( s e e  D a v i e s ,  op .  c i t .  , and G a l e s  and  Marks  (1974)  
who r e p o r t  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e g r e s s i o n  r e s u l t s  u s i n g  a  m easu re  o f  t r a d i t i o n  o f  
m a r r i e d  women w o rk i n g  i n  t h e  a r e a ) .
(4) A number o f  r e g i o n s  c o n t a i n  w i t h i n  them l o c a l  l a b o u r  m a r k e t s  w i t h  
h i g h  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by m a r r i e d  women and o t h e r s  w i t h  low l a b o u r  f o r c e  p a r ­
t i c i p a t i o n  ( s e e  Brown ( 1 9 7 0 ) ,  T a y l o r  ( 1 9 6 6 , 1 9 6 % ) ) .  The c o r o l l a r y  o f  t h i s  
i s  t h a t  t h e  m easu r e  o f  j o b  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  u sed  c o n v e n t i o n a l l y  i s  i n a d e q u a t e
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a s  i t  d o e s  n o t  p i c k  up t h e  v e c t o r  o f  j o b  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  s h i f t s ,  t y p e  
o f  work,  and e s p e c i a l l y  t r a v e l  t o  work t i m e ,  wh ich  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  ' f e m a l e '  
l o c a l  l a b o u r  m a r k e t s  w i t h i n  r e g i o n s .
T h ese  p r o b l e m s  a r e  mos t  s e r i o u s  i n  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  more 
r e c e n t  B r i t i s h  work which e s s e n t i a l l y  r e p l i c a t e s  t h e  B e l l o c - C a i n - B o w e n  
■md F i n e g a n  a p p r o a c h .  The e a r l i e r  w o r k , w h i c h  we b e g i n  w i t h ,  was e i t h e r  
d i r e c t e d  t o w a r d s  t h e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  t h e s e  p r o b l e m s  o r  d e s i g n e d  i n  s u ch  
a  way a s  t o  overcome them.  The f i r s t  B r i t i s h  s t u d y  (Galambo s ( 1 9 6 7 ) )  d i d  
n o t  u s e  a l a b o u r  s u p p l y  f u n c t i o n  c h o o s i n g  i n s t e a d  t o  exa mine r e g i o n a l  
d i f f e r e n t i a l s  u s i n g  a n a l y s i s  o f  v a r i a n c e  . T h i s  s t u d y  came t o  t h e  c o n c ­
l u s i o n  t h a t ,  c o n t r o l l i n g  f o r  o t h e r  f a c t o r s ,  s y s t e m a t i c  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  
fe m a le  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e s ,  by  r e g i o n ,  e x i s t .  A r e c e n t  s t u d y  b y  B a y a r d  e t  
a l .  ( 1 9 7 9 ;  t h i s  u s e s  i n d i v i d u a l  d a t a  so s e e  l a t e r )  f i n d s  t h e  o p p o s i t e  t h a t  
t h e r e  i s  no i n f l u e n c e  o f  ' r e g i o n '  p e r  so once  a l l  t h e  f a c t o r s  which  r e g i o n  
p r o x i e s  have been  a l l o w e d  f o r .
U s i n g  s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  d a t a  r a t h e r  t h a n  s t a t i s t i c a l  a n a l y s i s .  
Bowers  (19 70)  f i n d s  f o r  t h e  10 U.K. r e g i o n s  i n  t h e  1961 C en s u s  t h a t  t h e r e  
a r e  s u b s t a n t i a l  r e g i o n a l  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  f e m a le  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  He a t t r i b ­
u t e s  mos t  o f  t h i s  v a r i a t i o n  t o  ' dem and '  a s  m a n i f e s t e d  by  c h a n g e s  i n  i n d ­
u s t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e  a l t h o u g h  t h e  s t u d y  i s  i n c o n c l u s i v e  due t o  t h e  i m p o s s i b ­
i l i t y  o f  c h o o s i n g  b e tw e en  a  v a r i e t y  o f  c a u s a l  s e q u e n c e s  w h ich  seem e q u a l l y  
p l a u s i b l e  ( s e e  Bowers  (1975)  p p . 7 6 - 7  ) .  G o r d o n ( l 9 7 0 )  u s e s  t h e  1966 C en s u s  
d a t a  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  r e g i o n a l  and sub—d ^ f i e r e n t i a l s .  As w i t h  m os t  s t u d i e s  
l i t t l e  v a r i a t i o n  i s  found i n  male  r a t e s  so a t t e n t i o n  f o c u s e s  on f e m a l e
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r a t e s .  Gordon re g re s se s  ag e-ad ju s ted  female r a t e s  on measures of unemp­
loyment, r u r a l i t y ,  i n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c tu r e ,  and male ea rn in g s .  All of th e se ,  
excep t the  l a s t ,  a re  c l e a r ly  s i g n i f i c a n t .  Caution should be exerc ised  in  
t r e a t i n g  these  r e s u l t s  fo r  the  reasons  given above. In  p a r t i c u l a r  cau tion  
should be exerc ised  over the  a u th o r 's  conclusion  ( p .419) t h a t  female pa r­
t i c i p a t i o n  i s  about four tim es as responsive  in  c ro s s - s e c t io n  da ta  as i t  
i s  in  t im e -s e r ie s  d a ta  to  the  r a t e  of unemployment. Gordon p re se n ts  e s t ­
im ates of re g io n a l  labour re se rv e s  which are  s u b je c t  to the  same problems 
as  t im e -s e r ie s  d a ta  on account of probable m is - s p e c i f i c a t io n  in  the e s t  -  
im ating  equation .
Wabe ( 1969) makes an ingenious use of 1951 and I 96I  Census da ta  which 
i s  in  some ways an improvement on the American re sea rc h  in  terms of
c o n t r o l l in g  fo r  u n s p e c if ia b le  in f lu e n c e s .  Wabe's da tabase  i s  the 122 
boroughs, surrounding C en tra l  I.ondon (o m itt in g  the  f iv e  c e n t r a l  boroughs) 
a c ro ss  which he re g re s s e s  females 15-59 (d e f la te d  fo r  popu la tion  by two 
d i f f e r e n t  methods) on T (average journey time to  c e n tra l  London by publ­
i c  t r a n s p o r t ) ,  P (p r ic e  of the above journey  on average) ,  J f  (female jobs
per 1,000 female r e s id e n t s  in  borough),S ( s o c ia l  c h a rac te r  of the borough 
c o n s tru c ted  by ta k in g  r a t i o s  of membership of 'h ig h '  so c ia l  c la s s e s  per 
1 ,000 r e s id e n t s ) ,  Hm (c o n tro l  fo r  male i n s t i t u t i o n a l  p o p u la t io n ) ,  Hf (a s  Hm 
bu t fo r  women), C (c h i ld re n  aged 0-4  per 1,000 p o p u la t io n ) .  Male eq ua tions  
a re  a lso  es tim ated  bu t these  a r e ,  as u su a l ,  no t very  i n t e r e s t i n g .
The s i g n i f i c a n t  v a r ia b le s  a r e : -  T ( - ) , ? ( - ) ,  J f ( + ) , H f ( - ) , C (_ ) .  /
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S ( - ) .  R squares i s  about 0 ,85  fo r  most of the v a r ia n ts  o f  t h i s  equat­
ion although t h i s  w i l l  be i n f l a t e d  as the J f  v a r ia b le  i s  s u b je c t  to the  
usual c r i t i c i s m s .  Most i n t e r e s t  c en tre s  on the magnitudes o f  the c o e f f -  
ic e n t s  on C , t h i s  tu rn s  out to be about about a h a l f  or about a f i f t h  
in  1961 o f i t s  1951 value depending on which v a r i a n t  of the  dependent 
v a r ia b le  i s  used. An i n t e r e s t i n g  d iscu ss io n  o f the r e s id u a l s  from the 
1951 r e s u l t s  ( p .257) r e v e a ls  th a t  th e re  a re  f o r ty  boroughs which belong 
to  four la rg e  geographica l a re as  in which the borugh r e s id u a l s  a re  e i t h e r  
a l l  n ega tive  or a l l  p o s i t iv e .  The r e s id u a l s  from the remaining 80 bor­
oughs a re  sa id  to  seem random ( i t  might have been d e s i r a b le  to  r e - e s t ­
imate the equation  fo r  these  80 alone to see what p a t te rn  emerged but 
t h i s  was n o t done), Wabe a ttem pts  to  exp la in  the  p a t te rn  o f the remain­
ing  40 by using  arguments about the n a tu re  of the job market in  these  
a reas  and the 'o v e r lap p in g ' of the low employment o p p o r tu n i t ie s  in  one 
borough with the same problem in  an o th e r .  There i s  no d iscu ss io n  o f 
h e te r o s c e d a s t i c i ty  in  t h i s  a r t i c l e ;  in  view o f the  arguments given the  
fo llow ing proceedure should have perhaps been t r i e d -  group the  boroughs 
in  these  four reg io n s  in to  four aggrega tes  and then e s tim ate  the  84 ob­
se rv a t io n s  by weighted l e a s t  squares us ing  some measure of ' s i z e '  as the 
weight.
The remaining U.K. c ro s s - s e c t io n  work i s  more or l e s s  s e l f - c o n s c ­
io u s ly  modelled on B -F 's  s tudy . B ailey  (1973) o b ta in s  the u su a l p o s i t ­
ive response to the  in d u s t ry  s t ru c tu re  v a r ia b le .  This i s  a lso  found in  
the study by McNabb(l977) which we now consider .  This study uses  the  63
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s u b - d i v i d i o n s  o f  r e g i o n s  f rom t h e  1971 C e n s u s .  The ' T h e o r e t i c a l  C o n s i d ­
e r a t i o n s '  l a s t  one  p a r a g r a p h  (n.222) which r e f e r s  t o  B e c k e r ,  t e l l s  u s  
what  v a r i a b l e s  o u g h t  t o  be i n  t h e  e q u a t i o n  a n d ,  a s  w i t h  a l l  t h e  o t h e r  s t ­
u d i e s ^  i n  t h e  . a r e a ,  c o n t a i n s  no re fe rence  to t h e  d e b a t e  on w h e t h e r  o r  
n o t  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  proceed f rom t h i s  t h e o r y  t o  an  e s t i m a t e d  f u n c t i o n  
which  i s  i d e n t i f i e d  ( s e e  F e l d s t e i n  (196 %),  R a y n e r  (1968)  ) .
The p e r c e n t a g e  o f  m a r r i e d  f e m a l e s  e c o n o m i c a l l y  a c t i v e  i s  regressed  on 
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  v a r ia b le  w i t h  e x p e c t e d  s i g n  i n  f i r s t  b r a c k e t  and r e s u l t a n t  
s i g n  i n  t h e  second b r a c k e t :
HEMF, t h e  hourly earnings o f  manual  f e m a l e s ,  (+ , e x p e c t e d  on b a s i s  o f  
previous w o r k ) ,  ( f )
BENF, t h e  h o u r l y  earn ings o f  non-m anua l  f e m a l e s  ( f , s e e  a b o v e ) ,  ( )
7 1 ,  t h e  male  unemploym en t  r a t e  ( f o r  added w o r k e r  e f f e c t ) ,  ( + ) ,  (+ b u t  
m a r g i n a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  0L8 b u t  , , i n  ILC)
UF, f e m a l e  unemployment r a t e ,  f o r  d i s c o u r a g e d  worker, ( - ) ,  ( - )
FIN,  a B e l l o c  - C a i n -  B-F demand s h i f t  v a r i a b l e  which i s  t h e r e f o r e  d r ­
opped i n  t h e  ILS e s t i m a t e s ,  ( i ) ,  (+)
EDUG'., number of o u o i l s  aged 17 a s  a  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  t h o s e  aged 13 four 
years e a r l i e r  ( i . e .  s c h o o l  s t a y i n g - o n  r a t e ) , ( t )  ( - ,  but marginal)
IM, p e r c e n t a g e  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  who a r c  'New Commonweal th'  i m m i g r a n t s  ( + ) ,
( )
CaO, p e r c e n t a g e  o f  h o u s e h o l d s  w i t h  no d e p e n d e n t  c h i l d r e n ,  ( ■ ¥ )  ( + , b u t  
1.  The unpublished v e r s i o n  o f  M e t c a l f ,  N i c k e l ! , and R i c h a r d s o n  (1976)  r e f ­
u t e s  t h e  R ay n e r  c r i t i ( p j e  b u t  we do not d i s c u s s  t h i s  a r t i c l e  a s  i t  concerns 
male  l a b o u r  supply in  manufacturing f o r  manual  w o r k e r s  o n l y .
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m a r g i n a l ) . R s q u a r e d s  o f  o v e r  60 p e r  c e n t  a r e  a c h i e v e d  :when n o n - w a g e
v a r i a b l e s  a r e  a d d e d  t o  a  w ages  o n l y  e q u a t i o n  a l t h o u g h  t h i s  d r o p s ,  a l o n g
w i t h  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  l e v e l s  o f  m o s t  o f  t h e  v a r i a b l e s ,  when t h e  ILO o s t -
2
i m a t i o n  i s  c a r r i e d  o u t  (R f a l l s  t o  0 . 4 6 ) .  Of  some i n t e r e s t  i s  t h e  f a c t  
( n o t  d i s c u s s e d  by  t h e  a u t h o r )  t h a t  t h e  c o n s t a n t  i s  a l w a y s  n e g a t i v e  b u t  
n o t  s i g n i f i c a n t  u n t i l  t h e  ' s i m u l t a n e o u s '  e s t i m a t e s  w he re  t -  2 . 2 6 .
G r e e n h a l g h  ( 1 9 7 7 )  p r e s e n t s  a  s i m i l a r  s t u d y  t o  MeWabb. The m a j o r  d i f f ­
e r e n c e  i s  i n  t h e  d a t a  w h ic h  i s  t a k e n  f rom  t h e  1971 C e n s u s  f o r  106 to w n s  
and c i t i e s .  E s t i m a t i o n  i s  by  O . L . S .  , t h e  same s o r t  o f  v a r i a b l e s  a r e
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inc luded  fo r  the  same s o r t  o f  rea so n s ,  R square i s  s im i la r ly  low 
u n t i l  the  ' s o c i a l '  v a r ia b le s  are  in s e r te d ;  l ik e w ise  l i t t l e  a t t e n t io n  
i s  given to  the problem of i n t e r p r e t in g  the  es tim ated  equation  as a 
supply fu n c t io n .
A f u r th e r  s tudy using  the  1971 Census da ta  was produced by 
Lightman and O 'C le ire a ca in  (1978) which u t i l i z e d  the 50 l a r g e s t  county 
boroughs in  England and Wales. The major d i f f e r e n c e  between t h i s  and 
the o th e r  s tu d ie s  i s  th a t  d a ta  was ob ta ined  to  sep a ra te  earn ings  from 
o th e r  fam ily  income as in  the  American s tu d ie s .  This d a ta  was unpub­
l is h e d  DHSS f ig u re s  obta ined  from the Regional S t a t i s t i c s  o f  Earnings 
1969-70. AR, the a c t i v i t y  r a t e  o f  m arried  females aged 20-59 i s  reg ­
re ssed  on :
01, average weekly income o th e r  than wages and s a l a r i e s  in  1971 FES, 
added to
EMY, earn ings  o f  a l l  males aged 18-64 in  f u l l ,  or p a r t - y e a r ,  labour 
f o r c e , to  give INC, t o t a l  weekly fam ily  income, ( - ) ,  (-)
UN i s  the  unemployment r a t e  fo r  males aged 20-64, ( ) ,  ( )
ESF i s  average earn ings  of s in g le  females aged 18-59 in  the  f u l l - y e a r  
lab o u r  fo rce  (see p . 273 f o r  g ex p lana tion  of the use o f  t h i s  as the 
female wage ra te )  ( ) , (+ )
BL, dummy = 1 i f  designa ted  by DOE as Development Area in  1966 ( ) ,  ( - )  
GR, dummy =1 i f  designa ted  as in te rm ed ia te  a rea  in  1970 ( ) ,  (-)
RET, p ro p o r t io n  in  borugh c l a s s i f i e d  as r e t i r e d  ( - ) , ( - ) .
w ith expected s igns  in  f i r s t  b rack e t  and the rb 'su l tan t  s ign  in  the
second b rack e t .  An R squared ad ju s ted  o f  0 .41 i s  ob ta ined .
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I t  would be i n t e r e s t i n g  to  look a t  .the  co n s tan t  in  t h i s  a r t i c l e  in  
view of the r e s u l t s  ihMcNabb’ s a r t i c l e ;  a p o s i t iv e  c o n s ta n t  i s  o b ta i ­
ned bu t i t  i s  n o t p o ss ib le  to  t e l l  i f  i t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  from the  ta b le s  
given. One i n t e r e s t i n g  fe a tu re  of t h i s  a r t i c l e  i s  th a t  i t  p re se n ts  in c ­
ome and s u b s t i t u t i o n  e f f e c t s  obtained in  a curious  way t h a t  i s  by us ing  
re g re s s io n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  from a wage r a t e  v a r ia b le  and an o th e r  income 
v a r ia b le ;  these  can no t be e s t im a te s  o f  the  income and s u b s t i t u t io n  
e f f e c t s  derived  from in d if fe r e n c e  curve a n a ly s is  as wage r a t e  changes 
con ta in  both an income and a s u b s t i t u t io n  e f f e c t .  I t  i s  a l s o  be noted 
th a t  the a u th o r ’ s do not (as  A and H do) a ttem pt to  approximate the con­
tinuous s u b s t i t u t i o n  of the  theory .
In d iv id u a l  d a ta  s tu d ie s :
Although a number of in tro d u c to ry  econometrics tex tbooks s t i l l  say 
th a t  th e re  a re  two types o f  da ta  source, time s e r i e s  and c ro s s - s e c t io n  
the re  are  fundamental d i f f é r e n c e s  between the c ro s s - s e c t io n  and in d iv id ­
ual d a ta  r e g re s s io n .  These d i f f e r e n c e s  a re  d e a l t  with more f u l l y  in  
chapter 3; the c ro s s - s e c t io n  and t im e -s e r ie s  s tu d ie s  t y p i c a l l y  y ie ld  
h igher R squareds than the  in d iv id u a l  é tu d ie s  bu t th e re  i s  no guarantee 
(and the problem i s  never d iscussed  in  the  l i t e r a t u r e  save fo r  a pass­
ing  comment by A sh en fe l te r  and Heckman) th a t  the  param eters obtained 
a re  no t m isleading  on account of agg rega tion  b ia se s .
The e a r l i e s  s tu d ie s  used the  method o f small ( i . e .  iabout AOO) indep­
endent surveys to  in v e s t ig a te  the causes of labour fo rce  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
by m arried  women (see  R o s e t t ( l9 5 ^ ) , Mahoney ( l 9 6 l a ) ) .  The methodology 
used here i s  dubious; Mahoney’ s study  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  w ell as he pe r­
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forms a re g re s s io n  on a l i s t  o f  p la u s ib le  v a r ia b le s  ( the  usual ones p lus 
such th in g s  as number o f du rab les  in  the  fam ily  and w ives’ a t t i t u d e s  
measured on a t e n -p o in t  sca le )  and then drops those t h a t  a re  s t a t i s t i c i  — 
a l l y  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  to  provide a ’r e f i n e d ’ r e g re s s io n .  This might have 
been accep tab le  i f  the  r e s u l t s  a re  provided merely as  a d a ta  d e sc r ip t io n  
bu t i s  claimed t h a t  the e s t im a te s  are  based on a model (g iven in  Mahon­
ey (1961b ) .
A s i g n i f i c a n t  advance in  the  study of fam ily  lab o u r  supply was made , 
in  M incer(l962) where an e x p l i c i t  model i s  p u t  forward w ith  wives’ la b ­
our supply depending on ’permanent’ and ’ t r a n s i t o r y ’ components o f  fam? 
i l y  income with these  terms being id e n t i c a l  to  t h e i r  use in  Friedman’ s 
famous theory  o f  the  consumption fu n c t io n .  The Mincer model i s  th e re ­
fore  a reduced-form s in g le  equation  model of the  taxonomy o f  fam ily  la b ­
our supply models which we p re sen t  ih  chap ter 3; i . e .  a l l  o f  the husb­
and’ s v a r ia b le s  a re  t r e a te d  as endogenous to  the  w ife . As married wom­
en become more a permanent', fe a tu re  of the  lab o u r fo rce  c e r t a in  d i f f i c ­
u l t i e s  in  using  the Friedman appara tus  become apparen t v iz .  the f ig u re  
fo r  permanent income which i s  r e le v a n t  i s  what the  household b e l ie v es  
i t  t® be so i f  the  expected permanent income depends on both w ives’ 
and husbands ea rn in g s  streams then labour supply d é s is to n s  w i l l  be sim­
u lta n e o u s .  An i n t e r e s t i n g  a r t i c l e  by Maoney (198I )  d ea ls  with the  o ther 
h a l f  o f  t h i s  problem from Mincer i . e .  i t  i s  a s in g le  equation  reduced 
form of the  models in  our chap te r  3 where husbands’ labour supply i s
1. Mincer uses d a ta  on 7,000 working married women fro§' the Survey of 
Consumer F inaces and f in d s  t h a t  the permanent and t r a n s i t o r y  e f f e c t s  
a re  .n e g a t iv e  and p o s i t iv e  as expected.
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dependent on (exogenous) w i f e ' s  permanent employment income. The a r t i c l e  
claims to  show t h a t  wives' permanent employment e x e r ts  a s ig n i f i c a n t  
nega tive  in f lu en ce  on husband.ts labour supply. U n fo rtuna te ly  t h i s  a r t #  
i c l e  c o n ta in s  a fundamental econometric e r ro r  avoided in  a l l  the  o th e r  
in d iv id u a l  d a ta  s tu d ie s  (we have po in ted  out t h i s  mistake (see  Cameron
(1982) • the  sim ultaneous equation  b ia s  i s  n o t an e r ro r  as the  equzt^-'
ion  i s  i m p l i c i t l y  sp e c if ie d  as a reduced form.
The study by Cohen, Lerman, and Rea ( l9 7 l)  p icks  up the  conernB o f 
the  r e s e a rc h  surveyed] in  the  two prev ious s e c t io n s .  Using data. ,©n 100, 
ODD in d iv id u a ls  from the 1967 Survey o f Consumer Finances they  f in d  
la r g e r  discouraged worker and sm aller added worker e f f e c t s  than those 
in  aggregated  s tu d ie s  a lthough t h e i r  added worker fo r  o ld e r  women was 
b ig g e r .  These r e s u l t s  bear out the p o in t  o f  aggregation  b ia s  in  the  
aggregated  s tu d ie s  and they r a i s e  q u es t io n s  about the s t r a t e g y  o f ten  
employed (e .g .  by B-F, K-S e t c . )  of g e t t in g  comparable c ro s s - s e c t io n  
and t im e -s e r ie #  e l a s t i c i t i e s  as a re -a ssu ran ce  th a t  we have found more 
or l e s s  ' c o r r e c t '  f ig u r e s .
Two s tu d ie s  by Gramm(Gramm,1973,197.5) r e tu r n  to  the  independently  
taken survey in  t h i s  case of 414 married female te a c h e rs .  This sample 
has the  s p e c ia l  f e a tu re  t h a t  a l l  those observed had the o p p o r tu n i ty ,  
i f  they  so d e s i r e d ,  o f  tak in g  p a r t - ,  f u l l - t im e ,  or no work; t h i s  i s  a 
choice n o t  norm ally p re sen t  to  a l l  In  the sample o th e rs  have used. This 
problem i s  examined using  d isc r im in a n t  a n a ly s is  in  the 1973 paper.-'
— 49“
This a r t i c l e  f in d s  th a t  husband 's  wage r a t e ,  w i f e 's  wage r a t e ,  and 
age of youngest c h i ld  (o r  number of ch ild ren )  have an im portan t infl#.- _i 
uence on the w i f e 's  d ec is io n  ^t© work f u l l ,  p a r t ,  or no tim e. I t  i s  
concluded th a t  lumping p a r t - t im e  and fu l l - t im e  p a r t id ip a n t s  to g e th e r  
le ad s  to  se r ious  e r r o r s  in  the  e s t im a tio n  of c o e f f i c i e n t s .  S im ilar  
conclusions  can be derived from s tu d ie s  by . Morgenstern and Hamovitch 
( 1976) and Long and Jones (1981) which use a v a i la b le  n a t io n a l  survey 
d a ta .  The former estim ate , continuous (hours per year ,  weeks per year)
, r a th e r  than d icho tom ise# ,response  fu n c tio n s  s e p a ra te ly  , us ing  OLS, 
fo r  p a r t - t im e  and fu l l - t im e  occupations and t e s t s  whether the  two func­
t io n s  d i f f e r  s i g n i f i c a n t l y .  The l a t t e r  use m ultinom ial p r o b i t  analy ­
s i s  ( th e re  are  th re e  p o ss ib le  events  fo r  the 'dependent' v a r ia b le  -  
no work, p a r t - t im e ,  or f u l l - t i m e ) .  I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  uphold Gramra's 
con ten t io n  u n le ss  some a d d i t io n a l  t h e o r e t i c a l  arguments a re  given as 
th ese  s tu d ie s  could be sa id  to  imply t h a t  the aggregate  labour supply 
fu n c tio n  of married women i s  n o n - l in ea r  and ty p i c a l l y  s u b je c t  to  un­
c o n tro l le d  h e te ro g en e i ty  amongst the sample p o p u la tion . The above a r t ­
i c l e s  do no t provide an argument as to why the p a r t- t im e  fu n c tio n  i s  
fundam entally  d i f f e r e n t  from the f u l l - t im e  or give any reason  why we 
can n o t  j u s t  f i t  the  p a r t  and f u l l  time fu n c t io n s  to g e th e r  us ing  a sp­
l i n e  fu n c t io n .  ' ; ■ '
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Gramm's second a r t i c l e  u s ing  her own survey d a ta  i s  one of the  f i r s t  
s tu d ie s  of m arried  women which use a continuous measure o f  supply r a th e r  
than  a 0-1 measure. An e x p l i c i t  n e o - c la s s i c a l  type model of the u t i l i t y  
-maximising household i s  p resen ted  which i s  then transmuted in to  a s in ­
gle  equation  l i n e a r  reduced form fo r  w i f e 's  working time. Two r e s u l t s  
a re  of i n t e r e s t ;  the wives' own wage e l a s t i c i t y  i s  p o s i t iv e  and s i g n i f ­
ic a n t  w h i ls t  the  a s s e t s  v a r ia b le  i s  no t s i g n i f i c a n t .  The former in d ic ­
a te s  an upward-sloping supply curve w h i ls t  the  l a t t e r  i s  a r e s u l t  o f  a 
l o g ic a l  s l i p  caused by i n a t t e n t io n  to  the formal model. The formal mod­
e l  i s  a . one-period  model in  which th e re  i s  no savings th e re fo re  the  
c o n s t r a in t  should only inc lude  c u rre n t  period  d isposab le  income.
Using a one-period  model im p lies  th a t  the re  i s  no n e t  accumulation by 
households hence th e re  should not be^an a s s e t s  v a r ia b le  in  the equation  
( c f .  Wachter(l972) ' s assumption th a t  workers' savings a re  n e g l ig ib le )  
d e sp i te  th e re  being  a s s e ts  in  the survey. Looked a t  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  we 
can see no c le a r  reason why a houeshold with more a s s e t s  should have 
d i f f e r e n t  work time by the wife than one with l e s s ;  a ;p r e d ic t io n  could 
only be achieved through the s p e c i f ic a t io n  o f  a model w ith permanent 
income in  i t ,
Kushman and S c h e f f le r  (1975) p re se n t  the f i r s t '  study o f both husb­
ands' and wives' continuous labour supply fu n c t io n s .  They do. n o t use 
a simultaneous model but r a th e r  one where wives hours a re  recursive- on 
husband’s ' hours w ith  both fu n c tio n s  co n ta in ing  the same o th e r  v a r ia b le s ;  
i t  so happens t h a t  t h i s  model i^  i d e n t i f i e d  i f  the imposed r e s t r i c t i o n s
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are  j u s t i f i e d  (see  chapter 3 fo r  f u l l e r  d is c u s s io n ) .  We s h a l l  concent­
r a te  here on the  r e s u l t s  of the a n a ly s is  ignoring  the two i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
problems ( i . e .  supply-supply  and supply-demand). K and S use da ta  on 
1766 white and 1553 non-white p a i r s  o f  both working husbands and wives 
taken from the 1967 Survey o f Economic O pportunity . In  a l l  four r e p o r t ­
ed fu n c t io n s  the own wage e l a s t i c i t y  i s  p o s i t iv e  and s i g n i f i c a n t  (excep t 
in  ' the  non-white male fu n c t io n ) .  The response to spouse’ s wage r a t e  
i s  never s i g n i f i c a n t .  The netw orth  ( i . e .  non-labour income bu t s ince  
t h i s  i s  t r e a te d  as a s s e t s  t h i s  i s  in v a l id  on the  same grounds as wd 
c r i t i c i z e d  Gramm) v a r ia b le  i s  nega tive  and s ig n i f i c a n t  excep t in  the  
non-white female fu n c t io n .  The only o th e r  n o tab ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  v a r ia b ­
l e s  are  c h ild ren  (nega tive  in  w ife ’ s ) ,  own d i s a b i l i t y  (nega tive)  and 
male work time which i s  p o s i t iv e  in ^ w if e 's  fu n c tio n  which i s  (see ch­
a p te r  3) probably due to ra is sp e c if ic a t io n  as the  sign i s  ' wrong' (on 
the b a s is  o f  ve rba l arguments in  the t e s t )  and seems to  in d ic a te  the  
need fo r  simultaneous e s t im a tio n .  I t  i s  worth no tin g  t h a t  experience 
and education  v a r ia b le s  are  no t s ig n i f i c a n t ;  they  could be competing 
with wages and netw orth  as p rox ies  fo r  permanent income (which i s  
, aga in , no t discussed).
I t  i s  convenient to move to  the work of Kalachek, R aines , and L ars­
on' ( l979) as i t  i s  a. .rare e s tim ate  o f  the male labour supply fu n c tio n  
from in d iv id u a l  d a ta .  The model p o s tu la ted  i s  a dynamic on where L t  
(a c tu a l  hours) i s  p a r t i a l l y  ad ju s ted  to  L* (d e s i re d  h o u r s ) . This i s  
te s t e d  on N a tiona l L o n g t i tu d ln a l  Survey d a t a , f o r  men aged 45-59, 
from 1966, 69 , 73. The re g re s s io n  o f L t -  Lt-1 i s  on wages decomposed
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in to  permanent and t r a n s i t o r y  components, number o f  ea rners  i n  household,  
h e a l th  v a r i a b l e s ,  a t t i t u d e  to job ,  w i f e ' s  h ea l th  e t c .  The main conclus^ 
ions  are  t h a t  adjustment i s  slow and the wage e l a s t i c i t y  i s  h igher than 
t h a t  given in  o the r  s tu d i e s .  Two comments are  in  ord*r;  f i r s t l y ,  K,L and 
R do no t  consider the  problem t h a t  v a r i a b l e s  used may proxy the l i k e l ih o o d  
t h a t  workers can vary t h e i r  hours a t  w i l l  , t h a t  i s  a l o t  o f  t h e i r  observ­
a t i o n s  may be on the demand curve ( they  t e s t  f o r  h e te ro g en e i ty  bu t  t h i s  i s
not the  same th in g ) ,  secondly,  they inc lude  two family  v a r i a b l e s  (numb­
e r  of e a r n e r s ,  w i f e ' s  hea l th )  without spec i fy ing  the na tu re  o f  family  
time a l l o c a t i o n  i . e .  t h i s  i s  another reduced form ( im p l i c i t l y )  of the  
taxonomy of models presented  in  chapte r  3*
Smith and Ward (1980) are  concerned with a number of dimensions of 
family  a c t i v i t y  which we must,  f o r  #pace reasons ,  choose to  ignore .  Of 
i n t e r e s t  to u s , a r e  the. two func t ions  fo r  annual hours -  one fo r  husb­
ands and one fo r  wives; As these  r e s u l t s  do no t  agree with  the K-S ones
we s h a l l  s e t  out the f u l l  l i s t  of v a r i a b l e s  with the r e s u l t  in  the f i r c t
b racke t  and in  the second b racke t  i f  K-S did  not inc lude  such a va r ­
i a b l e ,  to be followed by exp lana t ion  i f  an analogous v a r i a b l e  i s  used.
V _
Annual hours of spouse -p resen t  marr ied  women'from"the Pane l Study of In c ­
ome Dynamics fo r  1968-70 (no sample s ize  appears  to be given) are  r e g r ­
essed on n e t  wortn ( ) , average. ....  .'income ( - )  (**,  K-S use computed
wage r a t e  in s t rum en ts ,  the S-W v a r i a b l e  i s  male hours X male wage r a t e  
averaged, seemingly as the computation of i t  i s  no t  e x p l a i n e d ' i n  the 
t e x t ) ,  change in  male income (- )  (%*), monthljr income i n s t a b i l i t y  ( ) , (% *) ,  
w ifes '  education ( + ) , (here  t r e a t e d  as proxy fo r  w i f e ' s  permanent income).
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, Marriage Duration 1-9 years  (- )  (**) ,  Marriage Duration 10-18 y ea t s  ( ) 
( , Husband's Age ( ) ,  Race ( ) (** ) ,  Husband' i n  Union ( ) (**) ,
Family owned Business  ( ) (**) ,  Number o f  Children over 4 year s  old ( - )  
(**,  only one v a r i a b l e  fo r  ch i ld ren  inc luded by K -S) , Number of  c h i ld -  
r e re n  under 5 years  old ( - )  (**,  see l a s t  var..) , Number of  Children under 
5 * Marriage d u ra t io n  ( ) (**) ,  (+) (**,  i s  to c o n t ro l  fo r  sample
c e n s o r in g ) , Divorce Proxy (+) (**) ,  Year of marriage ( ) (** ) ,  and cons t ­
an t .  The i n t e r e s t i n g  fe a tu re  o f  t h i s  i s  a p o s i t i v e  own education e f f e c t  
fo r  wives which c o n f l i c t s  with the K-S r e s u l t s ;  most l i k e l y  t h i s  i s  due 
to the absence of  an own wage or income va r iab le  in  which case school ing 
i s  probably a c t in g  as a proxy. Since education a c t u a l l y  measures educ­
a t io n  and not permanent income, p r o d u c t i v i t y  in the  home or any of  the 
o ther  th ings  which i t  i s  dragged in  to  r e p re se n t  i t  would be h e lp fu l  i f  
a model where the r o l e  of education i s  f u l l y  s p e c i f i e d  had been given ; 
u n fo r tu n a te ly  t h i s  i s  not the case,  we hope to f i l l  some of  t h i s  i gap 
in  chapte r  2.
La te r  in  t h e i r  a r t i c l e ,  Smith and Ward p re sen t  a r e g r e s s io n  of  husb­
an d 's  annual hours on Husband's Educat ion ,  Wife 's  educa t ion .  Own Ago, 
number of  ch i ld ren  over four  , number o f  ch i ld ren  under f i v e ,  mumber o f  
ch i ld ren  under f i v e   ^ Marriage d u ra t io n  , Year,  , and the  cons tan t .  
Of these  only the c h i ld ren  v a r i a b l e s  approach s ig n i f i c a n c e ,  being p o s i t ­
ive with ' t '  s t a t i s t i c s  of  around 2. This  again c o n t r a d i c t s  the K-S 
r e s u l t s  who f ind  no impact of  ch i ld ren  on husband 's  supply. I t  i s  d i f f ­
i c u l t  to  exp la in  the d i s c r ep a n c ie s  in  r e s u l t s  with  any degree of  c e r t -
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a i n t y .  Assuming t h a t  i t  i s  no t  s o l e l y  due to da ta  source and sample s e l ­
ec t ion  d i f f e r e n c e s  then we should presumably be looking  a t  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  
model s p e c i f i c a t i o n .  U nfo r tuna te ly  n e i t h e r  a r t i c l e  s p e c i f i e s  a formal 
model however we have shown i n  chapte r 3 t h a t  the  K-S model can be s e t  
out  as r e cu rs iv e  in  husband 's  hours. The S-W model appears  no t  to be i d ­
e n t i f i e d  fu r th e r  husband 's  hours en te r  i m p l i c i t l y  i n o t  the dependent va r ­
i a b l e s  in  the w i f e ' s  func t ion  ( i . e .  Husband's income =(hours X wage r a t e  ) 
+ o ther  payments ) ;  i f  i n c re a s in g  husband hours,  c e t e r i s  p a r i b u s , l e a d s  to 
decreasing  wife hours then t h i s  v a r i a b l e  i s  su b jec t  to  a nega t ive  b i a s .
The f i n a l  two U.S. s tu d i e s  we consider  are  concerned with the family  
l i f e  cyle ;  the f i r s t  (Waite (1980) i s  p r im ar i ly  s o c io lo g ic a l  w h i l s t  the  
second (Heckman and Macurdy (1980) i s  an advanced econometric s tudy which 
improves on the s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  of  Minier  (op. c i t . )  and Kalachek e t  a l .  
(op.  c i t . ) .  W ai te ' s  concern i s  to t e s t  the l i f e  cycle hypothesis  pu t  
forward by s o c i o l o g i s t s .  She r e g re s s e s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  r a t e s  us ing  p r o b i t  
a n a ly s i s  . of wives a t  the  th ree  phases of  the l i f e  cyc le ;  phase I  i s  
from the formation of marriage to the b i r t h  of the  f i r s t  c h i ld  (N=74l), 
phase I I  i s  from the b i r t h  of  the  f i r s t  ch i ld  to  the b i r t h  of  the l a s t  ch­
i l d  (N=878), phase I I I  i s  from the end of c h i l d b i r t h  u n t i l  ch i ld re n  leave 
home (N = 912).  Data i s  from the Nat ional  Longi tud ina l  Survey o f  the  Ed­
uca t ion  and Labor Market Experience of Young Women. V ar iab les  are  (with  
th ree  s e t s  of  b rack e ts  to whow s in i f i c a n c e  a t  90^ + l e v e l  fo r  Phases I , I I ,  
I I I  r e s p e c t i v e l y ) ;  Wife 's  wage r a t e  a t  l a s t  or c u r r e n t  job  (+) (+) (+ ) ,  
Husband's income ( a l l  wages, s a l a r i e s ,  b e n e f i t s  e t c .  added) ( ) ( - )  (- )  
(n .b .  c o e f f i c i e n t  i s  very sm al l ) .  Demand (a E e l loc  type v a r ia b le )  ( ) ( )
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( + ) , Unemployment r a t e  in  the  labour  market ( ) ( ) ( ) ,  Work Rat io  i s  
p ro p o r t io n  o f  weeks worked s ince  le av in g  school (+) (+) (+) ,  Dummies fo r  
ch i ld re n  ( n . a . )  (- )  ( - ) ,  Age ( ) (- )  ( - ) ,  Education (+) (+),  Age a t  
Marriage ( ) (- )  ( - ) .  The author  t e s t s  fo r  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  
the  c o e f f i c i e n t s  of  v a r i a b l e s  between s tages  the wages and income var­
i a b l e s  are  only s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  between phases I  and I I I ,  most 
of  the o the r  v a r i a b l e s  do no t  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r  between phases.
The most s o p h i s t i c a t e d  s tudy, to  d a te ,  o f  married women's labour 
supply i s  t h a t  o f  Heckman and MacCurdy (H-M) which we now consider .  We 
do no t  have space to  deal with the theory  which i s  , in  any case ,  a, 
f a i r l y  s tandard  n e o - c l a s s i c a l  l i f e  time u t i l i t y  maximising model (with  
ammendments from the well  known Becker-Ghez approach) . The sample used i s  
of  672, spouse p re sen t ,w h i te  women aged 30-65 taken from the 1968 Mich­
igan Panel Study of  Income Dynamics, Annual hours and annual labour fo rce  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  are  both t r i e d  as dependent v a r i a b l e s . A l l  e s t im a t ion  i s  
c a r r i e d  out  by Maximum Likelihood e s t im a t io n  o f  Tobi t  and P r o b i t  models. 
The maximum a v a i l a b l e  annual l e i s u r e  hours i s  s e t  to  860 ( fo l lowing  Beck­
er and Ghez (1975)) .  The major innovat ion  of H-M i s  to  r ig o r o u s ly  con t r ­
ol  fo r  permanent income by t r e a t i n g  a marginal u t i l i t y  o f  wealth cons t -
\  ' 
an t  demand fu n c t io n  A(o) as a f ixed  e f f e c t .  They c r i t i c i z e  the perman­
en t  income v a r i a b l e s , o f  Mincer (1962) and o th e r s ,  as being inadequate  ad 
hoc p rox ies .  Due to  the d i f f e r e n c e s  in  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  and e s t im a t io n ,  ^he 
t h e i r  r e s u l t s  c o n f l i c t  with the  o lder  s tu d ie s  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  f in d in g  t h a t  
there  i s  no: impact of t r a n s i t o r y  shocks ( c h i e f l y  from husband 's  unemploy­
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ment) to household premanent income; t h i s  f l a t l y  c o n t ra d ic t s  the r e s u l t s  
of  the Mincer a n a ly s i s .  To preserve conformity with the r e s t  of t h i s  
s e c t i o n  we presen t  only  the r e s u l t s  o f  the equation to p r e d i c t  the 
demand for  w i f e ' s  time in the home; holding \ ( 0 )  cons tan t-  s i g n i f i c ­
ant  s igns  from asympto tic  normal t e s t s  in b racke ts -
Household Income ( ) Children l e s s  than 6 (+) , Number of  Children (+) ,  
Wife 's  Age ( + ) Head of house r e t i r e d  or d isabled  ( 4-)  , Husband's Unempl­
oyment ( ) .
We turn  now to B r i t i s h  s t u d i e s .
There are only fou r  o f  these and the the l a s t  three are  in l i n e  with 
the above U.S. s t u d i e s  (with the exception of A-H, K-S) in  being im p l i c i t  
reduced forms of the taxonomy we p resen t  in chapter 3. The f i r s t  B r i t i s h  
study i s  Kelnal l  and Mitchell  (1959) which does not est imate  supply funct­
ions but  i s  merely an a p p l i c a t io n  of simple s t a t i s t i c a l  t e s t s  (Chi-square 
e t c . ) to a very small sample of married women , the sample being a by­
product of research  d i rec ted  to o th e r  o b j e c t i v e s .
Detailed  re sea rch  using ioa the U.K. using indiv idua l  da ta  only becomes 
poss ib le  in the 1960 's through the Family Expenditure Survey, the spec ia l  
survey by Hunt (1968), the General Household Survey (1971 onwards), the 
survey of family time budgets repor ted  in Young and Wilmott (1965), and 
the study of tiie e f f e c t s  of taxa t ion  on male labour  supply by C.V. Brown 
e t  a l .  ( 1976) .  Despite the f a c t  t h a t  the Hunt, and Young and Wilmott 
surveys a ffo rd  usefu l ma te r ia l  fo r i n v e s t ig a t io n  of Chicago-school type 
hypotheses in the context of the II.K* they have never been used (d e sp i te  
being a v a i l a b l e ) .  The Brown e t  a l .  study i s  notable  for i t s  recogn i t ion
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o f  the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  problem im p l ic i t ,  in the u;:e o f  in d iv id u a l  d a ta  i . e .  
v a r io u s  members of the labou r  force  are  haui's c o n s t r a in e d  by t h e i r  job  
and hence can not  be on ' s u p p ly '  f u n c t io n s .  The au th o rs  a t t em p t  to 
overcome t h i s  by i s o l a t i n g  groups who can vary hours w' h rand n e r f -  
orming r e g r e s s i o n s  on these  groups ( th e  o the r  o b se rv a t io n s  must be d i s ­
regarded  as  m e an in g le s s ) .
The proDlem above tends to  be g lossed  over in the e s t im a t io n  of  
female supply f u n c t io n s  as i t  seems to be assumed th-i t women can a f f e c t ­
i v e ly  co n t ro l  t h e i r  hours of work. This  i s  the case in  the  works by 
Layard e t  a l .  and Grecnhalgh(1980) which wo now cons ide r .
Layard e t  a l .  use  a sample o f  2,206 women from the 1974 General 
Household Survey to e s t im a te  a p n r t i c i p a t i o n  fu n c t io n ,  an hours o f  work 
fu n c t io n  fo r  p a r t i c i p a h t s  only  and an hours  of  work fun c t io n  fo r  p a r t i c ­
ip a n t s  and n o n - p a r t i c i p a n t s .  The i r  theory  i s  simply th a t :
( ) Ho = Ao 4 - al X 4 u
where Ho i s  hours o f  work, Ao the i n t e r c e p t ,  X i s  a vec to r  of  measured
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  ( i n c lu d in g  pecunia ry  v a r i a b l e s )  and u i s  the convent­
io n a l  d i s tu rb a n c e  term. Ho can no t  s e n s ib ly  be l e s s  than 0 so the eq­
u a t io n s  a r e  e s t im a ted  by l o g i t  and t o b i t  models as  well  as OLS to  guard 
a g a i n s t  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  some of the  measured X w i l l  p r e d i c t  a neg­
a t i v e  hours .  The r e s u l t s  do no t  d i f f e r  much from 0L3 r e s u l t s ;  t h i s  
seems to  b o .genera l  for  i n d iv id u a l  da ta  s tu d i e s  ( s ee  Smith (1980) and 
Gunderson (1980)) . > . • r
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The r e s u l t s  a re  p r e s e n t e d  below, w i th  s igns  i n  b r a c k e t s ,  a s  a l l  t h r e e  eq­
u a t i o n s  g e n e r a l l y  y i e l d  the  same s ig n s  f o r  c o e f f i c i e n t s  we g ive  o n ly  one.
X v a r ia b le s :  -  Own hour ly  wage ( + ) , Husband's wage ( - ) ' ,  Unemployed husband 
( - ) ,  Age of c h i ld re n  dummies (mostly  - ) ,  number of c h i ld ren  (+,  i f  i t  i s  
s i g n i f i c a n t .  West In d ia n  coloured (+, i f  s i g n i f i c a n t ) , o the r  coloured ( - ,  
i f  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  I r i s h  ( + , i f  s i g n i f i c a n t ) ,  I l l n e s s  (-)'■, Age (+ to  34, -  from 
4.5 onwards, dummies used with 35-44 being the e q u a t io n ) .
The most i n t e r e s t i n g  t h i n g  to  no te  about  the above i s  the  r e a p p e a r a n c e ,  
i n  U.K. work, of  the  Mincer r e s u l t  f o r  t r a n s i t o r y  income a l th o u g h  i t  must be 
borne in  mind t h a t  permanent  income i s  n o t  e x p l i c i t l y  s p e c i f i e d  i n  t h e  model. 
I t  may be the c a s e ,  f o r  t h i s  v a r i a b l e -  male unemployment, t h a t  c a u s a l i t y  runs  
i n  the r e v e r s e  d i r e c t i o n  to  t h a t  p o s i t e d  by the  a u t h o r s ;  i . e .  groups of  men
who are  more l i k e l y  to have wives working hours g r e a t e r  than the average fo r  
married women might have a h igher  p r o b a b i l i t y  of be ing l a i d  o f f  a t  a time of 
r i s i n g  unemployment. 'F u r the r  to  t h i s ,  the cause of unemployment i s  not 
c o n t ro l l e d  fo r  in t h i s  or o the r  s tu d ie s  so t h a t  the  wives of vo lu n ta ry  
j o b - q u i t t e r s  and those i n v o l u n t a r i l y  removed from employment a re  t r e a t e d  as 
being in  the same p o s i t i o n  as regards  t h e i r  a l l o c a t i o n  of time to paid  work. 
The r e g io n a l  dummies used by Layard e t  a l .  prove i n s i g n i f i c a n t  so they
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conclude that,when other v a r i a b le s  are con t ro l led  fo r ,  the re  i s  no e f f ,  
e c t  of region per s e .
Greenhalgh (1980) s t a t e s  a conventional goods- le isure  i - u t i l i t y  -  
maximising model; she recognizes  e x p l i c i t l y  t h a t  the s ing le -equa t ion  
es timation  of a married woman's h o u r s /p a r t i c in a t io n  i s  a reduced-form 
of a family s t r u c t u r a l  model hut argues (op. c i t .  p . 297) t h a t  t h i s  i s  
permiss ib le  on the grounds of the n e g l ig ib le  c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t i e s  of 
husband's hour's to v/ive's wa -es found by o th t s s  (e .g .  A-H).
A sample of 4453 p a r t i c ip a n t s  and 2194 for hours of work i s  used,  
being obtained from the 1971 General Household Survey. Much of the 
aim of t h i s  study i s  to contro l  for  the e f f e c t  of taxa t ion  which i s  
d i f f i c u l t  because of the complex UK f i s c a l  system; the 1971 data  i s  
he lpfu l as there was then ho choice over f i l i n g  as a s ing le  tax u n i t  
or as separa te  husband and wi"e t a x u n i t s .  OLG reg ress ions  are run 
for the whole hours sample, the whole p a r t i c i p a t i o n  samole, and 
separa te  hours functions  for three  groups- taxpayers  with husband pay­
ing standard r a t e ,  non-taxpayers ,  taxpayers.  The l i s t  of v a r i a b le s  
d i f f e r s  from tha t  of Layard ot  al . but; pii.Thllar rresul t s  a re  obtained 
for  comparable v a r i a b le s  inc luding  the in s ig n i f ic a n ce  of ' r e g io n '  
apar t  from the West Central  region of Scotland which i s  explained by 
lack of jobs .  In the aggregated functions  the following ad d i t io n a l  
v a r i a b le s  are s i g n i f i c a n t -  House paid for ( - ) ,  Q u a l i f i c a t io n s  ( a l l  -  
, dummies for c l e r i c a l ,  teaching, and nurs ing  ) .  In the d is saggrega ted  
function which we sha l l  c a l l  T ( l ) ,  T(2),  T(3) r e sp ec t iv e ly  to the above 
l i s t i n g ,  there  are  some d i f f e r en c es .  Poor hea l th  i s  now s i g n i f i c a n t  in
T(l)  i s  a p a r t i c i p a t i o n  func t ion .  '
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in T(l) but not ■. in T(2) , T(3). The p o s i t iv e  own wage r a t e  goes 
e n t i r e l y  on to T( l)  ; the c o e f f i c i e n t  in T(2) and T(3) i s  not s i g n i f ­
i c a n t ly  d i f f e r e n t  from zero. The q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  dummies a lso  become 
in s i g n i f i c a n t  in T(2),T(3) ( a p a r t  from Teaching in T(3)) w h i l s t  rem­
ain ing  s i g n i f i c a n t  in T ( l ) .  T(2),  T(?) do not conta in  many v a r i a b l e s
th a t  are  s i g n i f i c a n t  and the ' F' s t a t s i s t i e s  fo r  them, 11 and 20.8,  
are low r e l a t i v e  to t h a t  fo r the two aggregated , being 77.9.
Summary
We have w i l f u l ly  neglec ted  a la rge  number of s tud ies  due to  space 
l i m i t a t i o n s ;  however, we believe  th a t  the following conclusions are 
not a l t e r e d  by t h i s .  We propose to s t a t e  under var ious headings the 
r e s u l t s  of t l i is  survey :
In f luences  on 1 a I our time a l l o c a t i  on of the family ;
Macroeconomic f l u c tu a t io n s  ; i t  has not been poss ib le  to a ssess  the 
p rec ise  push and pull  responses  of labour force p a r t i c ip a t io n  to the 
s t a t e  of the aggregate labour market.
Regional C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s :
I i. appears th a t  thi; in f luence  of region in terms of job opportun­
i t i e s  e t c .  ; there  seems to be no impact of ' r e g io n '  as a va r iab le  
when a l l  other supply end demand ^ac tors  are taken account of.
Wife 's  Own Wsgo Fl a s t i c i t y  .
This appears to be ' convincingly p o s i t iv e  although doubt i s  c a s t  on 
t h i s  by Greet h a l g h ' s  r e s u l t s ;  at any r a t e  i t  seems no t to be negative
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Musband ' s Cun Wage E l a s t i c i  t.y;
I n s u f f i c i e n t  re sea rch  has been done on th i s ;  i t  could be negative  or 
p o s i t i v e .
Cross e l a s t i c i  t i e s :
These do not nppenr to be important determinants  of family labour  supply.  
Children
Hhece appear to reduce w i f e ' s  labour supply the more of them there  are 
and the younger they arc .  The impact on husband's labour  supply has not 
been s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  e s tab l i sh ed .
I l l n e s s
I t  i s  genera l ly  found th a t  own, or spouse, i l l n e s s  reduces time spent in 
the labour market.
E d u c a t i o n  ^
No coherent p ic tu re  can be formed of the impact of education .  I t  has 
been va r ious ly  measured and d i f f e r e n t l y  in te rp re te d  in d i f f e r e n t  exn l -  
i c i t  and ad hoc models. The ro le  of education needs to be spec i f ied  
in more d e t a i l  p r io r  to es t imat ion .
Non-labour x c  Income:
This has always been found to  be negat ive  although i t  can no t be t r e a t e d  
as an ' income e f f e c t '  as an elementary knowledge of in d i f fe r en c e  curves 
should show. '
Penmanon t Income ;
The e f f e c t  of permanent income is  < an open ques t ion ;  the main
problem i s  in measuring i t .  The question  of how wives'  earn ings  i n f l u ­
ence permanent income has not been adequately i n v e s t ig a te d .
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The above conclus ions  a re  based on surveying s in g le -p e r so n  s tu d i e s  
p lu s  Kushmann- and S c h a f f l e r  (1975). . The r e s u l t s  on wage e l a s t i c i t i e s  do 
n o t  agree e n t i r e l y  with  those from n e o - c l a s s i c a l  th ree  equat ion  demand sys­
tems es timated  on both  working p a r tn e r s .  From the survey of these  i n  
McElroy (1981) i t  appears  t h a t  c r o s s - e f f e c t s  are  a lso  n e g l i g i b l e  bu t  male 
supply i s  backward!bending w h i l s t  female e l a s t i c i t i e s  are  too poor ly  d e t e r ­
mined to  be ass igned a sign.
I t  i s  worth po in t in g  ou t ,  bear ing  in  mind the focus of the  r e s t  of 
t h i s  s tudy  ^ t h a t  th e re  i s  no a ttempt to  r e s t r i c t  these  samples in  any 
meaningful way o ther  than b lack workers being excluded in  some cases .
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Chapter Two : Towards à 'Theory of Family Labour Supply Decis ions .
We have now surveyed the re le v an t  l i t e r a t u r e  of an emp­
i r i c a l  na ture  in  the area of s tud ies  of family labour supply.  I t  wil l
have been evident th a t  most of t h i s  reaearch i s  based on an im p l ic i t  
t h e o r e t i c a l  background; hence few authors  have s e t  out the e x p l i c i t  
t rea tment  of labour supply in the context of the family.  In t h i s  
chapter we must address t h i s  problem; t h i s  can be done most f r u i t f u l ­
ly  by examining the t r a d i t i o n a l  economic theory which has been ex ten t  
del  in  a somewhat ^  hoc fashion to modelling the family.  According­
ly  the s t ru c tu re  of the chapter i s  as follows:
A- The standard n e o - c la s s i c a l  (pro-1965) i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c  labour supp­
ly  model ( i ) ,  extended to two labour supp l ie rs  ( i i ) ,  extended to two 
labour supp l ie rs  with in terdependent u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s ( i i i ) .
B- The Becker model of household time a l l o c a t io n  -  the bas ic  model ( i l  
, the problem of j .oint  decision-making in the bas ic  m ode l ( i i ) ,
C- The 'S o c io lo g ic a l '  model of economic behaviour of the family 
D- An E c lec t ic  model- a considera t ion  of the ex ten t  to which - B and C 
can be combined
Before these sec t ions  are given we need to provide some words 
on terminology and o r ig i n s .  Economics has t r a d i t i o n a l l y  neglected 
the concept of the family in  favoui' of the household which i s  t r e a t ­
ed as a single independent decision-making uni t .  As we hope to show 
( in  B below) the Becker model does not r e a l l y  r e c t i f y  the gross d i s t ­
o r t io n  of r e a l i t y  contained in t h i s  approach.
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The term 'household’ has been generally accepted as the unit of 
consumption in macroeconomics with the analysis of decisions over 
commodity demand, labour supply etc, in microeconomics also being 
treated in terras of the household.
The term household was used in Greek economic writ­
ings to signify the administrative decision-making unit. Sociolog­
ists have generally written about the 'family' rather than the 
household; this is not surprising as their emphasis is on marriage
and child-rearing etc, which are 'social' functions as opposed to
the. more 'economic' functions of the household concept.
Becker's pioneering of the economics of the family 
blurs this distinction by treating family decisions such as marriage 
, divorce, child-bearing etc, as being ae much subject to the mach­
inations of rational,informed, utility-maximising economic man as 
consuming and spending are. It is not clear that this is not still
a treatment of the household rather than the family as it appears
to treat the family as a single-decision-maker rather than a collec­
tion of diverse individuals with differing preferences (we return to 
this problem in various sections below); accordingly we use the term 
'household economy' in this chapter to show some reservations on ' 
the success of economic models as truly representing the family,
A(i) The Standard Meo-Gl'absicalc Labour Supply Model
In the standard model, labour supply is seen as the 
outcome of the process of maximising utilty subject to various con­
straints. The following presentation of this model is taken from
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Henderson and Quandt (1958),
Assume an individual with a utility function U= f(L,Y) 
where L is leisure and Y is income from employment with the price 
ratios of goods consumed by spending Y being held constant. The in­
dividual faces two constraints- 
L= 168- M 
Y= Wr.M
where l68 is the number of hours in a week, M is the number of hours
in paid employment, Wr is the exogenously given costant wage rate
from paid employment (we are assuming here that there)are no assets
or sources of unearned income), We can then re-write Ü as
U = f (168-M, Wr,M) which can be differentiated with respect to Wr
to give dU/dWr = - fl + f2.Wr = 0 and -dY/dL = fl/f2 = Wr i.e. the
rate of substitution between income and leisure is equal to the wage
rate. Further development of this analysis would lead us to the
well-known problem of the indeterminacy of the individual's hours
response to rising wage-rates (see Barzel and MacDonald( 1973)) because
of the fact that we can not know the net outcome of the positive
1
substitution effect and negative income effect.
In empirical work this model has been applied to the 
(usually male) household head on the assumption, that being the 
main income-earner will imply that there is no influence on the supp­
ly decision from other family members' consumption choices or earn­
ings. The model can (and has been) be extended in anumber of ways
mostly in terms of making it intertemporal through the introduction
1. Throughout this chapter, income and substitution effects have the 
opposite of the conventional signs as I refer to supply of labour rather 
than demand for leisure; also it is implicitly assumed that leisure is 
a normal good.
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of savings or endogenous wage rates via the specification of a funct­
ion for investment in human capital. These need not detain us at 
present so we pass on to the usual mode of extending the standard 
model to family labour supply.
A(ii). Standard Model with Two Labour Suppliers
The usual way of arriving at a treatment of more 
than one labour supplier in the standard model (see e.g. Ashenfelter 
and Heckman (1974)) is through a re-consideration of the budget con­
straint. Assuming a family of one husband and wife unit only, where 
both work and save the budget constraint above is expanded to:
Y= Wri.Mi + Wrj.Mj + Uli + Ufj
where the i and j subscripts refer to husband and wife, UX is unearned 
income (e.g. benefits etc.) which should also include savings if the 
budget constraint was treated interteraporally. Without working / 
through the maximisation calculus, it is obvious that spouse's unear­
ned income and wage rate enter as arguments into the individual's 
utility function eind hence labour supply function. Each individual 
is subject to two sets of influence from the labour market- changes 
in own wage rate and changes in spouse wage rate; the net effect of 
these will depend on the sum of two income effects and two substitut­
ion effects which are illustrated for the case of rises in own wage 
rates, ceteris paribus, and rises in spouse wage rates, ceteris parib- 
us in Table 2 , 1 \
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Table 2.1
Effect on i's labour supply , of increased Wri of increased Wrj
substitution effect + -
income effect 
. ... _ _______  .
- -
Most advanced industrialised 
nations, have experienced secular rises in women's real wage rates . 
relative to men's^ Uso that we might expect that, for men, that the 
cross-substitution effect would outweigh the own-substitution effect 
leading to a net fall in labour supply, and that, for women, the own- 
substitution effect might outweigh the cross-substitution effect 
with the ultimate outcome depending on the size of the two income
effects. & review of'--the-existing^ ©rapiTlcai vorkî< appears to suggest 
that own-wage elasticities for men appear to be zero or positive
whilst those for women appear to be strongly positive. It would be 
tempting to make inferences from these results about the standard 
model as it has been enshrined in the above table. However, a num­
ber of serious problems are skated over in the application of the
model as a justification for the results of econometric research.
1. This must not be confused with findings that there has been little
decrease in 'discrimination' as these are based on rates standardised
for occupation etc.; the secular trend embodies shifts of women to
better-paid jobs
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The first problem concerns the extent to which 
consumption is individual or joint; if incomes could be spent 
separately and preferences in consumption were not identical 
then changes in the relative husband/wife time in the labour 
market could alter the intra-household distribution of welf­
are through effects independent of changes in relative wage rates.
To rule out this problem (particularly that of indeterminate eq­
uilibrium) we could proceed 'as if there were only one good 
, represented by Y, which husband and wife consumed jointly. We 
then have to consider where and when this consumption takes 
place; to avoid the problem of its interdependency with leisure 
we have to suppose some such categories as 'pure consumption' 
where all consumption requires absolutely no time input or it 
can be carried on during other activities (i.e. it is 'replace­
ment' of one’s labour power at work^) without impairing prod­
uctivity, and'pure leisure'where leisure consists totally of 
doing nothing (although this is difficult to conceive of).
If we were to take the step of making leisure also joint 
(i.e. the pure leisure we have just defined) then we would have 
boiled the two-person household down into an individual. All 
consumption and leisure need not take place at the identical 
moments in time but it is necessary that there be no difficulty 
in separating the individual utility functions from the joint one,
1. In this case it is difficult to envisage 'joint' consumption but 
it is still plausible as an abstraction in terms of separable utility,
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A Ü i i )  s tandard  Model m h  T»o Labour ^ t h  I n t e r d e n . n . . . .
If we are unprepared to make leisure joint but continue to 
accept the other assumptions of the previous section then we can ex­
tend the standard model in terms of an interaction between husbands' 
and wives' satisfaction from leisure (with all time being either
work or leisure this is equivalent to bringing in relative 'tastes' 
for work).
Instead of using individualistic utility functions we in­
troduce ones capable of including extreme altruism or extreme selfish­
ness:
(2.1) Ui = Ui (Li,Lj,Y)
(2.2) Uj = Uj (Li,Lj,Y)
with letters and subscripts as before, L.
M a x i m i s a t i o n  o f  13^ a n d / o r  Uptakes place subject to the constraint:
(2.3) Ï = (T - L y  + W j ( T -  Lj)
with T being the length of the working period (day or week etc.) and W 
being the wage rate; we assume, for simplification that there are no sav­
ings or non-labour income and that T is computed after a fixed amount of
necessary rest time has been deducted.
With utilities being interdependent there is an additional constraint 
that the utility of one partner is maximised subject to the other's util-
1, Equation 2,3 assumes that the amount of such time is equal for both 
partners; the relaxation of this assumption would make no signficant
difference to the analysis.
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ity being set at some level. Assuming that i's utility is being maximised 
subject to j'3 utility being at the level Uj we can write the problem out 
as follows;
( 2 . A) L j ,  (W^ (,T -  L^) + Wj(T -  L j ) )  + \ ( , U j ( L ^ ,  L y  ( q ( T  -  Lj
+ W.(T -  L y )  -  ü°)
to be maximised subject to the constraint in 2,3,
This gives us:
(2.5)5sU«V à L .  ='àU/ ^ L. - W 'hV /Ü Î + X à U  /àL - W^ U  / àï)1 1 l l l l
(2.6) '^U^/'^L = ^ U / ^ L  - W^U /6Y +X(&U - W Xu /^Y )
i j i j j i j j j j
G
(2.7) XUJ A X  = U. ( L., L.,((T-L.)W. + (T-L.) W.) - U ‘
Setting 2.5 - 2,7 equal to zero for a maximum gives us thé; 
Pareto optimality condition 2.8:
(2 . 8 )
IbUi/)SLj -  Wj 'xu^Ay "àUj A lj -  W j A y
This condition does not determine a unique outcome, rather 
there is a feasible set of Pareto-efficient points which lie on a contract
curve.
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Supposing each partner followed the rule for utility-maximising in 
the single person case and set their hours of work where the rate of subst­
itution of income for leisure equals the own wage-rate, then 2,8 becomes
(2.9)
( / s L  -  / b Y )  (  'bU j A L j  -  A y ) =  o
which reveals the externality as satisfaction of the condition depends on 
the relationship between partner’s wage-rate and one's marginal rate of sub­
stitution between income and partner's leisure.
This problem arises because of externalities which are absent in the 
gingle person case. If the individuals followed the rules which would 
maximise their own utility in the single—person case this would mean that 
they would not automatically maximise their uitlity in the case shown here 
as this depends on partners’ hours.
The existence of indeterminacy in, the choice of working hours obviously 
opens up the problem of how this indeterminacy gets resolved in practice. 
The, typical approach of economists to the problem of indeterminacy is to 
set up bargaining models, this is looked at briefly in B(ii) below. Much of 
the discussion in B(ii)) is relevant to the present problem although it is 
expressed with reference to the Becker model rather than the income/leisure 
model. Discussion of bargaining is restricted until after the presnetat- 
ion of the Becker model in' order to avoid repetiton.
It is now relevant to ask what the implications of the above model are 
for econometric research; seemingly we should now insert a spouse quantity 
constraint variable. It is not clear that this leads to the identification.
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of anything remotely iüoaningful as the model outlined above (particul­
arly in the case of the non-equalitarian family) contains within it the 
possibility of cyclical ^ instability. Recognising this we are lead to 
look for some justification of an assumption that wives' and husbands' 
hours of work pairings do not fluctuate in a volatile fashion over all 
conceivable time horizons. We might appeal to institutional restrictions 
in the labour market but this negates the whole idea of having any theory 
oflabour supply in the first place, A more satisfactory approach might 
be to look outside economics, specifically at sociology, in the hope 
that justification for the assumption of stability can be found and 
perhaps some variables can be found which influence stability. It is 
for this reason that we include section C in the present paper.
We could, of course, step straight to these sections 
now but itc'seems we must consider the Becker model as it considers 
points left out by the standard model and claims to be fruitful for 
empirical work.
The Becker model of Household Behaviour
(i) The Basic Model
The original model (Becker 1965) has been modified 
, when used, according to the purposes of the user (see e,g, Gronau 
(1976) and Hunt and Kiker (n,d,, but distributed 1982)) so that there 
is not really a standard formal presentation of it. To us, some of 
the modifications appear to minimize the differences between the mod-
1, We mean 'cyclical' in the sense used in social welfare function lit­
erature ,
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el and the standard model of previous sections; for example, Hunt 
and Kiker make an assumption which is equivalent to our 'pure 
leisure' (see p.3 of Hunt & Kiker).
The following presentation originates with us and 
attempts to emphasize the view that the Becker model is ismply a 
general equilibrium model applied to the household. Our treatment 
of the standard model has used Y as an argument in the utility
functions; instead we could have used XI,X2 Xn, where the X* s
are goods purchased in the goods market, and re-written the budget 
constraint as:
PI.XI + P2.X2 +  + Pn.Xn. ’= Wr.M
In the standard model possible influences of the relative prices of 
goods on labour s u p p l y u s u a l l y  ignored.
In the Becker model, the X's are regarded as intermediate 
inputs into the household production of 'Commodities’ which we shall 
denote as 'C which are a function of inputs of X's and time.
The simplest view of this is as follows where we assume strictly one 
market good per household commodity and no usage of any G as the in<i»b, 
put to any other C( also no 'joint production' âs assumed in thisicase 
amounts to saying that households do not produce any market goods),
Cl = f (XI, tel)
C2 = f (X2, tc2)
• — • • • • • • « • • • •
Cn = f (Xn, ten)
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U * f (Cl, G2 ....... Cn)
is maximised subject to the following constraints :
tel + tc2 + ........... +tcn = T
Wr (ten) = PlXl + P2.X2 + ..... + Pn.Xn
The first, the time constraint, can be subsumed in the second, the 
budget constraint, by writing:
W ( T - ^ £tci) = ^PiXi
The C's and X's are commodities and goods, respective^ 
ly, as previously stated. The t's are the amounts of time required to 
produce.- each C, the subscripts represent this as a fixed amount per 
commodity. T is the total time available.
All t&is refers to a household as we defer 
consideration of how disparate individuals are aggregated until the 
next section. Work in the paid labour market is here treated as the 
nth commodity which is assumed, following tradition, to be a discomm­
odity. Analogous to Leontief Input-Output models, this nth. commodity 
is produced by an input of goods ( in this case only one), along with 
the requisite time which the household consumes in order to reproduce 
itself^. It would appear that, if we regard leisure as necessary 
costs of such reproduction, there is no information in this nth eq­
uation that is not contained in the other n-1 equations as Cn, labour 
will be produced by f(Cl,C2, ....Cn).
1. The budget constraint will be complicated by the presence of diff­
ering wage rates to family members^
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In such a model, the concept of pure leisure becomes 
somewhat strained, various items of the set of C may be regarded as 
leisure activities produced by inputs of market goods (e.g. golf 
clubs) and time (e.g. spent travelling to the course and in playing 
a game). Other members of the set of G are regarded as being 
'household production'; these are often of an almost metaphysical 
nature, e.g. ' child quality produced by baby food, clothes etc. 
from the market and loving attention and discipline from the parents 
or a clean house produced by a vacuum cleaner and the time spent 
by a household member in wielding it; neither of these can be ob­
jectively measured as an 'output' in any sense whatsoever.
Ultimately we have recourse to the ancient notion of 
opportunity cost to surmount this problem. Cj may not be measurable 
but the withdrawal of time from it and its transfer elsewhere are 
both observable. Ensuring an optimal allocation of household res­
ources implies that the 'price' of a unit of time is rendered equal 
in each of its possible uses. The application of this notion to 
labour supply is straightforward; if the value of time from enter­
ing the laboui’ market exceeds the value of a member's time in a 
home-based activity then the labour market should be entered. Op­
timal hours of work will be achieved where time in the labour market 
is such as to render its marginal value there equal to its marginal 
value in rival uses.
It is now time to consider whether there are any new em­
pirical implications of this approach. Glearly all household activ­
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ities àre rival to labour supply in the use of time, thus the 
conditions of production in these activities will be determinants of 
labour supply.
Following from this it would seem that the following 
factors need to be controlled in estimation;
(i) differences in the productivity of members in a household in 
homeV production vis-a-vis market work.
(ii) differences in tastes and productivity in non-market prod­
uction across households,
(iii) variations across households in the prices of market goods 
available as inputs to commodity production.
These generally are not directly observable and hence we 
are lead to seek proxies; this leads to the problem that a number 
of these may be deputising for different factors specified by 
other models, e.g. number of children may be taken as a proxy for 
the productiivity of wife's home time whereas it would represent 
part of the life-cyle utility maximising process in the standard 
model^ or education may be used to proxy home productivity whereas 
the standard model implies that education has no place in the model 
unless it is compensating for imperfectly measured (or absent) perm­
anent income * variables (being already included through its impact
1, Ghez and Becker (1975) consider the allocation of time and goods 
over the life cycle but they assume total leisure to be fixed which 
seems not in conformity with our interpretation of the essential < 
difference of the Becker model from traditional analysis.
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on the  wage r a t e .
Being l i t t l e  more than a genera l  equ i l ib i rum  or  in p u t - o u t ­
pu t  model app l ied  to the  household the above approach i s  sub jec t  to 
the  same s o r t  of problems i . e .  i t  becomes f a i r l y  u s e l e s s  i f  i n c r e a s ­
ing r e t u r n s  to sca le  or j o i n t  production  are  in t roduced .  Po l i ak  and 
Wachter (19750 make heavy weather of  a s s e r t i n g  these  f a i r l y  obvious 
p o in t s ,
B(ii) The Problem of Joint Decision Making in the Basic Model
Thus f a r  we have proceeded on the  i m p l i c i t  assumption 
t h a t  the  household has a* common u t i l i t y  fu n c t io n '  hence implying 
t h a t  the  c ond i t ions  l a i d  down by Samuelson (1956) fo r  the  const rue^  
t i o n  of  a group welfare  fun c t io n  from in d iv id u a l  p re fe rences  a re  
s a t i s f i e d ,  i . e .  i n d iv id u a l s  rank a l l  members of  the choice s e t  
i n d i v i d u a l l y ,  consumption i s  j o i n t  e t c .
Might t h i s  be a dangerous use o f  the  ' a s  i f  assumption 
in  modelling? S o c io lo g i s t s  and demographers have n a t u r a l l y  been 
concerned t h a t  t h i s  approach erodes the e s s e n t i a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
of the  family  i n  order to  make i t  econom etr ica l ly  t r a c t a b l e  (see  
e . g .  Ryder i n  S c h u l tz (e d . )  (1974) , Bivens in  S .J .B ahr  (ed .)  (1980)) ,  
O ccas iona l ly ,  concern has a l so  been f l e e t i n g l y  expressed by economy 
i s t s  as to  the  r e a l i t y  o f  the  p o s t u l a t e s  involved (see  e .g .  R o se t t  
i n  Foote (ed . )  ( I 96I) , Kushraarui and S c h e f f l e r  (1975));  f o r  a 
more ex tens ive  c r i t i q u e  we have to tu rn  to  G r i l l i c h e s  ( i n  Schultz  
o p . c i t . ) ; due to the comparative s c a r c i t y  of such c r i t i q u e  we tkae
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the liberty of quoting at length;
"One of the major working assumptions of the theory is
the existence of a common family utility function. In his paper (...)
Gary Becker shows that by introducing the notion of 'caring’ (or the
interdependence of utilities) one can show that the family will behave 
as if it has a common utility function. This will not do, I think, for 
the analyst s’-.of the empirical phenomena that we are really interested 
in. What parents care for is not the utility that their children re­
ceive, but ' the utility function that the children have and the re­
sources they control. * Parents care about the consumption basket of 
their children ; they have preferences over actual actions, not just
their subjective outcomes. Much of the within-family conflict comes 
from different evaluationsBof the same consumption opportunities. ... 
In any case , a common utility fucntion cannot explain either the gr­
owth of households or their dissolution (...).
(Grilliches, op. cit., p.546)
It will be recalled that when we introduced 'altruism' 
into the standard model (see A(iii)) a determinate solution did not 
exist and we could not proceed'às if the household were a single en­
tity. It might seem strange that Becker's results are different but 
this paradox will be resolved when we consider the exact nature of his
* Although Grilliches is talking about children it should be evident 
that appropriate substitution of the words 'husband' and 'wife' would 
not invalidate the argument.
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assumptions about the behaviour of individual family members. Super­
ficially it might appear that the original 1965 paper (and the numer­
ous implementations of it by Chicago economists which appear regularly 
in the Journal of Political Economy) represents an. extreme of 'self- 
ishmess' whilst the papers on caring (Becker (1974),(1976), (1981) 
represent an extreme of 'altruism'; in the major paper (Becker (1974)) 
situations in between are disregarded as mathematically trivial.
It must be stressed that the basic model does not embody 
selfish behaviour (this is what Grilliches implies it should embody)
, what it does embody is 'dictatorship'^  where the head of the family 
determines the composition of final household commodity output hence 
he/she also determines the time allocations of other family members 
as,in equilibrium, the latter vector is a function of the former vec­
tor. ! There is no 'sexist' bias in this approach (it all depends on 
who the household 'head' is) but it lacks generality as it seems to 
focus on one, limited type of family decision-making structure.
The introduction of 'caring' can be seen as an attempt to 
provide a more general framework. The trouble with Becker's use of it 
is that it does not embody altruistic behaviour within the family, it 
represents only the case of altruistic behaviour by the household 
head which is a veiled form of dictatorship. To see why this is so 
we consider the argument of the 1974 Becker paper.
1. We are using the term 'dictatorship' in the sense in which it is 
used in the proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem.
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Becker begins by d e f in in g  the  ' s o c i a l  income' rece iv ed  by 
the  household head as h i s /h e r  own income p lus  the  VAlue to  h in /h e r  of 
o t h e r ' s  r e c e ip t s .  The c r u c i a l  p o s tu la te  about the head i s  t h a t  h e /sh e  
i n t e r n a l i z e s  e x t e r n a l i t i e s ,  t h i s  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by the  q u o ta t io n s  below 
"He would take  any a c t io n  d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t in g  consumption only when 
e i t h e r  the  value of any in c re a se  in  h i s  consumption exceeded the  va lue
( to  him) of any decrease  in  o th e r  members’ consumption".........
" f o r  example, he would read in  bed a t  n ig h t  only i f  the  value o f  
read ing  exceeded the value ( to  him) of the l o s s  in  s leep  su ffe re d  by 
h i s  wife"
(Becker(1974), p . 1078)
The h ead 's  u t i l i t y  fu n c t io n  can be t r e a te d  as i f  i t  were the  
fam ily  fu n c tio n  because , owing to  h i s  concern f o r  o th e r  members, he 
w i l l ,  in  the p rocess  of maximising h i s  own u t i l i t y ,  a lso  maximize 
t h e i r s .
This appears to  have the  samè im p lic a t io n s  fo r  empir­
i c a l  work as the  model of A ( i i i )  i . e .  we might i n s e r t  a spouse hours
i ;
q u a n t i ty  c o n s t r a in t  in  the h e ad 's  labour supply fu n c t io n .  Econometr­
i c a l l y  th e re  i s  some d i f f e r e n c e  as t h i s  im p lies  a r e c u rs iv e  model w ith
i t  being necessary  t h a t  we can f i r s t  i d e n t i f y  the  head in  o rder to  p ick
\
the  r i g h t  fam ily  member on which to  e s tim ate  the  re c u rs iv e  r e g re s s io n .  
The model in  A ( i i i )  im plies  simultaneous e s t im a tio n  with both p a r tn e r s  
s u b je c t  to  the  in f lu en ce  of each o th e r s '  hours o f  l e i s u r e ;  t h i s  i s  be­
cause i t  was based on pervasive  a l t ru is m  r a th e r  t h a t  the  one-s ided  a l -
1 . This v a r ia b le  has an income e f f e c t  through a f fo rd in g  in c reased  
l e i s u r e  and a s u b s t i t u t i o n  e f f e c t  from the d i s u t i l i t y  of l o s t  spouse 
l e i s u r e .
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tru ism  of Becker,
I t  t r a n s p i r e s  then th a t  we s t i l l  have d i c t a to r s h ip  as h e a d 's  
p re fe ren ces  u l t im a te ly  d i c t a t e  the v e c to r s  of household consumption 
and time a l lo c a t io n .  The p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of p e rvasive  s e l f i s h n e s s ,  perv­
as iv e  a l t ru is m ,  and mixed a l t rm is m -s e l f i s h n e s s , are  thus  l e f t  unexplor­
ed in  the  household production  model. C onsidering  these  would seem to  
lead  us in  to  a sea of inde te rm ina te  or c y c l i c a l  ba rg a in in g  p o s i t io n s  
and hence leave  us in  the p o s i t io n  of appea ling  to  s e c t io n  C fo r  v a l id ­
a t io n  o f  the Becker cases as the  most e m p ir ic a l ly  r e le v a n t  or f o r  some 
sug g es tio n s  as to  non-economic de term inan ts  o f  s ta b le  b a rg a in in g  \ 
outcomes.
Before we do t h i s  we could conside r some t r a d i t i o n a l  appr­
oaches by economists to  awkward ba rg a in in g  problems. One th in g  which 
we could do i s  ignore  c h i ld re n  and t r e a t  the husband-wife d e c is io n s  as 
a duopoly problem where we e f f e c t i v e ly  have a ' Cournot household* w ith  
one member t r e a t i n g  the o th e r  member's v ec to r  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  as given 
when making h i s /h e r  d e c is io n s .  Implementing t h i s  e m p ir ic a l ly  would be 
y e t  ano ther  r e c u rs iv e  model. A more popular suggestion  i s  to  use game 
theo ry ; the most developed a p p l ic a t io n  o f  i t  to  our problem i s  by Man­
se r  and Brown (1980), as they d i r e c t l y  address  the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in h e r ­
e n t  in  the  Becker approach we now conside r  t h e i r  paper. M&B j u s t i f y  the 
a p p l ic a t io n  of game theory  to  m a r i ta l  behaviour on the  grounda. t h a t  
"because o f  the e x is ten ce  of household goods and c a r in g ,  the  m arriage 
'b a r g a in '  can be viewed as a two-person, nonzero sum game". ( i b i d . , p . 37) 
I t  i s  recognised  by the au tho rs  t h a t  an e x p l i c i t  'b a r g a in -
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ing  r u le  i s  req u ired  to  a r r iv e  a t  a de term ina te  so lu t io n  when we aban­
don the  assumption th a t  the  household i s  a s in g le  decision-m aking u n i t .
A gam e-theore tic  approach i s  used on the grounds th a t  i t  enables  sep a r­
ate; u t i l i t y  fu n c t io n s  to  be employed r a th e r  than  an aggregate  fu n c t io n .
Two b a rga in ing  r u le s  a re  proposed the d i c t a t o r i a l  and the symmet­
r i c a l  .
The d i c t a t o r i a l  i s  as fo llow s;
Maximise (XI, X2^, ,o4?)
s , s s d 8 .
and U (XI, X2 , L ,o4 ) _ Vo ^  0
i The symmetrical i s  as fo llow s (sym m etrical means t h a t  swopping 
the .’ l a b e l s ’ of the  p a r t i e s  i s  of no s ig n i f ic a n c e ) ;
Maxlgise N = max C o ^ (X l,  X2^, -  vè  W*", l ’')3
.  Cu^ '(xi, xgj, -  vb (p ’’ y ,  1^ 0
Both a re  su b jec t  to  the fo llow ing  c o n s t r a in t s :
P ’X + W'L -  I  = 0 
L* + L* = T 
X* ^ 0
The n o ta t io n  i s  as fo llow s; U i s  a p a r t y ' s  U t i l i t y ,  s r e f e r s  to 
s u b je c t ,  d to d i c t a t o r ,  i  and j to  the  two p a r t i e s  to  a b a rg a in ,  XI i s  
a vec to r  of 's h a re d '  or 'household ' goods ( i . e .  they a re  j o i n t l y  consum­
ed and s a t i s f y  the  p r o p e r t i e s  of a pure p u b lic  good)-, L i s  own l e i s u r e ,  
i s  an e f f ic ie n c y  param eter designed to cap tu re  the ga ins  from marr­
iage  which are  no t captured  in  ta n g ib le  o u tp u ts ,  X2 i s  a v ec to r  of goods 
which a re  no t capable of being  shared in  consumption, Vo i s  a '  ' t h r e a t  
p o in t '  determined by the u t i l i t y  a v a i la b le  in  tuo s in g le  s t a t e  ( i t  i s
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assumed th a t  m arriages  w i l l  no t be formed or , i f  formed, w i l l  d is so lv e  
i f  th e re  a re  no t  ga ins from the m a r i ta l  s t a t e ,
P' = ( P 1 , P 2  , p4 ) ,  X» = (X1,X2 ,X2 ) ,  W = (W^, W^) L' =(L^,L'*),
T = (T ,T ) ’ (T i s  t o t a l  time a v a i la b le  to  a member), I = I^+ I ^ ,
I  i s  the  budget c o n s t r a in t  , i s  exogenous income accru ing  to the  
household i f  i t  i s  formed, X* = (X ,L ) ' ,  L* = (L*^, L * j) '  where L* 
i s  time devoted to  market work.
The au thors  argue ( p . 41, op. c i t . )  t h a t  in te rd ep en d en t u t i l i t i e s  
\  l a  Becker, i . e .  i ' s '  u t i l i t y  depends on J ’ s bu t no t the  o the r  way 
round or v ice  v e r s a , i s  no t  the  source of determ inacÿ in  the  model; 
r a th e r  determinacy i s  achieved by the im p os it ion  o f a ba rg a in in g  r u le  
and hence a b a rga in ing  ru le  must be imposed to  enforce a s ta b le  outcome.
Whichever b a rga in ing  ru le  i s  used the  M-B model r e s u l t s  in  the  
commodity demand v ec to r :
X» = h" (P,W,
corresponding ly  the  v ec to r  o f  labour su p p l ie s  should c o n ta in  the same 
arguments.
Some comments a re  in  o rder on the  theo ry  before  we a sse ss  the  imp­
l i c a t i o n s  of the ba rga in ing  model fo r  em p ir ica l  re s e a rc h .
The model c l a r i f i e s  the  n e c e s s i ty  o f  a ba rg a in in g  r u le  bu t i t  
does n o t  r e a l l y  go any f u r th e r  than the  Becker approach in  in c o rp o ra t in g  
i n t e r a c t i o n  in to  fam ily  behaviour; a ba rg a in in g  ru le  can no t be imposed 
a\ p r i o r i  i f  i t  i s  i t s e l f  endogenous to  the  components o f  the  model or 
i s  s e p a ra te ly  bargained fo r  exogenously to the  model.
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One obvious p o in t  of c r i t i c i s m  which could have been made a t  any­
time s ince  the beginning of A ( i i i )  i s  t h a t  the  n o tion  o f c a rd in a l  u t i l i t y  
appears to  have s l ipped  in  to  the a n a ly s is ;  i t  i s  n o t  r e a l l y  p o s s ib le  to  
banish  i t  w ithou t s a c r i f i c i n g  the  de te rm ina te  eq u ilib r iu m  (where a barg­
a in in g  r u le  i s  imposed) .
We might proceed ' a s  i f  a b a rg a in in g  r u le  e x i s t s  and i s  imposed 
in  implementing econometric models b u t ,  by t h i s  token, we might j u s t  as 
w ell proceed as i f  a common u t i l i t y  fu n c t io n  e x is te d  as the  same 
arguments appear in  both or i f  they do n o t e x p l i c i t l y  they  can u s u a l ly  
be regarded  as p ro x ies  fo r  om itted  r e g r e s s o r s .  Hence the  var ious  models 
do n o t  r e a l l y  compete in  the  arena of hypothesis  t e s t i n g .
The barga in ing  model im plies  t h a t  a l l  wage r a t e s ,  a l l  p r i c e s ,  
a l l  non-labour incomes (endogenous and exogenous), and the  e f f ic ie n c y  
param eters  r e p re se n t in g  p ro d u c t iv i ty  in  the ou tpu t of in ta n g ib le s  from 
m arriage which have no market s u b s t i t u t e ,  ought to  be inc luded  in  the  
lab o u r supply fu n c tio n  along with any o th e r  f a c to r s  norm ally  used ' t& 
c o n t ro l  fo r  v a r i a t io n s  in  t a s t e s  e t c .  The problem w ith  t h i s  model i s  
t h a t  none of the  in d iv id u a l  equations  would appear to  be i d e n t i f i e d ;  
i t  i s  o f  course p la u s ib le  t h a t  we could impose a p r i o r i  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on 
c e r t a i n  param eters and proceed to  r e f in e  the s t a t i s t i c a l  model through 
mixed e s t im a tio n  ( e s s e n t i a l l y  t h i s  i s  what A sh en fe l te r  and Heckman 
( 1974) do f o r  the  standard model extended as per A ( i i ) ) .
1 .  I t  appears  we must adopt c a rd in a l  u t i l i t y  with P i g o u v i ^ n  bravado or 
abandon the search  of models which a t  a l l  resemble ' f a m i ly '  behav iour .
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P a ra d o x ic a l ly ,  models with in te rd ep en d en t  u t i l i t y  which la ck  a 
s p e c if ie d  b a rg a in in g  r u le  might prove i d e n t i f i a b l e  i f  they a re  t r e a te d  
as re c u rs iv e  models (see  Ch.3) i . e  wives' hours  might be re c u rs iv e  on
■ ■ ’i
husbands' hours." ■
Suppose we were to  t r e a t  the  b a rg a in in g  r u l e s  as a sp e c ts  of 
r e a l i t y  and no t mere in s tru m en ta l  assum ptions, then a new problem 
r e a r s  i t s  head, t h a t  i s  , w ith in  a sample p o p u la t io n  th e re  might be 
d i s t i n c t  s e ts  of households which o pera te  accord ing  to  d i f f e r e n t  ba rg ­
a in in g  r u l e s .  There w i l l  be an aggregation  problem of s e r io u s  dimens­
ions  i f  the model i s  es tim ated  on the whole d a ta  s e t  a s ,  although' 
the  arguments would be the  same in  symmetric and d i c t a t o r i a l  house­
ho lds^ ' fu n c t io n s ,  fu n c t io n a l  forms and param eter e s t im a te s  should 
n o t  be the  same. The s im p les t  way to  approach t h i s  would be to . 
e s t im a te  l i n e a r  fu n c t io n s  of each group and t e s t  t h a t  the  param eters  
a re  equa l.  A l te rn a t iv e ly  the  e x p l i c i t  fu n c t io n a l  forms could be d e r ­
ived and te s te d  through app ly ing  the r i g h t  model to  the 'w rong ' d a ta  
and comparing i t s  performance with the  ' r i g h t '  model f o r  t h a t  d a ta .
This has the  problem th a t  we need some i n i t i a l  idea, of 
which p o pu la tions  belong to  which group. C onsidering  t h i s  the barg­
a in in g  model seems incom ple tely  s p e c i f ie d  and so we look a t  soc io log­
i c a l  a n a ly s is  of fam ily  b a rg a in in g  in  the  n ex t  s e c t io n .  I t  ought to  
be added th a t  a l t e r n a t i v e  economic models a re  l ik e w ise  incom plete.
1 , I t  should be remembered th a t  the  use o f  the  term ' d i c t a t o r '  i s  no t 
i d e n t i c a l  in  Manser and Brown (1980) to  our e a r l i e r  usage.
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C. The S o c io lo g ic a l  Model of Economic Behaviour of the ^am ily
The p re s e n t  s ec t io n  i s  in  two p a r t s ;  the  f i r s t  d e f in e s  some 
r e le v a n t  concepts from genera l  sociology and the  sociology of the  
fam ily  , these  concepts have been a l t e r e d  in  v a r io u s  ways fo r  the 
purposes of the p re s e n t  s tudy; the second d is c u s s e s  em pir ica l  
work which i s  r e le v a n t  to  the  b a rga in ing  model.
( i )  Concepts
Roles An in d iv id u a l  performs a r o le  when ca r ry in g  o u t some 
a c t i v i t y  in  r e l a t i o n s h ip  to  another in d iv id u a l .  To a t t a i n  the  
s t a tu s  of a r o l e ,  the  a c t i v i t y  (o r  a c t i v i t i e s )  must be perceived  
as meaningful by the second p a r ty ,  i . e .  the  f i r s t  p a r ty  i s  seen 
to  be f u l f i l l i n g  some purpose w ith in  an o rg a n iz a t io n a l  network. 
S e lf -p e rc e p t io n  of r o le s  need no t conform w ith o th e rs  p e rc e p t io n s .  
In  the  economic theory  of the  fam ily  th e re  a re  no ’ r o l e s '  as  such 
as  a l l  members a re  e s s e n t i a l l y  t ra d in g  p a r tn e r s  maximising th e i r  
own u t i l i t y  through i n t r a - f a m i l i a l  exchange. I t  i s  here  t h a t  the 
crux of G r i l l i c h e s '  o b je c t io n s  about growth and d i s s o lu t io n  of fam­
i l i e s  can be d isce rn ed ;  c h i ld re n  can n o t  choose to  t ra d e  i n i t i a l l y  
as  they a re  in v o lu n ta r i l y  t h r u s t  in to  the  fam ily . To e x p la in  t h e i r  
d e c is io n  to  leave  in  terms o f expected u t i l i t y  gain comes down to  
saying th a t  they leave  because they le a v e .  Any o p t in g -o u t  of the  
fam ily  s t r u c tu r e  (d iv o rce ,  leav in g  home) must be proceeded by a 
r e - d e f i n i t i o n  of ro le s  w ith in  the old s t r u c tu r e ;  i . e .  the e x i s t in g  
order in  the  fam ily  f a i l s  to  s a t i s f y  the  d e p a r tee s  t h a t  they  a re  
s t i l l  ' s o n s ' ' d au g h te rs '  ' w iv e s ' ' husbands' e t c .
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Norms a re  the ex p ec ta t io n s  (o f  behaviour) which a re  c o l l e c t i v e ly  
held  by the  fam ily  . These a re  determined by in t e r a c t io n  between 
the husband and wife ( f o r  a s p e c i f i c a l l y  i n t e r a c t i o n i s t  t re a tm en t o f  
the fam ily  see Turner (1970)and the in f lu e n c e s  which have they  been 
s u b je c t  to  from t h e i r  own f a m i l ie s ,  educa tion , work, and the  exper­
ience  of developing shared va lues  with t h e i r  peer group ( th e  l a t t e r  
i s  the  concept of th e * co h o r t’ in  the study of s o c ia l  change, see 
Ryder ( I 965) ) .
As an example i t  might be a fam ily  norm t h a t  c e r t a in  members 
a re  e n t i t l e d  to a copious e n t i t le m e n t  o f  some of the  non-shareab le  
goods o f  the Manser-Brown a n a ly s is  on account of t h e i r  perceived  
ro le  w ith in  the fam ily . This would, of cou rse , be a fragment o f  a 
complex s e t  of ba rg a in in g  ru le s ^  whereby a n o n -e q u a l i ta r ia n  i n t r a ­
fam ily  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of w e lfa re  i s  l e g i t im is e d .  Economists might r e ­
gard (a s  Becker e t  a l .  tend to  do) t h i s  as simply eq u iv a len t  to  the  
assumption of given ' t a s t e s ’ ; in  p a r t i c u l a r  we might argue t h a t  the  
o th e r  members have no t a s t e  a t  a l l  f o r  the non-shareab le  good in  
q u es t io n  and have sa tu ra te d  t h e i r  own t a s t e s  or a re  a l t r u i s t i c a l l y  
in c l in e d  to  a consumption t r a n s f e r .
Norms are  n o t e q u iv a len t  to  t a s t e s  because they a re  n o t  supp­
osed to  be exogenous being formed in  the  p ro c e ss -o f  i n t e r a c t i o n  w ith­
in  the  fam ily  and of the fam ilÿ  with the  o u ts id e  world,
1> The above example could be viewed in  terms o f ' s o c i a l  exchange' 
i . e .  the  p r iv i le g e d  member d isch a rg es  c e r t a in  s e rv ic e s  in  r e tu r n  fo r  
acceptance o f  h i s / h e r  r o l e .
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Resourcea are  d e f in e d ,  in  m arriage , as "any th ing  th a t  one p a r tn e r  may 
make a v a i la b le  to  the o th e r ,  he lp ing  the l a t t e r  s a t i s f y  h i s  needs or 
a t t a i n  h i s  goals" . (Blood and Wolfe, I960, p . 1 2 ) .  Hence re so u rce s  
cover ta n g ib le s  such as goods and income and in ta n g ib le s  such as 
sympathy e tc .  ; the  in t r o d u c t io n  of the  e f f i c i e n c y  parameterotiin 
B ( i i i )  i s  a move in  the d i r e c t io n  of t h i s  concept,The c r u c i a l  elem­
en t in  the  concept of re so u rce s  i s  the  idea  o f  a p r iv a te  p ro p e r ty  as 
the  t a l e n t s ,  emotions, and possess ions  of the  m arriage p a r tn e r s  are  
no t looked upon as a common s tock .
C le a r ly  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of re so u rce s  w ith in  the fam ily  w i l l  
be a de term inan t o f  the type of decision-m aking  which ta k es  p lace  
( see Power below.ÿ
A u th o r i ty r e p re se n ts  the  a b i l i t y  to  impose one’ s p re fe re n ce s  
over fam ily  a c t i v i t i e s  w ithout recou rse  to  any th r e a t  of withdrawal 
o f re so u rce s  i f  d i s s e n t  a r i s e s ,  i . e .  a u th o r i ty  i s  based on the harm­
onious e s tab lish m en t of norms- t h i s  p o in t  i s  made in  Blood and Wolfe 
(I960) , S a f i l io s - R o th s c h i ld ( l9 7 0 ) , Wolfe (1959).
A u th o r i ty  can be d iv id ed , i . e .  one member may e x e rc ise  a u th o r i ty  in  
c e r t a in  a c t i v i t i e s  w h i ls t  ano ther may e x e rc is e  a u th o r i ty  in  o th e r s ,  
t h i s  d iv i s io n  w i l l  be determined by norms and r o l e  p e rcep tio n s  ( e .g .  
the  ' m aleness’ or ’ fem aleness’ of s p e c i f ic  decison-prob lem s.
Power i s  d e f ined  by R o l l in s  and Bahr (1976) as " the  r e l a t i v e  
p o t e n t i a l  of m arriage p a r tn e r s  to  in f lu en c e  the  behaviour of each 
o th e r  when a c o n f l i c t  of goa ls  e x i s t  between them", ( p .620)
This im p lies  t h a t  power i s  the  withdrawal o f  re so u rce s  in  o rder to
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enforce  o n e 's  own p re fe ren ces  in  re s p e c t  of some a c t i v i t y ,  R o l l in s  
and Bahr, op. c i t . ,  argue t h a t  power i s  a p roduct of s o c ia l  i n t e r a c t ­
ion ; t h i s  may determine the  degree to  which power i s  ex erc ised  ( i . e .  
the  f u l l  power possessed may never be ex erc ised  because i t  contravenes 
the  norms to  which i t s  ho lder  conforms or c o n t r a d ic t s  h i s / h e r  concept­
ion of t h e i r  own ro le )  but i t  does no t appear r e le v a n t  to  the  d e f i n i t ­
ion j u s t  advanced which concerns p o t e n t i a l  and hence would seem to  
be s o le ly  based on resource  ho ld in g s .
As i s  the case with A u th o rity ,  Power may be d iv id ed ,
( i i )  Em pirical Work
U lt im a te ly  our concern i s  with the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of power w ith in  
the  fam ily  as i t  i s  t h i s  which determ ines whether the economic models 
a re  v a l id  conceptions or n o t .  There a re  th re e  ways of i n v e s t ig a t in g  
the  lo c a t io n  of power w ith in  the household- (a) look a t  the  i n t r a -  
fam ily  income d i s t r i b u t i o n  (b) look a t  the behav io r of husbands and 
wives in  making p a r t i c u l a r  d e c is io n s  (c) ask f a m il ie s  what they be­
l i e v e  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of power to  be w ith in  t h e i r  fam ily .
Method (c) i s  f rau g h t  with d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and 
we s h a l l  only d is c u s s  i t  i n f e r e n t i a l l y  while covering  s tu d ie s  o f  the  
(b) type .
We now look a t  s tu d ie s  of the  (a) ty p e .  D ire c t  s tu d ie s  of t h i s  
type , i . e .  i n v e s t ig a t io n s  o f how t o t a l  rece ived  income i s  s p l i t  fo r  
consumption, a re  amazingly r a r e .  I have no t been able  to  f in d  any 
American re sea rch  d e sp i te  the  immense volume o f  s o c io lo g ic a l  s tu d ie s  
of the  family (S h o r te r  (1976) complains th a t  the  e f f o r t s  o f  what he
—90—
c a l l s  the ' socio logy of the  fam ily  in d u s t r y ’ f a i l  to  r e s u l t  in  any use­
f u l  in fo rm ation  about how fa m il ie s  a c tu a l ly  behaved
Young ( 1952) ,  w r i t in g  in  the B r i t i s h  c o n te x t ,  noted the  s i g n i f ­
icance of in t r a - f a m i ly  d i s t r i b u t i o n  fo r  a number of p o l ic y  is su e s  and 
l a id  down as a suggestion  f o r  fu tu re  re se a rc h  t h a t  measures o f  i t  be 
a v a i l a b le  in  some fu tu re  household survey. The in t r o d u c t io n  of the  
Family Expenditure  Survey in  1957 would have seemed an f i d e a l  oppor­
tu n i ty  to  do t h i s  bu t the  i n i t i a t i v e  was no t taken  and the FES s t i l l  
does n o t  co n ta in  any in form ation  of t h i s  type .
Thede a re  two small independent B r i t i s h  surveys (Hunt (1978)
1
and Pahl (1980)) of in t r a - f a m i ly  ’wage payment systems’ . Pah l prop­
oses a typology of th ree  types  of payment system, drawn from s c a t t e r ­
ed evidence in  community s tu d ie s  and s o c ia l  h i s t o r y  r e s e a rc h ,  and 
in v e s t ig a te s  a sample of 25 fa m il ie s  fo r  the  p resence of th ese  ty p e s .
The types  are  -  the whole wage system where ’’ the  husband hands over 
the  whole of h i s  wage packe t and the wife manages a l l  t h e i r  f in a n c ia l  
a f f a i r s ,  g iv ing  him a ce r ta in e  amount fo r  h i s  own personal pocket- 
money" ( i b i d . ,  p . 318); th e re  i s  a v a r i a n t  of t h i s  where the  husband 
hands over the  whole wage minus h is  pocket money, the  allowance 
system where the  husband g ives h i s  wife an ’ a llow ance’ or ’wage’ ou t 
of h i s  income, t h i s  being based on a ’norm’ r a t h e r  than h e r  genuine 
requ irem en ts ,  the  booling  system where a l l  income i s  ’ sh a red ’ by^  
husband and w ife . The meaning of ’ sh a red ’ in  the  l a s t  ca tegory  i s  
open to  debate p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  view of the  e a r l i e r  d i s t i n c t i o n  betw-
1. Rimmer (1982) surveys the  l i t e r a t u r e ,  in  the  U.K., on fam ily  in ­
come d i s t r i b u t i o n s ,  mainly to conclude i t  i s  sparse  and inadequa te . 
Piachaud (1982) prov ides  some new evidence from the Family Expenditure  
Survey bu t due to  the in a p p ro p r ia te n ess  of the  d a ta  source very  l i t t l e  of 
consequence i s  rev ea led .
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een shareab le  and non-shareab le  goods.
The f i r s t  two types of arrangement appear to  predominate in  
the lower s t r a t a  o f  the p o pu la tion  in  terms o f s o c ia l  s t a t u s  w h ils t  
the l a t t e r  i s  c lo s e r  to  a 'm id d le -c la s s '  system. I f  th in g s  were t h i s  
simple we could pronounce t h a t  the  lower s t r a t a  a re  c h a ra c te r is e d  by 
a 'dominance' ba rga in ing  r u le  implying wives' hours are  re c u rs iv e  on 
husbands' hours w h i ls t  the  middle s t r a t a  a re  la ck in g  a ba rga in ing  
r u le  and hence should be s im ultaneously  e s tim ated  o r t r e a te d  r e c u r s ­
iv e ly  (depending on p r io r  in form ation  about exogenous c o n s t r a in t s ) .
However we must note  the  query in  P a h l ' s  conclusion  :
"How much do p a r t i c u l a r  a l l o c a t iv e  systems r e f l e c t  p a t t e r n s  of 
power w ith in  marriage and how much do they a f f e c t  such p a t te rn s? "  
( i b i d ,  p . 334). I t  may w ell be the  case t h a t  the  e x te n t  of the  w i f e ' s  
involvement in  the  labour market a l t e r s  the  d i s t r i b u t i o n  of power in  
decision-m aking. This i s  the  im p lic a t io n  of i n d i r e c t  evidence such 
as  t h a t  of Hunt(l978) which shows t h a t  jobs a re  regarded as  p ro p e r ty  
which e n t i t l e s  wives to  a say in  a reas  of household a d m in is t ra t io n  
form erly  c losed . Correspondingly  t h i s  in c re a s e s  the in f lu en ce  of 
t h e i r  in form ation  s e t  on husbands' lab o u r  supply  d e c is io n .  I n d i r e c t  
evidence can a lso  be provided by the  f in d in g  th a t  wives' earn ings  
come to  be regarded as a component o f  permanent income (see  Mooney 
( I 98I )  and c o r re c t iv e  note  by Cameron (1982)); Mooney's study i s  
n o t  e n t i r e l y  r e l i a b l e  in  t h i s  con tex t as she does no t e s t im a te  a 
complete husband-wife system but proceeds as i f  the  wife was dominant
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We now look a t  s tu d ie s  us ing  method (b) which a lso  providfe 
i n d i r e c t  evidence p e r ta in in g  to  the l a s t  query.
Middleton and P u tney (I96O) argue th a t  th e re  i s  a continuum of 
decision-m aking s t r u c tu r e s  which a re  rep re sen ted  in  F igure  2.1  below
E q u a l i t a r ia n  (m idd le-c lass)
M a tr ia rch a l  -  —— - ■■ — " < - " '■■■•- - - —  < P a t r i a r c h a l
F igure  2 .1
They f in d  a s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  between fam­
i l i e s  w ith  working and non-working wives bu t the  s h i f t  i s  in  the 
d i r e c t io n  of a p a t r i a r c h a l  s t r u c tu r e .  M &P a lso  f in d  t h a t  working 
wives a re  l e s s  dominant, than non-working wives in  c h i ld - r e a r in g ,  
r e c r e a t io n ,  and r o le  a t t i t u d e s .  I t  i s  worth n o tin g  th a t  th e re  i s  
l i t t l e  s t a t i s t i c a l  c o n t ro l ,  in  t h i s  s tudy, f o r  system atic  d i f f e r e n c e s  
in  households.
Blood and Hamblin ( I 96O) f ind  t h a t  both working and non-work­
ing  wife p a i r s  regard  themselves as e q u a l i t a r i a n  and th a t  husbands 
of working wives d id  more housework than those of non-working w ives. 
This study was confined to  those m arried 1-6 y e a rs .
Heer(l958) found t h a t ,  c o n t r o l l in g  fo r  p e r s o n a l i ty  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  
working wives exer ted  more in f lu e n c e ,  than non-working, on d e c is io n s  
with th e re  being a s ig n i f i c a n t  p o s i t iv e  c o r r e la t io n  between the numb­
e r  of ch ild re n  and husband 's  in f lu en ce  on decision-m aking.
In  a la b o ra to ry  experim ent, S troed tbeck  (1951) found th a t  th e re  
was no s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n i f i c a n t  evidence of husband or wife dominan-
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ce but r a th e r  i t  was the p a r tn e r  who ta lked  the most, i . e .  acquired 
the  most in form ation , who dominated. .
Meyer and Lewis (1976) conclude th a t  a d i r e c t l y  measured 
'power' v a r ia b le  i s  no t a v a i l a b le  as the  d i f f e r e n t  p o s s ib le  measures 
of power show very low c o r r e la t io n .
F in a l ly  we must co n s id e r  t h a t  w i f e 's  work may have an in f lu en ce
on the s o c ia l  p o s i t io n  of the  family and hence th e re  w i l l  be mutual
cau sa tio n  between s ta tu s  (o r  c la ss )  and the type of ba rga in ing  ru le ( s )  
in  o p e ra t io n  in  the economy. Oppenheimer (l9 '/7) argues a g a in s t  P a rs ­
ons, who claimed t h a t  male-dominant s e x - ro le  seg rega tion  was necessary  
fo r  the  s t a b i l i t y  of the fam ily , th a t  the  w i fe 's  occupation i s  a d e t^  
erm inant of fam ily  p o s i t io n  in  the s o c ia l  s t r a t a .  An em pir ica l  study 
by Mahoney and Richardson (1979) f in d s  th a t  husband 's  s t a tu s  determ­
in es  w i f e 's  s t a tu s  and work of the wife has no in f lu en ce  on her s ta tu s ,  
The above l i t e r a t u r e  does no t provide us with any n ea t  or c lea r-  
cu t conclusions  , in  a d d i t io n  i t  i s  g e n e ra l ly  o ld ,  c o u n try -s p e c i f io ,  
and based on sm all,  p o o r ly -c o n tro l le d  samples.
D An E c le c t ic  Model
I t  i s  now time to  cons ide r  how th e  in s ig h t s  
of the  v a rio u s  models d e ta i l e d  above might u s e f u l ly  be combined in to
a s y n th e s is ;  as they have sep a ra te ly  been d e a l t  w ith . C onsidera tion  
of s e c t io n  C should lead  us to  r e a l i s e  t h a t  the  fo rm ulation  of the 
maximand fo r  the symmetric case in  the  Manser,Brown a n a ly s is  i s  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  case of a more genera l  model.
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The general model Ig based on a family u t i l i t y  fim ction  which,, i s  ad d i t  
ive in  both p a r tn e r s '  u t i l i t y  function^ 'j  Tt can be w r i t t e n  as Uf =
qi qj
Ui ( ) . Uj ( ) , in  the Manser-Brown a n a ly s is  q i and qj a re  t r e a te d
as bo til equal to  one.
I t  i s  p e r t in e n t  to ask what the de term inants  of q i and qj a re ,  these 
being parameters of the 'e f f i c i e n c y '  with which an in d iv id u a l  en fo rces  
h is /h e r  u t i l i t y  in  the family fu n c tio n .
Where a s ta b le  bargaining ru le  does not e x i s t  then q i  and qj a re  evid - 
en t ly  parameters which vary within households; where a s ta b le  (no t necess­
a r i l y  symmetric) bargain ing  ru le  does e x i s t  then q i and qj w il l  vary across  
these  households. I f  q i  = qj then some form of dominance e x i s t s ,  but 
not d i c t a t o r s h i p in  any of the senses used e a r l i e r .  The e a s i e s t  way to 
th ink  of th i s  i s  in  terms of what we now c a l l  ' s e l f  goods ( the  goods 
which are  not shareable) and 'fam ily ' |oods ( th e  s h a re a b le s ) . I f  q i  qj 
we could envisage th a t  q i i s  somehow voted by the family a p r i o r i t y  over 
commonly desired  se lf :goods  or i s  accorded a p r iv i leg e d  a l lo c a t io n  of pure­
ly  p e rso n a lly  des ired  goods (we could a lso  t r e a t  labour as a s e l f  'bad ' 
which when q i  qj means i  i s  e n t i t l e d  to r e l i e f  from according to  a c o l l ­
e c t iv e  judgement). Dominance i s  not achieved through an o u t r ig h t  impos­
i t i o n  of w i l l ,  r a th e r  i t  can be seen as an ex e rc ise  of a u th o r i ty )  i . e .  
i t  i s  based on ro le s  and norms). I f  power i s  to be invoked then i t  i s  
c le a r  th a t  the de term ina tion  of the ■ th r e a t  p o in t  becomes re le v a n t
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to  an a n a ly s is  of husband-wife d e c is io n s .  In  f a c t ,  ou ts ide  o f  pure d i c t a t ­
o r i a l  d ec is io n  s t r u c tu r e s ,  we would exnect th e re  to  be two th r e a t - p o in t s  
which we may des ig n a te  as U* and , C o n f l ic t  w i l l  ensue i f
e i th e r  p a r tn e r  f a l l s  below the U”- value , however we would no t expect every 
s in g le  in s ta n ce  of c o n f l i c t  to  r e s u l t  in  d i s s o lu t io n  . Rather th e re  should 
be some use of ba rga in ing  t a c t i c s ,  such as a t o t a l  withdrawal of some house­
hold good in  which an in d iv id u a l  produces with comparatives advantage.
In  the p re sen t  study we take the view t h a t  much em pir ica l  re sea rc h  i s  
re q u ire d  before a convincing model of the fam ily  and i t s  economic behav­
io u r  emerges. Accordingly we p re sen t  F igure 2 ,2  as a b ridge  to  the fo llow ­
ing  ch ap te rs  r a th e r  than pro long an a b s t r a c t  d iscu ss io n  in  terms p f ’' paramétr­
e r  s and s o c io lo g ic a l  concepts . In  chap ter th re e  we exp la in  the ro le  which 
the measured v a r ia b le s  we have obtained play in  the es tim ated  model r e l a t ­
ive  to  F igure  2.2 and the d iscu ss io n  in  t h i s  c h ap te r .
F igure  2.2 i l l u s t r a t e s  a general model fo r  a d e c is io n ,  i . e .  i t  could 
be purchasing  or m igra tion  j u s t  as r e a d i ly  as lab o u r  supply, by a husband 
and wife p a i r .  We w i l l  t ra c e  through the model with the only  s p e c i f ic  
re fe re n c e  to labour supply being in  the s p e c i f ic a t io n  of the  outcomes.
Labour supply c o n s id e ra t io n s  w i l l  be d e a l t  with in  the fo llow ing  ch ap te r .
The outcomes of a decison  are  t r e a te d  as p r o b a b i l i s t i c ;  in  the  exam­
p le  given a household chosen a t  random w il l  a r r iv e  a t  ( i )  w ith  p r o b a b i l i ty  
a, ( i i )  w ith  p ro b a b i l i ty  b, ( i i i )  with p ro b a b i l i ty  c. With only th ree  
p o te n t i a l  outcomes , a + b + c -  1. Amongst a group of i d e n t i c a l  fam il­
ie s  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  amongst a ,  b and c d e c is io n s  w i l l  no t be exac t due to  
random d is tu rb a n c e s .
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FIGURE 2.2  DETERMINANTS OF OUTCOMES IN HUSRAND-WIFE DECISIONS
OUTCOMES
( i ( i i i )i i
p ( i i )= b p ( i i i ) = c







(F u l l  or Part-Time) 
RACE/COLOUR
PRESENCE OF DEPENDENT CHILDREN
RACE/COLOUR
DIVORCE EXPECTANCY
Note: -p( ) i s  the  p r o b a b i l i ty  of an outcome ; a + b + c = 1
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An example of a labour supply d e c is io n  would be where a wife i s  o f f ­
e red ,  c e t e r i s  p a r ib u s , th ree  jobs -  one w ith 18 hours per week, one with 
2A hours per week, and one w ith  30 hours per week^.
These outcomes w i l l  d i f f e r  in  t h e i r  impacts on the  u t i l i t y  l e v e l s  
of the  m a r i ta l  p a r tn e r s .  The wife w i l l  gain u t i l i t y  from p o ss ib le  s a t i s ­
f a c t io n  of work, r e le a s e  from d i s u t i l i t y  of some household p roduc tion , 
and in c re a s e s  in  s e l f  and shared goods. She w i l l  lo se  u t i l i t y  from the 
p o s s ib le  unp leasan t consequences of work. The husband w i l l  gain u t i l i t y  
from any in c rease  in  common goods bu t he w i l l  lo s e  u t i l i t y  from the t r a n ­
s f e r  of some household p roduc tion , in  which the  wife i s  s p e c ia l iz e d ,  in to  
s e l f  goods fo r  the w ife.
The r e s u l t  which emerges from t h i s  p o t e n t i a l  c o n f l i c t  w i l l  depend 
on how the su b jec t iv e  outcomes to  the p a r tn e r s  a re  weighed hence the  r a t i o  
o f /  q^ i s  seen as the  proximate cause of the  p r o b a b i l i ty  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
of outcomes.
Behind the r a t i o  of ba rga in ing  e f f i c i e n c i e s  l i e  two fo rc e s  which 
move in  opposite  d i r e c t io n s .  One of these  i s  power which w i l l  be the  ex­
t e n t  to  which a s e l f i s h  d e c is io n  can be en fo rce ,  a g a in s t  t h i s  the  ’ t a s t e '  
fo r  s e l f i sh n e s s  over a l t r u i s m ' . w i l l  l i m i t  the e x te n t  to  which a p a r tn e r  
r e s i s t s  a t r a n s f e r  of w elfare  the o th e r  p a r tn e r .
Some of the de term inan ts  of t a s t e s  and power w i l l  be the  same; the 
boxing of f a c to r s  in  2 ,2 i s  merely t e n t a t i v e  and should no t  be regarded  as
1. Two th in g s  need to  be noted about t h i s  example- one i s  we ignore the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  th a t  zero hours i s  a p o s s ib le  outcome thereby  assuming the  p a r­
t i c i p a t i o n  d e c is io n  i s  a lre ad y  made (see  nex t c h ap te r ) ;  the  o the r  i s  t h a t  
t h i s  i s  s l i g h t l y  unusual as a supply of labour choice as the  w age-rate  i s  
assumed c o n s ta n t-  r e la x in g  the assumption would n o t much a l t e r  the  diagram 
in  terras of e x p lan a tio n .
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d e f i n i t i v e ,  F ac to rs  which a re  boxed show de term inan ts  of the outcome 
which a re  , a t  l e a s t  in  p r in c ip l e ,  observab le .
R e la t iv e  permanent incomes i s  taken  to  r e p re s e n t  the  r a t i o s  of 
l i f e t im e  d iscounted  earn ings  streams of husbands and wives. To pu t the  
m atte r  simply as the  r a t i o  f a l l s  i t  means t h a t  wives have a h igher command 
over v i s i b l e  (o r  ta n g ib le )  re so u rce s .
The bottom p a i r  of l i s t s  of ' v a r a ib le s  a re  both shown as  p o ss ib ly  
in f lu en c in g  incomes as the  earn ings  fu n c t io n  l i t e r a t u r e  has shown th a t  
an in c re a s in g ly  la rg e  s e t  of v a r ia b le s ,  o the r  than  simple schooling , ex­
perience  and experience  squared, ’ex p la in '  ea rn in g s  v a r i a t i o n ,  . Much of 
t h i s  exp lan a tio n  may be p u re ly  s t a t i s t i c a l  through an ab hoc in fu s io n  of 
whatever happened to  be in  the  da ta  in to  the  fu n c t io n s .  One fa c to r  wh­
ic h  seems convincing i s  d ivorce  expectancy; Greene and Q uester (1982) 
f in d  t h a t  a h igher ex p ec ta t io n  of d ivorce  r a i s e s  both w ives’ hours of 
work and p r o a b i l i t y  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  although the  impact i s  v i r t u a l l y  
i n s i g n i f i c a n t  fo r  coloured women. The r e l a t i o n s h ip  can be explained 
through wives' a t t a in in g  human c a p i t a l  and labour  fo rce  connections in  
o rder ro  hedge a g a in s t  idvo rce .
The r e l a t io n s h ip  of s o c ia l  c la s s  to  b a rg a in in g  power i s  through 
the wage payment system (see e a r l i e r  in  t h i s  c h a p te r ) ;  the e f f e c t  of 
c la s s  i s  explored in  Chapter Four, Age and dependent c h i ld re n  in f lu en ce  
power through being in d ic a to r s  of the  fam ily  l i f e  cycle  p a r t l y  due to  
m ir ro r in g  dependency of the  wife on the husband fo r  f in a n c ia l  and o th e r  
re so u rc e s .  The l i f e  cycle i s  in v e s t ig a te d  in  a s l i g h t l y  novel way in  
Chapter 6,
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Race and Colour may in f lu en ce  b a rga in ing  power due to  the d i f f ­
e r in g  ro le  s t r u c tu r e s  of non-white f a m i l ie s .  I n v e s t ig a t io n  of colour
i s  hampered by sample • l im i t a t i o n s  a lthough the problem i s  addressed 
in  Chapter 5.
The f a c to r s  on the  r ig h t-h an d  s ide  of F igure  2 .2  a re  mostly seen 
as  in f lu en c es  on the  t a s t e s  of husbands given t h a t  we are  u s ing  d a ta  in  
the  con tex t of a t r a d i t i o n a l l y  male-dominated s o c ie ty .
The in f luence  of d ivorce  i s  s im i la r  to  i t s  in f lu en ce  on wives’ 
e a rn in g s ;  as the p ro b a b i l iy  of d ivorce  r i s e s ,  husbands ought to  in c re a se  
t h e i r  p re fe rence  fo r  t h e i r  own w elfare  over a c t i v i t i e s  which support the 
m arr iag e ,
Increased  educa tion  i s  seen as a f a c to r  which i s  l i k e l y  to  f o s t e r  
more co -opera t ive  a t t i t u d e s .  I t  i s  n o t t r e a te d  in  a sep a ra te  chap ter  but 
comparing the c o e f f i c i e n t s  on education v a r ia b le s  across  the  groups used 
in  the various  ch ap te rs  p rov ides  a means of studying* the i n t e r a c t i o n  be­
tween education and o the r  v a r ia b le s .
Work s ta tu s  w i l l  p rovide some clue to  the  type of wage payment s y s t ­
em in  opera tion  and the expend itu res  which a re  funded by w ives’ earn ings  
-  i , e ,  i f  a husband l a b e l s  a wife as ’p a r t - t im e '  then i t  i s  more l i k e l y  
t h a t  her pay supports  lu x u r ie s  above normal consumption hence h i s  r e s i s t ­
ance to  an undesired  choice by the  wife i s  h ig h e r .  I f  a wife i s  la b e l le d  
f u l l - t i m e ’ then her d e c is io n s  w i l l  p robably  c a r ry  g re a te r  weight. The 
p a r t - t i m e / f u l l - t im e  s p l i t  i s  one way o f approaching the in f lu en c e  of 
r e l a t i v e  permanent income , which we do no t d ea l w ith ; work s ta tu s  i s  
explored  in  Chapter 7,
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CHAPTER THREE : IMPLEMENTATION
The p re se n t  chap ter o u t l in e s  the  s teps  taken  in  t ry in g  
to  e s t im ate  the model suggested by Chapter Two. This i s  done in  th re e  sec­
t io n s  -  one on the  econometric problems encountered , one on the d a ta  source 
and the v a r ia b le s  used ( th e  computer program to  e d i t  these  i s  reproduced 
and d e sc r ib ed  in  Appendix I I I )  , and one on the  t h e o r e t i c a l  ex p ec ta t io n s  
o f th ese  v a r ia b le s .
A^ : SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL.
We are  i n t e r e s t e d  in  the  fo llow ing  system of l i n e a r  e q u a tio n s-
(3 .1 )  . S^ = a + bS2 ■ + cXi + dX2 .....................+ nX^ + uq
(3 .2 )  Sg = a '  + b 'Sq + c'Xq + diXg.................. + n'X^ + ug
C ro s s -s e c t io n  d a ta  w i l l  be employed however the  observation, s u b sc r ip ts  
have been dropped, S i s  the  normal weekly hours of a m a r i ta l  p a r tn e r ;  
the  s u b sc r ip ts  1 and 2 on S r e f e r  to  husband and w ife . In  a f u l l  model 
th e re  would be n S ' s  bu t we are  assuming th a t  labour market a c t i v i t y  by 
dependents or extended fam ily  members i s  in c id e n ta l  to  the  d e c is io n s  of 
husbands and wives, a and a ' a re  the  re g re s s io n  in te r c e p t s  inc luded  ' 
i n  the b e l i e f  t h a t ,  in  the presence of n o n - l i n e a r i t y ,  they  w i l l  probide a 
b e s t  l i n e a r  approximation to  the  ' t r u e '  fu n c t io n .  T h e o re t ic a l ly  the 
n eg a tiv e  and la rg e  p o s i t iv e  in te r c e p t s  which appear in  t h i s  study are  
n o n sen s ica l  as weekly hours a re  bounded by zero and some f ig u r e  below l6 8 . 
As the  i n te r c e p t  i s  c o r r e c t in g  fo r  n o n - l i n e a r i t y  th ese  ap p a ren t ly  absurd 
e s t im a te s  make sense.
- 101-
These may be regarded as s t r u c tu r a l  eq u a tio n s  in  which the X 's  are
a s e t  of p re-determ ined  (exogenous) v a r i a b le s ;  b to  n and b^to  n ' are  
the  param eters  on these  v a r i a b le s .
The u l s  are  the d is tu rb an ce  terras which a re  assumed to  have the
p r o p e r t i e s  of being randomly and independently  d i s t r i b u t e d  with zero
mean and constan t v a r ian ce .  I f  (3 r l )  and (3 .2 )  were to  be es tim ated  by
2a system-wide e s t im a tio n  method then R fo r  the  sep a ra te  equations  ought 
to  be rep laced  by the system ( c o e f f i c i e n t  of v e c to r  a l ie n a t io n )  as
the t ^ s t  i s  of a complete model r a th e r  than sep a ra te  eq u a tio n s .
There a re  four b a s ic  v a r i a n t s  of t h i s  system fo r  the  purposes of e s tim ­
a t io n ,  the  d i f f e r e n c e s  between them depending on which r e s t r i c t i o n s  are  
in  fo rc e .  We assume Cov (uq^u2) /  0 except where s ta t e d .
V a r ia n t  1
I f  we have the  r e s t r i c t i o n  th a t  b or b* equals  zero then we have a
du,
re c u rs iv e  model ( see Dhrymes (1970) p p .303-5 f o r  a compact mathematical 
t rea tm en t of r e c u rs iv e  models) in  which the  r e c u r s iv e  equ a tio n ,  i . e .  the  
one w ithout the imposed r e s t r i c i t i o ç i ,  ■ i s : 'n o t  i d e n t i f i e d  bu t the  o th e r  eq­
u a t io n  i s L id e h t i f i e d .  The re c u rs iv e  equation  may be rendered  id e n t i f ia b ^ .  
l e  through the use of ap p ro p r ia te  zero r e s t r i c t i o n s  on the  c to  n or c ’ to  
n ' param eters bu t the  e s t im a tio n  of such an equation  by OLS y ie ld s  incon­
s i s t e n t '  parameter e s t im a te s .  In  e i t h e r  case the  n o n -recu rs iv e  equation  
can be c o n s i s te n t ly  es tim ated  by OLS, The b a s ic  id ea  of a re c u rs iv e  mod­
e l  i s  t h a t  th e re  i s  a tw o-stage d e c is io n  p ro cess ;  one p a r t n e r ' s  S i s  dec­
ided  befo re  the o t h e r ' s  which i s  decided s u b je c t  to  t h i s  p r io r  c o n s t r a in t .
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Variant 2
I f  we take v a r i a n t  1 and add the a d d i t io n a l  r e s t r i c t i o n  th a t  '
Cov (U^, Ug ) “ 0 then both equations  a re  i d e n t i f i e d  and can be c o n s i s t ­
e n t ly  e s tim ated  by OLS, E s s e n t i a l l y  the  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of both  equations  
i s  now p o s s ib le  because one of the S v a r ia b le s  i s  now e n te r in g  the  equat­
ion  in  which i t  i s  no t the dependent v a r ia b le  as  a p re-determ ined  r a th e r  
than j o i n t l y  determined v a r i a b le .  This appears to  be the s p e c i f i c a t io n  
used by Kushman and S c h e f f le r  (1975) as  they argue th a t  husbands s e t  th ­
e i r  lab o u r supply and t h i s  i s  then taken  as given in  the  Wives' equa tion . 
On the b a s i s  of t h i s  argument, s ta te d  as  a g e n e r a l i s a t io n  about behaviour 
in  Western s o c i e t i e s ,  they simply drop husbands' S from the  wives' equat­
ion w ithout p rov id ing  an e x p l i c i t -  assumption about the co var iances . As 
they  proceed on the b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e i r  model i s  i d e n t i f i e d  we must presume 
the i m p l i c i t  assumption of Cov (Uq, U2 ) i s  being  made.
V a r ia n t  3
I f  n e i th e r  b or b ' a re  r e s t r i c t e d  to  be zero then n e i th e r  equation  
i s  i d e n t i f i e d ;  the  parameter va lues  a re  no t un ique ly  determined and i t  i s  
no t p o s s ib le  to  d isen tan g le  combinations of (3 .1 )  and (3 .2 ) from the ' t r u e '  
eq u a t io n s .  F u r th e r  to  t h i s  OLS e s t im a te s  w i l l  be b iased  and in c o n s i s te n t .  
I d e n t i f i a b i l i t y  could be achieved through a p p ro p r ia te  ex c lu s io n s  and con­
s i s t e n t  e s t im a te s  through 2SLS e s t im a tio n .
V a r ia n t  U
I f  both b and b' a re  s e t  equal to  zero then n e i th e r  equation  i s  id ­
e n t i f i e d  ; fo r  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  and c o n s is te n t  e s t im a t io n ,  the  same remarks 
apply as f o r  V a r ia n t  3. I f  V a r ia n t  3 i s  the c o r r e c t  model we may es tim ate  
V a r ian t  4 and t r e a t  i t  as the  reduced forms from V arian t  3.
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In  Chapters 4-8 of the p re sen t  work we r e p o r t  e s t im a te s  of (3 .1 )  
and (3 .2 )  w ithout any r e s t r i c t i o n s  being  enfo rced . These r e s u l t s  could 
be the  e s t im a te s  of a simultaneous or re c u rs iv e  model. I f  the  S?b were 
dropped the  r e s u l t s  could be regarded as  reduced forms of V a r ia n t  3.
We have th ese  r e s u l t s  bu t do no t  r e p o r t  them as the  r e s u l t s  fo r  non-wage 
v a r i a b le s  a re  g e n e ra l ly  s im i la r .  The r e s u l t s  f o r  wage v a r ia b le s  w i l l  gen­
e r a te  d i f f e r e n t  e l a s t i c i t i e s  when b and b ' a re  s i g n i f i c a n t  ; in  Chapter 4 
some c a lc u la t io n  of the  reduced form e l a s t i c i t i e s  are  given to  i l l u s t r a t e  
the  d i f f e r e n c e s .
I n t e r p r e t i n g  whether the  r e s u l t s  re v e a l  a re c u rs iv e  model i s  some­
what d i f f i c u l t  as we do n o t know in  advance which p a r tn e r  has re c u rs iv e  
supply. Chapter Two has shown the n e c e s s i ty  to  consider ba rg a in in g  in  
decision-m aking and has thereby shown the inadequacy of Kushman & Sch- 
w ff le r  (1975) ’ s g e h e r a l i s a t io n .  Some households ^may be s im ultaneous, ^ 
some re c u rs iv e  on one p a r tn e r  and some r e c u rs iv e  on the o th e r  p a r tn e r .
I t  i s  hoped th a t  the  p a r t i t i o n i n g  of the  sample w i l l  re v e a l  d i s t i n c t  
s e t s  of households obeying one ru].e . I f  the r u le  i s  re c u rs iv e  d e c is io n s  
we could only be r e a l l y  sure we have found the re c u rs iv e  equation  i f  i t  
f e a tu re s  a s i g n i f i c a n t  cross-wage e l a s t i c i t y  and s ig n i f i c a n t  param eter
estim ate  on S w h i ls t  the no n -recu rs iv e  equation  should fe a tu re  an i n s i g -
2n i f i c a n t  cross-wage e l a s t i c i t y .
1 . I t  ought to  be added t h a t  th e re  i s  a d i s t i n c t i o n  between s im u l ta n e i ty  
with in te rdependen t u t i l i t i e s  ( v a r ia n t  3) and w ithou t ( v a r i a n t  4 ) .
2, The n o n -recu rs iv e  equation  w i l l  f e a tu r e  a s i g n i f i c a n t  response to  sp­
ouse hours i f  the  same i s  found in  the  o th e r  equ a tio n  as a l l  we do in  moving 
from one to  the  o th e r  i s  swop round the  S ' s .  B a rr in g  c o r re la te d  ' t a s t e s '  
f o r  working hours, b and b' ought to  be neg a tiv e  i f  we f in d  a re c u rs iv e  
system (see  sec t io n  C. on the  S v a r i a b l e s ) .
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In  Chapters 4 -8 ,  the OLS e s t im a te s  of the  system a re  re p o r ted  w ith 
only the  o ffe red  w age-rates  and non-labour incomes of both  p a r tn e r s  in  
the  s e t  of X 's  inc luded  ( S 's  a re  ex lu d ed ) ; th ese  a re  re p o r te d  on the  
r ig h t -h a n d  side  of the f u l l  equation  e s t im a te s .  These e s t im a te s  co rre sp ­
ond roughly  to  the  model of Chapter Two, A ( i i ) ,  comparing them with the 
f u l l  equa tions  shows the in f lu en c e  of the  o th e r  v a r ia b le s  sp e c i f ie d  on 
e s t im a te s  of income and s u b s t i t u t io n  e f f e c t s ,  A t e s t  fo r  the  s i g n i f i c ­
ance of adding non-pecuniary  v a r ia b le s  i s  carried out on the  r e s u l t s  of 
Chapter 4 , The t e s t i n g  i s  n o t  rep ea ted  in  C hapters  5-8 as comparing 
the  8 fo r  the p a i r s  of equa tions  makes i t  f a i r l y  obvious th a t  the  
t e s t  would be h igh ly  s ig n i f i c a n t ,
N on-L inearity
Thus f a r  we have assumed th a t  the  labour supply fu n c t io n s  are  l i n ­
e a r .  The bounding of weekly hours by zero and some f ig u re  l e s s  than l6B 
which i s  determined by requirem ents  fo r  s le e p ,e a t in g  e t c ,  suggests  t h a t  
the  fu n c t io n s  may well be n o n - l in e a r .  The p a t t e r n  of r e s id u a l s  from the 
r e s u l t s  of chap te rs  4-8 appears  to  lend some support to  t h i s  -  p l o t t i n g  
the  abso lu te  r e s id u a l  a g a in s t  hours produces a U-shaped p a t te r n  , A 
number of s tu d ie s  (see  e .g .  Layard e t  a l .  (1 9 7 9 ),Greenhalgh (1980), 
Solberg  ( 198I ) )  have found t h a t  maximum l ik e l ih o o d  e s t im a te s  of n o n - l i n ­
ear  response fu n c t io n s ,  l o g i t s  or p r o b i t s ,  d i f f e r  only very  s l i g h t l y  from 
OLS e s t im a te s .
The above f in d in g  need n o t be a cause fo r  comfort, f o r  e i th e r  OLS 
or ML e s t im a te s ,  as i t  may be th a t  the p a t te rn  of r e s id u a l s  may simply 
r e f l e c t  t h a t  a number of p o in ts  are  on the  demand curve and o f f  the 
supply curve.
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In  t h i s  study we r e p o r t  OLS e s t im a te s ;  some lo g a r i th m ic  t ran sfo rm a tio n s  
were t r i e d  but rev ea led  l i t t l e  d i f f e r e n c e  and a re  in  any case no t as eas^ 
i l y  in te r p r e te d  in  terms of the  impact of param eters  on hours of work.
The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of wives' from husbands' supply having been d iscussed  
above we now t r e a t  the  problem of supply-demand i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .
Supply and Demand For an In d iv id u a l  Worker
L e t  us presume th a t  we a re  e s t im a tin g  e i t h e r  (3 .1 ) or (3 .2) sep a r­
a t e l y  in  the absence of problems about id e n t i f y in g  one from the o th e r .
The conventional assumption, a l b e i t  r a r e l y  e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d ,  i s  t h a t  an 
in d iv id u a l  faces  ai h o r iz o n ta l  demand curve a t  the  o ffe re d  wage r a t e  w ith­
in  the  range of i n t e r e s t  i . e .  i f  th e re  i s  a N egative  p a r t  of the
demand fu n c t io n ,  due to  f a t ig u e  e t c . ,  we never observe i t  being used.
This im p lie s  th a t  the worker i s  paid according to  a m arginal revenue 
product which i s  co n s tan t  in  the  range of i n t e r e s t .  We have the problem 
of observing the m arginal revenue p roduct ' , or o f fe re d  wage, which we 
overcome by the use of a hum an-capital based earn ings  fu n c t io n .
The earn ings fu n c t io n s  fo r  husbands and wives a re  re p o r ted  in  
Appendix I I . .  These take the  form of the log  of average ho u rly  earn ings  
reg re ssed  on educa tion , experience and experience squared p lu s  dummies 
fo r  s ick n ess  and co lo u r .  Colour i s  included because of earn ings  d i s c ­
r im in a t io n  and s ickness  i s  included because of a wish to  remove the 
e f f e c t  of s ickness on earn ings  power from the e f f e c t  of s ickness  on
1. We d id  no t have access  to  a program capable of c a r ry in g  out maximum 
l ik e l ih o o d  e s t im a te s  which could accomodate the  d a ta  s e t  used he re .
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hours worked.
The p re d ic ted  va lues  from these fu n c t io n s  a re  used as in s tru m en ta l  
v a r ia b le s  in  p lace  of the observed h o u r ly  average wages; FINST i s  the 
ins trum ent fo r  wives' wages and MINST i s  the in s trum en t fo r  husbands' 
wages.
These in s trum en ts  must be used as the use of the observed hourly
■Ji.'
wage in troduced  severe neg a tiv e  b ia s  in t#  the  e s tim ated  wage pa ram ete rs . 
D espite  t h i s  some (see  Mooney( 1981) , S t e w a r t ' (1982) have m istakenly  used
the observed wage. The a ttem p t to  c le a r  t h i s  up below i s  l a r g e ly  based
on Cameron (1982)-,
Denote t o t a l  weekly earn ings  by Eq and Eg fo r  the  m a r i ta l  p a r tn e r s .  
C a lc u la t in g  the observed wage r a t e s  and l in t ro d u c e s  two new
n o n -s to c h a s t ic  equa tions  in to  the sytem being;
(3 .3) = % /  Si
(3 .4 )  Xj. = Eg /  Sg
where m denotes husband and m a r i ta l  p a r tn e r  1 i s  the husband; f  denotes 
wife and m a r i ta l  p a r tn e r  2 i s  the w ife . I f  X^ and Xf are  included in  
t h e i r  r e s p e c t iv e  fu n c tio n s  then e r ro r s  in  the  dependent v a r ia b le  are  
c o r r e la te d  n e g a t iv e ly  with them as they are  simply E d iv ided  by S.
This  c o r r e la t io n  i s  a computational a r t i f a c t  r a th e r  than a r e f l ­
e c t io n  of a ' t r u e '  r e l a t io n s h ip  th e re fo re  we re p la c e  (3 .3 ) and (3 .4) 
by the  p a i r  of ea rn in g s  fu n c t io n s  le av in g  us w ith a fo u r-eq u a tio n  s y s t ­
em in  which a l l  the  equa tions  have to  be e s t im a ted .
1. So long  as th e re  i s  measurement e r r o r  i n  the  hours v a r ia b le .
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Demandr and the V a r i a b i l i t y  of Hours Supplied ;
B ringing  the ro le  of demand in to  view fo rc e s  us to pay some a t t e n ­
t io n  to  impact of various  c o n s t r a in ts  in  the lab o u r  market on the  v a r ia b ­
i l i t y  of houi's.
Some i n s t i t u t i o n a l  economists (see  e .g .  S ta n f i e ld  (1979) have a s s e r t ­
ed th a t  labour supply curves do not e x i s t  as workers are  n o t  f r e e  to  choose 
t h e i r  hours and one o f te n  encounters orthodox economists who, i f  n o t  work­
ing  on the  study of labour supply, are r e l u c t a n t  in  accep tin g  the e x i s t ­
ence of a labour supply curve. •
An in d iv id u a l  in  a given job w i l l  , in  the  sh o r t  p e r io d ,  be extrem ely 
c ircum scribed  in  the choice of hours worked. N onetheless  some freedom s t i l l  
e x i s t s  in  the formm of options to take a second job or overtim e. In  the 
longer p e r io d  v a r i a t io n  can be achieved through s e le c t io n  of employer 
and/or occupation^ In  i t s e l f  th i s  may involve the  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of over­
time as a co n s id e ra t io n .  Some work invo lves  con s id e rab le  amounts of un­
paid  overtime which can no t be refused  and t h i s  w i l l ,  w ith the  a v a i l a b i l i t y  
of pa id  overtim e, e n te r  in to  the choice of job s l o t .  Most s tu d ie s  simply 
use annual hours of work we have measured t o t a l  weekly hours in  employment 
t h a t  the  respondent sees as 'normal' in  the b e l i e f  t h a t  t h i s  re p re se n ts  
a lo n g -ru n  r a t i o n a l  choice.
The o b serv a tio n  of responses to  wages i s  q u i te  s im ple . There are  
two case s .  In  one we may suppose th a t  two o therw ise  i d e n t i c a l  in d iv id u a ls ,  
the c e t e r i s  pa ribus  condition  being imposed by the  m u lt ip le  re g re s s io n  
techn ique , are  f o r  some reason , perhaps geographica l im m obility  and imper­
f e c t  in fo rm ation  , faced with d i f f e r e n t  h o r iz o n ta l  demand cu rves . This
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w il l  a llow  us to  t ra c e  out the u n sh if t in g  supply curve whether i t  be neg­
a t iv e ,  p o s i t iv e  or backward-bending in  response to  w age-ra tes .
In  the  second case we may suppose th a t  through investm ents  in  human 
c a p i t a l  a worker succeeds in  l i f t i n g  the  h o r iz o n ta l  demand curve which he 
f a c e s .  Amongst a group of otherwise id e n t i c a l  workers, t h i s  s h i f t i n g  of 
the  demand curve w i l l  allow us to  t ra c e  out the supply curve.
' M u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y :
Thus f a r  we have assumed th a t  a l l  the X v a r i a b le s  in  (3 .1 ) and (3 .2 ) 
are  o r thogona l.  I f  t h i s  i s  no t the case t h e i r  param eter e s t im a te s  w i l l  be 
rendered  im prec ise . Examining previous s tu d ie s  of labour supply us ing  in ­
d iv id u a l  d a ta  (see  Chapter l )  suggests the  presence of cons ide rab le  m u l t i -  
c o l l i n e a r i t y  on account of the low ' t '  r a t i o s  on many v a r ia b le s  and the 
tendency fo r  c o n f l i c t in g  r e s u l t s  from s tu d ie s  u s in g  d i f f e r e n t  samples.
Using the sample employed in  the p re sen t  study i t  has been shown 
(Cameron (1983)) t h a t  husbands and wives who hold  two jobs  t e n d .c e t e r i s  
p a r ib u s , tend to  have p a r tn e rs  who work sh o r te r  hours and a re  more l i k e l y  
to  have dependent c h i ld re n .  Some of t h i s  apparen t m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y  may 
be due to  in t e r a c t i o n  e f f e c t s .  We make no e x p l i c i t  a ttem pt to  deal with 
e i t h e r  i s s u e -b u t  our s p l i t t i n g  of the smple w i l l  provide some co n tro l  fo r  
both ; e .g .  the  l i f e  cycle approach of chapter 6 w i l l  e l im in a te  the  m u l t i -  
c o l l i n e a r i t y  between age and presence of dependent ch ild re p a  and w i l l  r e ­
veal the in te r a c t io n s  in  t h e i r  e f f e c t s  on labour supply. P a r t i a l  c o r r e l ­
a t io n s  of MINST and FINST are  reported  in  view of p o ss ib le  in f lu e n c e s  of 
mates' earn ings power in  m a r i ta l  s e le c t io n .  R e s u l t s ,  no t r e p o r te d ,  are  
a v a i la b le  of a l l  r e g re s s io n s  with each non-pecuniary  v a r ia b le  added sep­
a r a t e l y  to  the pecuniary  v a r ia b le s .  The only n o ta b le  f e a tu re  of these  i s  
t h a t  educa tion  v a r ia b le s  are  o ften  s i g n i f i c a n t ly  nega tive  u n t i l  o th e r  v a r ­
ia b le s  a re  added.
Ë . a m  SOURCE amp v a r ia b l e s  :
The d a ta  source used was, the 1974 General Household Survey; t h i s  i s  a 
l a r g e - s c a le  r e p re s e n ta t iv e  sample of U.K.Households. I t  i s  c a r r ie d  out ann­
u a l ly  in  fou r  streams of between three  and four thousand households each ; 
the  streams are  taken in  January-Mnrch, A p r i l - Ju n e ,  Ju ly -A ugust,  and September 
-December. Our f i r s t  e d i t in g  decis ion  was to exclude the f i r s t  q u a r te r  on 
the grounds th a t  i t  was taken during the period of the th ree -d ay  working week. 
Other r e s e a rc h e r s  who have used exac tly  the same source (see Chapter l )  have 
n o t  taken t h i s  s tep  d e sp i te  the fa c t  th a t  i t  seems j u s t i f i e d  on s t a t i s t i c a l  
grounds ; the re fe ren ce  period  used by the su rv e y 's  in te rv ie w ers  i s  g e n e ra l­
l y  the l a s t  week before  the in te rv iew , fo r  the th ree -d ay  worker t h i s  has 
to  be rep laced  by an assessm ent of "normal" working hours based on experience 
which i s  l e s s  re c en t  than th a t  of fu ll-w eek workers in te rv iew ed  in the th ree  
l a t e r  s tream s. We would expect the (unknowable) measurement e r r o r s  to be 
g r e a te r  f o r  the f i r s t  q u a r te r  group than fo r  the  groups of l a t e r  q u a r te r s .
Due t o  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  c o n c e p t s  an d  d e f i n i t i o n s  we c a n  n o t  p l a c e  much 
r e l i a n c e  on t h e  a b s o l u t e  v a l u e s  o f  f i g u r e s  o b t a i n e d  f rom t h e  s a m p l e .  T h e r e  a r e
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no surveys in  e x is ten ce  ( fo r  the  U.K.) designed s p e c i f i c a l l y  to  e l i c i t  in ­
form ation on the household d e c is io h  as to  what q u a n t i ty  of time to  a l lo c a te  
to  employment in  the  labour market. Inform ation  can be ob ta ined  from the 
Family Expenditure  Survey and the decennia l 'Census o f  P opu la t io n  fo r  some of 
the re le v a n t  v a r i a b le s .  These, ty p i c a l l y ,y i e ld  d i f f e r e n t  va lues  ( e .g .  fo r  
the F .E .S . of double-job  holders) because they ask \%heir q u es t io n s  in  the 
con tex t of a d i f f e r e n t  economic u n i t -  the  in d iv id u a l  or the fam ily  and with 
re fe ren ce  to  d i f f e r e n t  times", in  some cases the  year as  opposed to  the
survey week or in  o th e rs  the day of the in te rv iew  as opposed to  "norm ally" .
Not s u r p r i s in g ly  the u n i t  of observation  in  our sample i s  the  "house­
hold"; the  concept of household employed by OPCS (O ffice  o f  P o p u la t io n  Cen­
suses and Surveys) in  carry ing  out the survey does no t b e a t  any c lo se  comp­
a r i s o n  w ith  s im i la r ly  named e n t i t i e s i O i  economic or s o c io lo g ic a l  th eo ry .  I t  
r e f e r s  in s te a d  to  any group of in d iv id u a ls  l iv in g  a t  the . • same address  e .g .  
a group of s tuden ts  with the same address c o n s t i tu t e s  a houehold. Those 
u a t  an address  a re  regarded as belonging to  " fam ily  u n i t s " ;  i f  members of 
households have no blood or l e g a l  t i e s  with o th e r  members they  a re  c lassed  
as  sep a ra te  fam ily  u n i t s -  e .g .  the aforementioned s tu d en ts  would each be a 
fam ily  u n i t .  The p o s i t io n  with common law m arriages  forms an excep tion  to 
t h i s  as these  a re  coded as i f  they were fo rm ally  b ind ing  m arriageé  and hence 
we loser the  o p p o r tu n i ty  of examining v a r ia t io n s  in  the  a l l o c a t io n  o f  time be­
tween types  o f  c o h ab i ta t iv e  arrangement.
We encounter two problems in  tu rn ing  the raw d a ta  in to  a s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
usab le  fo rm at, the  f i r s t  being to d isen tan g le  p a i r s  of both  working husbands 
and wives from the household matrix  in  which they  a re  s to re d  and the  second 
to pick up the  v a r ia b le s  s e lec ted  fo r  a n a ly s is  and a t t a c h  th e se  onto the  p a i r  
in  q u es t io n .
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The so lu t io n  of these  problem s!w ill be shown in  an ex p o s it io n  o f the computer 
program w r i t te n  to reduce the v a s t  bulk of in fo rm ation  to  the  small p ro po rtion  
a c tu a l ly  re q u ire d .  This exposit ion  w i l l  be more e a s i l y  understood i f  we give 
beforehand a l i s t  of the  d e s ired  v a r ia b le s  sought from the q u e s t io n n a ir e s .
These v a r ia b le s  are  se le c te d  and re-coded in  accordance w ith  the  arguments of 
chap te r  2.
V ariab le  L i s t ;
Family U nit  Number : Within the recorded household a fam ily  u n i t  number i s  a s s ­
igned to  each in d iv id u a l ;  in d iv id u a ls  with the same number belong to  the same 
fam ily  u n i t .  (S ing le  person u n i t s  have a sp ec ia l  code)
Person Number. Each person i s  assigned a number in  accordance with t h e i r  pos­
i t i o n  on the  schedule e .g .  f i r s t  =1 second=2 e t c .
Age. This i s  given in  years  and does not involve any le g a l  v a l id a t io n ,  i t  i s  
th e re fo re  su b jec t  to rounding and any o ther d i s to r t i o n s  p o s s ib le .
C o lour. This i s  based on in te rv iew er assessment and no t on d i r e c t  q u es t io n in g .  
We have t r e a te d  cases of in te rv iew er doubt as being coloured and the no t a v a i la b ­
l e  ca tegory  as being non-coloured. The number of coloured fa m il ie s  tu rn in g  up 
in  the  survey i s  t y p ic a l ly  small and may r e f l e c t  a t t i t u d e s  to  being surveyed. 
Hours of Work. The es tim ate  given in  the raw d a ta  i s  of normal hours th a t  i s  
the  amount the in te rv iew ee  would suppose he/she works in  a r e p re s e n ta t iv e  week. 
We have added normal paid and unpaid overtime on to  t h i s .
Double Job Holding . (Known c o l lo q u ia l ly  as ’m oon ligh ting ')  This i s  s to red  as a 
dummy v a r ia b le  , equal to 1 i f  a second paid employment was p u rsu ed 'T as t  week.
* These v a r ia b le s  a re  not used a n a ly t i c a l ly  but have to  be he ld  in  o rder to  
jo in  wives d a ta  to husbands d a ta  from the 'househo ld ' schedule and then to  jo in  
husband ' i n d iv id u a l '  da ta  and wife ' i n d iv id u a l '  d a ta  back to the  composite house 
ehold d a ta .
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Soclo-economlc Group. In  accordance with orthodox id eas  on s o c ia l  s t r a t i f ­
i c a t io n  we take t h i s  from the  husband's grading under the  1970 C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
o f  Occupations. We use these  grades to  separa te  the  sample p a i r s  in to  f iv e  
groups fo r  the  purposes of the  an a ly s is  rep o r ted  in  our chap te r  4. The f o l l ­
owing ta b le  shows the  r e la t io n s h ip  between our groupings, the  1970 C l a s s i f i c ­
a t io n  and the  type o f  occupation covered. The o r ig i n a l  in te n t io n  o f  the  c l a s s ­
i f i c a t i o n  by socio-economic group i s  to  b racke t to g e th e r  those  who have s im ila r  
h a b i t s ,  a t t i t u d e s  and l i f e s t y l e s ,
TABLE 3.1
1970 Collapsed SEG's in Col. 1 TypeOur V ariab le  Coding 
1 1, 2 P ro fe s s io n a l ,  Employers & 
Managers.
In te rm ed ia te  and ju n io r  
non-manual.
S k i l le d  manual. 
S em i-sk il led  manual and 
persona l s e rv ice  workers. 
U nsk illed  manual.
NOTE; A ll th e se  . groupings have had eq u iv a len t a g r i c u l t u r a l  groupings added 
on during  the program, i . e .  u n sk i l le d  a g r i c u l tu r a l  labour added on to  5 e tc .
Job S a t i s f a c t io n  o f  Wives. Questions on t h i s  a re  asked of the  v a r i e ty  o f  t i c k ­
ing boxes marked ' f a i r l y ' ' very ' and so on. As we do not know the o r i g i n a l  exp­
e c ta t io n s  which a re  or a re  no t being s a t i s f i e d  we can no t expec t a f in e  d i f f e r ­
e n t i a t i o n  o f responses . A ll who evince some degree of s a t i s f a c t i o n  a re  given
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a dummy v a r ia b le  s e t  equal to  1; the i n d i f f e r e n t  have t h e i r  dummy s e t  equal to  
0 ,  We do no t use h o u rs - s p e c i f i c  s a t i s f i c a t i o n  in d ic a to r s  as the  s a t i s f a c t i o n  
over hours q u es t io n  i s  only asked of p a r t- t im e  workers i u  the  f i r s t  q u a r te r  ( 
hence we would no t  have the v a r ia b le  fo r  an im portan t group o f  women) . Anyway 
, on the  b a s is  o f  Chapter 2 we would expect success in  ba lan c in g  home a c t i v i t y  
w ith  lab o u r  market a c t i v i t y  to  be more f u l l y  r e f l e c t e d  in  t o t a l  job  s a t i s f a c t i o n  
than in  s a t i s f a c t i o n  over hours worked.
Job D i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  of Wives
Thpis i s  t r e a te d  e x a c t ly  as the previous v a r ia b le  a p a r t  from the obvious 
d i f f e r e n c e  of q u e s t io n .  The'dummy v a r ia b le  t r a p '  does n o t  occur in  any o f  the 
sub-samples used because th e re  i s  always p re sen t  an ' i n d i f f e r e n t '  segment who 
have a 0 recorded fo r  both v a r ia b le s .
Cost of L iv ing  Push on Husband's Earnings.
As with the socio-economic group v a riab le  we follow  orthodox id eas  on s t r a t i f i c ­
a t io n ;  we regard  the  husband as the household head by d in t  o f  h i s  being the ch­
i e f  income earner  and hence only h is  fe e l in g s  of a push on hife earn ings  a re  reco ­
rded . Thie i s  s to red  in  the  usual dummy v a r ia b le  fa sh ion .
Presence of C hildren  Less than 16 years o ld . This i s  ob ta ined  from a ques tio n  
appearing  on one or the o th e r  pa ren ts ' schedules in  the  p a r t  o f  the  questionn­
a i r e  concerning educa tion . I t  i s  an&ther conventional dummy v a r ia b le .
Education The nxx number o f  years of school completed i s  approximated by sub­
t r a c t in g  5 from the age given a t  the time of le av in g  the l a s t  ed u ca tio n a l  i n s t ­
i t u t i o n  a t ten d ed . I f  the  l a t t e r  f igure  i s  in d ic a t iv e  o f  having re tu rn e d  to  f u l l ­
time education  as  an a d u l t  an adjustment i s  made.
L ong-standing I l l n e s s . The questions on h e a l th  in  the  survey a re  extrem ely de­
t a i l e d  and th e re  a re  a la rg e  number of d isea se  codings which those w ith long­
s tan d in g  i l l n e s s e s  a re  asked to f i l l  in .  The numbers %pVolved are  too small
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fo r  us to be ab le  to  take in to  account the  impact o f  d i f f e r e n t  d is e a se s  on 
labour supply so we have used dummy v a r ia b le s  equal to  1 f o r  any i l l n e s s  a t  
a l l  being recorded  and 0 fo r  no i l l n e s s  recorded . I t  may appear p o te n t i a l l y  
m islead ing  to t r e a t  those with hole in  the  h ea r t  o r  chronic  b ro n c h i t i s  as  eq­
u iv a le n t  to  backache s u f f e r e r s  but i t  i s  u n l ik e ly  t h a t  those w ith ve ry  se r io u s  
a ilm en ts  w i l l  work a t  a l l  do th i s  lack  of d is c r im in a t io n  i s  probably only a 
problem in  the study of p a r t i c ip a t io n .  Since we a re  s tudying  the hours supp­
l i e d  by 'go ing  concern ' households (see Chapter 2) which a re  a lre ad y  committed 
to  p a r t i c ip a t io n  we would expect our i l l n e s s  v a r ia b le  to  be reasonab ly  homog­
eneous.
Weeks in  l a s t  year p a id . This i s  the number of weeks in  the  p a s t  year in  wh­
ich  the  in te rv iew ees  received  payment from t h e i r  primary occupation . In  p re ­
v ious work ( i . e .  the work by Greenhalgh and Layard e t  a l . )  in  t h i s  f i e l d  us ing  
t h i s  d a ta  t h i s  measure i s  accepted u n c r i t i c a l l y  as an accu ra te  measure of the 
number o f  weeks a c tu a l ly  worked; these au thors  then m u lt ip ly  t h i s  by the  hours 
per week given to o b ta in  annual hours supplied . I o ■ li ' '
T o ta l  E a rn in g s . This i s  an annual f ig u re  fo r  the  l a s t  y ear .  Respondents do 
n o t  n e c e s s a r i ly  provide an annual f igu re  them selves- i f  monthly or weekly f i g ­
u re s  a re  given these  are  m u lt ip l ied  by the  a p p ro p r ia te  number to  ge t an e s t ­
imate of annual e a rn in g s .  Evidently  measurement e r r o r s  fo r  t h i s  v a r ia b le  w i l l  
d i f f e r  a c ro ss  occupationa l groups due to  system atic  v a r i a t io n  in  methods of 
wage payment ( i .e .w a g es  vs. s a l a r i e s ) .  For example, lump sum payments w i l l  be 
omitted from a t o t a l  a r r iv e d  a t  by m ultip ly ing  a weekly wage by 52.
N.B. A ll  income and earn ings  information can be supplied  by se lf -co m p le t io n  of 
the forms by respondents  so the above problems a re  exacerbated .
A ll in fo rm ation  i s  on payments p r io r  to  deductions .
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Non-vage Income rece iv ed  in  the l a s t  year , The form of t h i s  v a r ia b le  i s  
d i c t a t e d  by th e o r e t i c a l  c o n s id e ra t io n s .  We can only  be u s in g  a one-period  
model as the  d a ta  we have only gives observa tions  on the  u n i t s  fo r  one y e a r /  
survey week. I t  i s  i l l e g i t im a te  th e re fo re  (as Gramm,1973) does to  inc lude  
a s s e t s  or any o th e r  v a r ia b le s  r e la te d  to savings as t h e i r  magnitude i s  meaning­
l e s s  in  th e  absence o f inform ation  about the p a t t e r n  o f accum ulation or fu tu re  
e x p e c ta t io n s .  The f ig u re  we have used fo r  th i s  v a r ia b le  i s  the  sura o f  the f o l l ­
owing :
paid  by the  S ta te  -  Supplementary allowances ; o th e r  payments ( e .g .  Unemploym­
e n t /S ic k n e ss  b e n e f i t ,  M aternity /Fam ily  allowances and Family Income Supplement) 
paid by o th e rs  -  from o rg a n is a t io n s ,  f r ien d s  or r e l a t i v e s  o u ts id e  the  house­
hold (e.&. alimony, annu ity , scholarsh ip) 
r e n t  from p ro p e rty .
Some re s e a rc h e r s ,  e .g .  Layard e t  a l . (1979), Solberg  (1981) t r e a t  the 
s t im ated  response of labour supply to non-labour income as an 'income e f f ­
e c t '  corresponding  with th a t  portray.; ' in  elem entary in d i f f e r e n c e  curve an­
al^ s i s .  Holding the o ffe red  wage con stan t ,  u.n in c rease  in  non-labor income 
w i l l  r e p re s e n t  an income e f f e c t .  However i t  w i l l  not be e q u iv a le n t  to  the
income e f f e c t  f^om a change in  w age-rates as th e re  w i l l  be d i f f e r e n t  income
1
e f f e c t s  from.each wage change. The only wav to c o n tro l  fo r  t h i s  i s  to  use
a wage X income in t e r a c t io n  term . (see  P arzo l and MacDonald (1973)._________
1. U nless very severe r e s t r i c t i o n s  are placed on the  u t i l i t y  fu n c t io n .
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Child under ^  a t  I Nursery School e t c .
T h i s  i s  o b t a i n e d  f r om  t h e  s c h e d u l e s  o f  one o r  t h e  o t h e r  p a r e n t ' s  r e s p o n s e s  t o  q u ­
e s t i o n s  a b o u t  e d u c a t i o n .  I t  i s  a n o t h e r  c o n v e n t i o n a l  dummy v a r i a b l e .
Inform ation obtained from surveys i s  nver p e r fe c t  or f ree  
from ambiguity so the d ec is ion  as to how to handle known im perfect inform ation i s  
of some importance. We excluded a l l  u n i t s  of observation  fo r  which a 'n o t  a v a i l ­
a b le '  code was ringed  by the in te rv iew er fo r  any v a r iab le  except the 'Weeks in  
l a s t  year pa id ' v a r ia b le  . U nits  fo r  which the v a r ia b le  was not a v a i la b le  were 
re ta in ed  but not included in  the i n i t i a l  analyses  of a l l  the sub-samples we have 
used. This created  a problem when we t r i e d  ' t o  ob ta in  a sub-sample of the h igh­
e s t  income earners  in  Socio-economic Group 1 w h ils t  the 'p e r f e c t '  da ta  r e s t r i c t ­
ion was in  fo rce . This group came back as 0 since we know th a t  a c e r ta in  number 
of u n i t s  above the earnings c u t -o f f  p o in t uses are  in  the sample i t  seemed reason­
able  to conclude th a t  the p ropensity  to  r e g i s t e r  weeks paid as not av a i lab le  has 
something to do with income and occupation.
I t  appears l i k e ly  t h a t , f o r  the self-em ployed, those on the f r in g e  of s e l f -  
employment ( i . e .  with a la rg e  f in a n c ia l  i n t e r e s t  in  a small company), and those 
in the upper s t r a t a  of occupations, the question has no c l e a t  meaning. This i s  
because i t  would be d i f f i c u l t  to conceive of the idea of being h ired  and paid fo r  
a d i s t i n c t  po rtion  of the year i f  one was employed in  these s e c to rs .  Obviously, 
where one i s  employed by someone e lse  , i t  might appear sen s ib le  to pu t down 52
as the answer . However, as thism i s  a se lf-enum eration  s ec tio n  , we can not be
sure how d i f f e r e n t  people w i l l  r e a c t  to the v ag a r ie s  th i s  question  involves fo r  
th e i r  occupation :; fo r  example, some may req u es t  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  and put down 52
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whereas o th e rs  may simply leave  the  q u es t io n  unanswered i f  i t  appears  meaning­
l e s s .  Where elements o f  autonomy e n te r  in to  the payment of earn ings  we can ex­
p e c t  i t  to  be in c re a s in g ly  l i k e l y  th a t  the  q u es t io n  w i l l  no t be answered. The 
upsho t of t h i s  problem i s  th a t  where a p e r f e c t  d a ta  r e s t r i c i t i o n - r u l e  i s  used 
the  sample w i l l  be b iased  because i t  w i l l  o v e r - re p re se n t  those s e c to r s  o f  the 
p o p u la t io n ,  i . e .  w age-earners , which a re  more l i k e l y  to  answer the  q u e s t io n .  
Th is  w il l  le ad  to  wage and income e l a s t i c i t i e s  which a re ’ d i s t o r t e d  as  the  upp­
e r  t a i l  o f the  earn ings  d i s t r i b u t i o n  maÿ be om itted  a l to g e th e r  from the  estim ­
a t e s .  This c r i t i c i s m  appears to  apply  to  the  work o r ig in a t in g  from the  Centre 
fo r  Labour Economics a t  the London School o f  Economics ( i . e .  the  work o f Lay­
ard  e t  a l .  and G reenhalghi. This work i s  c a r r ie d  ou t by d i f f e r e n t  people  from 
those  who e d i te d  the  o r ig in a l  tapes  ( the l a t t e r  be ing , u s u a l ly ,  programmers 
r a t h e r  than economists or s o c ia l  s c i e n t i s t s )  and the  former do no t  tend to  rep4 
orb what the  l a t t e r  d id  to  provide them with t h e i r  v a r ia b le s .  I t  seems l i k e l y  
t h a t  in  these  circum stances a p e r f e c t  d a ta  r e s t r i c t i o n  ru le  was used^
A f i n a l  p o in t  ought to  be made about sample s e le c t io n  b ia s ,  a lthough  in  
th i s  case we can no t do any th ing  about i t .  In d iv id u a ls  a re  f r e e  to  r e fu s e  to co­
opera te  w ith the survey and the p ro p en s ity  to  do so i s  in f lu en ced  by the  socio ­
economic grouping to  which they belong , f u r th e r  to  t h i s ,  having decided to  co­
opera te  the  r e l i a b i l i t y  of t h e i r  responses  w i l l  depend on the s tan d a rd s  of l i t ­
e racy , numeracy e tc  which they have acqu ired  and these  a re  a fu n c t io n  o f  s o c ia l  
s t r a t i f i c a t i o n .  Due to  these  co n s id e ra t io n s  a l l  samples taken a re  n o t  eq u a l ly  
r e p re s e n ta t iv e  o f  the  groups they  are  taken from and hence a l l  s tandard  e r r o r s ,  
t e s t  s t a t i s t i c s  e t c .  d i f f e r  from the ' t r u e '  ones to  an unknown e x te n t .
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C. THEORETICAL EXPECTATION'S OF VARIABLES;
This  s e c t io n  a ttem pts  to  r e l a t e  the v a r i a b le s ,  shown as a v a i la b le  in  B, 
above, to  the  model suggested by Chapter 2 . At the  end we d iscu ss  o m it t ­
ed v a r ia b le s .  The names given in  b ra c k e ts  are  the  v a r ia b le  names used in  
the  re g re s s io n  summary ta b le s  of Chs. 4 -8 .
Log P red ic te d  Hourly Wage R a te s ; (MINST,FIN3T).
Own wage e f f e c t s  a re  expected to  be p o s i t iv e  and c ro ss  wage e f f e c t s  n eg a t­
ive  as explained  in  Chapter 2 (see Table 2 .1 ) .  These r e s u l t s  w i l l  only 
hold in  the absence of any tendency fo r  the supply curve to  bend backwards. 
In  such cases we might f in d  n ega tive  own e f f e c t s .  To a p a r tn e r ,  of a back­
ward-bending s u p p l ie r ,  with a l i n e a r  supply fu n c t io n ,  t h i s  w i l l  appear as 
a p o s i t iv e  cross  e f f e c t .  There i s  no a p r i o r i  n e c e s s i ty  t h a t  the  supply
curve w i l l  bend backwards e v en tu a l ly ;  the  most t h a t  can be sa id  (see  Shar-
i r  (1981) i s  th a t  t h i s  i s  more l i k e l y  where a ' t a r g e t  income' i s  sought,
i . e .  some desired  l e v e l  of commodity income i s  ach ieved . We have no means 
of observ ing  income t a r g e t s  a v a i la b le  to  u s .
The r e s u l t s  of Chapter 7 may be regarded  as an in v e s t ig a t i o n  of 
female backward-bends v ia  f i t t i n g  l i n e a r  segments along the curve.
Non-Labour Incomes (HNLI -  f o r  husbands, WNLI -  f o r  w ives);
S t r i c t l y  these  v a r ia b le s  w i l l  no t y ie ld  param eters  t h a t  can be t r e a te d  as 
income e f f e c t s  but they  can provide us w ith some guide as  to  what i s  going 
on. To the  b e s t  of our knowledge, a l l  p rev ious  s tu d ie s  agg rega te  t o t a l  
fam ily  non-labour income. We s p l i t  re ce iv ed  non-wage income i n t o i  two 
p a r t l y  because the param eters of response may d i f f e r  accord ing  to  who i s
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the  r e c i p i e n t  bu t a lso  fo r  a more im portan t re a so n , The more im portan t 
reason  fo llow s from the  f a c t  t h a t  these  v a r ia b le s  should be n e g a t iv e ly  
signed i f  l e i s u r e  i s  a normal good. I t  i s  obvious from the a n a ly s is  of 
chap ter  2 t h a t  one’ s own l e i s u r e  may be a normal good and p a r t n e r ' s  and 
i n f e r i o r  good or v ic e - v e r s a .
Spouse Hours (WHRS -  fo r  wives, HHRS -  fo r  husbands):
The hours v a r ia b le  w i l l  be su b jec t  to  a number of in f lu e n c e s .  There 
w i l l  be a nega tive  income e f f e c t  opposed by a p o s i t iv e  s u b s t i t u t io n  e f f ­
e c t  ^ i f  j o i n t  decision-m aking i s  in  o p e ra t io n .  The s u b s t i tu t io n '  e f f e c t  
w i l l  be due to  the  p a r t n e r ' s  l o s t  l e i s u r e  and l o s t  home p roduc tion  bo th  of 
which may b r in g  w elfa re  lo s s e s  to  the p a r tn e r  whose fu n c tio n  we a re  es t im ­
a t in g ,  I f  a re c u rs iv e  model i s  in  o p e ra t io n ,  as  in  Kushman and S c h e f f le r  
( 1975) ,  where husbands decide t h e i r  lab o u r  time f i r s t ,  due to  t r a d i t i o n a l
r o l e  s t r u c tu r e s  then the female fu n c t io n  ought to  d isp la y  a n eg a tiv e  r e s -
2
ponse to male hours . Kushman and S c h e f f le r  f in d  a p o s i t iv e  response and 
do no t t r y  to  ex p la in  why. I t  could be due to  m isspefc if ica tiob  in  t h a t
they  have wrongly t r e a t e d  as a re c u rs iv e  model what i s  a sim ultaneous mod­
e l .  In  any event the hours v a r ia b le  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  i n t e r p r e t  e s p e c ia l l y  
in  view of the  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  ' t a s t e s '  fo r  work may be c o r r e la te d  which, 
in c id e n ta l l y ,  could w ell be the  case in  a household below i t s  t a r g e t  income.
1. Following s t i l l  the  proceedure of C h.2. in  re v e rs in g  s igns  from the  conv­
e n t io n a l  as we r e f e r  to  the u l t im a te  e f f e c t s  on labour supply,
2. See fo o tn o te  2 on p . 103.
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Y e a r s  o f  E d u c a t i o n  (HEDC -  f o r  h u s b a n d s ,  WEDC -  f o r  w i v e s ) :
F o r  h u s b a n d s  own s c h o o l i n g  w i l l  h av e  a n e g a t i v e  i m p a c t  f rom  proxying 
p e r m a n e n t  income and, according t o  some o f  t h e  labour s u p p l y  l i t e r a t u r e  
( K n i e s s n e r  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ,  a  p o s i t i v e  i m p a c t  f rom t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  e d u c a t i o n  
i m p a r t s  an  i n c r e a s e d  t a s t e  fo r  work w h ich  may be due  t o  a  w i s h  t o  r e c o u p  
t h e  f i x e d  c o s t s  o f  s c h o o l i n g  o r  t o  increased  c o n s u m p t i o n  c a u s e d  by w i d e ­
n i n g  o p p o r t u n i t y  s e t s .  The p e r m a n e n t  income e f f e c t  o f  h u s b a n d s '  s c h o o l i n g  
w i l l  b d ' n e g a t i v e  i n  t h e  w i v e s '  f u n c t i o n ;  a  f u r t h e r  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t  m i g h t  be 
expected i f  i n c r e s e d  sp o u s e  s c h o o l i n g  l e a d s  t o  a  s h a r e d  w ish  fo r  more j o i n t
l e i s u r e  t i m e ,  C o v e r s e l y  there  may be a  p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t  f rom changes i n  
a t t i t u d e s  -  i . e .  wi t h i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  (c la s s ,a g e )  group more e d u c a t e d  h u s ­
b a n d s  may be more w i l l i n g  t o  ad ju s t  t h e i r  own t i m e  a l l o c a t i o n  i n  o r d e r  t o  
a l l o w  w i v e s  t o  combine  w o rk in g  and home a c t i v i t i e s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e y  may 
t h e m s e l v e s  p a r t a k e  o f  more h o u s e h o l d  p r o d u c t i o n .  The abov e e f f e c t s  s h o u l d  
be m i r r o r e d  i n  t h e  impact of t h e  e d u c a t i o n  v a r i a b l e s  i n  t h e  f e m a l e  f u n c t i o n  
i . e .  n e g a t i v e  own and cross p e r m a n e n t  income e f f e c t s ,  p o s i t i v e  ' t a s t e  f o r  
work'  e f f e c t s ,  and a p o s i t iv e  e f f e c t  f r om  h u s b a n d s  e d u c a t i o n  i f  i t  s h i f t s  
a t t i t u d e s  a s  h y p t h e s i z e d  a b o v e .  I t  f o l l o w s  i n  terms o f  t h e  d i a g r a m  a t  
2 . 2  t h a t  i n r e a s e d  e d u c a t i o n  w i l l  e n h a n c e  w i v e s '  r e s o u r c e s  and  c o n s e q u e n t  
b a r g a i n i n g  po w er .  We a r e  a s s u m i n g  t h a t  i n c r e a s e d  e d u c a t i o n  t o  h u s b a n d s  
d o e s  n o t  have  t h i s  e f f e c t . .
P r e s e n c e  o f  C h i l d r e n  Unde r  l 6  a t  S c h o o l  : (KID)
N o r m a l l y  t h i s  i s  expected n e g a t i v e  i n  t h e  w i f e ' s  f u n c t i o n  u n l e s s  t h e  
c o s t  o f  ch ild ren  i s  so s e v e r e  t h a t  i t  l e a d s  t o  i n c r e a s e d  work by w i v e s  be­
cause a  f a i l u r e  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  c o r r e c t l y  t h e  cost o f  c h i l d r e n .  As m e n t i o n e d  
i n  Cameron (1983) and d e m o n s t r a t e d  i n  Cameron ( 19 83a)  such  a  f a i l u r e  may
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w e l l  r e s u l t  i n  w i v e s  t a k i n g  on a s e c o n d - j o b .  I t  f o l l o w s  f rom t h i s  t h a t  t h e r e  
w i l l  be some i n t e r a c t i o n  b e tw e e n  th e  v a r i a b l e  WMOON ( s e e  be low)  and  KID. 1^ 
t h e  p r e s e n t  s t u d y  t h e r e  i s  no a t t e m p t  t o  c o n t r o l  f o r  t h i s  and  i t  may r e n d e r  
t h e  s i g n s  and  m a g n i t u d e s  o f  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  on t h e s e  two v a r i a b l e s  somewhat 
u n s t a b l e .  A b y - p r o d u c t  o f  t h e  method o f  a p o r o a c h  i n  C h a p t e r  6 i s  t h a t  we 
have some u n r e p o r t e d  e s t i m a t e s  where t h e  e f f e c t  o f  a  s e c o n d - j o b  on t o t a l  h o u r s  
i s  e s t i m a t e d  f o r  t h o s e  w i t h  and w i t h o u t  d e p e n d e n t  c h i l d r e n .
We would  e x p e c t  t h a t  c e t e r i s  p a r i b u s  s m a l l e r  m a g n i t u d e s  f o r  t h e  c o e f f -
i e n t s  on KID i n  t h e  w i v e s '  f u n c t i o n s  w i l l  r e f l e c t  s h i f t s  away f rom p a t r i a r c h -  
i a l  d e c i s i o n  mak ing .  I f  c h i l d r e n  c o u ld  be r a t i o n a l l y  p l a n n e d  and c o s t e d ,  a s  
i n  B e c k e r  t y p e  m o d e l s ,  t h e n  t h e r e  would be an e x p e c t a t i o n  o f  z e r o  f o r  KID i n  
t h e  h u s b a n d s '  f u n c t i o n s .  A p o s i t i v e  s i g n  may . r e f l e c t  male  d om inance  a s  h i s  
l a b o u r  t i m e  i s  i n c r e a s e d  to  m ee t  t h e  u n a n t i c i p a t e d  c o s t s  o f  c h i l d r e n ,  f o r  dem­
o n s t r a t i o n  o f  t h i s ,  s e e  Cameron (1983) where  i t  i s  a l s o  shown t h a t  >ûs  l i k e l i ­
hood o f  h a v i n g  two j o b s  i s  i n c r e a s e d  by d e p e n d e n t  c h i d l r e n  b e i n g  p r e s e n t .  The 
l a s t  p o i n t  h a s  t h e  same i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  KID and a s  i t  d i d  f o r  KID and
HKOON i n  d i s c u s s i n g  w iv es  ( sec^ above)  w i t h  t h e  same c o n s e q u e n c e s  f o r  p a r a m e t e r  
e s t i m a t e s .  A n e g a t i v e  s i g n  on KID i n  t h e  h u s b a n d s '  f u n c t i o n s  w i l l  c l e a r l y  r e ­
f l e c t  t h a t  t h e  h u sb an d  i n c r e a s e s  h i s  o u t p u t  on h o u s e h o l d  t a s k s  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  
more t im e  i n  l e i s u r e  o r  i n  t h e  l a b o u r  m a r k e t  by t h e  w i f e .  We may t a k e  t h i s  a s  
some i n d i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  e q u a l . ! t a r i a n  f a m i l y  s t r u c t u r e .
I t  i s  p o s s b i l e  t h a t  someone m i g h t  a r g u e  t h a t  a p a t t e r n  o f  KID b e i n g  n e g a t ­
i v e  f o r  w i v e s  and p o s i t i v e  f o r  h u s b a n d s  s i m p ly  r e f l e c t s  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e ,  
however  i t  mus t  be e m p h a s i z e d  t h a t  t h e  e s t i m a t e s  a r e  made w i t h  b o t h  MINST and 
FINST i n  t h e  r e g r e s s i o n s  t h e r e b y  h o l d i n g  c o n s t a n t  r e l a t i v e  h o u r l y  o f f e r e d  
w ages .  R e l a t i v e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  on h o u s e h o l d  t a s k s  i s  n o t  o b s e r v e d  and i t  may
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be th a t  the  c o e f f i c i e n t s  on KID r e f l e c t s  i t .  N onetheless  comparing two gr­
oups and f in d in g  a sm eller n ega tive  impact fo r  wives in  one than the  o th e r  
w i l l ,e v e n  i f  i t  r e f l e c t s  r e la t iv e e p r o d u c t iv i t y  d i f f e r e n t i a l s ,  s t i l l  e f f e c t i v e ­
ly  show th a t  the wiÿes with lower c o e f f i c i e n t s  have a g re a te r  weight in  fam ily 
labour supply d e c is io n s ,
Presence of Child Under ^  School (SKE.)
A value of 1 fo r  t h i s  v a r ia b le  w i l l  in v a r ia b ly  in d ic a te  t h a t  a household 
indu lges  in  a d d i t io n a l  expend itu res  to  remove younger c h i ld re n  from the  house­
hold fo r  s u b s ta n t ia l  periods  of the day. A number of e f f e c t s  may fo llow  from 
t h i s  . The a d d i t io n a l  expend itu res  may be met by in c re a se s  in  the  work hours 
of e i t h e r  p a r tn e r  u n le ss  the p a r tn e r s  wish ^to accep t a red u c tio n  in  consumpt­
ion . On top  of t h i s  wives w i l l  be freed from some household p roduc tion  time, 
as may husbands depending on the  p r io r  ro le  s t r u c tu r e ,  which might be used to 
f a c i l i t a t e  a d es ired  in c rease  in her hours of wort. I t  need no t fo llow  th a t  
the s in g le  period  pay -o ff  of a d d i t io n a l  wives' ea rn ings  r e l a t i v e  to  the  costs  
o f  nu rse ry  schooling should be p o s i t iv e  as the wife may be pursu ing  æ ca ree r  
in  w hich^m aintaining a c e r ta in  minimal number of hours in the  labour market^ 
re p re se n ts  an investm ent in  human c a p i t a l .  In  t h i s  connection we would expect 
th a t  as a wife comes c lo se r  to  f u l l - t im e  s ta tu s  , and thereby c o n t r ib u te s
more to  permanent household ea rn in g s ,  then SKL i s  more l i k e l y  to  inc reade
her work hours with the  p o s s i b i l i t y  th a t  husbands' hours are  decreased  in  
o rder to  a s s i s t  with some of the  co -o rd in a tio n  problems of n u rse ry  school a t t ­
endance ,
   ^
1. P a r t i c i p a t i n g  in  the  labour market a t  a l l  may be regarded as human c a p i t a l
in  t h i s  l i g h t  and p a r t i c ip a t io n  in some occupations w i l l  only be worthwhile
to  employers a t  hours above c e r t a in  minima.
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Age an d  Age S q u a r e d  (OAGE an d  EXP).
These are  inc luded  because of the common f in d in g  of a c u r v i l in e a r  age-work 
p r o f i l e  where hours f i r s t  r i s e  with age and then f a l l  (see  e .g .  Kushraan and 
S c h e f f le r  (1975)). A squared term i s  used to  cap ture  t h i s ;  in  the commonly 
be lieved  case t h i s  should r e s u l t  in  a p o s i t iv e  c o e f f i c i e n t  on OAGE and a neg­
a t iv e  c o e f f i c i e n t  on EXP, I t  i s  h igh ly  l i k e l y  t h a t  the r e l a t i o n s h ip  i s  more 
complicated than t h i s  and t ry in g  to cap tu re  i t  as a l i n e  w ith one bend i s  
s e r io u s ly  m is lead ing . In  an a ttem pt to  combat t h i s  we develop a l i f e  cycle 
approach in  Chapter 6.
I l l n e s s  (HSIK -  f o r  H u s b a n d s ,  WSIK- f o r  w iv e s )
The impact of i l l n e s s  on fam ily  labour supply i s  expected to  r e f l e c t  the 
underly ing  ro le  s t r u c tu r e  between husbands and wives. I t  i s  to be remembered 
t h a t  we have a lread y  accounted fo r  the  impact of poor h e a l th  on ea rn in g s  in  
co n s tru c t in g  MINST and FINST, (see  s ec t io n  A of t h i s  c h a p te r ) .  Own i l l n e s s  
should reduce hours of work through l im i t in g  a c t i v i t y  w h ils t  spouse i l l n e s s  
ought to  in c rease  hours of work to compensate fo r  the  l o s t  income from the 
own e f f e c t .  These arguments are  p re d ic a te d  on the assumption th a t  i l l n e s s  
does not change the consumption le v e l s  which households d e s i r e .  I l l n e s s  may
i n t e r a c t  with o ther v a r ia b le s  e .g .  the presence of ch ild ren  under l6  may
have a d i f f e r e n t  in f lu en ce  on husbands' labour supply where the  wife i s  i l l ;
f o r  t h i s  reason we study wife i l l ,  husband i l l ,  n e i th e r  i l l  and both i l l
households s ep a ra te ly  in  Chapter 5.
C o l o u r  (HCOL -  f o r  c o l o u r e d  h u s b a n d ,  WCOL -  f o r  c o l o u r e d  w i f e ) :
We h a v e  l i t t l e  a  p r i o r i  e x p e c t a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  c o l o u r  on l a b ­
o u r  s u p p l y ;  t h e s e  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  i n c l u d e d  on t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  t a s t e s  a n d  r o l e  
s t r u c t u r e s  i n  t h e s e  h o u s e n o l d s  d i f f e r  f rom t h o s e  i n  w h i t e  h o u s e h o l d s .  I n  t h e  
a b s e n c e  o f  a n y  r e s e a r c h  on t h e  i n t e r n a l  w o r k i n g s  o f  c o l o u r e d  f a m i l i e s  i n  t h e
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Ünited Kingdom we can not provide a p p ro p r ia te  hypotheses. The coloured 
households a re  in v e s t ig a te d  s e p a ra te ly  in  Chapter 5 in an a ttem pt to  d i s c ­
over i f  d i s t i n c t  r o le  d i f f e r e n c e s  do e x i s t  r e l a t i v e  to  white households.
As with i l l n e s s ,  the  e f f e c t  of colour on wages i s  taken account of in  the 
c o n s tru c t io n  of MINST and FINST; Appendix I I  shows th a t  s i g n i f i c a n t  
colour d is c r im in a t io n  e x i s t s  fo r  the  men in  the sample (see Green-
halgh (1980)- fo r  comparable e s t im a te s  of d is c r im in a t io n  us ing  earn ings  fun­
c t io n s  of GHS d a ta  and S tew art(l982) fo r  a thorough in v e s t ig a t io n  us ing  
a la rg e  sample of coloured w orkers].
Second J ob Holding (WMOON fo r  wives, HMOON fo r  husbands):
A second job may f u l f i l l  a number of fu n c t io n s -  i t  can be used to  boost 
income when the re  i s  an hours c o n s t r a in t  imposed by the f i r s t  jo b ,  to  meet 
u n a n t ic ip a te d  c o s ts ,  or to more c lo se ly  approximate optimal hours when th ­
i s  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to adhieve through a s in g le  job o th e r  than the two he ld .
The f i r s t  two o f  t h e s e  a r g u m e n t s  i m p l y  p o s i t i v e  s i g n s  o f  own d o u b l e - j o b  
h o l d i n g  w h i l e  t h e  l a s t  i m p l i e s  n e g a t i v e  s i g n s .  The m o s t  u s u a l  c a u s e  o f  
u n a n t i c i p a t e d  c o s t s  i s  t h e  r e a r i n g  o f  c h i l d r e n  -  t h i s  i s  known a s  t h e  
' l i f e  c y c l e  s q u e e z e '  i n  t h e  s o c i o l o g i c a l  l i t e r a t u r e  ( s e e  O p p e n h e im e r  ( 1 9 7 4 ) .  
E v i d e n c e  on t h i s  u s i n g  t h e  p r e s e n t  d a t a  i s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  Cameron ( 1 9 8 3 , 1 9 8 3 a ) .
ASpouse double-job  ho ld ing  w i l l  produce an income e f f e c t  and a s u b s t i tu io n  
e f f e c t  which ought to  in c rease  own hours as the p a r tn e r  lo s e s  time in  
household ta sk s  or l e i s u r e .
No a ttem pt i s  made to  deal with the problem th a t  th e re  w i l l  be more than 
one wage-rate  i f  two jobs  are  h e ld , p a t t l y  because earn ings a re  given in  
t o t a l  in  the  da ta ,  as we simnly use t o t a l  average hourly  pay from a l l  work
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i n  t h e  e a r n i n g s  f u n c t i o n s .  T h i s  means ,  s t r i c t l y  s p e a k i n g ,  t h a t  MINST and 
FINST r e p r e s e n t  a v e r n g e  r a t h e r  t h a n  m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t s ^ "
So c ia l  C lass  (DUMA -  Segl, DUMB -  Seg I I ,  DITMC -  5eg TV, DUMD -  SegV)
As explained e a r l i e r ,  s o c i a l  s t a t u s  i s  taken from h u s b a n d s '  o c c u p a t i o n a l  
g r o u p i n g .  C h a p t e r  /, i n v e s t i g a t e s  the e f f e c t  o f  c l a s s  f u l l y ;  a s  t h i s  chan­
t e r  shows t h a t  b e h a v i o u r  d i f f e r s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  by c l a s s  we i n c l u d e  t h e  above 
0 - 1  v a r i a b l e s  i n  o t h e r  r e g r e s s i o n s  t o  c o r r e c t ,  a l b e i t  inadequate ly , f o r  t h i s .  
We have no c lea r  p r i o r  e x p e c t a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  s i g n  o f  t h e s e  v a r i a b l e s .
Some v a r i a b l e s  i n i t i a l l y  e x t r a c t e d  i 'rom t h e  d a t a  a r e  e x c l u d e d  and a r e  
d i s c u s s e d  a l o n g  w i t h  o t h e r  o m i t t e d  v a r i a b l e s  b e lo w ,  T a b l e  3.2 shows t h e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  r e t a i n e d  v a r ia b le s  i n  t h e  s a m o l e .
Omi t t e d i V a r i a b l e s ;
Two v a r i a b l e s  i n  t h e  d a t a  s e t  were o m i t t e d  f rom t h e  f i n a l  r e g r e s s i o n s  -  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  o f  w i v e s  (SAT) and c o s t  o f  l i v i n g  push  f e l t  by hu sb an d  on h i s  
wages  (COST). The l a t t e r  v a r i a b l e  was d e l e t e d  b e c a u s e  i t  was l a r g e l y  i n s i g ­
n i f i c a n t  p e r h a p s  due t o  t h e  mildness o f  t h e  1974 i n f l a t i o n a r y  c l i m a t e .  I t  
may w e l l  be t h e  c a s e  I,hat  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  s u s t a i n e d  s e v e r e  i n f l a t i o n  brings 
a d j u s t m e n t s  i n  f a m i l y  l a b o u r  s u p p l y  behaviour. E v e n t u a l l y  we e x c l u d e d  SAT 
on t h e  b a s i s  t h a t  we j u d g e d  i t  t o  be a  d u b i o u s  v a r i a b l e  d e s p i t e  i t s  u s e  by 
McGlone and  R u f f e l l  (1980)  i n  l a b o u r  s u p p l y  e s t i m a t e s .  The a f o r e m e n t i o n e d  
a u t h o r s  a r g u e  t h a t  t h o s e  who a r e  s a t i s f i e d  w i t h  t h e i r  j o b  w i l l  work l o n g e r  
a t  i t  i n  o r d e r  t o  j u s t i f y  t h e  l a r g e  s i g n i f i c a n t  p o s i t i v e  c o e f f i c i e n t  on t h e i r  
DAT v a r ia b le .  We found t h e  same r e l a t i o n s h i p  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  and r a n  t h e  r e g r -
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HOURS PER WEEK 45.39 27.51
WEEKS WORKED PERTYEAR 50.35 46.44
EARNINGS PER YEAR (£) 2 ,249.62 842.96
NON-LABOUR INCOME (£)
PER YEAR 30.07 33.51
EDUCATION (YEARS) 10.36 10.37
N"=1965
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c s s j o n s  w i t h  t h e  s a t i s f i e d  w i v e s  o n l y  and fo u n d  l i t t l e  change  i n  e s t i m a t e d  
c o e f f i c i e n t s  e x c e p t  f o r  a w e a k e n in g  i n  the l e v e l s  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  w i t h  t h e  
e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  v a r i a n c e  a l s o  f a l l i n g .  The v a r i a b l e  seems d u b i o u s  p a r t ly  on 
a c c o u n t  o f  what  i t  m e a s u r e s  ( s e e  Locke (l974))  a.s i t  s i m p ly  a s k s  how s a t i s f ­
i e d  w o r k e r s  a r e  w i t h  j o b s  and n o t  why o r  over what  a s p e c t s .  P e r h a p s  on a c c ­
o u n t  o f  t h i s  v a g u e n e s s ,  e i g h t y  p e r  c e n t  of women c i t e  t h e m s e l v e s  a s  s a t i s f -  
i.ed i n  t h i s  s a m p le .  On top  of t h i s  i s  t h e  p ro b le m  o f  r e v e r s e  c a u s a t i o n  i n  
t h a t  l o n g e r  w o rk in g  w eeks ,  and f a c to r s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  them su ch  a s  h i g h e r
r e l a t i v e  p e r m a n e n t  e a r n i n g s ,  may be t h e  determ inan ts  o f  s a t i s f a c t i o n  r a t h e r  
t h a n  t h e  o t h e r  way r o u n d .  F u r t h e r  s a t i s f a c t i o n  i s  r e l a t i v e  t o  a s p i r a t i o n s  
which may meant t h a t  t h e  e i g h t y  p e r  c e n t  o f  w i v e s  who a r e  s a t i s f i e d  may be 
a m el an ge o f  t h o s e  w i t h  low a s p i r a t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  e a s i l y  met and t h o s e  w i th  
i i igh  a s p i r a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e y  h ave  s t r i v e n  t o  a c h i e v e .
R e l a t i v e  p e r m a n e n t  e a i m i n g s  can n o t  be m ea s u r ed  i n  a way c o n f o r m a b l e  to 
F i g u r e  g , ^ ^ l . I t  w i l l  be p a r t i a l l y  c a p t u r e d  by th e  p r e s e n c e  o f  FINST,
FINST,WEDC,HEDC and s p o u s e  h o u r s  i n  e a c h  r e g r e s s i o n .  T h e s e  P a i l  t o  p i c k  up
t l ie number  of years worked and e x p e c t e d  to be worked and i t  mu s t  be a s s umed
th a t  the o m i s s i o n  o f  t h i s  d o e s  n o t  l e a d  to b i a s  i n  other p a r a m e t e r  e s t i m a t e s
D i v o r c e  p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  n o t  m eas u r ed  ; th e  method o f  G re en e  and Q u e s t i o n  
(1 982)  u s e s  age  and m a r i t a l  d u r - a t i o n  s p e c i f i c  s e p a  r a t i o n  r a t e s .  T h e s e  a r e  
o n l y  g e n e r a l l y  a v a i l a b l e  t o  u s  i n  g i 'ouped form whicii  i s  n o t  an i n s u r m o u n t a b ­
l e  p r o b l e m  how ever  t h e  d u r a t i o n  o f  m a r r i a g e  i s  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  on t h e  d a t a  
t a p e .  He nce we as sum e s e p a r a t i o n  r a t e s  a r e  d i s t r i b u t e d  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  t h e  
o t h e r  v a r i a b l e s  and  t h a t  t h e i r  v a r i a t i o n  b e tw e e n  g r o u p s  i s  c a p t u r e d  i n  t h e  
i n t e r c e p t  t e r m .
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D. PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION OF BARGAINING STRUCTURE 
Kany o f  t h e  a r g u m e n t s  o f  t h e  p r e c e e d  i ng s e c t i o n  c o n c e r n i n g  b a r g a i n i n g  
s t r u c t u r e  h i n g e d  on t h e  r e s u l t s  f o r  th e  e d u c a t i o h i  v a r i a b l e s  which had t o  
be o m i t t e d  b e c a u s e  o f  col  l i n e a r i t y  w i t h  t h e  wage i n s t r u m e n t s .  T h i s  a r o s e  
I e c a u s e  o f  t h e  u s e  o f  e d u c a t i o n  t o  g e n e r a t e  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t s  which r e s u l t e d  
in l u d i c r o u s  e s t i m a t e s  f o r  some wage e l n s t i c i  t i e s  and c o e f f i c i e n t s  on e d u c ­
a t i o n .  On o c c a s i o n  t l r i s e  r e s u l t s  a r e  m e n t i o n e d  i n  f o o t n o t e s  where  t h e  i n t e r ­
a c t i o n  o f  e d u c a t i o n  w i t h  no n-wage v a r i a b l e s  i s  o f  i n t e r e s t .
I n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  a s r . e c i f i c  v a r i a b l e  whici i  m e a s u r e s  b a r g a i n i n g  s t r u c t u r e  
it,  i s  somewhat d i f f i c u l t  t o  i d e n t i f y  i t .  I t  m i g h t  have b ee n  p o s s i b l e  t o  
overcome t h i s  by e x t r a c t i n g  a p r i n c i p a l  com pon en t  o r  f a c t o r  from t h e  m a t r i x  
o f  non-wage v a r i a b l e s  which  c o u l d  be s a i d  t o  r e p r e s e n t  b a r g a i n i n g  power  or  
s t r u c t u r e .  R e g r e s s i n g  h o u r s  o f  work orj su ch  a v a r i a b l e  p l u s  p e c u n i a r y  v a r ­
i a b l e s  would l o s e  c o n s i d e r a b l e  d e s c r i p t i v e  i n f o r m a t i o n  on t h e  r o l e  o f  non -  
m o n e t a r y  f a c t o r s  i n  h o u r s  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  so  t h i s  a p p r o a c h  i s  n o t  a t t e m p t e d .
As we do n o t  have  a  s p e c i f i c  v a r i a b l e  f o r  b a r g a i n i n g  s t r u c t u r e  we must  
l o o k  a t  thci c o m b i n a t i o n s  o f  c o e f f i c i e n t s  on d i f f e r  e n t  v a r i a b l e s  in o r d e r  t o  
a r r i v e  a t  an  i n t e r p r e  t a l i o n  o f  i t . .  I n  v iew o f  th e  d i s c u s s i o n  in  C h a p t e r  2 
we have d e v e l o p e d  a taxonomy o f  b a r g a i n i n g  regime:? which h a s  s ev e n  c a t e g o r ­
i e s .  The r e s u l t s  o f  C h a p t e r s  1 - 7  a r e  c l a s s  i f l e d  i n t o  t h e s e  c a t e g o r i e s  i n  
T a b l e  8 . 2  i n  C h a p t e r  8 .  The c a t e g o r i e s  a r e  l i s t e d  below w i t h  o u r  e x p e c t a t ­
i o n s  a b o u t  h o u r s  and m o n e t a r y  v a r i a b l e s  f ' o l l o w i n g  them.  A d d i t i o n a l  n o t e s  on 
(.he c r i t e r i a  f o r  a l l o c a t i o n  to  a g r o u p  f o l l o w  t h i s  l i s t .
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■ • T o t a l l y  I ride PO lid on I N e o-C 1. a s s i cm 1 M n d e l  (IND)
I n  t h i s  c a s e  we e x p e c t  i n s i g n i  r i c a ' "  t  hour ' s  par-ame t e n s , c r o s s  wage,  
and c r o s s  l a b o u r  income p a r a m e t e r s .  Own wage and income p a r a m e t e r s  
o u g h t  t o  be s i g n i f i c a n t .
9 .  Siriiul t a n e o u s  Ne o - C l a s s i c a l  Model Wi t h  Compos 1 t e  (I t i l  i  t y  F u n c t i o n  o r  
S e p a r a t e  N o n - I n  t e  r d e p e n d  e n t  U t i l i t y  F u n c t i o n s  (SIM)
I n  t h i s  c a s e  c r o s s  e f f e c t s  on p e c u n i a r y  v a r i a b l e s  o u g h t  t o  be s i g n i f -  
i can t  w h i l s t  the  s p o u s e  h o u r s  ter-rn o u g h t  t o  be  i n s i g n i f i c a n t .
3 . I n t e r d e p e n d e n  t  U t i l i  t y Mo d e l  Wi t h  S i m u ] t a n e o u s  D e c i s i o n s  (NTR) 
F i ' esumi ng a l t r u i s m  o v e r  p a r t n e r ' s  h o u r s  we e x p e c t  s i g n i f i c a n t  p o s i t -  
iv' ;  c o e l f  i c i e r ,  t s  on t h "  s p o u s e  h o u r s  t erm w h i l s t  r e c o g n i s i n g  t h e  o t h e r  
i n f l u e n c e s  on the  t-er:.- ( s e e  Chi sn t e r  3 ) .
Rt i cur s  I ye V. J i--1 (idl.C)
In  t h i s  c a s e  wu e x p e c  (, a  n eg a  Id vn s p o u s e  h o u r s  t erm and s i g n i f i c a n t  
c r o s s - w a g e  e f f e c t s  in one er^ua t i  on ( t h e  r  / c u r s  i ve  one) b u t  n o t  in t he
0 (,'ie r .
1, T a r g e  t  I n cvme ( "AR)
I n  t h i s  gr oup  n o u s e  ho i d s  a;a:- p u r s u i n g  a s p e c i f i c  l e v e l  o f  commodi ty  inc- 
o m e .w h ich  o u gh t  t o  be r e f l e c t e d  in p o s i t i v e  n o n - l a b o u r  income t e r m s .
1 . Un i den  t i f i ed Du'.i t o  To t/i. 1 Dorn 1 na I. i on Ry One P a r  t n o r- ( DOM) .
W he th e r  t h e  as rump  t i  on o f  a c l . u a i  o r  v e i l e c i  d i e  t,a t o r  s h i p  i s  t r u e ,  i f  
w -• a r e  i n  one o f  B e c k e r ' s  s t a t e s  ( s e e  Chap- ter  2 ) ,  we w i l l  be f a c e d  w i t h  
t h e  p ro b le m  t h a t  one e .q u a t io n  i s  n o t  i d e n t i f i e d  a t  a l l  a.; i t  j u s t  r e p -  
!' son t s  p a r t n e r ' s ,  d e c i s i o n s .  I t  w i l l  be im p o s s ib l e ;  t o  say  w h ich  one
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i l  i s .
7 .  U n i d e n t i f i e d  Due t o  L a b o u r  M a r k e t  R e s t r i c t i o n s  (LMR)
I f  b o t h  p a r t n e r s  a r e  r e s t r i c t e d  i n  t h e i r  c h o i c e  o f  h o u r s  by t h e  e x i g e n c ­
i e s  o f  t h e  l a b o u r  m a r k e t  t h e n  t h e  s y s t e m  o f  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  can  n o t  be 
o b s e r v e d .
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i n t o  g r o u p s  some l a b e l l i n g  o f  ' w i f e  d o m in ­
a t e d '  o r  ' h u s b a n d  d o m i n a t e d '  t a k e s  p l a c d  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c h a p t e r s .  T h i s  
i s  c a r r i e d  o u t  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  i m p a r t  o f  wage g r o w t h  on t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  
o f  t i m e .  Tire d o m i n a n t  p a r t n e r  i s  t a k e n  t o  be t h e  one  who h a s  a  p o s i t i v e  
own wage e l a s t i c i t y  w h i l s t  t h e  o t h e r  p a r t n e r  h a s  a  n e g a t i v e  own wage e l a s ­
t i c i t y .  T h i s  i s  n o t  e x a c t l y  t h e  same c o n c e p t  o f  d o m i n a n c e  a s  i n  Ch.  2 o r  
c a t e g o r y  6 above  a s  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  t h e s e  c o e f f i c i e n t  p a t t e r s  t o  em erge  
w i t h  t h e  p a r t n e r  we h av e  l a b e l l e d  a s  d o m i n a n t  n o t  b e i n g  t h e  one who makes  
rile h o u s e h o l d  d e c i s i o n s .  T h u s  d o m i n a n c e  i s  t r e a t e d  f rom t h e  r e s o u r c e s  v i e w ­
p o i n t  i n  i n t e r p r e  t i n g  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  w ork .
The IND c a t e g o r y  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  model  i n  A ( i )  w i t h  t h e  p a r t n e r s  
b e i n g  m a r r i e d  b e c a u s e  o f  some J o i n t  g o o d s  w h ich  a r e  s e p a r a b l e  f rom l a b ­
o u r  f o r c e  d e c i s i o n s  so  t h a t  e a c h  p a r t n e r  a c t s  ' a s  i f  t h e y  w ere  n o t  m a r r i e d  
wiien m a k in g  l a i i o u r  s u p p l y  d e c i s i o n s .
Our c r i t e r i a  f o r  i n c l u s i o n  i n  SIM s i m p l y  dem an d s  t h a t  one  p a r t n e r ' s  
o f f e r e d  wages  i n f l u e n c e  t h e  o t h e r ' s  h o u r s  r a t h e r  t i ia n  b o t h  d o i n g  s o .  The 
p ro b l e m  o f  i n t e r p r e t i n g  a s  a SIM g r o u p  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  may be a n e g a t i v e  imp­
a c t  t o  t h e  h o u r s  t e r m s  due to  t h e r e  b e i n g  an  income e f f e c t .
I n  t h e  n e o - c l a s s i c a l  f r a m ew o rk  w i t h  u t i l i t y  d e p e n d i n g  on p a r t n e r ' s  
l e i s u r e  an d t h e  l e v e l  o f  p a r t n e r ' s  u t i l i t y  ( s e e  C h a p t e r  2 . A . ( i i i )  a d e c -  
r e n s e  i n  p a r t n e r ' s  l e i s u r e  p r o d u c e s  a l o s s  i n  own u t i l i t y  c e t e r i s  p a r i b u s  
t h e r e f o r e  the  s p o u s e  h o u r s  t e - m  s h o u l d  be i p o s i t i v e  i n  t h e  NTR g r o u p .
I n  t h e  B e c k e r  I : aiiiework (Cnaf . i te r  2 .  B . ( i )  ) t h e  s p o u s e  h o u r s  t e rm  i s  d i f f i c -
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u l t  t o  i n t e r p r e t  i n  th e  NTR c o n t e x t .  C e t . e r l s  p a r i bus  an i n c r e a s e  i n  
spouse l a b o u r  m a r k e t  t im e  i m p l i e s  an i n c r e a s e  i n  m a r k e t  go od s  and a  d e c r ­
e a s e  i n  s p o u se  t im e  i n p u t s  t o  h o u s e h o l d  p r o d u c t i o n .  T h i s  m i g h t  c o n c e i v a b l y  
l e a d  t o  no change i n  t h e  o u t p u t  of h o u s e h o l d  c o m m o d i t i e s  a l t h o u g h  i t  m i g h t
l e a d  t o  an  a l t e r a t i o n  i r r  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  output i n  t e r m s  o f  s e l f  goods
and shareab les .  The r e a l  p ro b le m  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no l e i s u r e  t im e  i n  t h e  
h o u s e h o l d  p r o d u c t i o n  m ode l .  T h e r e f o r e  t h e r e  s h o u l d  be no d i r e c t  i n f l u e n c e  
of p a r tn e r ' s  non-market t i m e  on u t i l i t y  a s  t h e  d i r e c t  i n f l u e n c e  i s  t h r o u g h  
c o m r a o i i t i e s .  A d i r e c t  i n f l u e n c e  o f  p a r t n e r ' s  n o n - m a r k e t  t i m e  on u t i l i t y  
i m p l i e s  t h a t  p a r t n e r s  a r e  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  d i v i s i o n  o f  p a r t n e r ' s  t im e  
i n t o  m a r k e t  and n o n - m a r k e t  a c t i v i t i e s .  ^ I n  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  i d e a  o f  male
d o m i n a t i o n  we might e x p e c t  t h i s  t o  lead t o  a  p o s i t i v e  c o e f f i c i e n t  on s pouse
hours a s  th e  m a r g i n a l  u t i l i t y  o f  w i v e s '  work t ime to  h u s b a n d s  i s  n e g a t i v e  
i m p l y i n g  t h a t  he m i g h t  i n c r e a s e  h i s  own s t o c k  o f  s e l f  goods  t h r o u g h  i n c r -  
' •ascd  work t i m e .  O b v i o u s l y  tin; r e v w  se  a i-j'U'ru’n t- f o l l o w s  i f  t h e  m a r g i n a l  
u t i l i t y  o f  w i v e s '  t ime i n  t h e  lab oui -  market to h u s b a n d s  i s  p o s i t i v e .
I n  t h e  t a r g e t  income g r o u p  i t  i s  p o s i t e d  th a t  households a r e  i n  a s t a t e  
o f  p s y c h i c  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  a s  t h ey  have fewer m a r k e t  goods  t h a n  t h e y  d e s i r e  
g i v e n  t h e  wage r a t e  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on hours o f  wo rk .  I n  t h e  
n e o - c l a s s i c a l  f r am ew ork  t h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  l e i s u r e  t ime i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  r e d ­
u n d a n t  a s  i t  h as  no a l t e r n a t i v e  u se  th e re fo re  l e i s u r e  i s  an i n f e r i o r  good.  
I n  t h e  B e c k e r  f r am ew ork  home t ime i s  redundant due to a s h o r t a g e  o f  goods  
which  a r e  comtd e m e n t a r y  to  it.  in p r o d u c t i o n  t h e r e f o r e  t h e  re  i s  a s h o r t f a l l  
i n  t h e  o u t p u t  o f  c o m m o d i t i e s  r e l a t i v e  to th a t  d e s i r e d .
1. F o r  s i m p l i c i t y  we are t a l k i n g  i n  terms of a g g r e g a t e s ,  i t  i s  o b v i o u s  
t h a t  t h e r e  may be p r e f e r e n c e s  over the d i v i s i o n  o f  p a r t n e r ' s  non-market 
t ime and n o t  j u s t  i t s  t o t a l  am oun t .
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The above  d i s c u s s i o n  o n l y  r e a l l y  1,r e a l s  th e  s i n g l e  p e r s o n  c a s e .  F o r  a 
g r o u p  t h e  p r o b le m  o f  t a r g e t  income i s  s l i g h t l y  more c o m p l i c a t e d  a s  t h e  
p a r t n e r s  may p r e f e r  t h e  t a r g e t  t o  be met  a s  much a s  p o s s i b l e  t h r o u g h  t h e  
work t i m e  o f  one p a r t n e r ,  f o r  example  t h e  h u s b a n d  i n  a t r a d i t i o n a l  r o l e  
t r u c t u r o .  Thus  we may o b s e r v e  u p o s i t i v e  wage r e s p o n s e  f o r  t h e  p r i m a r y  
worker'  combined w i t h  i n f e r i o r i t y  o f  t h e i r  l e i s u r e  w i t h  n e g a t i v e  wage r e s p ­
o n s e s  f rom t h e  s e c o n d a r y  w o r k e r .
The r e m a i n i n g  g r o u p s  ( 1 , 5  and 7) a r e  s e l f - e v i d e n t  o r  have been s u f f i c ­
i e n t l y  d i s c u s s e d  e l s e w h e r e .
A f i n a l  word on m e t h o d o l o g y  seems a p p r o p r i a t e  a t  t h i s  p o i n t .  The above  
seems e x t r e m e l y  messy c o m p ar e !  w i th  t h e  e l e g a n c e  o f  n e o - c l a s s i c a l  s u p p l y  
t h e o r y  b a s e d  on consum er  d err and m ode l s  and m i g h t  be a c c u s e d  o f  b e i n g  an 
example  o f  a  fuz:vy o r  w o o l l y  model  d e r i v i n g  f rom t h e  u s e  o f  a l a r g e  d a t a  
s e t .  I n  d e f e n c e  o f  o u r  a n p r o a c h  t h e r e  a r e  two t h i n g s  t o  be s a i d .  One i s  
t h a t  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  on d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  can  be i g n o r e d  and t h e  r e s u l t s  
i n t e r p r e t e d  f rom w’r i t e v e r  b a s i s  the  reader -  c h o o s e s .  The second i s  t h a t  
i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  to  t a k e  t h e  v iew t h a t  some e m p i r i c a l  r e s e a r c h  i s  n e c e s s a r y  
in  some c a s e s  b e f o r e  com pac t  and p r e c i  se  t h e o r i e s  can  be fo r m ed .  Hope­
f u l l y  o u r  r e s e a r c h  i l l u m i n a t e s  the  p r o b l e m  o f  h o u s e h o l d  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  
i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  labour-  s u p p l y  and p r o v i d e s  p o i n t e r s  f o r  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  
b e t t e r  t h e o r i e s  and more a p p r o p r i a t e  s e t s  o f  d a t a .
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CHAPTER L POPULATION SUB-GROUPS I
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND HUSBANL-WTFE LABOUR SUPPLY 
In  t h i s  ch ap te r  we p re s e n t  r e g re s s io n  e s t im a te s  of husbands’ and \  
wives’ supply o f  hours fu n c t io n s  based on the models of chap te r  2; due 
to  c o n s id e ra t io n s  s e t  out th e re  the  sample i s  s p l i t  i n to  the  f iv e  soc io ­
economic groups ( d e t a i l s  given in  chap te r  3 ) .  The r e s u l t s  of these  estim ­
a te s  a re  given in  Tables 4 .1 -6  and e s t im a te s  of wage 
e l a s t i c i t i e s  a re  given in  Table 4 .7 .
We now d is c u s s  the  r e s u l t s  as given in  t a b le s  4 .1 -7 .  ' Bboking f i r s t
a t  R SQUARE we would expect i t  to  improve with d is sa g g re g a t io n  as the  use of 
s o c ia l  c la s s e s  w i l l  r e s u l t  in  f a i r l y  homogeneous groupings o f  households • 
w ith r e s p e c t  to  the  b a rga in ing  regimes invo lved - a l s o  we would expec t,  exp- 
e c i a l l y  in  the  case  of husbands, t h a t  some c la s s e s  have much g re a te r  freedom 
to  vary t h e i r  hours  than o th e rs  and a re  hence l i k e l y  to  be on the  supply 
curve enab ling  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .  Taking the  husband equations  f i r s t  we can 
see t h a t  Groups I I , I V  and V have a prom ising percentage  o f  explained v a r i a t ­
ion fo r  such small samples u s in g  in d iv id u a l  d a ta  ( c f .  the  work of Brown e t  a l  
1976). The alm ost n o n -e x is te n t  R SQUARE of groups I  and I l l a r e  almost c e r t ­
a in ly  due to  poor aggregation  as w itnessed  by the  sample s iz e s  which allow 
co n sid e rab le  h e te ro g e n e i ty .  For Group I  t h i s  i s  aggravated  by the l ik e l ih o o d  
of severe measurement e r r o r s  in  earn ings  (due to  u n d e r - re p o r t in g  and the 
po sse ss io n  of numerous hon-wage sources of income) which can n o t be c o r r e c t ­
ed. The s o c ia l  gfÀdihg system r e s u l t s  in  numerous husbands being  c la s sed  
as  be longing  to  Grbup I  when t h e i r  economic s t a t u s  i s  very  low e .g .  the  
s t ru g g l in g  ^usiness-ow her or se lf-em ployed. ' , .
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V ls o  a number of people in  
these  groups indu lge  in  la rg e  weekly hours which can n o t be explained by 
pecuniary  v a r ia b le s  or ^y any of the s o c ia l  or t a s t e  f a c to r s  we have in c lu d ­
ed ( f o r  some s o c io lo g ic a l  background on the phenomenon see Young and Wilm- 
o t t  (196$). In  an a ttem pt to  overcome t h i s  we r e s t r i c t e d  the Group I samp­
le  to  those  with incomes over £2,400 (ÿ h is  f ig u re  was a r r iv e d  a t  by in s p e c t ­
ing  re c e n t  s a la ry  surveys fo r  p ro fe s s io n a l  occupations  and d e f l a t in g  by 
a p r ic e  in d ex ) .  The r e s u l t s  of doing t h i s  are  given in  Table 4 .2  and are  
d iscu ssed  a t  the  end of the o th e r  r e s u l t s .
I t  i s  convenient to begin by look ing  a t  the param eters  of HHRS and 
WHRS as these  prov ide  the most d i r e c t  evidence on the  in terdependency of 
husband-wife lab o u r supply d e c is io n s .  S ig n if ic an c e  of these  v a r ia b le s  r i s e s  
as we go down the  s o c ia l  spectrum becoming s t r i k i n g l y  s trong  when we h i t  
IV ( s e m i- s k i l le d  manual w orkers); the s ig n f ican ce  i s  absen t a t  the  extremes
r
(Groups I  and V) 4 Zero o rder c o r r e la t io n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  fo r  HHR3.WHRS are
presen ted  in  thé  ta b le  below to  check on the p o s s i b i l i t y  th a t  HHRS and
WHRS are  h ighly  c o r r e la te d  due to p a i r in g s  with a high j o i n t  t a s t e  fo r  work
(a s  argued abové'). Thé simple c o r r e la t io n  c o e f f i c i e n t s  show t h i s  to  be un-
>
t r u e .  Like the  m u l t ip le ’ c o r r e la t io n  c o e f f i c i e n t s ,  the  simple c o r r e la t io n  
c o e f f i c i e n t s  are  a l l  p o s i t iv e  with the  exception  of t h a t  fo r  Group V.
Thé c o e f f i c i e n t s  fo r  HHRS are  n o t ic e a b ly  b igger than those  fo r  WHRS .
But see concluding comments ( s e c t io n  V)
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feowever i f  we use the  r a t i o s  of the  means to  compute an e l a s t i c i t y  of
response to  spiBuse hours then , fo r  group IV <(thfe o n ly  case fo r  which 
HHRS and WHRS are  c l e a r ly  s ig n i f ic a n t )  the  two e l a s t i c i t i e s  are  approx­
im ate ly  equal which i s  what we might exoect given the problems of e s t ­
im ation o u tl in ed  e a r l i e r .
We now d is cu s s  the pecuniary  v a r ia b le s  ( e l a s t i c i t i e s  a re  d iscussed  
in  the  n ex t s e c t io n ) .  We have ignored the problem of m a r i ta l  cho ice , 
the c o n s id e ra t io n  of which might lead  us to  the conclusion  th a t  h ig h -  
earn ing  husbands (w ith in  a group) would be p a ire d  with h ig h -ea rn in g  
wives. In  co n s id e ra t io n  of t h i s  we give the simple c o r r e la t io n  of FINST 
.MINST in  the  t a b le s  below the  re g re s s io n  e s t im a te s ;  i t  can be seen 
t h a t  the  r e l a t i o n s h ip  i s  always p o s i t iv e  but i s  much s t ro n g e r  in  I , I I  
and IV than in  I I I  and V. The m oderately la rg e  r e s u l t s  fo r  these  simple 
c o r r e la t io n s  ought to  be borne in  mind as in d ic a t in g  p o s s ib le  m u l t i c o l l -  
i n e a r i t y  when the r e s u l t s  f o r  FINST and MINST a re  being d iscu ssed .
The simple ex tens ion  of the orthodox s in g le  su p p l ie r  of labour 
case to  two s u p o l ie r s  (g iven in  Chapter 2) suggests  the  p a t te r n
and the p a t t e r n  fo r  the  f i r s t  fo u r  v a r ia b le s  in  the ta b le s
fo r  WHRS and HHRl) fu n c t io n s  r e s p e c t iv e ly .
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This p a t t e r n  may f a i l  to  emerge as the own wage e f f e c t s  may capture  some 
income e f f e c t s  th a t  a re  not co n tro l le d  fo r  elsewhere in  the equation  and th e re ­
fo re  tu rn  out to be neg a tiv e .  The p a t te rn  may be f u r th e r  d is tu rb ed  by the i n f ­
e r i o r i t y  of own or spouse l e s i u r e  which woyld make the c o e f f i c i e n t s  on the  non­
labour income terms p o s i t iv e .
The ta b le s  show th a t  the non-labour income terms are u s u a l ly  ro b u s t with 
r e s p e c t  to  the  a d d i t io n  of non-pecuni'ary v a r ia b le s ;  a lso  they ty p ic a l ly  show 
both p a r t n e r ' s  l e i s u r e  (o r home-production) to be normal, or a t  l e a s t  n o t i n f ­
e r i o r ,  goods. The c o e f f i c i e n t s  on MINST and FINST are  f a i r l y  s e n s i t iv e  to  
the a d d i t io n  of non-pecuniary v a r ia b le s .  A la rg e  p a r t  of these  changes may be 
due to  the  in f luence  of KID as B lundell and Walker(1982) produce own-wage e la s ­
t i c i t i e s  of 4-8 g r e a te r  fo r  no c h ild  fa m il ie s  compared with fa m il ie s  with c h i ld ­
ren .
C ro s s -e f f e c ts  a re  u su a l ly  sm all, s ig n i f i c a n t  and n e g a tiv e .  Exceptions to 
t h i s  occur in  Seg 2 and Seg 4. The r e s u l t s  fo r  Seg 4 suggest th a t  husband 's  
home time i s  {jointly consumed with w i fe 's  as the p o s i t iv e  response of WHRS to 
MINST i s  matched with a nega tive  response to i t  by HHRS. The e f f e c t  of t h i s  i s  
shown in  the  s ig n i f i c a n t  p o s i t iv e  response to  the  spouse hours term. For Seg 2 
the  c r o s s - e f f e c t  in  HHRS i s  too weak to  support an argument none the less  i t  i s  
accompanied by a r e s u l t  fo r  HNLI which s tro n g ly  suggests  t h a t  husband 's  l e i s u r e  
time i s  an i n f e r i o r  good to  him.
O vera l l  wives' supply appears to  have a p o s i t iv e  own-wage e l a s t i c i t y  in  the 
upper s o c ia l  c la s s e s  with th e re  being inva riance  in  the lower so c ia l  c la s s e s .  For 
husbands th e re  i s  a negative  response to  own wage r a t e s  in  the  lower c la s se s  
and a p o s i t iv e  Pne in  the  upper.
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V a r ia t io n  in  the  o th e r  param eters  i s  no t p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e r e s t i n g ;  
probably the most i n t e r e s t i n g  i s  the nega tive  e f f e c t  of KID in  WHRS and 
t h i s  does no t show any s t r i k in g  p a t t e r n  by group which might suggest 
d i f f e r i n g  a t t i t u d e s ,  c e t e r i s  p a r ib u s , to  the  presence of young c h i ld ­
ren  and time spent out of the  home by wives who have a lre ad y  decided to  
go to  work.
A rough l i n e  of demarcation can be drawn between groups 1 and 2 
and groups 3-5 as 'u p p e r ’ and ’ low er’ c la s s e s  r e s p e c t iv e ly .  Doing t h i s  
i t  i s  s t r i k in g  t h a t  wives’ wage r a t e s  e x e r t  a s ig n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  on 
household time a l lo c a t io n  in  the  lower group. Also c ro ss-hou rs  e f f e c t s  
emerge . in  the  lower groups- those of 4 a re  unden iab le , adm itted ly  
those of 3 are  weak, the absence of e f f e c t s  in  5 i s  p robably  due to  the 
i n a b i l i t y  of workers in  t h i s  group to  o b ta in  v a r i a t io n  in  t h e i r  hours .
In  looking a t  r e s u l t s  f o r  group 4 i t  w i l l 'b e " h e lp f u l  to  s p e l l  out 
what the  p re c ise  meaning of adding a spouse hours terra i s .  I n  the  absence 
of a spouse hours term we would expect t h a t  s im ultaneously  w ith v a r i a t io n s  
in  own hours due to  changes in  both wage r a t e s  th e re  a re  v a r i a t io n s  in  
spouse hours a lso  -  o u ts id e  of p e r f e c t  equ ilib r ium  th e re  w i l l  be an indep­
endent e f f e c t  of th e se  v a r i a t io n s  on own hours ( i . e .  a q u a n t i ty  e f f e c t ) .  
Adding a spouse hours v a r ia b le  means we ev a lua te  the  v a r io u s  parameter e a t -  
im ates ho ld ing  spouse hours co n s tan t  -  t h i s  w i l l  mean a f a l l  in  the  s iz e  of
I
both the  own and é rô s s  wage e l a s t i c i t i e s .  As mentioned e a r l i e r  most co ef f­
i c i e n t s  do no t  change g re a t ly  in  the  t h i r d  s tep  however as  we would expect 
i/here the  spouse Hours v a r ia b le  i s  s ig n i f i c a n t  the  wage, e s t im a te s  do change.
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The c u r v i l in e a r  age—work r e l a t i o n s h ip  de­
r iv e s  l i t t l e  support from our d is sa g g re g a t io n s  with the  hyp o th es is  Sometimes
being supported f o r  one p a r tn e r  only a lthough i t  g e ts '  much s t ro n g e r  
support amongst the  lower s t a t u s  f a m i l ie s .  Such a simple r e l a t i o n s h ip  with
age i s  probably  n o t  p la u s ib le  suggesting  th a t  we ought perhaps to  experim­
en t  w ith  a l t e r n a t i v e  decay p r o f i l e s  or use sp l in e  fu n c t io n s  to  cap tu re  a 
more complex r e l a t i o n s h ip .  On grounds of o p e ra t io n a l  s im p l ic i ty  we r e f e r  
the problems of the  age-work r e l a t i o n s h ip  to  chap te r  6 ,
The KID v a r ia b le ,  as one would expect i s  
s t ro n g ly  and s ig n i f i c a n t ly  nega tive  in  a l l  the groups fo r  V/HRS, The exp­
ected? p o s i t iv e  s ign  in  HHRS f a i l s  to  be no tab ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  except in  I I I  
L i t t l e  importance should be a t tach ed  to  t h i s  f in d in g  as i t  i s  p robably  due 
to  the  sheer magnitude of I I I  in  comparison with the  o th e r  groups- the  o th­
e r  l a rg e  group(l) i s  the  only o ther to  f e a tu re  an( ’F ’ r a t i o  g re a te r  than 1.
The SKL v a r ia b le  i s  hampered by the  very 
small number of Cases of c h i ld re n  under f iv e  which occur in  any o f the  sam­
p le s ;  in  consequence i t  only  appears in  th ree  s e t s  of r e g re s s io n s  and these  
re v e a l  l i t t l e  of i n t e r e s t ,
HSIK i s  r a r e ly  of much s ig n i f ic a n c e  in  
HHRS when i t  i s  weakly s i g n i f i c a n t  i t  i s  p o s i t iv e ,  c o n tra ry  to  our expec t-  
: . t io n s .  An exp laM tiO h could be co n s tru c ted  fo r  t h i s -  the  wage in s trum en ts
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raay n o t  adequate ly  p ick  up the  impact of i l l n e s s  on ea rn ings  c ap ac ity  
so t h a t  in c reased  work to  compensate fo r  income inadequacy r e l a t i v e  to  
the  husband 's  re fe re n c e  group i s  undertaken . HSIK appears  s ig n i f i c a n t  
only a t  the  extremes of the  s o c ia l  spectrum ( I  and V) when i t  i s  used as
a re g re s s o r  in  the  WHRS fu n c t io n -  in  V i t  i s  p o s i t iv e  as  we would expect
whereas i t  i s  neg a tiv e  in  I ; we might sugges t,  to  ex p la in  t h i s ,  t h a t  
t h i s  r e f l e c t s  a switch of the  w i f e 's  time from market work in to  ca r in g  
f o r  the  husband b u t  most of the  lo n g -s tan d in g  i l l n e s s e s  involved in  con­
s t r u c t in g  the dummy ought n o t to  have t h i s  s e r io u s  an e f f e c t ,  WSIK i s  
n ega tive  and s ig n i f i c a n t  in  I I I  and V fo r  the WHRS re g re s s io n  as expect­
ed however i t  i s  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  in  the  o th e r  groups, WSIK i s  weakly pos­
i t i v e  in  WHRS fo r  I and more s i g n i f i c a n t ly  p o s i t iv e  in  V; t h i s  l a s t  r e s ­
u l t  m ir ro rs  the s ig n f ic a n t  p o s i t iv e  response torHSIK in  WHRS fo r  V -  
both r e s u l t s  appear sen s ib le  as we would expect p o s i t iv e  spouse s ickness  
responses  to  emerge in  the  lower s t a t u s  groupings due to  t h e i r  g re a te r  
su b s is ten ce  need fo r  income % i,e ,  they have fewer a s s e ts )  although i t  i s
i n t e r e s t i n g  to  no te  in  t h i s  connection th a t  HNLI,WNLI were no t s i g n i f i c ­
an t  in  HHRS fo r  V although they were m ild ly  s ig n i f i c a n t  in  WHRS fo r  V.
Sickness i s  in v e s t ig a te d  in  g re a te r  d e t a i l  in  Chapter 5,
HCOL i s  p o s i t iv e  as we p re d ic ted  in  HHRS 
fo r  I I I  bu t i t  hds f very  la rg e  and s i g n i f i c a n t  c o e f f i c i e n t  fo r  the  equiv- 
Cilent WHRS estiraatev For the  moment we can only a sc r ib e  t h i s  apparen t an­
omaly to  the  smaQ:l sample s i z e s -  i . e .  the  HCOL dummy i s  p ick in g  up the  r e ­
sponses of th ree  o r four people who might j u s t  happen to  possess  some hours 
reduc ing  a t t r i b u t e  which i s  n o t  c o r r e la te d  with t h e i r  .co lour, HCOL i s  no t 
^ ig h if ic ah b  ih  Hhÿ groub fCr WHRS excep t V where i t  has the  r i g h t  sign
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in  o p p o s it io n  to  i t s  performance in  HHRS, WCOL behaves in  am id e n t i c a l  
fa sh io n  in  WHRS to  HCOL in  HHRS- i t  i s  ' r i g h t '  in  I I I  and wrong in  V, 
Likewise WCOL behaves in  an i d e n t i c a l  fa sh io n  in  HHRS to  HCOL in  
WHRS- i t  i s  only s ig n i f i c a n t  in  V where i t  has the  r i g h t  s ign ,
HMOON i s  s i g n i f i c a n t ly  p o s i t iv e  in  HHRS (what we would normally ex­
pect) only in  I I  and V, I t  i s  nega tive  and s ig n i f i c a n t  in  I  and I I I  
(more so than the  weak p o s i t iv e  s ig n if ic a n c e  in  I I  and V) -  the  p o s s ib le  
ex p lan a tio n  f o r  t h i s  i s  given e a r l i e r *  HMOON in WHRS i s  s ig n i f i c a n t ly  
llQgativ© only f o r  IV- i t  i s  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  e lsew here.
In  WHRS a p o s i t iv e  WMOON never m a te r ia l i z e s ;  the  neg a tiv e  s i g n i f i c ­
an t responses  appear in  the i d e n t i c a l  groups to  which a p o s i t iv e  s i g n i f ­
i c a n t  HMOON appears fo r  HHRS, WMOON has the  expected nega tive  e f f e c t  in  
HHRS f o r  a l l  groups except IV bu t i t  i s  only the  in e x p l ic a b le  p o s i t iv e
sign  f o r  t h i s  group which i s  s i g n i f i c a n t .
The use of a r e s t r i c t e d  SECT group (Table 4 .2) prov ides  l i t t l e  of
i n t e r e s t  f o r  any a d d i t io n a l  d iscu ss io n  of the non-pecuniary  v a r ia b le s  4
-141-
II
This s ec t io n  d iscu sse s  the  wage e l a s t i c i t i e s  obtained from the e s t ­
im ates given in  Tables 4.* 1 -4 .6 ;  these  a re  c a lc u la te d  as  percentage changes of 
hours to  n a tu ra l  wage r a t e s .  Spouse e l a s t i c i t i e s  should n o t be taken too 
l i t e r a l l y  as they w i l l  i n d i r e c t l y  cap tu re  an income e f f e c t  so t h a t  they  
do n o t s t r i c t l y  measure the  s ize  of the  pure c r o s s - e f f e c t s .  Even i f  pure 
cross  e f f e c t s  had been obtained  th ese  would have to  be q u a l i f i e d  on acc­
ount of the  s t a t i c  way the e l a s t i c i t y  e s t im ates  a re  ob ta indd- i . e .  any 
e l a s t i c i t y  i s  c a lc u la te d ' on the  b a s is  t h a t  a l l  o th e r  v a r ia b le s  a re  he ld  
co n s tan t  -  f ig u r e s  would c l e a r ly  be d i f f e r e n t  i f  we allowed fo r  the  imp­
a c t  of j o i n t  changes in  v a r i a b le s .  This study has foregone the  use of 
i n t e r a c t io n  e f f e c t s  as well as the  use of r e s t r i c t i o n s  on the  grounds th a t  
much of the  re sea rc h  re p o r ted  i s  in  r e l a t i v e l y  uncharted  reg io n s  and 
re q u i r e s  the s im p les t  p o ss ib le  approach to  the problem as we have very  
l i t t l e  p r io r  in form ation  to  go on.
The o v e ra l l  im pression from Table 4 .7  i s  t h a t  a wage in c rease  to  e i t h e r  
p a r tn e r  r e s u l t s  in  am iucp^,asp in  t o t a l  hours of work. This goes a g a in s t  
the id ea  t h a t  th e re  i s  a backward-bending supply curve fo r  labour in  d eve l­
oped economies Which Hunter(l970) has suggested should be seen in  a fam ily  
co n tex t .
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As i s  well-known (see Hanoch(l965) , B arzel and MacDonald(1973),S h a r i r  
( 1981) )  i t  i s  no t p o ss ib le  vo prove t h e o r e t i c a l l y  the  e x is ten ce  of the  back­
ward-bending supply curve even in  an in d i v i d u a l i s t i c  co n tex t .  S h a r ir  shows 
t h a t  i t  i s  most l i k e l y  to occur where th e re  i s  a ’ t a r g e t  income' l e v e l  in  
the form of a c e r t a in  l e v e l  of commodity income which once achieved w i l l  
r e s u l t  in  a re c ta n g u la r  hyperbo lic  supply curve above the  l e v e l .
Our r e s u l t s  suggest th a t  fa m il ie s  in  h igher s o c ia l  s t a tu s  groups may 
be pursu ing  a t a r g e t  which has no t been a t ta in e d  w h ils t  lower so c ia l  s ta tu s  
groups may have a t ta in e d  t h e i r  t a r g e t .  This conclusion re q u ire s  nega tive  
own wage e f f e c t s  in  the  lower groups and p o s i t iv e  ones in  the upper groups. 
As group 4 i s  the only lower one with a negative  own wage e f f e c t  the conc­
lu s io n  pught not to  be over-emphasized due to  the  odd behaviour of wives 
supply in  t h i s  group.
The genera l im pression of a p o s i t iv e  response to  wage changes may appear* 
p a radox ica l in  view of the observed tendency of the normal working week to  
f a l l  a t  times of r i s i n g  r e a l  wage r a t e s  however i t  should be r e c a l le d  th a t  
these  a re  c ro s s - s e c t io n  r e s u l t s .  The problem i s  fu r th e r  in v e s t ig a te d  in  
Cameron(1982a) as one of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  d i f f i c u l t i e s  due to  changing t a s t « s ;
the  use of non-peôtüïlary v a r ia b le s  and socio-économic sub-samples has en­
ab led  reasonab le  c o n tro l  f o r  t a s t e  h e te ro g en e i ty  ( th e  use of somewhat crud­
e r  methods (see  Cdmerôn (1982&) can e x t r a c t  a p o s i t iv e  own wage e f f e c t  from 
the  t im e - s e r ie s  d ê ià  fo r  the  whole economy).
In  view of the  measurement problems involved therA would be no p o in t  
ih  c la im ing  any p re c is io n  or u s e fu ln e s s  as p o l ic y  guidesi fpp the v ar ious  
è i à s i i c i i l e s  reported»  However as  f a r  as s igns  go we would expect t h a t  
the  Hégiëbt tax  s t r u c tu r e  In troduces  a b ia s  in  favour of a ccep ting
t h a t  th e re  i s  a neg a tiv e  o v e ra l l  response to wage in c e n t iv e s  so th a t  we




I t  i s  now time to  co n s id e r  what has been learned  from the  fo re ­
going. The f i r s t  q u es tion  which might be asked i s  'does  the  a d d i t io n  of 
s o c ia l  and t a s t e  v a r ia b le s  improve s i g n i f i c a n t ly  the  f i t  of the  supply 
f u n c t io n s ? ' -  casua l in sp ec t io n  of the changes in  R SQUARE from the 
pecuniary  v a r ia b le s  only modël suggests  t h a t  i t  does, A formal t e s t  of 
t h i s  i s  given in  Table 4 .8  where we give the r e s u l t s  of performing T' 
t e s t s  on the  s ig n if ic a n c e  of adding th e se  v a r ia b le s  and spouse houns -  
the  t e s t  f o r  spouse hours added to  the  second s tep  re g re s s io n s  i s  simply 
to  use the  'F '  r a t i o  fo r  the  c o e f f i c i e n t  fo r  an 'F '  t e s t  w ith  ( l , n - k - l )  
degrees of freedom). The i^size of the  r a t i o s  in  I  and I I I  ought n o t to  
give r i s e  to  r io to u s  c e le b ra t io n s  as one can more or l e s s  'm anufacture ' 
such b e a u t i f u l  f ig u r e s  by in c re a s in g  the  sample s iz e .
As evidenced in  the  fo rego ing  d iscu ss io n  the  a d d i t io n  of these  v a r­
ia b le s  r e in f o r c e s  the  tendency to  a ' c o r r e c t '  p a t t e r n  o f .s igns on the  
monetary v a r ia b le s  and the added v a r ia b le s  themselves t e n d ’to  behave a s  
expected , th e re fo re  we may conclude t h a t  the  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of the 
supply fu n c t io n  i s  improved by the expanded s p e c i f i c a t io n .
The second inaih q u es t io n  concerns the  e f f e c t  of c o n t ro l l in g  fo r  
s o c ia l  s t a t u s .  I t  ought to  be borne in  mind th a t  membership of a h igher  
group does no t  n e c e s s a r i ly  connote h ig h e r  wage r a t e s .  I t  i s  s e l f - e v id e n t  
t h a t  the  p o s tu la te  of in v a r ia n t  param eters  on the  wage v a r ia b le s ^ a c ro s s  
s o c ia l  groups (im plied  in  the  usual aggregate  s tu d ie s  of wives' hours by
' I
Layard e t  al,(l97*^) a n d  Greenhalgh(l980) and the numerous U.S.A s tu d ie s )  
SGLUS to  be in c o r r e c t .
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IV
T h i s  s e c t i o n  l o o k s  a t  e a c h  p a i r  o f  r e g r e s s i o n s  i n  t h e i r  e n t i r e ty  i n  an  
a t t e m p t  t o  i n f e r  wha t  t h e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  s t r u c t u r e  i s  i n  d i f f e r e n t  g r o u p s  
o f  h o u s e h o l d s .
The r é s u l t é  o f  S e g l  a r e  t o o  poorly d e t e r m i n e d  t o  rev ea l a n y t h i n g .  The 
r e s u l t s  o f  S e g l a  d i s p l a y  t h e  o n l y  n e g a t i v e  s i g n  on t h e  s p o u s e  h o u r s  v a r i a b l e  
which ms anyw here  n e a r  s i g n i f i c a n t .  Own wage e f f e c t s  are  ^ n s i t i v e  so  t h a t  
t h e r e  w i l l  be an i n d i r e c t  c ro s s - s u b s t i tu t io n  e f f e c t  t h r o u g h  t h e  h o u r s  term 
when one p a r t n e r ' s  wages  r i s e .  The evidence h e r e  i s  of j o i n t  d e c is io n ­
making a s  b o t h  own-wage r e s p o n s e s  a no f a i r l y  w e l l - d e t e r m i n e d .  I t  i s  a l s o  
p o s s i b l e  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  in terdependent u t i l i t y  i s  an a p p r o p r i a t e  model  i n  
v i ew o f  t h e  absence o f  d i r e c t  c r o s s - s u b s t i tu t io n  e f f e c t s .
Seg2 shows very c u r i o u s  b e h a v i o u r  which  i s  a l s o  fo und  i n  s i m p le  d e s c r i p t ­
i v e  s t a t i s t i c s  f o r  t h e  g r o u p .  Weekly h o u r s  f o r  h u s b a n d s  ( 4 2 . 1 4 )  and  w ives  
( 24 . 5) on a v e r a g e  a r e  w e l l  be low t h e  a v e r a g e s  f o r  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  sample  
w i t h  h u s b a n d s '  d o u b l e - j o b  h o l d i n g  o f  5 .2 6 ^  b e i n g  w e l l  abo ve  t h e  r e s t  o f  
sample  a v e r a g e .  The p a t t e r n  o f  p a i r e d  be low a v e r a g e  h o u r s  i s  n o t  found i n  
any o t h e r  g r o u p .  I t  seems t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  commodi ty  c o n s t r a i n t  on these? 
h o u s e h o l d s  w hich  i s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  h u s b a n d ' s  l e i s u r e  being an i n f e r i o r  good 
uo him.  T h i s  d o e s  n o t  g a i n  strong s u p p o r t  i n  t h e  own e f f e c t  o f  HMOON 
b u t  a t  l e a s t  i t  i s  n o t  n e g a t i v e  which would c o n tra d ic t  t h e  t a r g e t  income 
i d e a .  The b e h a v i o u r  of t h e  w i v e s '  f u n c t i o n  i s  n o t  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  
i d e a  o f  a  t a r g e t  income a l t h o u g h  t h e  negative  own wage e f f e c t s  and n o r m a l i t y  
o f  w i v e s '  ovm l e i s u r e  m e r i t  f u r t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  T h ese  s u g g e s t  t h a t  a l -  
thuiigh t h e r e  i s  a t a r g e t  t h e  h o u s e h o l d  p r e f e r s  t o  meet i t  c e te r i s  pa r i b u s  
^Hi-Sb|h t h e  tide 6f klisBahd r a th e r  t h a n  w i f e  work t i m e .
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The im p lic a t io n  of the above i s  th a t  Seg2 i s  a t a r g e t  income household 
op e ra ting  w ith in  a ' t r a d i t i o n a l '  ro le  s t ru c tu re  i . e .  the husband i s  seen as 
the  primary labour fo rce  p a r t i c ip a n t .  The f a c t  th a t  these  are  members of 
the in te rm ed ia te  and non-manual c la s s  may he lp  ex p la in  the  t a rg e t  income 
natune of the group; i f  they compare t h e i r  l i v in g  s tandards  to  t h e i r  
su p e r io rs  they may s u f fe r  ' r e l a t i v e  d e p r iv a t io n '  ^ (see  Runciman) which 
s t im u la te s  e x tra  work to  r a i s e  consumption l e v e l s .
The d i s t i n c t i v e  fe a tu re  of Seg3 i s  the  p o s i t iv e  response of HHRS to KID 
which i s  absent in  the o ther so c ia l  c la s s  r e g re s s io n s .  Wives have a p o s i t ­
ive  own supply response to  wages and husbands a negative  one suggesting  an 
im portant ro le  fo r  wives work in  family time a l lo c a t io n .
The above e f f e c t  appears more s t ro n g ly  fo r  Segjj- with the  a d d i t io n a l  
presence of a s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  of wives' wages on husband 's  hours. The 
c o e f f i c i e n t  on KID in  HHRS i s  however much weaker. Seg 4 may in d ic a te  
how the  r e s u l t  f o r  HHRS.FINST comes about through the path of r e l a t i v e  
permanent earn ings  in f lu en c in g  /  q  ^ in  F igure  2 .2 .  WHRS (29,3) 
on average are  no tab ly  above those fo r  the  r e s t  o f the sample w h ils t  
HHRS(42.02) are  no tab ly  below the average. In  a d d i t io n  to  t h i s  wives' 
double-job  hold ing  i s  a s tag g e r in g  9,35%.
Hence the  s im ila r  but s t ro n g e r  r e s u l t s  in  Seg4 compared with Seg3 might 
suggest t h a t  th e re  i s  a ro le  fo r  wives in  lab o u r-m ark e t  d ec is io n s  which 
s t ren g th en s  as c ld s s  i s  lowered. This i s  no t s u b s ta n t ia te d  by the r e s u l t s  
fo r  Seg5 which show a poorly  determined husbands' supply, a s t ro n g ly  s ig ­
n i f i c a n t  wives' néga tive  response to MINST and l i t t l e  c o r r e la t io n  in  hours.
i :  I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  hdte  th a t  Wilensky f in d s  r e l a t i v e  d e p r iv a t io n  to be
pw eëiotgrs o f  moonlighting (see  Wilensky(l963} .
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The r e s u l t s  fo r  Seg 5 suggest th a t  th e re  i s  r e c u r s i v i ty  due to  severe 
labour market r e s t r i c t i o n s  on the v a r i a b i l i t y  of husband’ s tim e. The neg­
a t iv e  e f f e c t  of t h i s  in  WHRS i s  perhaps conealed by i t  being picked! up in  
the response to  FINST,
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TABLE 4 .1 SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP 1
Denendent V ariab le  : WHRS HHRS
MINST -1 2 ;8 (1 .8 ) -1 6 .7 (3 .4 ) 8 .3(1) 1 6 .3 ( 5.6)
FINST 1 2 .3 (2 .9 ) 16 .97(5 .3 ) -2 .1 (0 .1 ) -1 .05 (0 .04 )
HNLI -0 .0 03 (0 .8 ) -0.0002(0.004) -0 .0 06 (4 .9 ) -0 .0 06 (6 .1 )
WNLI -0 .0 03 (0 .2 ) -0 .0 1 (3 .4 ) -0 .002 (0 .2 ) 0 .001(0 .1)
CAGE 0 .6 5 (3 .2 ) 0 .3 3 (1 .3 )
EXP 40.01(4 .4 ) -0 .004(2)
KID -8 .8 (6 1 .3 ) 0 .9 8 (1 .1 )
SKL -2 .2 4 (0 .0 4 ) 2.03(0 .05)
HSIK -2 .6 ( 3 .1 ) -0 .8 (0 .0 5 )
HMOON -1 .1 (0 .2 ) -4 .2 ( 5 .1 )
WMOON -8 .1 ( 7 .9 ) -1 .3 2 (0 .3 )
HCOL 4.5 5 (0 .3 ) 2 .8 (0 .2 )
WOOL 4.54 (0 .3 ) -4 .1 ( 0 .4 )
HHRS 0 .04(0 .55)
WHRS 0.03(0 .63)
INTERCEPT 21.6 27.8 40.6 46.3
WSIK -0 .5 (0 .1 ) 1 .5 (1 .7 )
R SQUARE 0.15 0.02 0.05 0.02
N=555




NOTES To ALL TABLE;
1 , F ig u re3 Ih paren theses  a re  ab so lu te  'F '  r a t i o s .
2i R SQRaRE i â  R Unadjusted fo r  degrees of freedom,
3. V ariab les  w ithout rep o r ted  c o e f f i c i e n t  e s t im ates  re p re se n t  non­
occurence o f  the ev en t ,  i f  dummies, and exclusion  due to  the  inab­
i l i t y  of the  program to  ob ta in  a unique so lu t io n  i f  continuous.
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TABLE 4 .2  SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP I RESTRICTED TO THOSE WITH HUSBAND’S EARNINGS 
GREATER THAN 2.400 (1974 C 's) PER ANNUM
















-11 .9 (1 )
17 .8 (3 .6 )
0 .004(0 . 8)
-0 .001(0 .02)
0 .6 5 (1 .1 )
-0 .0 1 (1 .7 )
- 7 . 6 (20 . 1 )
-2  (0 . 03) 
-3 .3 (2 )  
1 . 6(0 , 4) 
-3 .9 ( 0 .8 )  
-8 .1 ( 3 .4 )  
8. 2(0 . 4) 
-0 .1 2 (2 .4 )
28.3
WHRS
-1 4 .7 (1 .6 )
23 .7(6 .3 )
0 .002(0 .3)
- 0 .003(0 . 2)
26.4
HHRS
22. 1(4 . 2)
-1 0 .3 (1 .4 )
0 .0006(0 .02)
0 .004(0 .3)
-0 .4 (0 .5 )  
0 .002(0 .09) 
1 .05(0 .04) 
-0 .04(0) 
- 2 (1 . 2)
4 .2 (3 .9 )  
-7 .1 (3 .5 )  
-4 .9 (1 .5 )  
-1 3 .7 (1 .2 )
-0 .1 (2 .6 3 )
62.1
18 .8 (3 .4 )
- 2 .05(0 .06)
-0 .0 04 (0 .3 )
0 .003(0 .3)
46.3








TABLE 4.3 SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP II
Dependent V a r ia b le :
-4 2 .7 (4 .3 )  
6 . 1 (0 . 2) 
-0 .01(0 . 36) 
-0 .05(2 ) 
1. 6( 1. 3) 



















-5 .3 (0 .7 )  
4 .98(0 .7 )  
-1 .5 (0 .0 5 )  
- 2(0 . 1)
-5 .3 (0 .6 )
0 .1 7 (1 .3 )
2.3
WHRS
-5 1 .8 (7 .4 )
15 .3 (1 .3 )
-0 .003(0 .06)
-0 .0 8 (7 .7 )
HHRS
20 . 2(1 . 2) 
4 .7 (1 .4 )  
0 .024(3 .9 )  
0 .016(0 .3)  
-1 .98(1.4) 
-0 .023( 1 . 6) 
0 . 4(0 .02)
7 .9 (2 .2 )  
-7 .7 (2 .7 )
6 .7 (1 .3 )
-2 .7 (0 .3 ) 
0 .4 (0 .005)
23.5
0 . 11( 1)
6.5(0.2) 
13 .5 (1 .4 )  
0 .022(3 .5)  
0 .034(2)
R SQUARE 0.J2 0 .24 0 .22 0.1
N=76





TABLE 4 .4 SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP III



















-0 ,7 (0 )  
11 ,4 (2 ,9 )  
-0 .0024(0 .4) 
-0 ,0 03 (0 ,1 )  
0 .5 (3 ,3 )  
-0 .0 08 (5 ,8 )  
-9V2(118.3) 
3 . 2(0.3) 
0 , 2 ( ( 0 . 02) 
- 1 . 6( 2) 
0 ,5 (0 .0 7 )  
-4 ,3 (5 .5 )  
-0 .8 (0 ,0 3 )
9 ,3 (4 .1 )  
0 .0 5 (1 .2 )
25.7
- 8( 1)
21. 9( 1 0 . 2) 
-0 ,0032(0 . 6)
-0,0022(14)
HHRS
-35 .2 (18 .6 )  3 .8 (0 .4 )
-7(2) -6 .9 (2 )
-0 .004 (2 .1 )  -0 .003 (1 .4 )
0.0003(0.01) 0 .0 1 (5 .4 )  
0 .1 (22 .3 )
-0 .01( 26. 6)
1 .8 (7 .5 )
-4 .2 (1 )
0 .4 (0 .3 )
0 , 8(0 ,9)
•3.4(5.9)
-1 ,4 (1 )
3(0.9)
-2 ,7 (0 .9 )
28.6
0 .0 3 (2 .2 )
26.4 45.2
ffi SQUARE 0 ,1 4 0 ,0 2 0.076 0,0077
H= 1055







Dependent V ariab le  :
26 .3 (4 .1 ) 



















-0 . 2(0 .1) 
0 .0004( 0 .002 ) 
-8 .7 (1 5 .3 )
-2 .9 (1 .1 )
-1 .1(0 .1)
-6 ,6 (4 .2 )  
0 .55(0 .02) 
2 . 8(0 .02)
0 .2 7 (5 .8 )
WHRS
9 .96 (0 .6 )
19 .7(4 .05)
0 .005(0 .4 )
0 .016( 1)
HHRS
-2 5 .1 (6 .7 )
-1 6 .3 (4 .5 )
-0 .006(1)
-0 .02 ( 2 .1)
0 . 2 (0 . 2) 
- 0 .003 (0 . 2) 




5 .9 (3 .8 )  
-3 .1 (0 .3 )




-0 .024( 3 . 8)
INTERCEPT 27.3 27.97 34.3 43.4









TABLE 4.6 SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP V
Dependent V ariab le  : WHRS HHRS
MINST -7 8 .1 (9 .8 ) -68 .01(10 .2) 22.9(1) 12 .74(0 .7)
FINST -2 .8 (0 .0 4 ) 8 .03(0 .3 ) 1 .4 (0 .02) 0 .62(0.003)
HNLI -0 .0 2 (2 .2 ) -0 .025 (2 .8 ) -0 .002(0 .02) -0 .01(1)
WNLI -0 .0 3 (1 .5 ) -0 .005(6 .8 ) -0 .0 1 (0 .4 ) -0 .01 (0 .25 )
OAGE 1 .9 (7 .1 ) -0 .5 3 (0 .6 )
EXP -0 .3 (8 .1 ) 0 .005(0 .4)
KID -9 .9 (2 0 .8 ) 0 .8 (0 .2 )
SKL
HSIK 4(2) -1 .7 (0 .6 )
WSIK -4 .2 (2 .1 ) 5 .6 (7 .1 )
HMOON —4(0.4) 5 .2 (1 .2 )
WMOON -3 .8 (0 .5 ) -21 .3(1)
HCOL 20(5.03) -21 .3 (10 .5 )
WCOL -8 .7 (1 .1 ) 15 .4 (6 .4 )
HHRS 0 .0 5 (0 .2 )
WHRS 0.05 (0 .7 )
INTERCEPT -1 .3 28.3 58.2 47.03
R SQUARE 0.23 0.13 0.15 0.015
N=143






ELASTICITIES OF WHRS HHRS
SEG TO MINST FINST MINST FINST
1 -0.47 0.45* 0.18 .-0 .04
LA -0.48 0.73* 0.49* -0 .23
2 -1.7* 0.25 ' 0 .48 0.11
3 -0.025 0.41* -0.79* 0.16
4 0.9* 0 .44 -0.6* -0.39*
5 -2.85* -0 .1 0.49 0.03
NOTES TO TABLE
1. SEG i s  Socio-Economic Group.
2. lA i s  SEGl r e s t r i c te d ;  to  households with husbands' 
earn ings  of over £2,400.
3.  ^ s i g n i f i e s  ' F' r a t i o s  on param eter e s t im a te s  ex- 
deed 2 .5 .
This convention w il l  be adopted in  a l l  fo llow ing  tab le s ,
TABLE 4 .8 ’F' TESTS FOR THE
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SIGBIFICANGE OF JOINTLY ADDING SPOUSE
HOURS AND THE SOCIAL AND TASTE VARIABLES TO THE REGRESSION
SEG D.F. HHRS REGRESSION WHRS REGRESSION
I 14,540 5*45 16.42
2 14,61 3.13 1 .32
3 14,1040 15.47 29.02
4 14,124 ' 6 .7 2.82
5 14,1128 4,06 3.35
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CHAPTER 5 -  POPULATION SUB-GROUPS I I  -  THE EFFECTS OF SICKNESS AND
COLOUR.
In  subsequent c h ap te rs ,  the f a c to r s  in v e s t ig a te d  a re  
the  r e s u l t  of choice (p a r t - t im e  or f u l l - t im e  working) or an in e v i ta b le
p rocess which a l l  of the sample must go through (a g e in g ) .  In  c o n t r a s t  
to  t h i s  people can no t g e n e ra l ly  avoid being coloured or being i l l  (un­
l e s s  they  can make c e r ta in  investm ents  in  t h e i r  h e a l th  which p reven t 
i l l n e s s  emerging).
I
Tables 5 .1 -4  p re s e n t  the r e s u l t s  from e s t im a tin g  the  
model on households where n e i th e r  p a r tn e r  i s  s i c k ,  where a l l  wives a re  
s ic k ,  where a l l  husbands are  s ick ,  and where both  the husband and the  
wife i s  s ic k .  In  the  middle two cases a dummy i s  used fo r  spouse i l l n e s s ,  
There a re  no in v e s t ig a t io n s  of the impact of i l l n e s s  on lab o u r  supply 
us in g  U.K. d a ta ;  s tu d ie s  us ing  U.S d a ta  have been c a r r ie d  out by Nagi 
and H ad ley ( l9 7 2 ) , Berkowitz and Johnson(l974), S c h e f f le r  and Iden (1974). 
A number of f e a tu re s  d i s t in g u is h  these  papers from our t rea tm en t of i l l ­
n e ss -  ( l )  a fam ily  model i s  n o t  used -  e s t im a tio n  i s  c a r r ie d  out u s ing  
s in g le  equations  fo r  m arried and unmarried males to g e th e r  (w ith  dummies 
fo r  family: r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s )  (2) more se r io u s  i l l n e s s e s  are  looked a t -  
such as l im i t in g  d i s a b i l i t y  (3) equations  are  n o t  e stim ated  s e p a ra te ly  
f o r  the  s ic k -  in s te a d  dummies are  simply used to  determine whether t h i s  




I t  can be seen th a t  the  above s tu d ie s  a re  l im i te d  by ignoring  
the  fam ily  con tex t of labour supply d e c is io n s  and through t h e i r  impos­
i t i o n  of parameter constancy across  groups of s ick  and no n -s ick  workers. 
The i n t e r e s t i n g  fe a tu re  of i l l n e s s  i s  t h a t  i t  would be expected to  modify 
behaviour so t h a t  param eters (and e l a s t i c i t i e s ) a r e  no t co n s tan t  . 
P o s i t iv e  own s u b s t i t u t io n  e l a s t i c i t i e s  w i l l  be expected to  r i s e  as the  
impact of s ickness  impinges on the household and negative  c ross  e l a s t i c ­
i t i e s  w i l l  be expected to  r i s e ^  ; th e se  p re d ic t io n s  are  based on the 
assumption th a t  i l l n e s s  does no t in  any way transform  the  t a s t e s  of 
the  members of households so th a t  the  f a l l  in  lab o u r supply brought 
about by decreased p ro d u c t iv i ty  in  household a c t i v i t y  r e s u l t s  in  a 
f r u s t r a t i o n  of d e s ir e d  consumption. Most of the non-pecuniary  v a r ­
i a b l e s  a re  su b jec t  to  a number of c o n f l i c i tn g  in f lu en c es  and i t  i s  
im possib le  to  determine a p r i o r i  how they w i l l  d i f f e r  in  s ick  and 
n o n -s ick  households. An exception to  t h i s  i s  wives' age in  
where we expect a l i n e a r  negative  response corresponding to  the  a sc ­
ending va lu es  of the own-sickness dummy fo r  wives aged 36-45,4^-55 , 
and 56-65 r e p s e c t iv e ly .
I l l
The r e s u l t s  given in  Tables 5 .1 -4  suggest s t ro n g ly  t h a t  the
1, E f f e c t s  of s ickness  on the  wage o f f e r  ought to  be a l re ad y  taken  care 
of by the  use of s ickness  in  the equa tions  to  p r e d ic t  lo g  w age-ra tes .
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param eters are  no t  co n s tan t across  the  s ick  and no n -s ick .  E l a s t i c i t i e s  to 
MINST and FINST are  d iscussed  below in  IV. The improvement brought about 
in  R SQUARE by separating, the  i l l  from the h ea l th y  i s  e a s i l y  recognised  
e s p e c ia l ly  fo r  the  husbands’ equation  (cp. Table ‘8.1) -  the  s t ro n g e s t  
sep a ra t io n  (5 .4) r e s u l t s  in  a p a i r  of R va lues  as high almost as one can 
reasonab ly  expect in  t h i s  kind of s tudy . S ep a ra t io n s  a lso  re v e a l  t h a t  the 
c o r r e la t io n  between spouse hours i s  a t  i t s  s t ro n g e s t  amongst p a i r s  with 
a t  l e a s t  one member i l l  and seems extrem ely weak in  t o t a l l y  h ea lth y  house­
holds ( 5 .1 ) .  I t  may be th a t  the  problem of coping with an i l l n e s s  b r in g s  
about more j o i n t  involvement in  p lanning  household time a l lo c a t io n .  At 
any r a t e  the  decision-m aking regime in  households with i l l n e s s  looks to  
be sim ultaneous.
The KID v a r ia b le  seems to  reduce w ives’ labour time more in  h ea lth y  than 
in  i l l  households. Bearing in  mind t h a t  these  a re  red u c t io n s  from d i f f e r ­
ing l e v e l s  t h i s  i s  probably due to the  l a t t e r  type of households bear ing  
a g r e a te r  c o s t  burden from b rin g in g  up c h i ld re n -  t h i s  i s  supported by 
the l a r g e r  e s t im a te s  on KID in  WHRS in  ta b le s  5 .4  and 5.3 than in  5 .1 .
The r e s u l t s  of 5 .4  and 5.3 suggest t h a t  w ife ’ s i l l n e s s  b r in g s  about a 
neg a tiv e  e f f e c t  of SKL in  HHRS and a p o s i t iv e  e f f e c t  in  WHRS (a lso  
found in  the case bf husband’ s i l l n e s s  5 .2 ) ,  This could be i n te r p r e te d  
as showing th a t ,w i th in  siCh households, nu rse ry  schools  a re  used to  r e ­
a l lo c a te  time in  the  paid  lab o u r  market from husbands to  wives.
The r e s u l t s  fo r  shov t h a t  working hours a re  s t ro n g ly  related to  age
when r l l n e s s  i s  absen t but much more weakly or n o t a t  a l l  when th e re  i s  a 
p a r tn e r  I l l n e s s .
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IV
E l a s t i c i t y  es t im ates  fo r  the i l l  and h ea lthy  households are  given in  Table 
5 .5 . Husbands' own wage e l a s t i c i t i e s  ane poorly  determined except in  the  case 
o f t o t a l l y  h ea lthy  households where they are  s t ro n g ly  n eg a tiv e ;  t h i s  makes 
sense i f  we th ink  in  terras of a f a l l  in  w age-rates  where husbands in  t o t a l l y  
h ea lthy  households would in c rease  supply to  make up fo r  t h i s  w h ils t  those 
who are  i l l  or have i l l  wives would be unprepared to  change hours (perhaps 
because of lower p ro d u c t iv i ty  in  home p roduction ,
None of the FINST e l a s t i c i t i e s  are of any, s ig n i f ic a n c e  in  the HHRS re g re s s ­
ions by h e a l th  s t a tu s  thus c o n tra d ic t in g  the s trong  s u b s t i t u t io n  e f f e c t  in  
Seg 4 in  the  l a s t  chapter which i s  r e f le c te d  in  the c o e f f i c i e n t  on DUMC in  
the t o t a l l y  h ea l th y  group but only weakly or no t a t  a l l  in  the o the r  groups.
In the wives' fu n c tio n  own wage e l a s t i c i t i e s  a re  always p o s i t iv e  in  l i n e  
with the  general f in d in g s  of the previous ch ap te r .  These e l a s t i c i t i e s  a re  
only o f  note  where e i th e r  a l l  husbands or a l l  wives have an i l l n e s s ;  i t  i s  
s l i g h t l y  pe rp lex ing  th a t  a s trong  r e s u l t  does no t come through fo r  both i l l  
but we have no ready exp lana tion  fo r  t h i s .  The cross  e f f e c t  of MINST i s  
weak except in  a l l  wives i l l  which i s  what we would reasonab ly  expect as a 
wage r i s e  to  the husband in c re a se s  market in p u ts  to  household p roduction  in  
which wives' p ro d u c t iv i ty  i s  expected to  be im paired. Admittedly wives own 
wage e f f e c t s  are p o s i t iv e  fo r  the same groups p o ss ib ly  r e f l e c t i n g  t h a t  mark­
e t  p ro d u c t iv i ty  i s  l e s s  a l t e r e d  by i l l n e s s  than home p ro d u c t iv i ty .
VE stim ates  of the model fo r  a sample of both p a r tn e r s  coloured 
households i s  given in  Table 5 .6 . This e s tim ate  i s  plagued by the  prob­
lems of an extremely small sample s iz e ;  i t  i s  to  be expected th a t  the 
presence of a coloured p a r tn e r  lead s  to  so c ie ty  ' l a b e l l i n g ’ the  fam ily  
as coloured more p a r t i c u l a r l y  i f  the  husband i s  co loured- th e re  a re  
37 coloured males and 34 coloured females in the  t o t a l  sample, e s t im a te s  
(no t rep o r ted )  have a lso  been made fob these  groups. A consequence . -  t  
o f th e  small sample s ize  i s  a severe aggrava tion  of the  m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y  
problem. Some people may f in d  i t  r id i c u lo u s  to  a ttem pt to  use the number of 
r e g re s s o r s  which we have when th e re  are  so few o b serv a t io n s ;  the  proceedure 
has been employed on the grounds of m ethodological con s is ten cy  so t h a t  d i f f ­
e re n t  sub-samples can be compared;
Some kind of check on the m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y  can be provided by look­
ing  a t  the  ’F ’ r a t i o s  on v a r ia b le s  added s ing ly  to  the  pecuniary  v a r ia b le s  
only model. Doing t h i s  re v e a ls  th a t  none of th ese  v a r ia b le s  which a re  in s ig ­
n i f i c a n t  in  the  whole equation  become s ig n i f i c a n t  when the  o th e rs  a re  removed. 
The major f e a tu re  of i n t e r e s t  in  the coloured only e s t im a te s  i s  the  presence
of a n eg a tiv e  KID e f f e c t  in  the  husbands’ equation  accompanied by a p o s i t iv e  ;
e f f e c t  in  the wives’ equation ,
VI '
This chapter has whown th a t  w ith in  households t h a t  a re  
coloured or have i l l  wives th e re  i s  a much g re a te r  co -o rd in a t io n  of hus­
bands and wives labou r supply than w ith in  t o t a l l y  h ea lth y  and non-coloured 
households. This would apoear to  be i n d i r e c t  evidence of e q u a l i t a r i a n  
decision-m aking regimes in  the  former types  of households.
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TABLE 5.1 HOUSEHOLDS WHERE NEITHER HUSBAND OR WIFE HAS AN ILLNESS
Dependent V ariab le : WHRS HHRS
MINST -3 .7 (0 .3 -1 7 .7 (9 .7 ) -1 2 .5  (6) 1 .33(0 .1)
FINST 5.8 (1 .7 16 .8(14 .4) -1 .7  (0.2) -7 .5 (5 .4 )
HNLI 0.003 (1 .2 0.004(1 .81) -0 .001 (0 .3 ) -0 .002 (0 .5 )
m i -0 .009 (3 .4 -0 .0025(28.4) 0 .002(0 .3 ) 0 .001(9 .04)
KID -9 .1  (180.5 1.36 (6.7)
SKL -2 .9 (0 .3 -1 .1  (0.08)
OAGE 0 .4 (3 .4 0 .7  (18.3)
EXP -0 .0 7 (6 .4 -0 .01 (21 .9 )
HMQON -1 .7 (1 .4 -2 .7 6  (6 .3)
WMOON -4 .1 7 (7 .7 -1 .1  (0.9)
HCOL 1.82 (0 .2 0 .1 (0 .001)
WCOL 5.1 (1 .7 -0 .24(0 .006)
DUMA -0 .008 (0 1 (4.1)
DUMB -3 .3 (4 .9 -1 .9  (2.7)
DUMC 1.5 (1 .6 -2 .5 2  (8 .2)
DUMD -0 .4 2 (0 .14 0 .71(0 .75)
HHRS 0.02 (0.42
WHRS 0.016(0.75)
INTERCEPT 53.84 28.42 32.3 45.06
R SQUARE 0.15 0.03 0.065 0.0097
N=1562





TABLE 5.2 HOUSEHOLDS WHERE HUSBAND HAS AN ILLNESS
Deoendent V ariab le: WHRS HHRS
MINST -1 .9 (0.02 -9 .13(0 .54) -1 2 .8 (1 .3 ) -8 .6 4 (1 .07 )
FINST 32.5 (6 .9 17.3(1.97) -1 2 .2 (1 .9 ) -3 .1 (0 .1 4 )
HNLI -0 .005 (1 .1 -0 .0075(2 .4) -0 .009(7 ,3 ) -0 .0 09 (7 .3 )
WNLI -0.006 (0 .3 -0 .008(0 .7) 0.001 (0) 0 .0015(0 .05)
KID -8 .7 (25.7 2 .17(2 .8 )
SKL 24.1 (3 .6 -8 .1  (0 .8)
OAGE 1.23 (6 .4 -0 .2 (0 .002 )
EXP -0 .002 (7 .1 -0 .009 (0 .3 )
HMOON -2 .5 (0 .6 0 .41(0 .03)
WMOON -6 .7 (3 .6 0 .91(0 .12)
HCOL -6 .9 (0 .3 11.05(1 .5)
WCOL 11.8 (1 .1 -8 .4 (1 .1 )
DUMA -2 .2 (2 -0 .3 (0 .1 )
DUMB -5 .9 (1 .1 -0 .5 (0 .0 1 )
DUMC -3 .1 (1 .1 -2 .4 (1 .2 )
DUMD 1.7 (o .4 -0 .8 1 (0 .2 )
HHRS 0.18 (4
WHRS 0 .1 (4 .6 )
INTERCEPT 3.2 27.83 44.9 45.34
WSIK -2 .2 ( 2.1) 0 .3 7 (0 .1 )
R SQUARE 0,20 0.02 0.10 0.03
N = 259






TABLE 3.3 HOUSEHOLDS WHERE WIFE HAS AN ILLNESS
Dependent V ariab le: WHRS HHRS
MINST -3 1 .3 (5) -20 .4 (2 .66) 17.45 (2) 9 .2 (0 .7 )
FINST 21.3 (2.6) 23.6(3 .02) - 3 .4 (0.09) 1 .7 (0 .02)
HNLI - 0.006 (1 .7) -0 .0082(2 .9) -0 .002 (0.15) - 0 . 006( 2 . 11)
WNLI -0 .007 (0.3) 0 .007(0 .7) 0.007 (0 .5) 0 .003(0 .14)
KID -7 .8 (19.4) 0 .73 (0.2)
SKL 26.5 (4.4) -1 4 .7 (1.7)
OAGE 0.53 (1 .2) 0 .37 (0.62)
EXP -0 .01 ((:2,,7) -0 .005 (0.9)
HSIK -0 .7 4 (0.2) —1 .4 (1)
HMOON -0 .0 8 (0) -7 .3 (4.6)
WMOON -0 .6 2 (0.02) -1 .2 (0.1)
HCOL 29.6 (3 .6) -1 8 .2 (1.7)
WCOL -2 0 .6 (1 .6) 14.7 (1 .1)
DUMA 0.17 (0.03) 0 .62 (0.2)
DUMB 1.2 (0 . 06) -11 .8 (7.7)
DUMC 2.8 (0.73) -4 .6 (2 .3)
DUMD -1 .9 (0 .4) 4 .1 (2 .7)
HHRS 0.21 (7.6)
WHRS 0.18 (9.4)
INTERCEPT 16.4 26.66 36.3 46.16
R SQUARE 0,23 0.038 0 .19 0.014
N = 221





TABLE 5 .4 HOUSEHOLDS mEHE BOTH HUSBANDS AND WIVES HAVE AN ILLNESS
Dependent V ariab le: WHRS HHRS
MINST 4» 4 (0.02) -1 8 .8 (0 .5 ) -1 5 .4  (0 .6) 0 .96(0.003)
FINST 10.4 (0.1) 28 .1(1 .2 ) 24.4  (2 .1) 31 .8(4 .14)
HNLI -0 .003 (0.1) -0 .003(0 .08) -0 .002(0 .001) -0 . 0006(0 . 01)
WNLI -0 .002 (0.1) 0 .003(0.03) 0 .025(3 .2) 0.0035(0.13)
KID -8 .8 (6 .5 ) 3 .3  (2 .2)
SKL 38.7 (4.6) -31 .9  (8.7)
OAGE -0 .5 (0.2) 1.16  (2 .3)
EXP 0.003 (0.2) -0 .0 1  (2.1)
HMOON -20 .9 (4.6) 1 .33(0 .06)
WMOON -3 (5.9) -0 .4 5 (0 .01 )
HCOL 15.9 (1 .6) -8 .8  (1 .2)
WCOL
DUMA -1 .9 (1.6) 0 .08(0.002)
DUî'ffi 5.8 (0 .5) -7 .6  (2 .2)
DUMC 3.73 (0.4) -3 .9  (1 .3)
DUMD 3.9 (0.5) - 2 .3  (0.35)
HHRS 0.51 (6.8)
VJHRS 0.22(7 .91)
INTERCEPT 21.3 26.09 12.2 44.97
R SQUARE 0.31 0.024 0 .32 0.08
N = 77















NONE -  0.276* 0 .04 -  0 .134 0.21
ALL . . WIVES,
(Wives where WSIK =1)
-0 .28 -0 .2 7 -  0.071 1 . 2L
ALL HUSBANDS
(Husbands where HSIK=1)
0.38 =0.074 -1.18* 0 . 8*
BOTH -0 .3 4 0.55 0 .17 0 .4
NOTE TO TABLE
1. * s ig n i f i e s  th a t  the parameter e s t im ates  have *F'
r a t i o s  g re a te r  than 2 . 5 .
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TABLE 5.6,. HOUSEHOLDS WHERE BOTH HUSBANDS AND WIVES ARE COLOURED •
Dependent V ariab le  : WHRS HHRS
MINST -53 .4 (2 .33 ) -4 5 .5 (5 .3 ) 3 .86(0.005) -5 .2 (0 .0 4 )
FINST -28 .09(1 .04) -5 .5 (0 .1 ) 8 . 2(0 .06) - 6 . 2(0 .06)
HNLI 0.018(2.02) 0.015(2 .34) -0 . 006(0 . 12) 0 .002(0.04)
WNLI - 0 . 005( 3 . 26) -0 .019 (1 .1 ) 0 .019(0 .25) -0 .01(0 .14)




HSIK -3 .5 9 (0 .1 4 ) 5.33(0.38)
WSIK 5.58(0.52) -0 .28(0 .001)
DUMA 1.37(0 .08) - 1 . 88(0 . 1)
DUMB 3.2(0 .08) 0 .32(1 .13)
DUMC 9.5(0 .97) -8 .3 3 (0 .5 )
DUMD -5 .2 (0 .3 5 ) - 0 . 32(0 .001)
HHRS 0 .14(0 .4 )
WHRS 0.32(1 .13)
INTERCEPT 5.96 34.96 5.41 46.6
R SQUARE 0.45 0.099 0.33 0.013
N=30





CHAPTER 6 -  A SIMPLE DIRECT APPROACH TO FAMITY LIFE CYCLE LABOUR SUPPLY
Our previous chapters  were mostly s t a t i c  -  the th e o r e t ic a l  chap ter 
( 2) did  not address d i r e c t ly  the problem of l i f e - c y c l e  v a r ia t io n s  in  
labour supply. S im ila r ly ,  chapters. 4,5 and 7 deal with the is su e  oply 
through an assumed c u rv i l in e a r  age-work r e la t io n s h ip  imposed by adding 
age and age squared to the reg re ss io n s .
At p resen t the re  i s  l i t t l e  in v e s t ig a t io n  of the problem by econom­
i s t s  (and apparen tly  none by U.K. econom ists). The i n te r e s t in g  paper by 
Smith(l977) i s  hampered by the l im i ta t io n s  of aggregate da ta  w h i ls t  the 
more so p h is t ic a te d  work of Heckman and MacCurdy(see Chapter 1) i s  in  the 
s t r i c t  n e o -c la s s ic a l  t r a d i t i o n  (see Becker and S t ig le r  (1977) fo r  an 
e lab o ra t io n  of t h i s  methodology) of supposing a given u t i l i t y  fu n c t io n -  
hence the l i f e t im e  of a family simply c o n s is ts  of maximising an o b jec t iv e  
function,known from i t s  in cep tion , su b jec t  to c o n s t r a in t s .  The same app­
roach i s  adopted;' ’ in  Cohen and S tn f fo rd ( l9 7 4 ) ' s complex s im ula tion  of a 
household’ s l i f e t im e  plan.
In  the so c io lo g ica l  l i t e r a t u r e  the concept of a 'Family L ife  Cycle' 
has long been popular (beginning with G lick ( l9 4 7 )-  fo r  fu r th e r  re fe re n ce s  
and a c r i t iq u e  th a t  the concept can no t be o p e ra t io n a l ise d  see Nock(l979) ) 
and has been in v es t iq g e ted  v ia  reg re ss io n  a n a ly s is  by W aite(l980). The 
v a l i d i t y  of the l i f ^  cycle notion i s  con tingen t on the production of 
ch ild ren  being the main o b jec t ive  of m arriage- in  c h i ld le s s  m arriages 
the only v a r ia t io n s  with age would be simply due to changing t a s t e s  i . e .  
e ther  than v a r ia t io n s  which could be coped with as p a r t  of a pure ly  'e c ­
onomic' model
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C hild -bearing  marriages r e s u l t  in  th ree  broad phases of the l i f e  
cycle -  phase I being the ye&rs from the  formation of the marriage to  the 
b i r t h  of the f i r s t  c h i ld ,  phase I I  being from the b i r th  of the f i r s t  
ch ild  to  the p o in t  where the l a s t  c h i ld  i s  grown up, phase I I I  being 
from the departure  of the l a s t  ch ild  u n t i l  the couple r e t i r e  from work.
An a d d i t io n a l  phase could be in se r ted  between the b i r t h  of the l a s t  
ch ild  and i t s  departu re  ( i . e .  ' growing u p ' ) .
The broad im p lica tio n s  of these phases are  th a t  in  I  couples w i l l  
be 'b u i ld in g '  a family -  labour supply w i l l ,  c e t e r i s  p a r ib u s , be h igh­
er in  order to pay o f f  debts  incurred in  purchasing the i n i t i a l  s tock  of 
household c a p i ta l  goods a lso  i t  may r i s e  to  f a c i l i t a t e  savings to  cushion 
the lo s s  of wives' earnings through reduc tion  of market work when the 
f i r s t  ch ild  i s  born. During phase I I  wives' labour supoly i s  expected 
to  be, c e t e r i s  p a r ibus , lower and husbands' labour supply, c e t e r i s  p a r ib ­
us h igher due to the t r a d i t i o n a l  s p e c ia l iz a t io n  of ro le s  w ithin  the fam­
i l y ,  In  phase I I I  we should expect c e te r i s  paribus  th a t  wives' supp­
ly  w i l l  r i s e  and poss ib ly  th a t  husbands' w il l  f a l l .
Taking the l i f e - c y c l e  as a whole t h i s  im plies  th a t  the s t ru c tu re  of 
decision-m aking w i l l  vary with wives having a s tronger in f luence  in  the 
ea r ly  and l a t e  phases than they do in  the middle phase when ch ild ren  are 
being brought up. I t  a lso  follows th a t  wage and non-labour income para­
meters a re  no t in v a r ia n t  to  a l t e r a t i o n s  in the l i f e - c y c l e  phases; accord­
in g ly  the  research: reported  in  th i s  work attem pts  to  es tim ate  wage e la s ­
t i c i t i e s  fo r  the phases of the cyale and d iscover which decision-m aking
y  ' izi ■egimd dominates which phase.
- l6 8 -
I I
The s tra te g y  used to address the above problems i s  as follows -  
the sample i s  s p l i t  in to  f iv e  groups by wives’ age, as fo llow s, 18- 25 , 
26- 35, 36- 45 , 4.6- 55, 56- 65 , the supply func tions  are  estim ated for these  
groups as in  previous chap ters  ( i . e .  with a dummy fo r  ch i ld  u n d e r '16 p re s ­
en t and four s o c ia l  s ta tu s  dummies) these  r e s u l t s  are  reported  in  ta b le s  
6 .1 -5 .  To approximate the l i f e  cycle phases we estim ate  the f i r s t  
group fo r  those without ch ild ren  under : l 6 (Phase I ) ,  the second two
groups fo r  those with ch ild ren  under . l 6 (Phase I I ) , and the f in a l  two 
groups fo r  those without ch ild ren  under i 6 -'(Phase I I I ) .  The e l a s t i c i t ­
ie s  from these reg re ss io n s  are repo rted  in  Table 6 , 6 ; in  order to avoid 
an excess of ta b le s  the r e s u l t s  in  f u l l  are  not given although s i g n i f i c ­
ant d i f f e r e n c e s  of these groups from th e i r  repo rted  coun te rpar ts  w i l l  be 
noted in  I I I  below.
The method has obvious l im i t a t i o n s  -  the KID dummy i s  only a proxy 
fo r  which l i f e  cycle phase the family i s  in and i t  may th e re fo re  inc lude  
some i r r e l e v a n t  observations and exclude some re le v a n t  ones fo r  each gr­
oup. In  ad d it io n  to  th i s  we have no inform ation  on the ex ten t  to which
1
b i r th s  are  planned or the presence of in te n t io n a l ly  or u n in te n t io n a l ly  
c h i ld le s s  couples (we would obviously exclude both these  groups i f  we 
could id e n t i f y  theii) ^
I I I
We now d iscu ss  the r e s u l t s  given in  Tables 6 .1 -5 .  Looking a t  the 
explanation  of v a r ia t io n  f i r s t  i t  i s  immediately apparent th a t  the labour 
sup&ly func tions  perform very poorly a t  exp la in ing  the d ec is io n s  of fam-
i ;  1 ;W: intbütiGh& iiÿ c h i ld le s s  throughout the l i f e  cyc le .
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i l i e s  w ith in  the 46-55 age group; a t  b e s t  around % of the  observed v a r i a t ­
ion only  can be explained  fo r  e i th e r  husbands o r  wives. In  genera l the  
model appears  much more capable of e x p la in in g  v a r i a t i o n  in  the  e a r ly  and 
l a t e  phases than in  the  middle phase.
The KID v a r ia b le  p rov ides  the most d i r e c t  evidence on l i f e - c y c l e  
v a r i a t i o n s  in  time a l l o c a t io n -  moving ac ro ss  the  f iv e  groups i t  f i r s t  
low ers w ives’ work time and then in  the  36-55 age brabket i t s  in f lu en ce  
d e c l in e s  u n t i l  i t  i s  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  in  the o ld e s t  group I t  r e s u l t s  
in  an in c re a se  in  husbands’ hours only  fo r  the  youngest group- t h i s  
in c re a se  being l a r g e r  than those found fo r  Socio-Economic Groups I and 
I I I  in Chapter 4.
The r e l a t e d  SKL v a r ia b le  again performs poorly  (a lthough  see Chap­
t e r  7 where i t  i s  much more su c c e s s fu l ) .  I t s  weak s ip n if ic a n c e  in  V-TiRS 
in  the  46-55 group suggests  th a t  c h i ld re n  under f iv e  are  sen t  to  school 
in  o rd e r  to  f a c i l i t a t e  market work by m others- the  nega tive  sign in  HHRS 
sugges ts  a s u b s t i t u t io n  of husbands’ time to  home p roduction  to  compens­
a te  f o r  t h i s .
The pecuniary  v a r ia b le s  are  g e n e ra l ly  e i t h e r  in  conform ity with the 
expected  p a t t e r n  of s igns  or i n s i g n i f i c a n t  with the excep tion  of the 
own n e g a t iv e  e f f e c t  of FINST in  the youngest group. ■:
Some minor changes occur when re g re s s io n s  a re  performed on the KIDO 
and KID=1 sub-samples but these  are no t such as to  make FINST ahd MINST,
1 v">r the  age-groups, change from s ig n if ic a n c e  to  in s ig n i f ic a n c e  or v ic e -v e r s a .
There are  only 12 observa tions  fo r  which KID=1 in  t h i s  group.
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F o r  WHRS t h e r e  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s p o n s e s  t o  MINST and  FINST i n  t h e  
g ro u p s  f o r  w iv es  ag e d  18 -4 5  however  t h e  a d d i t i o n  o f  n o n - p e c u n i a r y  v a r i a b l e s  
r emoves  t h e s e  e f f e c t s  w i t h  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  s t r o n g  c ro s s -e f f e c t  i n  t h e  
1 8 - 2 5  g ro u p  and  t h e  s t r o n g  own e f f e c t  i n  t h e  3 6 -4 5  g r o u p .
F o r  HHRS there  i s  l i t t l e  sign o f  r e s p o n s i v e n e s s  t o  changes i n  e i t h e r  
p a r t n e r ' s  w a g e - r a t e .
The n o n - l a b o u r  income v a r i a b l e s  show m o s t l y  i n s i g n i f i c a n c e  o r  t h e  p r e s ­
e n c e  o f  l e i s u r e  a s  a  no rm a l  good w i t h  t h e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  h i n t s  t h a t  w i v e s '  l e i s ­
u r e  i s  an  i n f e r i o r  good t o  h u s b a n d s  i n  t h e  26 -3 5  and 56-65 groups.
' E x a m i n i n g  HSIK and WSIK r e v e a l s  a  s t r i k i n g  a g e - s i c k n e s s  re la t io n s h ip  
f o r  women w hich i s  n o t  m a tc h e d  f o r  men g o i n g  through t h e  f i n a l  t h r e e
g r o u p s ,  t h e  WSIK dummy p r o d u c e s  e s t i m a t e s  o f  r o u g h l y  2 ^ t o  4 . 3  h o u r s  l e s s
1
p e r  week f o r  working women,! . O n ly  t h e  36 -4 5  g ro u p  shows male
r e d u c t i o n s  due t o  i l l n e s s  ( o f  around  2 h o u r s )  t h e  o t h e r s  show i n s i g n i f i c a n t  
HSIK c o e f f i c i e n t s .  T h i s  sexual d i f f e r e n c e  p r o b a b l y  r e f l e c t s  t h e  e x t e n t  
o f  t h e  b u r d e n  o f  co m b i n i n g  t h e  ro le s  o f  worker and  housewife b o r n e  by wo­
men; t h i s  i s  s u b s t a n t i a t e d  by t h e  l a c k  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  n e g a t i v e  WSIK c o e f f ­
i c i e n t s  i n  t h e  HHRS f u n c t i o n .  A n e g a t i v e  r e s p o n s e  t o  HSIK by w iv e s  ap p ­
e a r s  f o r  t h e  a g e s  1 8 -3 5  and 5 6 - 6 5 ,  i t s  t e n d e n c y  t o  a p p e a r  a t  t h e  e x t r e m e s  
o f  t h e  l i f e  cycle s u g g e s t s  t h e r e  some s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  w i v e s '  home p r o d u c t ­
io n  t i m e  away f r o m  marlte't work on a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  p r o d u c t i v i t y  
o f  h u s b a n d s  i n  work a t  home.
1 .  t  i s  w o r t h  m e n t i o n i n g  t h a t  there  i s  s u b s ta n t ia l  c o r r e l a t i o n  o f  i l l n e s s  w i t h
c . c - i c h  tiiaD t i c  r i s i n g  e f f e c t  o l  WSIK i n  W; 1RS w i t h  age  i s  much more p r o — 
DSHiiBed ëducâtiSH I s  Allowed i n t o  t h e  e q u a t i o n s  w i t h  o r  w i t h o u t  wage r a t e s .
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The own e f f e c t s  of double job-hold ing  are almost u n iv e rs a l ly  negative; 
in the few cases where they are p o s i t iv e  they are  in s ig n i f i c a n t .  As ar^aied 
in  chap ter  4. t h i s  i s  probably a r e f l e c t io n  of the f a c t  th a t  a c tu a l  hours 
are ty p ic a l ly  above 'o p tim a l '  hours hence two jobs  may be used to  f a c i l i t ­
a te  a reduc tion^ . Aside from the s t r ik in g  p a i r  of negative  signs in  the 
36-45 age group the c ro s s -e f f e c ts  from second-^jobs appear to  be neglig ible-.
The dummies fo r  colour do not behave much b e t t e r  in terms of our exp­
e c ta t io n s  than they did in  chapter 4 in  any case i t  i s  p o ss ib le  t h a t  the 
l i f e  cycle p a t te rn  of coloured households d i f f e r s  from th a t  of non-coloured 
s o . t h a t  any p a t te rn  of p o s i t iv e  and negative  signs might occour. The lack  
of a s u f f i c i e n t ly  la rg e  number of observations  of coloured people ba rs  any 
f u r th e r  in v e s t ig a t io n  of t h i s  is su e .
As with the previous chapter in t e r p r e ta t io n  of the so c ia l  s t a tu s  var­
i a b le s  must be t r e a te d  with caution . In us ing  in te r c e p t  dummies we are 
proceeding 'a s  i f  parameters within an age-group were constan t ac ro ss  
socio-economic groups; chapter 4 has shown th a t  t h i s  i s  u n l ik e ly  to  be 
t ru e .  Using the cooncept of a simple ad d i t iv e  s ta tu s  e f f e c t  r e s u l t s  in  
no s ig n i f i c a n t  s h i f t  being found fo r  e i th e r  p a r tn e r  in SEGs I and V (DUMA 
and DUMB). SEG I I  d isp lay s  a negative s h i f t  fo r  both p a r tn e rs  in  the  midd­
l e  phase, i . e .  the ages 26-45. SEG IV ' d isp la y s  a negative  s h i f t  fo r  wives 
only in  the ages 18-25, and 36-55. Hence there  i s  s t i l l  no c le a r  r e la t io n s h ­
ip  between s ta tu s  alM age-work p a t te rn s  tak ing  t h i s  chapter along with chap­
te r  4 ,
The spouèe’ hour's v a r ia b le s  are in  two cases a l te r e d  in  s ig n if ic a n ce  
b./ the use of the r e s t r i c t e d  groups to  approximate the l i f e  cycle ; fo r  the 
;;:ol35 sAe ^o'up exc’i 'id ing  those without ch ild ren  under f ive  removes the 
o^.grii'HdbncS of wHh spotiée hours e f f e c t ,  fo r  the 36-45 age group doing so 
in c rease s  both 'F ' r a t i o s .
1. Our a n a ly s is  i s  made cruder by the f a c t  th a t  (as  with a l l  s im ila r  work) 
we do no t use d i f f e r e n t i a l  p r ic in g  fo r  second jobs  and overtime.
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IV
Wage e l a s t i c i t i e s ,  computed as be fo re , fo r  the l i f e  cycle phases are 
given in  Table 6 . 6 . Evidently  there  are  f ive  r e s u l t s  for th ree  phases with
the middle and f in a l  phase having two groups each.
I t  i s  not r e a l ly  p lau s ib le  to bracket the p a i r s  of groups toge ther as
the e l a s t i c i t y  r e s u l t s  are highly d i s s im i la r .
O verall the e l a s t i c i t y  estim ates  are  not r e a l l y  capable of showing up 
any kind of p a t te rn  as most of them come from c o e f f ic ie n t  e stim ates  which 
are  very poorly determined. This may be because earnings p o te n t ia l ,  fo r  
many w orkers , v a r ie s  with age making i t  d i f f i c u l t  to id e n t i fy  any wage-resp- 
onsiveness w ithin a cohort. This seems e sp e c ia l ly  true  of husbands as 
a l l  of th e i r  e l a s t i c i t i e s  are computed from s u b s ta n t ia l ly  in s ig n i f ic a n t  
parameter e s tim ates .
For wives, the one highly s ig n i f ic a n t  own-wage response -  for those 
aged 36-45 y ie ld s  a highly  p o s i t iv e  own-wage e l a s t i c i t y  which i s  c o n s is t ­
en t  with the idea of a l i f e - c y c le  squeeze. Given th i s  i t  i s  somewhat d i s ­
q u ie t in g  th a t  th is  i s  not repeated fo r  the 26-35 years  old group. This 
may well be due to ô b l i i n e a r i ty of FINST with non-pecuniary v a r iab le s  given 
the s im i l a r i t y  of r e s u l t s  for the tvô groups using pecuniary v a r ia b le s  only. 
The la rg e  c ro es'-é la s t i c i t y  fo r  husbahd's wage in the 18-25 group presumably 
r e f l e c t s  a household preference fo r wife s p e c ia l i s a t io n  in home a c t i v i t i e s  
e a r ly  ihi marriage.* (see  tM' discUssioh of Figure 6.1  for fu r th e r  co n s id e ra t­
ion of th i s )  . T'lW positive ' c ro s s - e f f e c t  of MINST in  WHRS for the 56-65 
group along with the HHRS response to WNLI suggest th a t  wives' l e i s u re  or
h c  e - t  j '! f y
iiome-time are  i n f e r io r  goods as working couples approach re t irem en t.
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O v e r a l l  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  a r e  d i s s a p p o i n t i n g  a s  an  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  l i f e - c y c l e  
v a r i a t i o n s  i n  l a b o u r  s u p p l y .  The m a jo r  i m p a c t  o f  a g e i n g  on s u p p l y  o f  l a b o u r  
seems t o  be due t o  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  r e a r i n g  a  f a m i l y .  T h i s  i s  shown i n  t h e  
p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t s  o f  KID i n  HHRS and t h e  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t  o f  KID in  WHRS i n  
t h e  g r o u p s  f o r  age  1 8 - 3 5 .  The p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t  on h u s b a n d s  v a n i s h e s  i n  t h e  
s u b s e q u e n t  g r o u p s  where  i t  i s  ac com pan ied  by a  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  m a g n i tu d e  o f  
th e  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t  on w iv e s .
B e a r i n g  i n  mind t h a t  much h o u r s - a g e  v a r i a t i o n  i s  t h r o u g h  c h i l d r e n  we 
would  s t i l l  e x p e c t  i t  t o  r e s u l t  i n  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  w a g e - e l a s t i c i t i e s  and  d e c ­
i s i o n - m a k i n g  p a t t e r n s .
The p a t t e r n s  f o r  e l a s t i c i t i e s  a r e  n o t  e a s i l y  d e t e c t e d .  Wives r e s p o n s e  
t o  c r o s s  e f f e c t s  moves f rom n e g a t i v e  a t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  c y c l e  t o  p o s i t ­
i v e  a t  t h e  end b u t  t h e  i m p r e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  e s t i m a t e s  i n  b e t w e e n  makes i t  d i f f ­
i c u l t  t o  t e l l  wh a t  k i n d  o f  t r a n s i t i o n  t h e r e  i s .  Wives '  p o s i t i v e  own e f f e c t s  
weaken a f t e r  age  45 w h i l s t  a l l  e f f e c t s  on h u s b a n d s  seem t o  be  u n d e t e c t a b l e .
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  i n f e r  a n y t h i n g  a b o u t  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  r e g i m e s  i n  any  
o f  t h e s e  h o u s e h o l d s  a s  t h e  c o r r e l a t i o n s  o f  h o u r s  a r e  weak a l t h o u g h  t h e y  do 
show a  p a t t e r n  o f  b e i n g  i n i t i a l l y  n e g a t i v e  and t h e n  bec oming i n c r e a s i n g l y  
p o s i t i v e  ( e s p e c i a l l y  i f  we l o o k  a t  t h e  p a r t i a l  c o r r e l a t i o n s ) .
The v a r i a t i o n s  o f  h o u r s  j o i n t l y  seems t o  be a c r o s s  t h e  g ro u p s  u s e d  h e ' e  
r a t h e r  t h a n  w i t h i n  them,- Hence a l t h o u g h  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  show l i t t l e  s i n g ^  o f  
s i m u l t a n e i t y  i n  h o u r s  d e c i s i o n s  i t  d o e s  n b t  mean t h a t  i t  d o e s  n o t  e x i s t  r a t h e r  
t h a t  i t  i s  he Ie  b e i n g  c o n t r o l l e d  f o r  by t h e  s am p le s  u s e d .
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The e f f e c t  o f  t h e  l i f e  c y c l e  on l a b o u r  s u p p l y  can be f u r t h e r  
i l l u s t r a t e d  w i t h  t h e  a i d  o f  F i g u r e  6 . 1  and some f u r t h e r  c o n t e m p l a t i o n  
o f  t h e  d a t a .  F i g u r e  6 . 1  shows t h e  means  o f  t h e  s a m p le s  used  i n  t h e  
r e g r e s s i o n s  f o r  T a b l e s  6 . 1 - 5  and t h e s e  means a d j u s t e d  by c o r r e c t i n g  f o r  
t h e  i m p a c t  o f  c h i l d r e n  by u se  o f  t h e  p o i n t  e s t i m a t e  f o r  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  
KID on t h e  r e g r e s s i o n s  f o r  h o u r s  o f  w ork .  Where t h e  a d j u s t e d  l i n e  m erges  
w i t h  t h e  u n a d j u s t e d  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  KID i s  n o t  s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t .  
The a d j u s t e d  l i n e s  d e m o n s t r a t e s  s t r i k i n g l y  how w i v e s '  t i m e  i n  t h e  l a b ­
our  m a r k e t  i s  s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  t h a t  o f  t h e  h u s b a n d  i n  t h e  home a s  t h e  
m a r r i a g e  a g e s  ( a p a r t  from t h e  i n i t i a l  f a l l  i n  w i v e s ' ' t i m e  e a r l y  i n  t h e  
c y c l e ) .
R e f e r r i n g  back t o  t h e  model  em b o d ied  In F i g u r e  2 . 2  we would e x p e c t
w i v e s '  i n c r e a s i n g  h o u r s  r e l a t i v e  t o  h u s b a n d s  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  r e l a t -
1
i v e  p e r m a n e n t  e a r n i n g s  and hence  a l t e r  /  q^ . i n  su ch  a  way t h a t  t h e y  
have  more  i n f l u e n c e  i n  d e c i s i o n s .  I n  v iew o f  t h i s  i t  i s  somewhat  f r u s ­
t r a t i n g  t h a t  f o r  g r o u p s  w i t h  w i f e  ag e d  l e s s  t h a n  56 we c a n  do l i t t l e  t o  
i d e n t i f y  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  r e g i m e s .  We m i g h t  t r y  t h e  a r g u m e n t s  u s e d  i n  
C h a p t e r  4 c o n c e r n i n g  Se'g2 t o  c l a i m  t h a t  some o f  t h e  y o u n g e r  g r o u p s  a r e  
be low  a  t a r g e t  in com e .  I n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h i s ,  h u s b a n d s  d o u b l e  j o b -  
h o l d i n g  i s  abov e a v e r a g e  i n  t h e  2 6 -3 5  (5 .86f . )  and 36 -4 5  ( 4 . 9 / 0  g r o u p s
1. "  I t  i s  r e c o g n i s e d  t h a t  à d i s c o n t i n u o u s  work h i s t o r y  may w e l l  widen 
t h e  w i f e - h u s b a n d  h o u r l y  pay gap ( s e e  A pp end ix  I I I )  however  a f t e r  r e ­
e n t e r i n g  t h e  l a b o u r  m a r k e t  a  woman who s t a y s  i n  work s h o u l d  n o t  s u f f e r  
a d e c a y i n g  e a r n i n g s  p r o f i l e .  E l i a s  and  Main ( l 9 B 2 i  show t h a t  m o s t  women 






although w ives’ double job holding shows l i t t l e  v a r ia t io n  by age a p a r t  from 
a f a l l  to  2 , 96% in  the /+6-55 group. The v a r i a t io n  in  husbands' double job 
holding may well r e f l e c t  the ' l i f e  cycle sq u eeze '(see  Chapter 3 .C .) .  In  conn­
e c t io n  w ith  t h i s  i t  i s  in t e r e s t in g  to note  th a t  wives' l e i s u r e  appears to  be 
an i n f e r i o r  good to  husbands in  the 26-35 age group.
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TABLE 6.1 HOUSEHOLDS WHERE WIVES ARE AGED 18-25
Dependent V ariab le  : WHRS HHRS
MINST -3 4 .7 (5 .7 ) -2 7 .6 (2 .6 ) - 1 . 64( 0 . 01) 9 .0 2 (0 .4 )
FINST 2.6 (0 .07) 28 .4 (6 .9 ) -3 .6 (0 .1 3 ) -1 0 .6 (1 .3 5 )
HNLI 0.008(1.53) 0 .006(0 .7 ) -0 .0 03 (0 .2 ) - 0 .003(0 . 2)
WNLI -0 .0 1 (2 .5 ) -0 .0 3 (6 .7 ) -0 .0 03 (0 .1 ) - 0 . 001(0 .02)
KID -1 3 .7 (119 .8 ) 2 .5 (2 .5 )
SKL
HSIK -3 .9 (3 .4 2 ) 1 .35(0 .4 )
WSIK 0.71(0 .09) 6 .56(6 .62)
HMOON 0.47(0 .03) -3 .4 (1 .6 )
WMOON 2 .5 (0 .4 ) 2 . 8(0 .5)
HCOL - 6 . 5(0 . 8) 4 .8 (0 .4 )
WOOL 13.5 (0 .8 ) -8 .4 (1 .7 )
DUMA 0.26(0 .04) 1.38(1)
DUMB -1 .1 4 (0 .1 ) 2 .7 (0 .7 )
DUMC 1.28 (0 .3 ) -4 -5 (3 .3 )
DUMD -1 .5 (0 .3 5 ) 2 . 04(0 . 6)
HHRS -0 .0 4 (0 .3 )
WHRS -0 .0 1 (0 .4 )
INTERCEPT 38.05 31.4 4-6 46
R SQUARE 0,38 0.052 0.13 0.023
N=228





TABLE 6.2 HOUSEHOLDS WHERE WIVES ARE AGED 26-35
Dependent V ariab le : vIhRS HHRS
MINST -2 .9 (0 .0 5 ) -2 1 .8 (2 .7 ) -9 .2 ( 0 .7 ) -1 7 .6 (3 .4 )
FINST 0 . 66(0 .01) 22. 4 ( 6 . 6) -1 .3 (0 .0 4 ) -5 .9 (1 )
HNLI - 0 . 0001(0 . 002) - 0 . 001(0 . 06) -0 .0 03 (1 .5 ) - 0 . 002(0 . 8)
WNLI 0.002(0.03) - 0 . 003( 11. 6) 0 .01(2 .25) -0 .0 17 (6 .2 )
KID -14 .6 (107 .1 ) 2 .68(4 .84)
SKL - 3(0 . 2) - 0 . 005(0 )
HSIK -2 .2 (1 .5 ) 0 .8 2 (0 .3 )
WSIK 0.92(0 .23) 0 . 8(0 . 2)
HMOON - 0 . 9 (0 . 1) -3 .5 (3 .4 )
WMOON -5 .5 (6 .5 ) 0 . 1(0 . 01)
HCOL -7 .3 (1 .3 ) 3 .72(0 .5 )
WCOL 13.4 (3 .5 ) -7 .0 2 (1 .4 5 )
DUMA 0.18(0 .02) 0 .15(0 .02)
DUMB -5 .8 (5 .4 ) -4 .3 (4 .5 )
DUMC 3.85(4 .1) - 1 . 23(0 . 6)
DUMD - 1 . 6(0 .5) -0 .3 (0 .0 3 )
HHRS 0.083(2 .07)
WHRS 0 .0 5 (2 .1 )
INTERCEPT 33.2 27.5 43.2 40.6
R SQUARE 0.25 0.05 0.07 0.037
N=4b8





Dependent V ariab le  : WHRS HHRS
MINST -1 3 .3 (1 .6 ) -2 7 .2 (6 .9 ) 4 .1 (0 .3 ) - 6 . 06(0 . 6)
FINST 18 .5 (6 .5 ) 19 .2 (6 .5 ) - 8 . 6( 2 .4) - 6 . 1 (1 . 2)
HNLI 0.001(0 .03) 0 .005(0 . 8) -0 .015(11 .4 ) - 0 . 013(10)
WNLI -0 .008(2 .1 ) -0 .015(6 .8 ) -0 .002(0 .15) 0 . 004(0 . 8)
KID -8 .0 5 (52 .9 ) 0 .57(6 .42)
SKL -0 .47(0 .004) -0.-5(0.007)
HSIK 0 .7 (0 .2 ) - 1 . 9 ( 2. 6)
WSIK - 2(1 . 6) 0 .3 4 (0 .1 )
HMOON - 5 . 2 ( 4 .8) -4 .2 (5 .5 )
WMOON -3 .9 (3 .3 ) - 2 . 1 (1 . 6)
HCOL 16 . 2( 6) 3 .4 (0 .45)
WCOL -8 .0 2 (1 .2 ) 4 .5 (0 .6 )
DUMA -1 .1 2 (1 .1 ) 1 .1 (1 .8 )
DUMB -4 .0 2 (2 .3 ) -2 .5 (1 .4 )
DUMC -0 .7 2 (0 .1 ) 1 4 .9 (10 .8 ) .
DUMD 0.51(0 .08) 1 .9 (0 .65)
HHRS 0 .06(1 .4 )
WHRS 0.031(1 .1)
INTERCEPT 31.5 28.1 44.6 45.75
R SQUARE 0,16 0.03 0 .1 0.025
N=531






HOUSEHOLDS IVHERE WIVES ARE AGED 46-55
Dependent V ariab le; WHRS HHRS
MINST -6 .3 (0 .4 ) -1 0 .6 (1 .5 ) -1 .1 (0 .0 2 )
FINST 7 .4 (0 .9 ) 7 .4(1) -1 .1 (0 .0 4 )
HNLI -0 .0 0 5 (1 .5 ) -0 .0063(2 .3) -0 .0 02 (0 .3 )
WNLI -0 .0 07 (0 .5 ) 0 .003(0 .1) -0 .0 0 4 (0 .3 )
KID -3 .8 (1 1 .2 ) 0 .6 6 (0 .6 )
SKL 13 .9(1 .1) -8 .7 (0 .8 )
HSIK 0 .4 3 (0 .1 ) 0 .4 5 (0 .2 )
WSIK -2 .2 4 (2 .3 ) 1 .6 (2 .1 )
HMOON 0.41(0 .02) 0 .11(0 .003)
WMOON -5 .3 (1 .9 5 ) -3 .2 (1 .4 )
HCOL 5.3 (0 .52) -8 .7 (2 .6 )
WCOL -1 .1 (0 .0 3 ) 6 .1 (1 .5 )
DUMA 0 .5 (0 .2 ) 1 .1 3 (1 .8 )
DUMB -0 .3 (0 .0 1 ) -1 .3 (0 .4 )
DUMC 0.93(0 .14) -4 (4 .7 )
DUMD -1 .4 (0 .6 5 ) 0 .7 (0 .3 )
HHRS 0 .0 5 (0 .6 )
WHRS 0.03 (0 .6 )
-3 .7 (0 .33)
-3 .6 5 (0 .42 )
-0 .002 (0 .3 )
-0 .0 04 (0 .3 )
INTERCEPT 27,4 28.2 43.8 45.2
R SQUARE 0.045 0.007 0.052 0.004
N=540





table 6.5 HOUSEHOLDS WHERE WIVES ARE AGED 56-65
Dependent V ariab le : WHRS HHRS
MINST 25.4(2 .2) 12 .7 (0 .6 ) 15 .7(1 .7 ) 8 .3 (0 .5 )
FINST - 2v 6 (0 .01) -7 .7 ( 0 .1 ) - 14. 9( 1) -2 1 .3 (1 .7 5 )
HNLI -0 :0 2 (0 .2 ) -0 .0 2 (0 .3 ) -0 .002(0 .02) -0 .0 1 (0 ,1 )
WNLI 0 .007(0 .5) -0 .005(0 .3 ) 0 .02(2) , -0 .027 (2 .6 )
KID -3 .3 5 (0 .8 ) 2 .3 (0 .8 )
SKL
HSIK -1 .5 (0 .4 ) 0 .7 7 (0 .2 )
WSIK -4 .35 (3 .06 ) -0 .4 8 (0 .1 )
HMOON -1 .7 (0 .1 ) -1 .9 (0 .3 )
WMOON -1 0 .5 (1 .3 ) 2 .9 (0 .2 )
HCOL 19.9(2 .4) - 1 . 5(0 . 03)
WCOL
DUMA -0 .6 (0 .1 ) 0 .2 (0 .02 )
DUMB - 14 . 4( 2 . 3) -18 .7 (8 .23 )
DUMC 4.9 (1 .4 ) 0 . 52(0 . 03)
DUMD -4 .2 (1 .4 ) 2 .1 (0 .53)
HHRS 0.12 (1 .3 )
WHRS 0 . 09( 2 . 95)
INTERCEPT 24.77 27.32 41.1 42.1
R SQUARE 0.097 0.005 0 .1 0.026
N=178


















(KID=0) 0.16 -0 .23 - 1 . 12* 0.33
26-35
N=371
(KID=1) T 0 .13 0.01 0 .33  -0.048
36-45
N=394
(KID=1) 0.11 - 0.16 -0 .6 7  0.77*
46-55
N=380
(KID=0) 0 .03 - 0.063 0.14  0 .3
56-65
N=l66
(KID=0) 0 .34 -0 .35  . 1* -0.05
NOTES TO TABLE
1. ^ s i g n i f i e s  th a t  the  parameter e s t im a te s  have ’F'
r a t i o s  g re a te r  than 2 .5 .
-183-
CHAPTER 7 LABOUR SUPPLY IN FAMILIES WITH PART-TIME OR FULL-TIME WORKING WIVES 
As well as n eg lec ting  the problem of husbands’ labour supply most 
s tud ie s  of female labour supply im p l ic i t ly  assume th a t  married women 
are Sim ilar in  having a continuous response of normal hours to  in c en t­
iv e s!  I t  i s  c le a r  th a t  a number of women w i l l  have a ’ c e i l in g ’ to  the 
number of hours which they are prepared to work- i t  i s  equally  ev iden t 
th a t  men w il l  normally have a c e i l in g  a lso  but in t h i s  case the estim ­
a tio n  problems are not so severe as the re  i s  l i k e l y  to be comparatively 
s l i g h t  v a r ia t io n  amongst the male working population in th e i r  c e i l in g s .  
There would not be an estim ation  problem i f  the v a r ia b le s  included in 
the equations were adequate to explain  in te rp e rso n a l  v a r ia t io n s  ifi the 
c e i l in g .  This i s  not the case -  a t  b e s t  we can find  v a r ia b le s  c o n s tr ­
ucted from the number and ages of ch ild ren  -  these  v a r ia b le s  w il l  not 
exp la in  the ’ t a s t e ’ fo r  p a r t  versus fu l l - t im e  work. We concentra te  on 
the p a r t - t im e / f u l l - t im e  dichotomy as i t  im plies  a simple tw o-ce il ing  
model. The le v e l  of the lower c e i l in g  can not be decided a p r io r i  so 
we experiment with d i f f e r e n t  c u t-o f f  p o in ts  -  the o f f i c i a l  U,K. d e f i n i t ­
ion i s  th a t  p a r t- t im e  work i s  where l e s s  than 30 hours per week are 
worked.
The econometric l i t e r a t u r e  on p a r t  and f u l l - t im e  supply fu n c tio n s  
fo r  married women i s  extremely small -  there  i s  no B r i t i s h  re sea rch  and 
the only American s tu d ie s  are by Gramm (1973), Morgenstern and Haraovitch 
(1976) and Long and J o n e s ( l9 8 l) .  The f i r s t  and l a s t  of these assume 
th a t  two (or th ree  -  p a r t -  f u l l -  and now work) regimes e x i s t  and in v e s t ­
ig a te  the consequent binary  choice problem, Morgenstern and Hamovitch 
1. As indica ted  in Ch.3 . ,  the binding of hours supplied by zero and a 
maximum im plies a no n -l in ea r  function ; es tim atin g  th is  implies norm aliz­
a t io n  of the r igh t-hand  v a r ia b le s  which s t i l l  r e q u ire s  parameter constan­
cy. Our approach can be regarded as f i t t i n g  a s e t  of b e s t  l in e a r  approx­
imations whicii allows the response to s h i f t  in switches ra th e r  than acc­
ording to the s p e c if ic a t io n  of a pre-ordained d ensity  func tion .
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sep a ra te  women in to  p a r t  and f u l l  time jobs  on the  b a s is  of average hours 
per week worked in  the occupation in  which they a re  employed. This e s s ­
e n t i a l l y  sees the  p a r t i t i o n  as being due to  segmentation in  the  demand 
side o f th e  labour market.
The above a r t i c l e s  provide l i t t l e  t h e o r e t i c a l  d iscu ss io n  of the  d i f f ­
erence between a household with p a r t - t im e  wives and one with f u l l - t im e  
wives. Morgenstern and Hamovitch suggest t h a t  a 'sw itc h in g  regimes' 
model may be ap p ro p r ia te  hence sugges ting  t h a t  a t  some c r i t i c a l  number of 
hours th e re  i s  a o n c e -a n d - fo r -a l l  s h i f t  in  the  param eters  (o r  a s h i f t  of 
some type in  the  underly ing  model i . e .  from 'o n '  to  'o ff*  the  demand curve 
t h i s  i s  no t made c le a r  as the  a u th o rs '  ^provide only a sh o r t  ' j
d iscu ss io n  about e s t im a tio n  methods). ''
In  t h i s  chapter we p a r t i t i o n  households in to  p a r t- t im e  wife and f u l l -  j
time wife on the b a s is  of the value o f w ife 's  hours using  a number of ;
' d i f f e r e n t  c u t - o f f  p o in ts .
This r a i s e s  a number of s t a t i s t i c a l  problems which w arrant the e x e rc ise  
of some cau tion  in in te r p r e t in g  the fo llow ing r e s u l t s .
One problem i s  t h a t  although the wives' hours v a r ia b le  i s  f a i r l y  widely 
d isp e rsed  up to a maximum of 73 hours there  a re  a number of c lu s t e r s  a t  
p a r t i c u l a r  va lues  thus suggesting  an im portant in f luence  of i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
f a c to r s  in  hours de te rm ina tion . The median of 40 hours i s  chosen by 
12.3% of the sample; along with four o ther  c lu s t e r s  -  38(6.8%),35(6.4%) 
30(5.5%) and 20(8.9%) i t  accounts fo r  v i r t u a l l y  40% of the sample. S p l i t t ­
ing the  sample involves the  assignment of these  c lu s t e r s  to e i t h e r  the 
p a r t - t im e  or fu l l - t im e  group which may in troduce  unexpected changes in  
the r e s u l t s .
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There i s  a r e l a t e d  problem of s p l i t t i n g  the  sample on th e  dependent
v a r i a b l e  le a d in g  to  t r u n c a t io n  b ia s  as  we a re  perfo rm ing  r e g r e s s io n s  w ith
a  r e g re s s a n d  which has had p a r t  o f  i t s  d i s t r i b u t i o n  chopped o f f .  I f
th e r e  a re  women in  the  sample who work v e ry  long  or very  s h o r t  hours  where
1
t h i s  cannot be ex p la in e d  by th e  o f fe re d  wage th en  s p l i t t i n g  the  sample 
somewhere in  the  middle in t ro d u c e s  b ia s e s  in t o  the  f u l l - t i m e  and p a r t - t im e  
wage re sp o n ses  due to  the  la c k  o f  any com pensation to  the  w eight g iven to  
h igh  or low hours o u t l i e r s .  For example, i f  th e r e  were a ' t r u e '  r e g r e s s io n  
l i n e  o f  hours  on wages which was p o s i t i v e l y  s lo p in g  bu t had h igh  and low 
hours  o u t l i e r s ,  as  ex p la in ed  above, then  s p l i t t i n g  in  the middle would im­
p a r t  a n e g a t iv e  b ia s  to  the  wage response in  the  e s t im a te s .  Given the  r e s ­
u l t s  f o r  WHRS.FINST re p o r te d  in  p rev io u s  c h a p te r s  the  above example seems 
to  be a p la u s i b l e  c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  o f  our d a ta .
D esp i te  the  above problem s, the  r e s u l t s  g iven  in  t h i s  c h a p te r  a re  s t i l l  
o f  c o n s id e ra b le  i n t e r e s t  as  changes in  n o n -p ecu n ia ry  v a r i a b l e s  of the wife 
and the supply  fu n c t io n  o f  the  husband a re  not o b v io u s ly  d i s t o r t e d  by the 
b i a s .
There i s  a f u r th e r  problem caused by the  com plex ity  and endo g en e ity  o f  
the  ta x  r a t e ,  A number of wives may be c l u s t r e d  around a p a r t i c u l a r  band of 
low hours  because o f  a wish to  avoid becoming ta x o a y e rs  ( see ''G reenhalgh( 1980.)' 
so t h a t  our fu jL l- t im e /p a r t - t im e  d i s t i n c t i o n  may in  e f f e c t  be a ta x p a y in g /  
n o n - tax p a y in g  d i s t i n c t io n .C o r r e s p o n d in g ly  G re e n h a lg h 's  t a x -p a y e r /n o n - ta x ­
payer  f u n c t io n s  may be p ic k in g  up th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  o f  reg im es due to  d i f f e r -
in g  home/market t a s t e s . ____________________________________________________________
1 ,  I f  th e  o f f e r e d  wage in c lu d ed  compensating d i f f e r e n t i a l s  f o r  people 
who work unusual l e n g th  hours  the s i t u a t i o n  would be d i f f e r e n t .
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I I
An obvious th in g  to  do i s  to t e s t  fo r  the  s t a b i l i t y  of the supply 
fu n c tio n s  when the sample i s  s p l i t  according to  w ives’ employment s t a t u s .  
Tables 7 ,2 -9  p re sen t  e s t im a te s  above and below the c u t - o f f  p o in ts  of 30 hours 
,35; 25; and 20 hours . Using the p a i r s  of above and below re g re s s io n s  of th ­
ese ta b le s  and the aggregate  re g re ss io n s  given in  Table 8.1 we can perform 
the  so -c a l le d  *Chow t e s t ’ fo r  the s t r u c tu r a l  s t a b i l i t y  of r e g re s s io n  c o e f f ic ­
i e n t s .  The r e s u l t s  of performing these  t e s t s  a re  given in  Table 7 .1 .  In
view of our e a r l i e r  d iscu ss io n  of the  p a t te rn  of r e s id u a ls  (see  Chapters 3 &
4) i t  must be noted t h a t  the t e s t  assumes the constancy of e r r o r  v a rian ces
and may be a f fe c te d  by the presence of h e te r o s c e d a s t ic i ty  (see  Toyoda(l974) 
and the comments by v a r io u s  au tho rs  in  Sconometrica( 1976). Also the  t e s t  
does no t in v e s t ig a te  which v a r ia b le s  are  re sp o n s ib le  fo r  the i n s t a b i l i t y .
A ll the t e s t s  except one (which i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the  95% le v e l )  
a re  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  the 99% le v e l  in d ic a t in g  u b iq u i t ib u s  i n s t a b i l i t y -  i f  the 
sw itching regimes idea  was valid"' the re  ought to  be a c u t - o f f  p o in t  where 
the ’F ’ r a t i o  becomes s ig n i f i c a n t  and switching does n o t take p lace  w ith in  
these  reg im es, i . e .  t e s t s  on a s p l i t  w ith in  the f u l l  and a s p l i t  w ith in  the  
p a r t- t im e  would; no t  be s ig n i f i c a n t .  C an u a l/ in sp ec tio n  suggests  extreme in s ta b ­
i l i t y  in  the  wives’ func tion  the R SQUARE values  are  extrem ely poor r e l a t i v e  
to  o th e rs  found in  the p re sen t  study and the ’F ’ t e s t  fo r  s t a b i l i t y  y ie ld s  
remarkably la rg e  v a lu es .  Explanation of va riance  in  husbands' fu n c tio n s  i s  
s im ila r  to  t h a t  found elsewhere in  t h i s  study .
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There i s  l i t t l e  previous work with . which to  compare these  f in d in g s  
-  Morgenstern and Hamovitch do not p re s e n t  any t e s t s  of s t a b i l i t y  bu t t h e i r  
R Square in  hours per year re g re ss io n s  a re  0.088 and O.O65 fo r  f u l l  and p a r t  
time r e s p e c t iv e ly  which are  low r e l a t i v e  to  the f ig u r e s  found in  aggregate  
r e g re s s io n s  (Morgenstern and Hamovitch do no t p re se n t  an aggregate  r e g re s s io n  
bu t R i s  t y p i c a l ly  g re a te r  than 0 .1 5 ) .
In s p e c t in g  the  p a t te r n  of parameter e s t im a te s  suggests  t h a t  thæ  
25-34 hours of .w ives ' work households a re  somehow d i f f e r e n t  -  t h i s  i s  in v e s t ­
ig a te d  by e s t im a tin g  t h i s  group sep a ra te ly  as shown in  Table 7 .10 .
I l l
This s e c t io n  d iscu sses  the  r e s u l t s  fo r  non-pecuniary v a r ia b le s .  The age- 
work p r o f i l e  remains as expected fo r  husbands with the exception  of the  in s ig ­
n if ic a n c e  of age in  the 35 hours c u t -o f f  f u l l - t im e  wives group; For wives 
th e re  i s  no sign of s ig n i f i c a n t  age in fluence  on hours in  the f u l l - t im e  r e g r ­
e ss io n s  . This probably r e f l e c t s  the longer working hours of women in  the 
f i n a l  phase of the. family l i f e  cycle.
The impact of ch ild ren  on husband's hours i s  n e g l ig ib le  in  the p a r t- t im e  
groups; i t s  s ig n if ic a n ce  in  the fu l l - t im e  groups weakens as the c u t - o f f  i s  
ra i s e d  u n t i l  i t  i s  in s ig n i f i c a n t  in  the 35 plus group. The p rog ress ive  
decrease  in  the s ize  of the KID c o e f f ic ie n t  in  HHRS as the fu l l - t im e  c u t­
o f f  i s  r a i s e d  i s  c o n s is te n t  with the idea  th a t  where wives are  f u l l - t im e  
market goods from wives'income and husbands' time may be s u b s t i tu te d  fo r  
market goods from husbands' income end wives' time in  c h i ld  care . This i s  
confirmed by the response of WHRS to KID. In  the top fu l l - t im e  c u t - o f f  there  
i s  a s tro n g  p o s i t iv e  response w h ils t  o th e r  groups show a negative  repense .
The absence o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  KID e f f e c t s  in  th e  lo w e s t  c u t - o f f  p a r t - t im e  group 
shows t h a t  KID can e x p la in  why women a re  in  such a low hours-band  b u t  can 
n o t  e x p la in  d i f f e r e n c e s  between t h e i r  hours  and o th e r  low h o u rs  women.
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The SKL v a r ia b le  i s  i n s ig n i f i c a n t  in  a l l  the WHRS fu n c tio n s  w h i ls t  the 
number o f  b iz a r re  la rg e  c o e f f ic ie n ts  on i t  in  HHRS suggest t h a t  th e re  are 
some id io s y n c ra t ic  men in  the samplè who happen to  have c h i ld re n  a t  nursery  
school. Bearing in  mind the infrequency of SKL being equal to  1 i t  i s  prob­
ably  wise not to make in fe re n c es  from the  SKL c o e f f i c i e n t s .
The e f f e c t s  of i l l n e s s  seem f a i r l y  c le a r .  There i s  no impact of husb­
and' s I l l n e s s  on e i t h e r  p a r t n e r ' s  hours re g a rd le s s  of w i f e 's  choice of 
work mode. Husbands in c rease  hours per week by an es tim ated  2-3 hours 
per week when f u l l - t im e  wives are  i l l  w ith  t h i s  being h ig h ly  s ig n i f i c a n t ;  
a s i g n i f i c a n t  decrease occurs only where wives work le s s  than  20 hours per 
week. The r e s u l t s  fo r  f u l l - t im e  wife households confirm the  s ig n if ic a n c e  
of wives' labour market time fo r household commodity p roduction  , Wives' 
i l l n e s s  does not appear to reduce earn ings^ and judging by the results.'.-, 
fo r  WHRS reg re ss io n s  i t  does not have a s ig n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  in  reducing 
wives' hours of work. This suggests t h a t  the r i s e  in  husbands' hours due 
to wives' i l l n e s s  i s  caused by a decrease in  p ro d u c t iv i ty  in  the wives' 
household production ;s increased  work by husbands' means t h a t  market goods 
are  s u b s t i tu te d  fo r  wives' time in  household p roduction . As husbands' 
hours o f  home production time inpu ts  f a l l  in  o rder to in c re a se  the flow of 
market goods i t  seems th a t  the f a l l  in  household p ro d u c t iv i ty  of wives i s  
in  a c t i v i t i e s  iwhere p a r tn e rs  time inpu ts  are  complementary.
R esu l ts  fo r  the two jobs dummies a re  s im ila r  to  those in  e a r l i e r  chap te rs ;  
one fe a tu re  of note i s  the s ig n i f i c a n t  c r o s s - e f f e c t  from HMOON in  the  h ig h es t  
c u t - o f f  fo r  fu l l - t im e  work. C e te r is  p a r ib u s , a two job p a r tn e r  su p p lie s
1. Judged by the r e s u l t s  fo r  the wives' earn ings  fu n c tio n  shown in  Table 
A . I I , I  a lthough i t  may be th a t  earn ings are  in flu en ced  by the  p ro b a b i l i ty  
of employment over the l i f e  cycle which would no t  be r e f l e c t e d  in  c u r re n t  
period  earn ings as used in  our earn ings fu n c t io n .
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l e a s  time to  household p roduction  because of the c o -o rd in a tio n  time of having 
two jo b s .  In  response to t h i s ,  f u l l - t im e  wives are  s u b s t i t u t in g  market goods 
r a th e r  than  th e i r  own time because of a s tro n g  s u b s t i t u t io n  e f f e c t  from the 
market wage. In  orthodox theory  we would expect the s trong  own-wage s u b s t i t ­
u t io n  e f f e c t  to  be the f a c to r  which would make women in to  f u l l - t im e  workers 
in  the f i r s t  p lace .
S ig n i f ic a n t  e f f e c t s  of colour appear only when the low est c u t - o f f  po in t 
fo r  p a r t- t im e  work i s  used. Estim ates of the c o e f f i c i e n t s  on the  co lour 
dummies a re  su b jec t  to the problem th a t  most coloured peonle in  the sample 
have coloured p a r tn e r s .  Bearing th i s  in  mind the n e t  e f f e c t  on p a r t - t im e  
wives appears to  be about -  3 hours in  the  low est c u t -o f f  group w h i ls t  the 
e f f e c t  on husbands seens to  be about + 10 hours. These e s t im a te s  suggest 
th a t  low hours coloured women have lower hours than low hours white women 
with th i s  lead in g  to in c re a s e d •hours by husbands on account o f  the lower 
earn ings of coloured households.
The s o c ia l  c la s s  dummies mostly confirm the p a t te rn s  suggested in  Chapter 
4. In  two groups, Seg 2 and Sag 4, husbands' hours are  l e s s  when wives work 
p a r t- t im e  w h ils t  fu l l - t im e  wives lead  to  longer hours by husbands only in  
Seg 1 suggesting  th a t  hours are  c o r re la te d  h igher s ta tu s  due to s trong  
t a s t e s  fo r  work.
The only s ig n i f i c a n t  v a r ia t io n  by so c ia l  s t a tu s  w ith in  p a r t - t im e  or f u l l ­
time groups fo r  wives i s  fo r  Seg 5 which seems to  be a p o s i t iv e  e f f e c t  in  
the 25-29 hours range judging by the r e s u l t s  fo r  Tables 7 .5  and 7 .1 0 .
A c le a r  p a t te rn  emerges of the c o r r e la t io n  between p a r t n e r ' s  hou rs .  Ag 
the c u t -o f f  fo r  p a r t- t im e  i s  lowered the s ig n if ic a n c e  of the  c o r r e la t io n  
p ro g re s s iv e ly  van ishes  w h ils t  r a i s in g  the  f u l l - t im e  c u t - o f f  p o in t  p ro g re s s ­
iv e ly  r a i s e s  i t s  s ig n if ic a n c e .  The p o s i t iv e  s ign  in  the f u l l - t im e  groups
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suggests  t h a t  wives and husbands with above average hours share a t a s t e  
fo r  e x tra  work, r e l a t i v e  to  o ther people, with t h e i r  p a r tn e rs  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
in  view of the seeming lack  of r e la t io n s h ip  between wives' low hours and 
husbands' low hours.
IV
We now d iscu ss  pecuniary v a r ia b le s  and the accompanying e l a s t i c i t y  e s t ­
im ates. As regards  the non-labour income v a r ia b le s ,  none of the e s t im a te s  
show own or p a r t n e r ' s  l e i s u r e  to be i n f e r i o r  goods. The r e s u l t  o f  i n t e r e s t  
i s  the p e r s i s t e n t  s ig n if ic a n ce  of HNLI in  H[ÏRS fo r  the p a r t - t im e  groups 
accompanied by i t s  p e r s i s t e n t  in s ig n if ic a n c e  in  the  f u l l - t im e  groups.
This would seem to  be accounted fo r  by the dominance of the income e f f e c t  
in  the HHRS.MINST c o e f f ic ie n t s  fo r  the fu l l - t im e  groups and the genera l  
in s ig n i f ic a n c e  of these  c o e f f ic ie n ts  fo r  the p a r t - t im e  groups.
The supply e l a s t i c i t i e s  in  Table 7.11 show the importance of the  i n f l ­
uence of wives work on husband 's  labour supply. This does not appear d i r ­
e c t l y  through a s trong  c ro s s -e f f e c t  as a l l  of these  prove to  be i n s i g n i f i c ­
a n t  fo r  the husband or through a negative  c o r r e la t io n  fo r  hours as these  
prove to  be p o s i t iv e  in  fu l l - t im e  groups and i n s i g n i f i c a n t  in  the p a r t -
time groups. The in fluence  appears i n d i r e c t ly  in  the form of n eg a tiv e
1
e l a s t i c i t i e s  of HHRS.MINST in  the fu l l - t im e  groups. This e l a s t i c i t y  i s  
the  only one of those c a lc u la te d  th a t  shows any degree of s t a b i l i t y  across  
the  d i f f e r e n t  c u t - o f f  p o in ts .  I t s  negative  sign can be in te r p r e te d  as a 
r e f l e c t i o n  of the in f luence  of wives' permanent income ; we cannot measure 
d i r e c t l y  the permanency of wives' income or employment as we do no t have
1. I t  ought to be pointed out th a t ,  in  the presence of s im u lta n e i ty  of 
hours , th e re  may be tru n c a t io n  b ia s ,  as explained in  s e c t io n  I ,  in  the  
husband 's  wage c o e f f i c i e n t  e s tim ate . As can be seen the MINST c o e f f i c i e n t s  
i n  HHRS are  in s ig n i f i c a n t  u n t i l  non-pecuniary v a r ia b le s  a re  added; in s p e c t ­
ing  the r e s u l t s  of o ther  chap ters  suggests  th a t  t h i s  i s  due to the a d d i t io n  
of OAGE and EXP ra th e r  than the hours terra.
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panel d a ta  a v a i la b le  ’ to  in v e s t ig a te  th i s  problem. N onetheless, the 
possess ion  of a f u l l - t im e  job i s  a reasonab le  in d ic a t io n  t h a t  a woman i s  a 
permanent labour fo rce  member. Permanent worker s ta tu s  in c re a se s  household 
permanent income which would be expected to modify husband 's  labour supply.
The la rg e  p o s i t iv e  own e l a s t i c i t y  fo r  husbands in  the l e s s  than 30 hours 
group appears  im plausib le  and anomalous given the o ther e s t im a te s ;  i t  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  to ex p la in  although i t  probably a r i s e s  from the in te r a c t io n  of 
age and age squared with MINST.
Wives' own wage e l a s t i c i t y  d isp lays  a somewhat odd p a t t e r n  which i s  
probably due to  t ru n c a t io n  b ia s  and the f a c t  t h a t  c lu s te r in g  takes  p lace 
a t  a number of hours po in ts  where s p l i t s  are  enforced .
Taking in to  account the probable nega tive  b ia s ,  i t  seems th a t  the wives' 
fu n c tio n  responds p o s i t iv e ly  to own wage changes a t  high le v e l s  of hours 
worked. This seems to  f i t  in  with the idea th a t  women with high le v e l s  
of hours have s tro n g e r  t a s t e s  fo r  market work with th e i r  market work being 
corresponding ly  more im portant as a f a c to r  in  household Decision-making.
In  conventional terms the impact of a f u l l - t im e  work mode can be expressed 
as the s u b s t i t u t io n  e f f e c t  of own wage ch mges outweighing the income e f f ­
e c t  fo r  working wives. This would lead  us to expect th a t  the c r o s s - e l a s t ­
i c i t i e s  from MINST should be in s ig n i f i c a n t  or o f  n e g l ig ib le  magnitude where 
wives work f u l l - t im e .  This i s  confirmed in  Table 7.11 which shows the e la s ­
t i c i t i e s  fo r  f u l l - t im e  wives to  be i n s i g n i f i c a n t l y  d i f f e r e n t  from zero a t  
the 95% s ig n if ic a n c e  le v e l .
The c r o s s - e f f e c t s  may a lso  sub jec t  to  t ru n c a t io n  b ia s  which may exp la in  
the la rg e  s ig n i f i c a n t  f ig u re s  fo r WHRS.MINST in  the f i r s t  two pa '- t-tim e 
groups.
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The r e s u l t s  fo r  pecuniary  v a r ia b le s  g en e ra l ly  confirm the im pression given 
by the r e s u l t s  fo r  non-pecuniary v a r ia b le s ;  the o v e ra l l  p ic tu re  from the reg ­
re s s io n s  i s  d iscussed  below,
V
S p l i t t i n g  the  sample by wives’ hours of work r e s u l t s  in  a s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
s i g n i f i c a n t  change in  the equations  of the model although t h i s  i s  somewhat 
v i t i a t e d  by the problem of t ru n c a t io n  b ia s  in the  case of the  wives’ fu n c t­
io n ,  Examination of in d iv id u a l  c o e f f i c i e n t s  re v e a ls  th a t  th e re  a re  system­
a t i c  v a r i a t io n s  in  the impact of v a r ia b le s  ac ro ss  the p a r t- t im e  and f u l l ­
time wife households fo r  both p a r tn e rs .
The e x te n t  to which v a r i a t io n  i s  system atic  seems to  be concealed by 
p e c u l ia r  r e s u l t s  when the c u t - o f f  p o in ts  include those fa m il ie s  where women 
work 25-34 hours per week. These p e c u l ia r  r e s u l t s  may be due to  women who 
are  t r y in g  to  maximise t h e i r  earn ings su b jec t  to  the c o n s t r a in t  t h a t  i t  does 
not exceed the  tax  exemption l im i t . ^  Looking a t  the r e s u l t s  fo r  Tables 
7 ,3  and 7 ,8  w i l l  tend to give a c le a re r  p ic tu re  as most women in  the l e s s  
than 20 hours group w i l l  no t be taxpayers ,  w h i ls t  those in  the 35 p lu s  
group w i l l  almost c e r t a in ly  be taxpayers .
For the  f u l l - t im e  group th e re  i s  s tro n g  evidence of s im u lta n e i ty  due to  
the in f lu en ce  of wives' commitment to  the labour .market, t h i s  i s  shown in  
the c o r r e la t io n  of the hours terms, the c r o s s - e f f e c t  in  the  i l l n e s s  v a r ia b ­
l e s  and the  emergence of a negative  own-wage e f f e c t  fo r  husbands only in  
t h i s  group. There i s  a lso  a weak negative  e f f e c t  of FINST in  HHRS.
1. The impact of the  tax  and b e n e f i t  system on n e t  earn ings  makes the prob­
lem more complicated than t h i s .  Regressions fo r  non-taxpaying wife and ta x -  
paying wife households are  p resented  in  Appendix IV.
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I t  i s  p o ss ib le  to  co n s tru c t  an a l t e r n a t i v e  exp lana tion  fo r  the  change 
in  the response of HHRS to  MINST over p a r t- t im e  and f u l l - t im e  wife house­
ho lds . I f  p a r t- t im e  wives a re  working a t  sub-optim al h o u rs ,g iven  the  wage- 
r a t e ,  and f u l l - t im e  wives a re  working g re a te r  than optim al hours, given 
the  wage-ratç , due to  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  then th e re  w i l l  be an 
imbalance in  the p ropor tion  of household p roduction  time by wives to  a v a i l ­
ab le  market goods.
For the over employed wife the re  w i l l  be an excess of market goods and 
a shortage  of w ife ’ s household p roduction  time in p u t  r e l a t i v e  to the e q u i l ­
ibrium p o s i t io n  under f l e x ib le  hours. I f  the excess i s  no t channelled  
in to  savings then we would expect an increased  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  husband’ s 
hours to  changes in  h is  wage-rate as a wage-rise to  him which was unmatched 
by hours red u c tio n s  would exacerbate  the  problem of the excess of goods r e l ­
a t iv e  to  household time in p u ts .  Conversely t h i s  im plies  a p o s i t iv e  response 
of husband’ s to  MINST where wives’ hours are  below the eq u ilib r iu m  in  a 
f l e x ib l e  hours s i tu a t io n .  As can be seen from the ta b le s  th e re  i s  l i t t l e  
support fo r  th i s  except fo r  the p e c u l i a r ly  la rg e  own e l a s t i c i t y  fo r  husb­
ands in  the  sample where wives work l e s s  than 30 hours.
The above im plies  a re c u rs iv e  decision-m aking s i tu a t io n  where the wife 
chooses her hours f i r s t  under an hours c o n s t r a in t  which p e rp e tu a te s  a 
d is e q u i l ib r iu m  which i s  re so lved  i f  p o ss ib le  through marginal adjustm ent 
by husbands. The s i tu a t io n  envisaged i s  th a t  wives pick a high or low 
number of hours where they have l i t t l e  scope to  a d ju s t  around i t  which i s  
accompanied by adjustment of the husband around the i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  d e te r ­
mined norm fo r  men.
The re c u rs iv e  s i tu a t io n  re q u ire s  t h a t  the spouse hours term be nega tive
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as husband 's  hours adjustment should be in v e rs e ly  r e l a t e d  to  the choice by 
wives o f  a high or low hours c o n s t r a in t .
As exp lained  elsewhere t h i s  could be masked by c o r re la te d  t a s t e s  over 
market work as ag-sinst home production .
A very  weak nega tive  e f f e c t  occurs in  the l e s s  than 20 hours group which 
suggests  th a t  low hours wives are not married to  low hours husbands. This
could be due to  the impact of ch ild ren  as one of the c h ie f  v a r ia b le s  which
d is t in g u is h e s  p a r t - t im e  from f u l l - t im e  wives i s  the  presence of dependent 
c h i ld re n .  However we would expect t h a t ,  i f  husbands' hours are  in f luenced  
by the sh o r te r  hours of wives due to  the demands on th e i r  time by c h i ld re n ,
the  ' c o e f f i c i e n t  on KID in  HHRS would be p o s i t iv e . .
We have looked a t  the evidence above a g a in s t  the  p a r t - t im e  wife households 
being a simultaneous decision-making regime bu t the  r e g re s s io n s  in  Table 7 .8  
a re  too poorly determined to provide much support in  favour of the re c u rs iv e  
model.
On the  o ther hand, the r e s u l t s  in Table 7 .3  p o in t  s t ro n g ly  to a s im ultan­
e i t y  which i s  due to a s trong  j o i n t  d e s i r e  fo r  market goods not simply as 
s u b s t i t u t e  f a c to r s  of production for time in p u ts  to  commodities but a lso  to 
in c rease  the amount of commodities a v a i l a b le .
The p o s i t iv e  WHRS.FINST e l a s t i c i t y  i s  c o n s is te n t  with t h i s  idea and r e j e c t s  
the over employed wife recu rs iv e  model. The same can be sa id  fo r  the  c o e f f ic ­
i e n t s  on KID, HHRS and HMOON in  the WHRS fu n c tio n .  In  the re c u rs iv e  model 
we would expect KID, HHRS and HMOON to be negative  or i n s i g n i f i c a n t  (co n s id ­
e r in g  the r e s u l t  fo r  HMOON in  HHRS) r a th e r  than p o s i t iv e  as they are  s':own to  
be.
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TARLË 7 .1 .  TESTS FOR THE EQUALITY OF COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN GROUPS WITH 
PART-TIME AND FULL-TIME WORKING WIVES











TABLE 7 .2 HOUSEHOLDS WHERE WIVES WORK LESS THAN 35 HOURS PER WEEK
Dependent V ariable: WHRS HHRS
MINST -8 .95 (2 .99 ) -5 .8 (1 .7 ) -3 .4 (0 .3 ) 4 .1 5 (0 .8 )
FINST 6.61(3 .1 ) 8 .6 (5 .4 ) -4 .9 (1 .4 ) -9 (5 .1 )
HNLI -0 .001(0 .2) -0 .002(0 .9 ) -0 .0 05 (5 .7 ) -0 .0 0 6 (8 .1 )
WNLI -0 .001(0 .1 ) -0 .009(5 .2 ) -0 .001(0 .05) 0 .007 (3 .1 )
OAGE 0 .5 (8 .6 ) 044(3.5)
EXP -0 .0 0 7 (1 1 .X) -0 .006 (5 .7 )
KID —A.X( 50,4-) 0 .9 7 (2 .1 )
SKL 2 .78(0 .5) -1 .5 (0 .2 )
HSIK -0 .8 (1 .3 ) -0 .5 (0 .5 )
WSIK 0.08(0 .01) 0 .54(0 .05)
HMOON ' -1 .6 (2 .4 ) -2 .4 (4 .2 )
WMOON -2 .7 (6 .0 3 ) -1 .6 (1 .8 )
HCOL -1 .1 (0 .0 7 ) -5 .3 (1 .8 )
WCOL 0.9 (0 .04) 4 .6 (1 .5 )
DUMA 0.21(0 .15) 0.6(0195)
DUFB 0.26(0 .05) -2 .65(4)
DUMC 2.97(9 .5) -3 .7 (1 2 .8 )
DUMD 1.22(1 .95) 0 .62(0 .44)
HHRS 0.04(2 .05) »
WHRS 0.053(2 .8 )
INTERCEPT 13.3 20.4 39.5 4 5 .4 .
R SQUARE 0.07 0.007 0 .07 0.01
N=1209





TABLE 7.3  HOUSEHOLDS WHERE WIVES 35 OR MORE HOURS PER WEEK























-1.95(0 .3) -0 .4 3 (0 .02 )
4 .9 (3 .9 )  3 .01(1 .6 )
-0.00004(0.001) - 0 . 0004(0 . 1) 
-0.0025(1.1) -0 .0 01 (0 .3 )
-0 .1 (0 .7 )
0 .002(1 .3 )
1 .2 (7 .7 )
2 .7 (0 .3 )
-0 .9 (3 .2 )
-0.54(1)
1 .86(3 .5 )
-0 . 2(0 . 02 )
-1 .9 (1 .1 )
0 .9 (0 .3 )
0 .07(0 .03)
0 . 34(0 . 1) 





-1 6 .8 (6 .3 )  
-5 .6 (1 .5 )  
-0 .001(0 .1) 
0 .002(0 . 2) 
0 .82 (0 .2 )  
-0 .01(0 .002) 
0 .3 9 (0 .3 )  
-1 3 .3 (2 .4 )  
1 .02 (1 . 2)
2 .3 (4 .9 )
—4. 4(6 . 1) 
2.96( 1 . 8) 
4 .7 (2 .05 )  
-4 .1 (1 .5 )  
1 .3 3 (3 .6 )  
-3 .2 (2 .7 )  
-0 .8 1 (1 .3 )  
0 .9 (1 . 2)




-0 . 001(0 . 2) 
0 .007(2 .6)
44.99
R SQUARE 0.061 0.0025 0.105 0.007
N
N=756





TABLE 7.4  HOUSEHOLDS VfflERE WIVES WORK LESS THAN 30 HOURS PER WEEK
Dependent Variable : WHRS HHRS
MINST -9 .1 (3 .4 ) -5 .2 (1 .7 ) 50 .8(3 .5 ) 3 .3 (0 .4 )
FINST -1 .6 (0 .2 ) -2 .3 (0 .4 ) -2 .2 5 (0 .2 ) -6 .5 (1 .9 )
HNLI -0 .001(0 .4 ) -0 .0 0 2 (1 .5 ) -0 .0 05 (4 .4 ) -0 .006(6 .9 )
WNLI 0.004(1 .4) 0 .0002(0.005) -0 .0 03 (0 .3 ) 0 .006(1 .9 )
OAGE 0 .41(6 .8 ) 0 .4 6 (4 .5 )
EXP -0 .006(8 .4) -0 .0 0 6 5 (6 .5 4 )
KID -2 .8 (1 9 .7 ) 1(1 .7)
SKL 2.2(0 .33) -1 4 .5 (9 .1 )
HSIK -1 .1 (2 .7 ) -0 .2 (0 .0 5 )
WSIK 0 .2 6 (0 .1 ^ -0 .84(1 )
HMOON -1 .3 (1 .7 ) -2 .1 (2 .9 )
WMOON -1 .9 (3 .8 ) -1 .5 (1 .5 )
HCOL -3 .5 (0 .8 ) -4 .2 (0 .7 )
WCOL 4.5 (1 .1 ) 2 .8 (0 .3 )
DUMA 0.09(0 .04) 0 .53 (0 .7 )
DUMB 0.27(0 .05) -3 .7 (6 .6 )
DUMC 1.26(1 .7 ) -3 .8 (1 0 .2 )
DUMD -0 .1 (0 .0 1 ) 0 .6 (0 .3 )
HHRS 0 .02(0 .8 )
WHRS 0 .0 4 (1 .1 )
INTERCEPT 11.7 17.6 37.9 4.5.4
R SQUARE 0.05 0.005 0.082 0.01
N=997
ZFRÔ ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
MINST WHRS
FINST 0.5
I n i 'IS 0.03
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TABLE 7.5 HOUSEHOLDS WHERE WIVES WORK 30 OR MO'IE HOURS PER WEEK
Dependent V ariab le : WHRS HHRS
MINST -2 .4 (0 .4 4 ) -4 .5 (2 .1 ) -1 1 .6 (3 .6 ) -1 .4 3 (0 .1 )
FINST 1.57(0 .4 ) 0 .8 (0 .1 ) -5 .9 (2 .1 ) -8 .0 3 (4 .3 )
HNLI 0 .001(0 .4) 0 .0007(0 .2) -0.0025(1) -0 .002 (0 .7 )
WNLI -0.0001(0.003) -  0 .0001(0.003) -0 .0007(0.03) 0 .008 (4 .4 )
AGE -0.005(0 .35) 0 .69(12 .4 )
EXP 0.0007(0.2) -0 .009(15 .5)
KID -0 .46(1 .23) 1 .13(3 .1 )
SKL -3 .3 (0 .7 3 ) 14 .2 (5 .4 )
HSIK -0 .7 (1 .7 5 ) 0 .045(0.003)
WSIK -0 .7 (1 .4 ) 3 .3(12 .5)
HMOON 1.44(2) -4(6 .03)
WMOON -0 .13 (0 .01 ) 1 .75(0 .8 )
HCOL -1 .5 (0 .6 ) 2 .97(0 .91)
WCOL 2.2 (1 .1 ) -2 .6 3 (0 .7 )
DUMA -0 .2 (0 .2 ) 1 .4 (4 .6 )
DUMB -1 .9 (3 .3 ) 0 .9 (0 .3 )
DUMC -0 .8 (1 .2 ) -1 .2 (1 .1 )
DUMD -1 .2 5 (3 .5 ) 1 .3 (1 .4 )
HHRS 0 .0 6 (7 .8 )
WHRS 0.15(8 .44)
INTERCEPT 36.4 37.7 27.4 43.2
R SQUARE 0.025 0.0027 0.085 0 .01
N=978





TABLE 7 .6  HOUSEHOLDS WHERE WIVES WORK LESS THAN 25 HOURS PER WEEK
Dependent Variable  : WHRS HHRS
MINST -2 .3 (0 .2 3 ) 0.14(0.001) 0.93(0 .02) 6 . 92( 1 . 6y
FINST -1 0 .4 (7 .6 ) -1 0 .8 (8 .7 ) -2 .1 5 (0 .2 ) -5 .1 (1 )
HNLI -0 .002(1 .4 ) -0 .003 (2 .5 ) -0 .005 (4 .5 ) - 0 . 006( 5. 6)
WNLI 0 . 0006(0 .02) -0 .003(0 .6 ) 0 . 0006(0 . 01) 0 .0 1 (4 .1 )
OAGE 0 .22 ((2 .24 ) 0 .3 9 (2 .9 )
EXP -0.0034(3 .6) -0 .006(4 .35)
KID -2 .5 (1 5 .7 ) 0 .9 4 (1 .2 )
SKL 0.25(0.004) -1 9 .1 (9 .9 )
HSIK -0 .5 9 (0 .9 ) 0 .4 1 (0 .2 )
WSIK 0.32(0 .24) -1 .1 4 (1 .6 )
HMOON -0.33(0 .14) - 2 .4 ( 3 .8 y
WMOON -1 .4 2 (2 .5 ) -1 .0 4 (0 .7 )
HCOL -1 .6 9 (0 .2 ) -3 .1 (0 .4 )
WCOL 3.71(1) 3 .9 (0 .5 )
DUMA 0 . 12(0 .06) 1 .08(2 .65)
DUMB 0.34(0 .09) -3 .6 (5 .2 )
DUMC 1.1(1 .43) -2 .8 (4 .7 )
DUMD 0.51 (0 .4 ) 0 .9 1 (0 .6 )
HHRS -0.005(0 .04)
WHRS -0.0002(0)
INTERCEPT 14.8 15.85 39.35 44.95
R SQUARE 0.048 0.018 0.085 0.014





TABLE 7 .7 HOUSEHOLDS WHERE 'WIVES WORK 25 OR MORE HOURS PER WEEK
Dependent V ariab le  : WHRS HHRS
MINST 1.21(0.1) -4 .8 5 (1 .9 ) -1 4 .6 (6 .2 )  -3 .7 7 (0 .6 )
FINST 1 .51(0 .3) 3 .28(1.5) -4 .55(1.4 '!  -8 .5 (5 .4 )
HNLI 0 .0006(0 . 1) -0 .0005(0 .1) -0 .0025(1 .3 ) -0 .0026(1 .2 )
m L i -0 .003 (1 .4 ) -0 .006 (5 .9 ) -0 .0003(0 .01) 0 .007(3.45)
OAGE 0.12(0 .7) 0 .7 (1 3 .4 )
EXP 0.001(0.4) -0 .0 1 (16 .5 )
KID -2 .15 (22 .9 ) 1.24(4c24)
SKL -2 .3 6 (0 .4 ) 6 .83 (1 .9 )
HSIK - o . i (o !o3) -0 .5 (0 .4 )
HMOON 1.46(1 .6) -3 .1 ( 4 .1 )
WMOON -1 .03(0 .65) -0 .15 (0 ,01 )
HCOL 0.52(0 .05) 2 .2 (0 .5 )
WCOL 2.33(0.95) -2 .9 5 (0 .8 )
DUMA -0 .2 (0 .1 ) 0 .77(1 .65)
DUMB -2 .2 4 (4 .1 ) -2 .1 6 (2 .1 )
DUMC -0 .52 (0 .45 ) -2 .2 (4 .3 )







36.15 31.5 45.44 
2 .8 (10 .7 )
R SQUARE 0.045 0.008 0 .^ 7 3  0.011
N=1140





TABLE 7.8 HOUSEHOLDS WHERE WIVES WORK LESS THAN 20 HOURS PER WEEK
Dependent V ariab le  ; WHRS HHRS
MINST -6 .6 (1 .7 ) -1 .83(0 .21) 5 .14(0 .3 ) 8 .2 (1 .25)
FINST -5 .24(1 .84) -5 .7 (2 .4 5 ) -8 .3 7 (1 .4 ) -9 .6 (2 )
HNLI 0.0004(0.07) 0(0) -0 .007 (0 .4 ) -0.008(9)
WNLI -0.0Ü2(0.3) -0 .002 (0 .3 ) 0 .001(0.02) 0 .017(6 .2 )
OAGE 0.0097(0.38) 0 .3 (0 .9 )
EXP -0 .002(0 .77) -0 .0045(1 .5)
KID -0 .6 7 (0 .9 ) 1 .09(0 .78)
SKL -2 .62(0 .31) -38 .34(21 .4 )
HSIK -0 .89(1 .95) -0 .2 4 (0 .05 )
WSIK 0.21(0 .1 ) -2 .2 3 (3 .4 )
HMOON’ 0.52(0 .39) -1 .4 (0 .8 6 )
WMOON 0.13(0 .3 ) -0 .84 (0 .34 )
HCOL -9 .1 (5 .3 5 ) 2 .58(0.13)
WCOL 6.08(2 .5) 10.33(2.25)
DUMA -0 .07(0 .02) 0 .7 9 (0 .8 )
DUMB 0.07(0.003) -3 .77 (3 .46 )
DUMD 0.58(0 .5 ) 0 .9 4 (0 .4 )
HHRS -0.013(0 .26)
WHRS -0 .041(0 .25)
INTERCEPT 12.22 12.02 41.73 44.75
R SQUARE 0.04 0.007 0.13 0.01
N = 490





TABLE 7 .9  HOUSEHOLDS WHERE WIVES WORK 20 OR MORE HOURS PER WEEK 
























- 2 .8 2 ( 0 .38j -10 .21(6 .5 ) -11(4 .8) -1 .7 (0 .2 )
10.72(10.86) 14.8(21.9) -3 .5 (1 .0 7 )  -7 (4 .6 )
0 .002(1 .2) 0.002(1.02) -0 .0015(0 .5) -0 .002 (0 .6 )
-0 .005(2 .2 ) -0 .001(14 .6) -0 .002(0 .003) 0 .005(2 .8 )
0 .027(0.03) 0 .61(14 .3)
-0.0012(0.38) -0 .008(18.15)
-4 .32(73 .82) 1 .31(6 .32)
-0 .88(0 .05) 5 .9(1 .96)
-0 .2 (0 .0 9 ) -0 .1 (0 .0 2 )
-1 .9 (2 .4 2 ) 2 .28(10.04)
0 .9 (0 .5 ) -3 .4 (7 .3 )
-1 .2 (0 .7 ) -0 .81 (0 .31 )
0.41(0 .02) 1.74(0 .37)
2 .7 (0 .8 ) -2 .8 (0 .8 5 )
-0 .3 1 (0 .4 ) 0 .73(2 .03)
-2 .93 (5 .7 ) -2 .4 (3 .6 )
-0 .08(0 .01) -2 .7 6 (9 .1 )
-0 .83(0 .99) 0 .74(0 .75)
0 .043(2.97)
0 .052(3 .65)
(34.06 32.94 35.14 45.33
0.085 0.03 0 .07  0.01
M = 1475





TABLE 7 . 1 0 HOUSEHOLDS VJHERE WIVES WORK 25-34 HOURS PER WEEK INCLUSIVE
Dependent V ariable: WHRS HHRS
MINST 2 . 9 1 ( 0 . 7 ) 0 . 5 9 ( 0 . 0 4 ) - 5 .6 ( 0 . 2 ) - 2 . 9 5 ( 0 . 1 )
FINST 1 . 2 9 ( 0 . 4 ) 3 . 3 9 ( 2 . 7 7 ) -10 .1 ( 2 . 2 ) - 1 4 . 3 ( 4 . 8 )
ÜNLI - 0 . 0001 ( 0 . 006 ) 0 . 0 0 0 3 ( 0 . 0 4 ) - 0 . 0 0 7 (] - .8 ) - 0 . 0 0 8 ( 2 . 5 1 )
WNLI - 0 . 0 0 6 ( 6 . 9 ) - 0 . 0 0 6 7 ( 9 . 8 ) - 0 . 0 0 0 6 ( 0 . 0 0 7 ) 0 . 0 0 4 ( 0 . 4 2 )
KID - 0 . 7 9 ( 4 . 4 ) 0 .3 ( 0 . 0 7 )
SKL - 0 . 4 5 ( 0 . 0 5 ) 1 4 . 7 ( 5 . 3 )
OAGE - 0 . 1 9 ( 2 . 3 4 ) 0 . 3 1 ( 0 . 6 )
EXP 0 . 0 0 2  ( 1 . 7 5 ) - 0 . 0 0 5 ( 1 . 1 )
HSIK 0 . 6 5 ( 1 . 8 3 ) - 2 . 8 ( 3 . 4 )
WSIK 0 . 2 8 ( 0 . 3 3 ) 4 . 2 3 ( 7 . 9 )
HMOON 0 . 0 3 ( 0 . 0 0 0 1 ) -1 .5 ( 0 . 3 )
WMOON - 0 . 8 ( 0 . 7 7 ) - 5 . 8 ( 4 . 3 )
HCOL 0 . 5 4 ( 0 . 0 3 ) -1 0 .7 (1.4)
DUMA 0 . 0 5 ( 0 . 0 2 ) - 0 .4 ( 0 . 1 7 )
DUMB 0 . 0 8 ( 0 . 0 2 ) - 1.61 ( 0 . 4 )
DUMC 0 . 7 1 ( 1 . 5 ) - 4 . 9 4 ( 7 . 5 )
DUMD 1.15 ( 4 . 3 7 ) -0 .1 ( 0 . 3 2 )
HH IS -0 .01 ( 0 . 4 )
WHRS - 0 . 0 9 ( 0 . 2 7 )
1NTERCEPT 3 4 . 1 2 2 9 . 2 8 4 6 . 2 4 6 . 4 7
R SQUARE 0 . 0 9 6 0 . 0 3 4 0 . 1 3 0 . 0 2 7
N = 384
ZERO ORDER CORRET.ATION COEFFICIENTS
MINST HHRS
FINST 0. 56
WHRS -0 .0 7
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TAi-LE 7 . 1 1  SUPPLY E L A S T I C I T I E S  FOR P A R T - T I M E  AND F U L L - T I M E  WIFE HOUSEHOLDS
ELASTICIITIES o f HHItS WHRS
to to
MINST FINST MINST FINST
CUT-OFF POINT : FULL-TIME WIVES
35 - 0 . 3 7 * - 0 . 1 2 - 0 . 0 5 0 .1 2 *
30 -0.26% - 0 . 1 3 - 0 .0 6 0 . 0 4
25 -0.32% - 0 . 1 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 4
20 -0.24% - 0 . 0 8 - 0 . 0 8 6 0 .3 3 *
PART-TLME WIVES
35 - 0 . 0 7 - 0 . 1 -0.45% 0 .3 3 *
1.12% - 0 . 0 5 -0.52% - 0 . 0 9
25 0 . 0 2 - 0 . 0 5 - 0 . 0 1 - 0 . 6 6 *
20 0 .1 1 - 0 . 1 8 - 0 . 5 5 - 0 . 4 4
2 1 ^ 4  HORRS PER WEEK WORKED HY WIVES
- 0 . 1 2 - 0 . 2 2 0 . 0 ^ 0 . 0 4
s i g n i f i e s  t h a t t h e  o r i g i n a l p a r a r e t e r  entim-: t e ;3 have ’ F ’ r a t i o s g r e a t e r  t h a n
2 . 5
-206.
CHAPTER S ; SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
T h i s  c h a p t e r  a t t e m p t s  t o  draw t o g e t h e r  t h e  v a r i o u s  t hem es  d e v e l o p e d  i n  
C h a p t e r s  1 - 7 .  The f i r s t  s e c t i o n  p l a c e s  t h i s  work i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  p r e v ­
i o u s  r e s e a r c h  i n  t h e  a r e a ,  t h e  second  d i s c u s s e s  t h e  a g g r e g a t e  e s t i m a t e  a s  
r e p o r t e d  i n  T a b l e  8 . 1 .  The f i n a l  t h r e e  s e c t i o n s  d i s c u s s  t h e  f i n d i n g s  o f  
C h a p t e r s  4 - 7 .
I
W h i l s t  t h i s  s t u d y  was i n  p r o g r e s s  two p i e c e s  o f  r e s e a r c h  on h u s b a n d -  
w i f e  l a b o u r  s u p p l y  m odel s  u s i n g  U.K. d a t a  w e - e  p u b l i s h e d ( A s h w o r t h  and U lph  
( 1 9 8 1 ) ,  B l u n d e l l  and W alk e r  ( 1 9 8 2 ) ' ) .  T h e s e  were t h e  f i r s t  e v e r  e m p i r i c a l  
s t u d i e s  o f  t h e  Kamily l a b o u r  su p p ly  p r o b le m  u s i n g  U.K. d a t a .  They we re  
pac ed  w i t h  s e v e r e  p r o b l e m s  o f  sample  s i z e  -  A sh w o r th  and Ulph had 85 
o b s e r v a t i o n s  and B l u n d e l l  and Walker  135 .  The p r e s e n t  s t u d y  i n v o l v e d  t h e  
c o l l e c t i o n  o f  1965 o b s e r v  i t i o n s  copT)-irable t o  tdioso o f  t h e  above a u t h o r s ,  
a c c o r d i n g l y  o u r  e s t i m a t e s  in  T a b l e  ^ .1 may be com pared t o  t h e i r s .  T h i s  
i s  t h e  f i r s t  s e t  o f  r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  t y p e  u s i n g  G e n e r a l  H o u s e h o ld  S u r v e y  
d a t a ;  l u n d e l l  and W a lk e r  use  the  F a m i ly  E x p e n d i t u r e  S u rv e y  and Ash w or th  
and  Ulph th e  S t i r l i n g  s u rv e y  on t a x a t i o n  and l a b o u r  s u p p l y .
B o th  t h e  works  r e f e r r e d  t o  a r e  h i g h l y  r e s t r i c t i v e  i n  t h e i r  t h e o r e t i c ­
a l  o r i e n t a t i o n  a s  t h e  B l u n d e l l  and W a lk e r  p a p e r  i s  b a s e d  on t h e  L i n e a r  
E x p e n d i t u r e  System and t h e  Ashwor th  and Ulph c h a p t e r  i s  b a s e d  on n e o ­
c l a s s i c a l  t h e o r y  augmented  by i n t e r d e p e n d e n t  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s .  We have  
t a k e n  t h e  v iew  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  a number o f  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  f a m i l y  w hich  
a r e  i l l e g i t i m a t e l y  i g n o r e d  i n  l a b o u r  s u p p l y  t h e o r y  and , i n  l i n e  w i t h  
t h i s ,  have  s e t  o u t  a  t ax o n o m ic  a p p r o a c h  i n  C h a p t e r  2 .
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The u p s h o t  o f  t h i s  a p p r o a c h  i s  t h a t  we ca n  h a r d l y  be e x p e c t e d  t o  
c o n s t r u c t  s u c c e s s f u l  mode ls  o f  f a m i l y  l a b o u r  s u p p l y  i f  t h e  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  
p r o c e s s  i s  i g n o r e d  o r  s u b j e c t  t o  an a s s u m p t i o n  which makes  i t  i n v a r i a n t  
t o  h o u s e h o l d  t y p e .  To h e l p  i d e n t i f y  t h e s e  t y p o s  and t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  
c o n t i n g e n t  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  r e g im e  wo s e t  o u t  a  p r o t o t y p e  o f  a b a r g a i n i n g  
model à t  t h e  end o f  C h a p t e r  2.
O b s e r v i n g  t h e s e  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  b a r g a i n i n g  s t r u c t u r e  r e q u i r e s  t h e  
e x t e n s i v e  u seu  o f  d i s a g g r e g a t i o n  which h a s  p ro v e d  p o s s i b l e  w i t h  ou r  
l a r g e  s am ple .
The l i t e r a t u r e  on to  male  and male  I 'diour '  s u p p l y  f u n c t i o n s  t r e a t ­
ed s e p a r a t e l y  i s  h o s t  t o  a  p a r a d o x  which i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  ne e d  t o  b r i n g  
some c o n s i s t e n c y  to t h e  m i c r o e c o n o m ic s  o f  t h e  h o u s e h o l d  v i a  a  d i r e c t  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  b a r g a i n i n g  s t r u c t u r e  p r o c e s s .  The p a r a d o x  i s  t h i s -  
e c o n o m i s t s  began e s t i m a t i n g  fe m a le  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  f u n c t i o n s  and h o u r s  o f  
work f u n c t i o n s  i n  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h ey  a r e  more l i k e l y  to  be i d e n t i f i e d  
a s  women have more f r eedom  t o  v a r y  t h e i r  h o u r s ;  a t  t h e  same t im e  t h e  
'new home e c o n o m ic s '  l ias assumed m; l e  d o m i n a t i o n  o f  a l l  d e c i s i o n s  , i n  
o r d e r  t o  c i r c u m v e n t  t h e  p ro b lem  o f  j o i n t  d e c i s i o n s  o r  c o n f l i c t ,  which 
i m p l i e s  t h e  f e m a le  f u n c t i o n  can  n o t  be i d e n t i f i e d  . ' ^ h i s  p a r a d o x  ca n 
be r e s o l v e d  by t r e a t i n g  m a l e - i o m i n a n c e  a s  one o f  a  c l a s s  o f  mod el s  -  i f  
t h e  d e c i s i o n  i s  s e q u e n t i a l  , i . e .  h u s b a n d s  d e c i d e d  o^vn h o u r s  f i r s t ,  t h e n  
a r e c u r s i v e  model  can  be i d e n t i f i e d  ( s e e  C h a p t e r  3 ) .  I f  male  d o m in an ce  
i s  n o t  t o t a l  t h e n  some b a r g a i n i n g  goes  on and b o t h  e q u a t i o n s  c a n ,  i n  
p r i n c i p l e ,  be i d e n t i f i e d  a s  p a r t  o f  a s i m u l t a n e o u s  model .
I f  male  dom inance  i s  t o t a l  t h e  w i v e s '  f u n c t i o n s  w i l l  n o t  be i d e n t -
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i f i e d  however  i t  seems u n r e a s o n a b l e  t o  a c c e p t  a  p o s t u l a t e  made f o r  t h e  
p u r p o s e s  o f  s i m p l i f y i n g  f o r m a l  m ode l s  a s  an i n e l u c t a b l e  b a r r i e r  t o  s t a t ­
i s t i c a l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  R a t h e r  t h e  b a r g a i n i n g  s t r u c t u r e  i t s e l f  s h o u l d  be 
i n v e s t i g a t e d .  T h i s  i s  p r e c i s e l y  what  t h e  p r e s e n t  s t u d y  i s  a b o u t ;  c o n c l ­
u s i o n s  a b o u t  thd'  b a r g a i n i n g  s t r u c t u r e s  o b s e r v e d  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  i n  IV b e lo w .
The r e s u l t s  o f  e s t i m a t i n g  the  model  on a l l  o u r  sample  a r e  p r e s e n t e d  
i n  T a b l e  8 . 1 .  The e q u a t i o n s  seem o u i t e  w e l l  d e t e r m i n e d  and  r e f l e c t  most  
o f  t h e  f e a t u r e s  o f  e a r l i e r  c h a p t e r s  sho wing  t h a t  a g g r e g a t i o n  h a s  n o t  l e a d  
to  t h e  l o s s  o f  c e r t s i n  i n f o r m a t i o n .
The c r o s s - e l a s t i c i t i e s  o f  wages p r o v e  to be s t a t i s t i c a l l y  i n s i g n i f i c ­
a n t  a s  i s  u s u a l l y  fo und  i n  a g g r e g a t e  s t u d i e s .  The o t h e r  wage v a r i a b l e s  
s u g g e s t  t h a t  h u s b a n d s '  s u p p l y  may be b a c k w a r d - b e n d i n g  and t h a t  w i v e s '  
s u p p l y  i s  foswa d - o l o p i n g .  T':e . i m p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h i s  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  c o n s i d ­
e r a b l e  s co p e  t o r  c o n v e r g e n c e  o f  h u s b a n d s '  and w i v e s '  no rm a l  w eek ly  h o u r s  
I f  e a l  wages  c o n t i n u e  to  g"ow.
Age i s  s t r o n g l y  r e l a t e d  t o  work h o u r s  f o r  b o t h  p a r t n e r s  w i t h  t h e  p a t t ­
e r n  f o r  b o t h  b e i n g  s u r p r i s i n g l y  s i m i l a r ;  o t h e r  c h a p t e r s  have shown t h a t  
t h e  s i m i l a r i t y  o r  s i g n i f i c a n c e  d o e s  n o t  p e r s i s t  t h r o u g h  a l l  g r o u p s  i n  t h e  
p o p u l a t i o n .
The e f f e c t  o f  c h i l d r e n  on w ives  i s  a b o u t  n i n e  h o u r s  p e r  week w h ich  i s  
i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  o t h e r  s t u d i e s ,  t h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  a v e r a g e  h o u r s  f o r  
women w i t h  c h i l d r e n  a r e  20 p e r  week which i s  f i r m l y  i n  t h e  p a r t - t i m e  g r o u p .  
The SKL dummy p r o v e s  t o  be i n s i g n i f i c a n t  f o r  b o t h  p a r t n e r s .  H u s b a n d s '  p o s ­
i t i v e  r e s p o n s e  t o  KID i s  n o t  found i n  th e  A m er ic an  s t u d y  by Kushman and
-209-
S c h e f f i e r (1975)  who u s e  a  s i m i l a r  l i s t  o f  v a r i a b l e s  a p a r t  f r om  u s i n g  
t h e  number  o f  c h i l d r e n  r a t h e r  t h a n  a  dummy f o r  t h e i r  p r e s e n c e  o r  a b s e n c e .  
T h i s  r e s u l t  i s  h i g h l y  s e n s i t i v e  t o  r e s t r i c t i o n s  o f  t h e  s am p le  and d o e s  n o t  
a p p e a r  a t  a l l  f o r  some g r o u p s ;  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s u r p r i s i n g  i s  i t s  w e a k n e s s  i n  
t h e  e s t i m a t e s  by a g e - g r o u p .
The c l a s s  dummies  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  s o m e t h i n g  u n u s u a l  a b o u t  g r o u p s  
2 and /+ a s  found  i n  c h a p t e r  4 w h i l s t  t h e  o t h e r  dummies  g e n e r a l l y  m i r r o r  
t h e  e f f e c t s  fo u n d  e l s e w h e r e .
The s p o u s e  h o u r s  t e r m s  t a k e n  a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  v a r i a b l e s  s u g g e s t s  
t h a t  t h e  m o s t  a p p r o p r i a t e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  s am p le  a s  a  w h o l e ,  i n  t e r m s  
o f  o u r  e a r l i e r  taxo no my would  be a s  a  c a s e  o f  i n t e r d e p e n d e n t  u t i l i t y  w i t h  
s i m u l t a n e o u s  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g .
The above  c o n c l u s i o n s  a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  m o d i f i c a t i o n  i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e  
c h a n g e s  w hich  t a k e  p l a c e  when we s p l i t  t h e  s a m p l e .  T h ese  c h a n g e s  a r e  summ­
a r i s e d  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  s e c t i o n s  w h ich  d e a l  w i t h  p e c u n i a r y  v a r i a b l e s ,  
n o n - p e u n c i a r y  v a r i a b l e s ,  and b a r g a i n i n g  s t r u c t u r e  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,
] U
H u s b a n d ' s  own-wage e l a s t i c i t y  i s  g e n e r a l l y  n e g a t i v e  b e i n g  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
so  w h e re  w iv es  a r e  f u l l - t i m e  ( the maximum i s  0 . 3 7 )  and i n  S e g 3 ( 0 . 7 9 )  and
S e g 4 ( 0 , 8 ) ,  where  n e i t h e r  p a r t n e r  i s  i l l  ( 0 . 2 8 ) .  P o s i t i v e  own wqge e l a s t i c ­
i t i e s  o c c u r  i n  S e g l  r e s t r i c t e d  ( 0 , 4 9 )  an d  w here  w i v e s  work l e s s  t h a n  30 
h o u r s  ( 1 . 1 2 ) .
T h e r e  i s  o n l y  one s i g n i f i c a n t  c r o s s - e f f e c t  o f  FINST on h u s b a n d s  w h ich  i s  
t h e  - 0 . 3 9  i n  Seg 4 .
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The own-wage e l a s t i c i t y  of wives proves to be overwhelmingly p o s i t iv e  
with the only s ig n i f i c a n t  negative  r e s p o n s e  being of 0 ,66  where wives 
work l e s s  than 25 hours p e r  week. S ig n i f ic a n t  p o s i t iv e  responses  are  
found in ;  age group 3 6 - 4 5 ( 0 , 7 7 ) ,  households w ith husband i l l  ( 0 , 8 ) ,  with 
wife i l l  ( 1 , 2 1 ) ,  in  S eg 1 ( 0 . 4 5 ) ,  Seg 1 r e s t r i c t e d  ( 0 . 7 3 ) ,  Seg3 ( 0 , 4 1 ) ,  
wives working 20+ hours (0 ,3 3 ) ,  and wives working 35+ hours (0 ,1 2 ) .
T h e r e  e r e  a number o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  n e g a t i v e  c r o s s - e f f e c t s  o f  MINST 
in  WHRS a  number o f  t h e s e  being i m p l a u s i b l y  l a r g e ,  i . e .  S e g 2 ( l , 7 ) ,
Seg5  ( 2 , 8 5 )  end t h e  1 8 -2 5  ag e  g ro u p  ( 1 , 1 2 ) .  T h es e  r e s u l t s  may n o t  seem 
so i m p l a u s i b l e  i f  wo c o n s i d e r  t h a t  t h e s e  women may have  a  weak l a b o u r  
f o r c e  a t t a c h m e n t  ' . 'hereby t h e y  work to  a c h i e v e  a  t a r g e t  income t h a t  i s  
u n a t t a i n a b l e  g i v e n  h u s b a n d ' s  e a r n i n g  powe" ,  T h i s  b e i n g  t h e  c a s e  t h e  l a r g e  
c r o s s - e l a s t i c i e s  may s i ’i p l y  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e y  would  d r o p  o u t  o f  t h e  l a b ­
o u r  ' "orce i n  r e s p o n s e  to  wha t  seem l i k e  q u i t e  s m a l l  r i s e s  i n  t h e i r  p a r t ­
n e r ’ s w a g e - r a t e .  P o s i t i v e  c r o s s - e f f e c t s  o c c u r  i n  S e g 4 ( 0 , 9 )  and ag e  
g r o u p  56- 65 ( 1) .
The non-labour income v a r i a b l e s  a r e  u su a l ly  n e g a t i v e  with own e f f e c t s  
tend ing  to be s i g n i f i c a n t  but n o t  c r o s s - e f f e c t s .
H u s b a n d s  have n e g a t i v e  and s i g n i f i c a n t  o w n - e f f e c t s  whe re  w iv e s  work l e s s  
t h a n  3 5 ,  l e s s  t h a n  30 o r  l e s s  t h a n  25 h o u r s ,  i n  S e g l ,  S e g 3 ,  S e g 4 ,  h u s b an d  
i l l ,  an d  ag ed  3 6 -4 5  g r o u p s  . The o n l y  p o s i t i v e  s i g n i f i c a n t  own e f f e c t  i s  
i n  S e g 2 .
The only s ig n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t s  of WNLI in  HHRS are  p o s i t iv e  and occur in  
both p a r tn e rs  i l l  and ag e d  26 -3 5  groups. This suggests t h a t  w ives’ home 
time inpu ts  are i n f e r io r  in  t h e s e  g r o u p s  which i s  c o n s is te n t  w ith the idea
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TABLE 8 . 1 . HUSBAND AND WIFE SUPPLY FUNCTIONS FULL SAMPLE
Dependent V ariab le  ; WHRS HHRS
MINST - 7 . 2 9 ( 1 . 8 ) - 1 6 . 5 ( 1 1 . 4 3 ) - 8 . 3 3 ( 3 . 6 ) 0 . 9 5 ( 0 . 0 7 )
FINST 1 0 . 6 2 ( 7 . 3 ) 1 8 . 3 3 ( 2 1 . 2 ) - 3 . 5 9 ( 1 . 4 ) - 7 . 1 ( 5 . 8 2 )
HNLI 0 . 0 0 0 2 ( 0 . 0 1 ) - 0 . 0 0 0 9 ( 0 . 1 ) - 0 . 0 0 4 ( 5 . 3 ) - 0 . 0 0 4 ( 6 . 5 )
WNLI - 0 . 0 0 3 4 ( 0 . 7 ) - 0 . 0 2 ( 2 1 . 2 ) 0 . 0 0 0 5 ( 0 . 0 3 ) 0 . 0 0 7 5 ( 6 . 8 )
OAGE 0 . 5 4 ( 9 . 2 ) 0 . 5 5 ( 1 4 . 6 )
EXP - 0 . 0 0 9 ( 1 4 . 7 ) - 0 . 0 0 7 ( 1 9 . 1 )
KID - 9 . 2 2 ( 2 3 9 . 1 ) 1 . 2 6 ( 7 . 1 4 )
SKL 1 . 9 4 ( 0 . 2 ) - 2 . 7 3 ( 0 . 5 2 )
HSIK - 0 . 7 5 ( 1 ) - 0 . 1 ( 0 . 0 2 )
WSIK - 1 . 2 8 ( 2 . 5 3 ) 1 . 0 9 ( 3 . 1 )
HMOON - 1 . 4 3 ( 1 . 3 ) - 2 . 7 2 ( 7 . 8 )
WMOON - 4 . 5 5 ( 1 1 . 7 ) - 0 . 7 8 ( 0 . 6 )
HCOL 2 . 9 ( 0 . 7 ) 0 . 9 ( 0 . 0 5 )
WCOL 4 . 0 4 ( 1 . 3 ) - 0 . 0 9 ( 0 . 1 1 )
DUMA - 0 . 2 2 ( 0 . 1 5 ) 0 . 8 3 ( 3 . 5 )
DUMB - 3 . 6 3 ( 6 . 7 ) - 2 . 5 2 ( 5 . 4 )
DUMC 1 . 0 6 ( 1 ) - 2 . 5 6 ( 1 0 . 1 )
DUMD 0 . 0 5 ( 0 . 0 9 ) 0 . 9 2 ( 1 . 5 )
HHRS 0 . 0 4 8 ( 2 . 6 6 )
WHRS 0 . 0 3 4 ( 3 . 8 )
INTERCEPT 24 2 8 . 1 2 3 5 . 1 4 5 . 3
R SQUARE 0 . 1 5 1 0 . 0 2 3 0 .064 0 .009
N=1965
ZERO ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
MINST WHRS
FINST 0 . 4 8
HHRS 0 . 0 1 7
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t h a t  a l i f e - c y c l e  squeeze occurs in  middle-age and the argument t h a t  i l l n e s s  
d ecreases  wives’ p ro d u c t iv i ty  in the household.
There are no s ig n i f i c a n t  p o s i t iv e  own e f f e c t s  fo r  wives bu t a number of 
s i g n i f i c a n t  negative  r e s u l t s  occur these  being in  age groups 18-25 and 36-45 
where n e i th e r  p a r tn e r  i s  i l l ,  where both p a r tn e rs  are  co loured , where wives 
work more than 19 hours per week or 25-34 hours per week.
HNLI i s  negative  and s ig n i f i c a n t  in  Seg 5 which i s  in  l i n e  with the  r e s u l t  
f o r  WHRS.MINST ih  Seg 5. There i s  a p o s i t iv e  s ig n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t  o f  HNLI in  
WHRS fo r colured households.
IV
In  t h i s  sec t io n  we d iscu ss  the r e s u l t s  ob tained fo r  non-pecuniary  v a r ia b le s  
These are  given in  the foi'mat of the name of the v a r ia b le  followed by a 
b r i e f  sui'cnaiy of f ind ings  wi th regard to i t .
KID; i s  u su a lly  negative  and s ig n i f i c a n t  in  WHRS with i t s  magnitude :
I
vary ing  in  a p re d ic ta b le  way across  groups. Exceptions to  t h i s  a re  i t s  ; 
in s ig n i f ic a n c e  in the o lder age groups and the coloured households and ' 
i t s  s ig n i f i c a n t  p o s i t iv e  e f f e c t  in  the fu l l - t im e  group. The f i r s t  of 
these  i s  not s u rp r i s in g ,  the second r e f l e c t s  the unusual s t r u c tu r e  in  
coloured households w h ils t  the th i r d  may r e f l e c t  the c o s t  p re s su re s  of 
c h i ld re n .  The l i f e  cycle squeeze ex p lana tion  may be appea ling  bu t i t  
does no t s i t  well with o the r  f e a tu re s  of the  f u l l - t im e  wives, e .g .  the 
in f lu en ce  of hours on s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  and ' i t ' i s  somewhat c o n t ra d ic to ry  
th a t  i t  does not r e s u l t  in  a p o s i t iv e  e f f e c t  in p a r t s  of the  l i f e  
cycle  where the squeeze i s  s t ro n g e s t .  As the  a d d i t io n  to  hours of
KID i s  w ith in  the fu l l - t im e  group we ought not to  conclude t h a t  KID
i s  a determ inant of choice of fu l l - t im e  work.
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The p o s i t iv e  e f f e c t  may be connected with the  backward-bending supply 
curve in  th a t  once a d e s ired  consumption t a r g e t  has been reached] fo r  the 
p a r tn e r s  themselves they w i l l  compensate fo r  the  lo s s  of income through a 
t r a n s f e r  to  c h i ld re n  by working longer hours.
KID i s  s t ro n g ly  s ig n i f i c a n t  and p o s i t iv e  in  HHRS fo r  Seg3, both p a r t ­
ners  h e a l th y  and p a r t- t im e  wives. I t  i s  moderately s i g n i f i c a n t  in  the  i l l  
households and the wives aged 18-25 group. I t  i s  no t c le a r  t h a t  th e se ,  nr 
the more s ig n i f i c a n t  p o s i t iv e  e f f e c t s  above, r e p re s e n t  the l i f e  cycle  
squeeze o th e r  than th a t  the choice of p a r t - t im e  mode by wives may r e f l e c t  
c o s t  p re s su re s  on wives who would not to therw ise  be working.
The nega tive  e f f e c t  on coloured households' HHRS appears to  r e f l e c t  a 
reversed  ro le  s t ru c tu re  as mentioned e a r l i e r ,
SKL : The r e s u l t s  fo r  the SKL dummy in  both p a r tn e r s '  fu n c t io n s  prove to 
be im plausib ly  la rg e  when the c o e f f ic ie n t  e s t im a te s  are  s i g n i f i c a n t .  In 
view of t h i s  i t  seems 'b e s t  to  regard these  e s t im a te s  as a r i s in g  from the 
p e c u l i a r i t y  of some of the very small numtter of households who have c h i ld ­
ren  a t  nu rsery  school. Accordingly we do not d iscu ss  the SKL c o e f f i c i e n t s .
HSIK: very r a r e l y  r e  i u ce s  h u s b a n d s '  .houi-s, t h e  o n l y  excep tions  being 
t h e  s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t s  where wives a r e  aged 36 to  45 o r  work 25 to 
34 hours per week. A n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t  i n , -WHRS i s  produced f o r  a  numb­
e r  o f  groups b e i n g  s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  S e g l ,  ag e d  1 8 - 2 5  and f u l l - t i m e .
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None of the groups fe a tu re  n negative  e f f e c t  of HSIK in  HHRS so 
we must presume th a t ,  in  them, wives reduce labou r time to  compensate 
fo r a diminished p ro d u c t iv i ty  of husbands a t  home. This of course a s s ­
umes th a t  the re a l lo c a te d  wives home time i s  more e f f i c i e n t  than the 
market s u b s t i t u t e s  which i t s  use a t  paid  work would have produced.
WSIK; d isp la y s  a p a t te rn  of reducing WHRS in c re a s in g ly  as s ta tu s  i s  
lowered (comparing magnitudes of Seg3 and Seg5 c o e f f ic ie n ts )  and age 
advances beyond m id - l i fe  (comparing the magnitudes of 46-55 and 56-65
c o e f f i c i e n t s ) .     -
The impact of WSIK on husbands i s  d iv e rs e .  I t  i s  p o s i t iv e  in
Seg5 m irro ring  the r e s u l t s  fo r  wives as Chapter 2 suggested. I t  i s
p o s i t iv e  and s ig n i f i c a n t  in  HHRS in  Segla , wives aged 18-25, wives
working 25-34 hours and f u l l - t im e  wives. As th ese  groups do not f e a t ­
ure a l o s s  of wives' hours due to i l l n e s s  i t  must be suggested th a t  
t h e i r  p ro d u c t iv i ty  a t  home f a l l s  so HHRS i s  inc reased  to  buy market 
s u b s t i t u t e s .  In  Seg2 , HHRS a c tu a l ly  f a l l s  in  response to  an in c ­
idence of w ife 's  i l l n e s s .  I t  w il l  be r e c a l le d  th a t  t h i s  was regarded 
as a t a r g e t  income group mostly due to  the  i n f e r i o r i t y  of husband 's  
own l e i s u r e .  In  view of t h i s  we must e i th e r  suggest t h a t  he withc- 
draws from work to undertake home production when the wife i s  i l l  
or t h a t  the i l l n e s s  reduces the t a r g e t .
HMOON : Where the own e f f e c t  of HMOON i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  i t  i s  always a neg- 
ive (S eg la , Seg3, wives aged 26-35,36-45, po r t- t im e  wives, fu l l - t im e  wives, 
both w e ll ,  wife only i l l )  suggesting  th a t  two jobs  are  used to approximate 
optimal hours in these  groups. In  groups where the second job i s  used to
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raeet c o s ts  which are  u n a n t ic ip a te d  e tc .  we need no t expect to  observe any 
e f f e c t .  I t  i s  to^be noted th a t  there  i s  an in te r a c t io n  between KID and 
HMOON (cp . Cameron (1983)) in  which case p o ss ib le  p o s i t iv e  e f f e c t s  of the 
HMOON dummy may go on KID -  in  t h i s  connection i t  i s  of i n t e r e s t  t h a t  KID 
was s ig n i f i c a n t ly  p o s i t iv e  in  HHRS in  Seg3, p a r t - t im e  w ives,w ife  only i l l ,  
and p a r t - t im e  wives,
A n e g a t iv e  c ro s s  e f f e c t  a r i s e s  where both  p a r tn e r s  a re  i l l  and in  
th e  36-45 aged wives group. These r e s u l t s  may.be due to  th e  c o - o r d in a t ­
ion  c o s t s  o f  having two jo b s .
The p o s i t i v e  c ro s s  e f f e c t  in  th e  f u l l - t i m e  wives group adds to  th e  
id e a  of a s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  female f o r  male la b o u r  m arket time in  t h i s  group 
when we c o n s id e r  HMOON i s  n e g a t iv e  in  HHRS., - t
WMOON : hàS s ig n i f i c a n t  negative  own e f f e c t s  in  almost the  same groups as 
HMOON has negative  own e f f e c t s  (Segla ,Seg3, wives aged 26 -35 ,36-45 ,both 
w e ll ,  husband only i l l ,  wives aged 56-65). There a re  no p o s i t iv e  own e f f ­
e c t s .  As few households fe a tu re  j o i n t  double jo b -h o ld in g ,  i t  seems th a t  
a number of groups, Segla,Seg3, wives aged 26 -45 ,both w e ll ,  w i l l  f e a tu re  
one p a r tn e r  or the o ther using  a second job to  approximate normal hours .
A negative  cross  e f f e c t  i s  found where wives work 25-34 hours and a pos­
i t i v e  one ineSeg4. The former may f i t  in  with the idea of a husband ad­
ju s t in g  to  wifeks permanent income advanced in Chapter 7. The l a t t e r
c o n t r a d ic t s  the r e s u l t s  fo r  the whold sample rep o r te d  in  Cameron (1983) 
which suggested t h a t  both p a r tn e rs  are  l e s s  l i k e l y  to  hold two jobs 
when the o t h e r ' s  hours are  in c reased .  In  Chapter 4 we po in ted  out th a t  
WMOON had a value of 9.6% in  t h i s  group with the group seeming wife-dmmin- 
a ted ..M aking sense of the  c ro ss  e f f e c t  seems to  re q u ire  the  b e l i e f  t h a t  
wives genera te  an increased  consumption t a s t e  through t h e i r  involvement 
in  the market.
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SOGIAL GLASS- : DUMA and DUMD are  very r a r e ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  and hence d isp ­
la y  l i t t l e  in  the  way of an i n t e r e s t i n g  p a t te rn  across  Chapters 5-0, 
From t h i s  we may conclude t h a t  Seg 1 and Seg5 do no t d i f f e r  from Seg3 
in  ways o ther than those so f a r  noted . The p a t te r n  fo r  Seg2 confirms 
our conclusions in  Chapter 4 b u t . in s p e c t in g  the p a t te r n  of DUMB c o e f f ­
i c i e n t s  ac ro ss  groups provides some new in s ig h t s .
By age the fo llow ing  p a t te rn  occurs-  in  the 26-35 group wives' hours 
f a l l  by a sm aller amount than husbands' do, in  the  36-45 group husbands' 
hours ^ fa l l '  from the  cohort norm bu t by a sm aller amount than in  26-35 
w h ils t  wives' hours are  a t  the  cohort norm; in  the  46-55 group both are  
a t  the cohort norm w h ils t  in  the 56-65 group both f a l l  by a massive 
amount (es tim ated  around 14 hours each).  I f  we su b t ra c t  the DUMB from 
the mean hours in the  age r e g re s s io n s ,  t h i s  re v e a ls  the s t r i k i n g  p a t t ­
ern  of e x ac tly  p a r a l l e l  r i s e s  and f a l l s  in  the p a r tn e r s '  labour time 
as  • shown in  Figure 8 ,1 .
The o ther major p o in t of i n t e r e s t  to be derived  from the  DUMB 
es t im a te s  i s  the massive f a l l  in  WHHB seemingly brought about by i l l ­
ness  in  Seg2. However i t  must be s t r e s s e d  th a t  WSIK was i n s i g n i f i c ­
an t in  the  Seg2 re g re s s io n .
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Figure 8.1 ; Hypothetical Age P ro file  FQr Socio-Rconomic Group 2 Obtained
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Some very  sketchy arguments may be o ffe re d  fo r  the  seemingly massive 
j o i n t  l e i s u r e  p re fe ren ce  shown a t  the end of the l i f e  cycle  in  Seg2,
F i r s t  i f  m o b il i ty  in  the labour market has been s l i g h t  over the period  
1920-74 those  f in d in g  themselves in  Seg2 a t  the end of t h e i r  l i v e s  may 
see themselves as economic f a i l u r e s ,  i . e .  they a re  l i k e l y  to  have f a i l e d  
to  reach  Segl r a t # e t  than succe^iflg in  r i s i n g  to  Seg2, and tu rn  to  each 
o ther r a th e r  than •. the  labour market fo r  the f u l f i l lm e n t  of some wants. 
Secondly, i f  these  households have l iv e d  h a b i tu a l ly  under a t a r g e t  income 
le v e l  they  may in  the end develop a h a b i tu a ted  t a s t e  fo r  l e i s u r e .
I n t e r e s t  in  the DUMC r e s u l t s  c en tre s  mostly on what they 
re v e a l  about the a g e -p ro f i le  of work in  Seg4. I t  w i l l  be r e c a l l e d ,  from 
Chanter 4» th a t  4 unis group has above average hours fo r  wives, below 
average hours fo r  husbands, and strong  c o r r e la t io n  between hours. DUMC 
re v e a ls  a s eq u en tia l  p a t te rn  in  t h i s  group; fo r  husbands’ hours are  ’ 
r a is e d  above the norm in  the 26-35 group with t h i s  being followed by a 
f a l l  of w ives’ hours below the norm in  the 36-55 p e r io d . This i s  a 
p a t te rn  no t  revea led  elsewhere perhaps re v e a l in g  t h a t  wives work long 
hours e a r ly  in  the l i f e  cycle to  accumulate market goods fo r  a s h i f t  to  
horae-centredness:’ in  the c h i ld - r e a r in g  phase.
COLOUR : HCOL and WCOL are no t very o f ten  s ig n i f i c a n t  but no t much
s t r e s s  should be l a i d  on t h i s  in  view of the odd r e s u l t s  fo r  coloured 
households in  Chapter 5. The ch ie f  r e s u l t s  of note  are  a p a i r  of pos-
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i t i v e  own e f f e c t s  in  Seg3 and a p a i r  of p o s i t iv e  c ross  e f f e c t s  in  Seg5.
As most coloureds are  married to  each o th e r  the dummies a re  h igh ly  c o l l -  
in e a r  so th a t  pondering over the d i s t i n c t i o n  between the c ross  and own 
e f f e c t s  i s  of l i t t l e  importance.
The above suggests  th a t  lower s ta tu s  coloured households tend to  work 
longer hours than white households. This could be due to  the  perceived  
earn ings lo s s  from d is c r im in a t io n  or being crowded in to  jobs  with u n so c ia l  
hours. The HCOL dummy adds to  WHRS in  the  36-45 age group w ith  th e re  being 
no es tim ated  WCOL e f f e c t  and the WCOL dummy adds to  i t  in  the  wives only  
i l l  group w i th , th e re  being no estim ated  HCOL e f f e c t .  ï  The former may 
r e f l e c t  the  l i f e  cycle  squeeze.
AGE: The e f f e c t  of age can be observed in  the con tin u a l  f a l l  in  the
1
i n t e r c e p t  in  WHRS in  the r e s u l t s  of Chapter 6. I f  we s u b t r a c t  the e s t ­
imated impact of KID in  order to  form a sy n th e t ic  cohort which always has 
dependent ch ild ren  p re sen t  u n t i l  the age of 56 th i s  g ives approximate 
normal hours of 25, 18 .6 , 23, 23.6 and 24 re s p e c t iv e ly  fo r  the f ive  age 
bands used in  Chapter 6. This gives a U-shaped age-work p r o f i l e  fo r  
women. The p re c ise  shape of the U depends on the spacing of ch ild re n  
and the le n g th  from completion of a fam ily  to  i t s  beginning. N e ither of 
these  a re  observable . The p r o f i l e  may become S-shaped as i l l n e s s  which 
reduces hours of work seems to be a s so c ia te d  with age fo r  women with t h i s  
r e l a t i o n s h ip  being an in c re a s in g  fu n c tio n  of age.
1. I n t e r p r e t i n g  the in te r c e p t  in  t h i s  way i s  su b je c t  to  the  fu n c tio n  be­
ing  t r u l y  l i n e a r .
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Using the polynomial express ion  of Age and Age squared (EXP) only prod­
uces one U-shaped r e l a t i o n s h ip  fo r  women -  in  the 25-34 hours group and th i s  
i s  no t h igh ly  s ig n i f i c a n t .  Strong in v e r ted  U r e la t io n s h ip s  occur in  Seg5, 
in  groups of p a r t - t im e  a t  l e s s  than 25,30 and 35 hours w h i ls t  the  r e l a t i o n ­
sh ip  w ith age i s  poorly  determined elsew here.
The conv en tio n a lly  expected p r o f i l e  fo r  husbands i s  of an in v e r te d  U 
shape. This i s  g e n e ra l ly  found here bu t i t  i s  only s t ro n g ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  
where wives work f u l l - t im e  or n e i th e r  p a r tn e r  has an i l l n e s s .  A ll  these  
r e s u l t s  p o t e n t i a l l y  in accu ra te  due to the in te r a c t io n  of age and age sq­
uared with the wage in s trum en ts ,
V
We now d iscu ss  the  conclusions which we have reached about the ba rga in ­
ing s t r u c tu r e s  p re sen t  in  each type of household. The taxonomy of barg­
a in in g  s t r u c tu r e s  was s e t  out in  Chapter 3 along with the c r i t e r i a  to be 
used to  id e n t i f y  them in  the subsequent c h ap te rs .  Conclusions on the b a s is  
o f  app ly ing  those c r i t e r i a l  to  the  r e s u l t s  of Chs. 4-7 are  given in  Table 
8 .2 .  In  Table 8 ,2 the ab b re v ia t io n s  of Chapter 3 are  employed; where 
one group has two r e s u l t s  separa ted  by an oblique t h i s  means t h a t  both 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  seem to be p re s e n t ,  where a symbol appears in  b rack e ts  t h i s  
shows the in f lu en ce  which i s  thought to  be obscuring the r e s u l t ( s )  g iven. 
Where th e re  i s  a space r a th e r  than LMR th i s  means th a t  we be lieve  th a t  
th e re  i s  no determ inate  r e s u l t  due to  l im i t a t i o n s  of the  sample r a th e r  
than f i x i t y  of hours in  the labour market.
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Some comments are  provided below on the  a l lo c a t io n  of groups in to  regimes 
in  Table 8 .2 .
No c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i s  o ffe red  fo r  co loureds because of the small sample, fo r  
the  low and middle hours wife hours group because of the l im i t a t i o n  on the  
WHRS v a r ia b le  being a more probable cause of poor de te rm in a tio n  r a th e r  than 
the  job m arket, or fo r  the o ld e r  wife groups (36-55) because v a r i a t io n  i s  r e s ­
t r i c t e d  w ith in  these  groups as much of i t  i s  l i f e  cycle v a r i a t i o n  hence LMR 
would seem an in ap p ro p r ia te  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .
Seg 2 and the 26-35 group a re  c l a s s i f i e d  as t a r g e t  income households because 
both f e a tu re  husband 's  non-labour market time as an i n f e r i o r  good. Seg2 i s  
c l a s s i f i e d  as husband dominated because of the nega tive  WHRS.MINST c o e f f i c i e n t  
and the absence of a negative  HHRS.FIN3T c o e f f i c i e n t .
Seg lA, Seg 5 , wives aged 1 8 -2 5 ,  and 36-45 are  c l a s s i f i e d  as simultaneous 
w ithou t u t i l i t y  being dependent on hours of the p a r tn e r  because the spouse 
hours terras a re  i n s ig n i f i c a n t  w h i ls t  th e re  are  s ig n i f i c a n t  c r o s s - e f f e c t s .  A tt­
r i b u t io n s  of dominance fo r  these  groups are  based 6n the presence  of c ro s s ­
e f f e c t s  fo r  one p a r tn e r  only.
F u l l - t im e  w ife , wife only i l l  and both i l l  households are  c l a s s i f i e d  as 
sim ultaneous with u t i l i t y  depending on p a r tn e r s  hours of non-market work on 
the  grounds of s i g n i f i c a n t  c r o s s - e f f e c t s  and s ig n i f i c a n t  spouse hours terms. 
Dominance i s  a t t r i b u t e d  as above with the r e s u l t  fo r  fu l l - t im e  wives being 
s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  in  th a t  i t  r e s t s  on a comparison of HHRS.MINST with p a r t -  
time groups (see  Chapter 7 ) .
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TABLE 8 .2  ; CLASSIFICATION OF SAMPLES INTO DECISION MAKING REGIMES ON THE
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Seg 3 and both h ea l th y  households are  c l a s s i f i e d  as independent due to  
the presence of own e f f e c t s  combined with the absence of c ross  e f f e c t s  of 
wages or hours.
The remaining groups are  c la ssed  in to  LMR as i t  does not seem th a t  the 
samples have been r e s t r i c t e d  in  ways which might r e s t r i c t  v a r ia t io n  of 
hours to  the  p o in t  where i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  was d i f f i c u l t .  Ruling out t h i s  
p o s s i b i l i t y  leaves  uw with labour market r e s t r i c t i o n s  as the reason fo r  
the  poor r e s u l t s .
VI
The conclusions  in  t h i s  chap te r  are  no t e a s i ly  d ig es ted  th e re fo re  we con­
clude with two b as ic  p o in ts  concerning the connection of t h i s  to  o th e r  
s tu d ie s .  The f i r s t  i s  th a t  we have shown th a t  param eters do no t seem to  
be in v a r ia n t  to  the  choice of p o pu la tion . The second i s  t h a t ,  in  g e n e ra l ,  
our r e s u l t s  show wives' own supply response to be p o s i t iv e  with husbands' 
being n e g a t i v e ,p a r t i c u l a r ly  a t  high wife hours'^ which i s  somewhere in  b e t -  
ween the r e s u l t s  in  fam ily models where husbands supply i s  backward-bend­
ing  and wives’ inde te rm ina te  and those in  in d iv id u a l  re g re ss io n s  which 
f in d  wives' supply to  be p o s i t iv e  and husbands' in d e te rm in a te .
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APPENDIX I -  A MODEL OF FEMALE LABOUR. FORCE PARTICIPATION FOR U.K. DATA 
1951-70
The p re se n t  model i s  developed and es tim ated  in  such a way as  to  
overcome the  o b je c t io n s  t h a t  can be r a i s e d  a g a in s t  the  e x i s t in g  t im e -s e r ie s  
re sea rch .
I
There seems no lo g ic a l  reason why the re  should be a dichotomy 
between n e o - c la s s ic a l  and q u a n t i ty  adjustm ent models, as Wachter 1972 
supposes, provided th a t  the p ro n e r t ie s  of both a re  c l e a r ly  understood ,
A n e o - c la s s ic a l  labour fo rce  p a r t i c ip a t i o n  model would suppose th a t  i f  
the  o ffe re d  market wage W i W *  -  the re s e rv a t io n  wage of the  j t h  in d iv ­
id u a l  then t h i s  in d iv id u a l  w i l l  choose to  p a r t i c ip a t e  in  the  labour market. 
W* w il l  be determined by the t a s t e s  f o r ,  and p ro d u c t iv i ty  in  home a c t i v i t ­
i e s .  E v iden tly  W* d i f f e r s  amongst the  female popu la tion  a t  a p o in t  in  
tim e- r a i s in g  Wi, c e t e r i s  p a r ib u s , w i l l  mean th a t  a r i s i n g  percentage of 
the  a v a i la b le  female labour fo rce  w i l l  e n te r  the  market to  look fo r  jo b s .  
Labour supply as measured by the p a r t i c ip a t io n  r a t e  r i s e s  bu t a labour 
supply fu n c tio n  as such i s  no t being observed- we can no t i n f e r  anyth ing  
about the in d iv id u a l s ’ response in  terms of hours worked with re s p e c t  to  
wages o f fe re d .  What i s  r e a l l y  being observed i s  a cumulative response 
fu n c tio n .
Two elements need to  be added to  such a simple model -  the  ro le  
of wealth and search  c o s ts  in  the labour supply d e c is io n .  C le a r ly  Wi i s  
no t the  ’ t r u e ’ r e tu r n  from e n te r in g  the  labour market as i t  i s  the  wage
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which would be rece iv ed  a job were obta ined  hence the p ro sp ec tiv e  e n tra n t  
w i l l  d isco u n t the  expected wage by the p r o b a b i l i ty  of f in d in g  a job and the 
search c o s ts  with the  l a t t e r  vary ing  w ith the i n t e n s i t y  of search . We would 
expect w ealth  to  in f lu en ce  women through household permanent income -  a f a l l  
in  permanent income through su s ta in ed  husbands’ unemployment would be expected 
to  in c re a se  the p r o b a b i l i ty  of a woman working ^ f u r th e r  unmarried women w i l l  
a lso  be a f f e c te d  by susta ined  male unemployment. We do n o t  model the  f ixed  
c o s ts  of e n te r in g  the  labour fo rce  -  the  suggestion  of Mincer (1962) t h a t  
wives respond to  t r a n s i t o r y  shocks to  husbands’ income seems the opposite  of 
the  t r u t h -  i f  t h i s  were the  case then e n te r in g  the  labour fo rce  would be d i s ­
eq u il ib r iu m  behaviour by m arried  women. I t  i s  to  be expected t h a t  e n te r in g  
the  lab o u r fo rce  i s  r e p re s e n ta t iv e  of long-run  equ ilib r ium  as prompt e x i t s  
would mean the c o s ts  of en try  a re  more burdensome.
I I
The estim ated  model i s :
FPRj = a + bHRWj + cUMEDRj + dVURj + eVj +ffD]_+r + hD^
+CT + Uj
where FPR i s  the  p a r t i c ip a t i o n  r a t e ,  HRW the market wage r a t e ,  VUR the  vac­
ancy unemployment r a t i o  to  r e p re s e n t  the  ex p ec ta t io n  of f in d in g  a jo b ,  V i s
the  ab so lu te  number of vacanc ies  which we use because . .
the  assumption by Alban and Jackson (1976) of no ’vacancy i l l u s i o n ’ does not
seem j u s t i f i e d -  e s t im a tin g  e ho ld ing  VUR constan t w i l l  r e f l e c t  the  c o s ts  of
sea rch ,  D1,D2,D3 are  dummy v a r ia b le s  and T i s  a t im e - tren d .  U i s  the  normally
and independently  d is tu rb an ce  term and j i s  the  group s u b s c r ip t .
I t  i s  ev id en t  t h a t  W* i s  no t observed so t h a t  the wage r a t e  response 
i s  measured with e r r o r -  we do no t know what gap in  HRWj -  W*j i s  rep resen ted  
by HRWj. Attempts to  ge t round t h i s  (see  Berg and D a lto n ( l9 7 7 ) , W achter(l972))
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may be m isleading  as using  a moving average of HRW to  genera te  a s e r i e s  of 
W* (or permanent wage) simply leav es  us with the  tren d  growth in  wages which 
can no t be an adequate r e f l e c t i o n  of the  r e a l  movements in  W*. We include 
HRW on the  grounds t h a t  i t  i s  d e s i t a b le  t h a t  o th e r  f a c to r s  are  evalua ted  
holding r e a l  wages c o n s tan t .
UMEDR i s  the  unemployment r a t e  of males unemployed 26-52 weeks; th i s  
i s  used to  p ick  up s h o r t f a l l s  in  permanent income. The dummies are  used to 
p ick  up seasonal v a r i a t io n s .
The expected s igns a re  i , p o s i t i v e ,  b p o s i t iv e ,  c p o s i t iv e  b u t  poss­
ib ly  n eg a tiv e  due to  UMEDR a c t in g  as an aggregate  demand v a r ia b le ,  d p o s i t iv e  
and e n e g a t iv e .  The model i s  a l i n e a r  p r o b a b i l i ty  fu n c tio n  estim ated  by OLS 
as the dependent v a r ia b le  i s  bounded by 0 and 1; t h i s  i s  u n l ik e ly  to  le ad  to  
b iased  e s t im a tio n  in  the p re se n t  case as the  FPR measure l i e s  between 0 ,37  
and 0 ,42  thus  avoid ing  the problem of extreme p r o b a b i l i t i e s .  P red ic te d  v a l­
ues from the estim ated  equation  l i e  :.n t h i s  range so we are  spared from the 
embarassraent of n ega tive  or g re a te r  than 1 p r o b a b i l i t i e s .
Low Durbin-Watson s t a s t i s t i c s  on the OLS re g re s s io n  in d ic a te  t h a t  
Uj i s  su b je c t  to  a f i r s t - o r d e r  a u to c o r re la t io n  p rocess  so we estim ated  the 
model by the  Cochrane-Orcutt proceedure to ob ta in  GLS r e s u l t s ,
I I I
The da ta  used was as  fo llow s;
FPR -  q u a r t e r ly  s e r i e s  of female and unemployment r e g i s t r a t i o n s  (March,
June,September,December) d iv ided  by q u a r t e r ly  s e r i e s  (M,Jn,S?D) of female 
p o p u la t io n  over 18 obtained by l i n e a r  in t e r p o la t io n  of the  R e g is t r a r  Gen­
e r a l ’ s Mid-Year P opu la tion  E s tim ate .
SOURCES : H i s to r i c a l  A b strac t  of B r i t i s h  Labour S t a t i s t i c s ,  Yearbooks of 
B r i t i s h  Labour S t a t i s t i c s ,  Annual A b s trac ts  of S t a t i s t i c s .
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HRW -  q u a r te r ly  s e r i e s  of b a s ic  hourly  wage r a t e s  f o r  a l l  manual women workers 
(1947=100; Jan ,A p r,Ju ly ,O c t)  d iv ided  by q u a r te r ly  s e r i e s  of index of general 
r e t a i l  p r ic e s  (same month,same base)
SOURCES; H i s to r i c a l  A b strac t  of B r i t i s h  Labour S t a t i s t i c s ,
Yearbooks of B r i t i s h  Labour S t a t i s t i c s ,
UMEDR- q u a r te r ly  s e r i e s  (M,Jn,S,D) of numbers of unemployed men 26-52 weeks 
d u ra t io n  aged over 18 ( c o l l e c t io n  month was moved back one in  O c t,1962) 
d iv ided  by q u a r te r ly  s e r ie s  (same months) of male popu la tion  over 18 obtained 
by l i n e a r  i n t e r p o la t io n  from R e g is t r a r  G enera l’ s Mid-Year P opu la tion  Estim ated , 
SOURCES As f o r  FPR.
VUR-  q u a r t e r ly  s e r i e s  of female vacancy/unemployment r a t i o  obtained by d iv id in g  
female vacanc ies  n o t i f i e d  by number of females over 18 who were unemployed 
( both March,June,September,December -  vacanc ies  fo r  nurses  no t inc luded  u n t i l  
May 1962) .
SOURCES H is to r i c a l  A b s trac t  of B r i t i s h  Labour S t a t i s t i c s ,  Yearbooks of B r i t i s h  
Labour S t a t i s t i c s .
V from above.
The equation  was es tim ated  fo r  1951,2 -1970 .4 - t h i s  l i m i t ­
a t io n  being  imposed due to  t h e : i l l e g a l i t y  of n o t i f y in g  female vacanc ies  a f t e r  
the  Sex D isc r im in a tio n  Act was passed,
IV
The estim ated  equation  i s :
FPR = 0,371 + 0.0191 HRW -  3.66 UMEDR + 0,00344 VUR
(22.45) (1.16) (5.08) (2 ,42)
1
-0,000071 V + 0,00059 T
(1.71) ( 3 . 92)
R  ^ = 0,992  F(8,67) = ]014.5  D.W = 2,054 RHO = 0.929
1, T i s  the  s e r i e s  T= 1 ,2 ,3 .......................77.
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Absolute ’ t ’ r a t i o s  are  given in  p a ren th ese s .  Dummy v a r ia b le s  are  om itted .
Most of the  v a r ia b le s  are  s i g n i f i c a n t  w ith  the poor de term ina tion  of b being 
u n s u rp r is in g  in  view of the  problems w ith HRW -  the  p o s i t iv e  value fo r  d i s  
encouraging in  view of the f a c t  t h a t  th e re  i s  a n ega tive  b ia s  due to  the  
c o n s t ru c t io n  of VUR i . e .  FPR =(E + U)/P and VUR=V/U.
An extrem ely high ex p lan a tio n  of va riance  i s  ob ta ined  which i s  
c l e a r ly  s ig n i f i c a n t  judging by the 'F ’ t e s t  fo r  the  equa tion . This ought 
no t to  be taken as implying t h a t  'm ic ro ' p a r t i c ip a t io n  behaviour can be 
r e a d i ly  exp la ined  by t h i s  model as the  in t e r c e p t  p ro b a b i l i ty  of 0,371 and 
the  s i g n i f i c a n t  time trend  in d ic a te  t h a t  the  'economic' v a r ia b le s  only 
'e x p la in '  f lu c tu a t io n s  in  the  growth of p a r t i c ip a t io n  r a t e s  above the  p re -e x is t -  
ing  l e v e l  . The r e s u l t  fo r  the  equation  im plies  t h a t  movements in  the  v a r­
i a b le s  of the  model w i l l  no t lead  to  the  e x i t  of those a lread y  p a r t i c ip a t in g .  
However the  s ize  and s ig n if ic a n c e  of the  in te r c e p t  might merely r e f l e c t  the 
f a c t  t h a t  i t  i s  c o r re c t in g  the b ia s  in  the  OLS e s t im a tio n  r e s u l t i n g  from 
the p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  the  t ru e  model ought to  be a n o n - l in e a r  response fu n c t io n .
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AFPENDIX II ; EARNINGS FUNCTIONS FOR HUSBANDS AND WIVES
This appendix d e sc r ib e s  and reproduces the earn ings  fu n c t io n s  which are  
used to  generate  MINST and FINST fo r  the neasons given in  Chapter 3.B.
I
Since i t  was pioneered  by Becker and Mincer in  the 1 9 6 0 's ,  the human- 
c a p i t a l  earn ings  fu n c t io n  has become one of the most fa m i l ia r  to o ls  in  l a b ­
our market re sea rc h .  I t  has many a p p l ic a t io n s ;  i t s  use here to  generate
in s tru m e n ta l  v a r ia b le s  fo r  husbands'-and. wives' wage r a t e s  i s  s tabdard  in
■ )'
the  l i t e r a t u r e  using  microdata to e s tim ate  labour supply fu n c t io n s  (see  
Cameron(l982) fo r  c i t a t i o n  of a number of s tu d ie s  using  the method).
The standard  n e o c la s s ic a l  approach i s  to  regard  earn ings as a power fun­
c t io n  of a number of fe a tu re s  re p re se n t in g  an i n d iv id u a l ' s  p ro d u c t iv i ty .  
This enab les  transfo rm ation  in to  a sem i-log fu n c tio n  where the  lo g  o f  hour­
l y  earn ings  i s  reg re ssed  on the exp lana to ry  v a r ia b le s  in  l i n e a r  form (see 
F le i s h e r  and K niessner (1980) fo r  a textbook e x p o s i t i o t i )
The s im p les t  form of the  model i s  to  use educa tion , experience  in  the  
lab o u r  m a rk e t /  andmexperience squared, to  re p re se n t  human c a p i t a l  in v e s t ­
ment, The c o e f f i c i e n t s  on these  v a r ia b le s  r e p re se n t  r a t e s  of r e tu r n  on 
human c a p i t a l  investm ent. This model has been augmented in  th re e  ways- 
( i )  by in c lu d in g  a d d i t io n a l  in form ation  oifi the in d iv id u a l  such as IQ, 
m a r i ta l  s t a t u s ,  fam ily  background ,race ,co lour e t c .  to  co n tro l  fo r  v a r ­
i a t i o n s  in  d r iv e  e tc ,
( i i )  by i n t e r a c t i n g  education  and experience and qquaring educa tion  to  
a llow  d im in ish ing  r e tu r n s  to  formal schooling  and a j o i n t  e f f e c t  of form­
a l  schooling  and labou r market ex p er ience .
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( i i i )  by a llow ing demand-side f a c to r s  ( s t r a t i f i c a t i o n )  in  the  labour mar­
k e t  to  in f lu en ce  earn ings  (see  Beck,Horan and T o lb e r t  (1978)) .
Our earn ings  fu n c tio n s  are  s l i g h t l y  conserva tive  in  t h a t  they  do no t 
a ttem pt to  take account of ( i i i ) .  We experimented with i n te r a c t io n s  ( i i )  
bu t  found th a t  they simply added m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y  and did l i t t l e  to  exp­
and the  exp lana tion  of v a r ian ce .  As f a r  as ( i )  goes our re g re s s io n s  . 
a l re ad y  co n tro l  fo r  m a r i ta l  s t a t u s  as a l l  our sample are  m arried . In  add­
i t i o n  to  t h i s  we add dummies f o r  co lour and i l l n e s s  bu t are  unable to  con­
t r o l  fo r  o th e r  f a c to r s  as we la ck  the in fo rm ation . One p o t e n t i a l l y  im port­
a n t  f a c to r  i s  the e x is ten ce  of d iscon tinuous  work h i s t o r i e s  fo r  women which 
may mean men and women get unequal r e tu r n s  to  years  of labour market exper­
ience  even in  the absence of sex d is c r im in a t io n .
Our equation  i s  th e re fo re ;
( A . I I . l )  LOG (E/H) = a + b EDO + c XP + d SQXP + e COL + f  SIK + u 
where (o b se rv a t io n  s u b s c r ip ts  omitted) E i s  annual ea rn in g s ,  H i s  annual 
hours , EDO i s  years  of schooling , XP i s  years  of labour market experience , 
SQXP i s  squared years  of labour market experience , COL i s  the  colour dummy, 
SIK i s  the  s ickness dummy, u the  random and independently  d i s t r i b u t e d  d i s t ­
urbance terra, and a , b , c , d , e , f  a re  the re g re s s io n  param eters .
The expected s igns  are  b ^  0 ,  c^ 0 , d < 0 ,  e zt. 0 ,  and f < 0 .
I I
The d a ta  used i s  as desc r ib ed  in  Chapter 3. XP i s  derived  by s u b t r a c t ­
ing  EDC p lus  5 from c u rre n t  age. This i s  no t a t o t a l l y  accu ra te  r e f l e c t i o n  
o f  labour market experience as y ea rs  ou t of the labour market &re no t taken
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in to  account. This w i l l  be a p a r t i c u l a r l y  se r io u s  problem f o r  wives on 
top of t h a t  caused by d iscon tinuous work h is to ry  even i f  y ea rs  of experience 
were a c c u ra te ly  measure.
There i s  no th ing  we can do about t h i s  and i t  i s  faced by v i r t u a l l y  a l l  
econometric work jising earn ings  fu n c t io n s ,  COL and SIK' a re  simply the  
dummies f o r  HCOL?WCOE,HSIK,WSIK used in  the  supply fu n c t io n s ;  s im i la r ly  
EDC i s  j u s t  WEDC or HEDC from the supply fu n c t io n s .
I l l
The r e s u l t s  are  reproduced in  Table A . I I . l  and show a l l  the  expected 
s igns  a t  h igh le v e l s  of s ig n if ic a n c e  except fo r  the  f a i l u r e  o f  i l l n e s s  
to  be s i g n i f i c a n t  in  e i th e r  fu n c tio n  ^ and the in s ig n i f ic a n c e  of colour 
in  the w ives’ fu n c tio n .  The poorer performance of XP and SQXP in  the  
wives' fu n c t io n ,  compared to the husbands', probably r e f l e c t s  the  measure­
ment e r r o r  in  these  v a r ia b le s .
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TABLE A .I I .l
EARNINGS FUNCTIONS OF HUSBANDS AND WIVES
Dependent V ariab le ; Log of Hourly Earnings
VARIABLE WIFE HUSBAND
EDUCATION (EDC) 0.0424 0.029
(288.29) (258.95)
EXPERIENCE (XP) 0.0032 0.0136
(4.33) ( 116. 8)
EXPERIENCE SQUARED -0.000054 -0.00024
(SQXP) (3.41) ( 122, 06)
COLOUR (COL) 0.0084 - 0,0693
(0 . 063) ( 7 . 09)
ILLNESS (SIK) 0.0068 -0 .0087
(0 . 24) ( 0 , 69)
CONSTANT ' -0 .714 0.47
R SQUARED 0.150 0.161
(UNADJUSTED)
N 1965 1965
NOTE; F ig u res  in  parenthese s below c o e f f i c i e n t s  are absolute', ’F* r a t i o s .
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The General Household Survey can no t  be r e a d i ly  e d i t t e d  using; commonly 
a v a i la b le  computer packages because i t  i s  no t  in  a ' f l a t ’ form at bu t i s  h i e r ­
a r c h i c a l ly  s t ru c tu re d ;  th e re  i s  a non -constan t number of cards fo r  each 
household, the  amount or cards req u ire d  to  cover ' household ' in fo rm ation  
a re  fo llowed by sequences of pe rsona l cards  which give ' i n d iv id u a l '  in f o ­
rm ation .
A l l  the  survey in te rv ie w  cards  are  processed  on magnetic tape as blocked 
card  images. D-ue to  t h i s  only seq u e n t ia l  access i s  a v a i la b le  so each card 
must be read  and i t s  r e le v a n t  in fo rm ation  held in  f i l e s  while subsequent 
cards a re  read .  The fo llow ing  account of the programme used w i l l  r e f e r  to  
the  l i n e s  as (1 .5-10) fo r  example and then  d esc r ib e  the  fu n c tio n  of these  
l i n e s  fo r  example and then d e sc r ib e  the  fu n c tio n  of these  l i n e s .  A ll  prog­
ramming was w r i t te n  in  F o r t ra n  using  an ICL 2980 Computer; we omit d is c u s s ­
ion  of v a r io u s  ro u t in e s  which had to be developed a f t e r  the main sample was 
taken  in  o rder to  overcome the l im i t a t i o n s  of a v a i l a b le  s t a t i s t i c a l  packages.
( i . l )  i n s t r u c t s  the computer to  t r e a t  a l l  a lp h a b e t ic  v a r ia b le  names 
as  r e p re se n t in g  in te g e r s  .
(1 .2 )  s e t s  up the  a r ra y s  and m a tr ices  which are  re q u ire d  to  hold d a ta  during  
the  programme. HHOLD(20,500) which ho lds the p a i r s  of husbands and wives 
in fo rm atio n  i s  the  only one re ta in e d  to  be w r i t te n  to  d is c ,
(1 .3 -9 )  read  in  as  d a ta  the c h a ra c te rs  punched on the  o r ig in a l  cards; these  
have to  be converted in to  in te g e r  form at before  a r i th m e t ic a l  c a lc u la t io n s  are  
p o s s ib le  u s in g  the  answers on the ca rd s ,
(1.10-2A) a re  v a r io u s  counters  (n o t  a l l  o f which a re  necessa ry  when de-bugging
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i s  complete) which have to  be s e t  equal to  0 or loops  in v o lv ing  them w i l l  
n o t  o p era te  due to  t h e i r  having an undetermined v a lu e .
( Ï . 24) i n s t r u c t s  the  computer to  read  d a ta  from the  in p u t  u n i t  5 -  the  tape 
co n ta in in g  the  GHS tape being used (5 i s  defined  in  job  c o n tro l  language 
o u ts id e  the  programme) in to  the  a r ra y  KARD which has been dimensioned a t  1 .2 .  
The computer w i l l  go to  l a b e l  598 and hence te rm ina te  the programme i f  an 
e n d - o f - f i l e  cond ition  occurs . The d a ta  i s  to  be read  in  the  format given a t  
l a b e l  100,
( 1 , 25) g ives the form at fo r  (1,24.) commands as being  80 s in g le  c h a ra c te r s .  
(1 ,26-7) i s  the f i r s t  loop;; i t  s e ts  a l l  elements o f  the  a r ra y  CARD as  0 , 
(1 .28-41) I j  the second loop which converts  a l l  the  elements of th e  f i r s t  
card  read  in to  in te g e r s ;  we now have two v e rs io n s  of the  in p u t  d a ta  -  KARD 
co n ta in in g  l e t t e r s  and numbers as  c h a ra c te rs  and CARD co n ta in ing  only in te g e r  
numbers.
( 1 . 42) i s  re a u ire d  to  p reven t the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  ab o r t io n  be fo re  any d a ta  
has been c o l le c te d  in  the processed  form. C i s  the  count of the  number of 
d e s i re d  in d iv id u a ls  in  the c u r re n t  household and R i s  the count of the  num­
ber of d e s ir e d  p a i r s .  R i s  ob ta ined  from (1 ,120-208), C i s  incremented (1.219) 
each t i $ e  the  in d iv id u a l  schedule of a p a i r  member i s  encountered. So when 
C=2*R we know th a t  complete in fo rm ation  has been ob ta ined ; C=2*R when both 
a re  equal to  zero so we hold the  code DID=1 fo r  t h i s  c ircum stance.
( 1 . 4.3) n o t i f i e s  t h a t  the nex t household has been encountered as  Colon in  co l­
umn 2 i s  the  symbol of the household card ; t h i s  be ing  the case and C being = 
2*R we know th a t  the  in d iv id u a l  in fo rm ation  in  the  l a s t  household m atr ix  i s  
complete.
( 1 . 4.4.) d i r e c t s  the  computer to  Ib^^ps which w ri te  t h i s  in form ation  to  approp­
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r i a t e  f i l e s  (1 ,5 7 -103 ).
(1.4-5) w i l l  only be reached i f  we have encountered a Colon in  column 2 i f  t h i s  
on one of the  cards fo r  a household in  which th e re  i s  s t i l l  no in d iv id u a l  
in fo rm atio n  s to red ;  C w i l l  equal zero as  a household card w i l l  no t come be­
tween in d iv id u a l  c a rd s .  Since we are  s t i l l  c o l l e c t in g  household in fo rm ation  
f o r  t h i s  household t h i s  l i n e  d i r e c t s  us to  (1,119-200) where t h i s  in fo rm ation  
w i l l  be c o l le c te d ;  i f  we a re  a t  the f i r s t  household card on the  wholq, tape  
s p e c ia l  trea tm en t i s  re q u ired  (see  1 .5 5 , 1.114.-9) .
( 1 . 46- 50) d i r e c t s  us to  l a b e l s  where in d iv id u a l  in fo rm ation  i s  c o l le c te d  i f  
the  symbol on column 2 denotes a card w ith  in d iv id u a l  in fo rm ation ; A r e p re s ­
e n ts  Employment, B, job  s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  E ,E duca tion , I ,  H ea lth , and 0 ,  Earn ings 
andiIncome. ' Other symbols e x i s t  bu t we simply bypass them as they co n ta in  
in fo rm ation  we do n o t r e q y i r e .
( 1 . 51) i s  in  t h i s  v e rs io n  superfluous .
( 1 . 52) w i l l  be reached i f  the  card being read i s  no t  r e q u i r e s ;  i t  d i r e c t s  us 
back to  (1 . 24) l a b e l  25 where a new card w i l l  be read .
(1.53) counts the number of household c a rd s  read fo r  the  c u r re n t  household.
( 1 . 54) i s  a check to  te rm ina te  the programma i f  f a u l t s  occur,
( 1 . 55) d i r e c t s  us to  a loop (1 .114-9) which f i l l s  HHOLD q i th  O' s ;  o therw ise  
th e re  would be problems with the  m atrix  being undefined when we t r y  to  f i l l  i t  
up . This i s  only im portant fo r  the f i r s t  card on the  whole tape a s ,  i f  t h i s  
i s  a  'new* household , the  m atrix  w i l l  , have been f i l l e d  with O 's  a f t e r  the l a s t  
one was w r i t t e n  to  f i l e s  (see  1 , 104- 6) ,
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(1.56) d i r e c t s  the  computer to  the s e c t io n  where the  household in fo rm ation  i s  
c o l le c te d  (1.120-208) i f  t h i s  i s  a co n tin u a tio n  card fo r  the  households; i f  i t  
was the  f i r s t  card fo r  the  household i t  would have been d iv e r te d  by (1 .5 5 ) .  
(1 ,57-103) are  loops fo r  w r i t in g  the  completed p a i r s  of both working couples 
to  f i l e s  on d is c .  As s ta te d  p rev io u s ly  R i s  the  number of e l i g i b l e  p a i r s  so 
a l l  loops run from 1 to  R, The f i r s t  loop (1,57-62) i s  merely to  a s s i s t  in  
f in d in g  v a r ia b le s  qu ick ly  when checking the  ou tpu t on a sample p r in to u t .  T&# 
r e s t  of t h i s  segment (l.64-DO3) does the  fo llow ing  th in g s ;  -  excludes p a i r s  
which we do no t want becaune th e re  i s  m issing d a ta  o r  a t  l e a s t  one member i s  
n o t  working.
Depending on the socio-economic group of the  p a i r  (v a r ia b le  HHOLD (M,7) they 
a re  w r i t t e n  to  f i l e s  ou ts ide  the programme ( u n i t s  90-4 ); each such p a i r  i s  
counted and the t o t a l s  are  p r in te d  a t  the  end (1 ,3 1 8 ) .
(1.104-113) w i l l  be reached when a l l  thd, e l i g i b l e  p a i r s  w ith  adequate d a ta  
have been w r i t te n  to  f i l e s .  The HHOLD m atrix  i s  c lea red  and the counters  B 
and C s e t  to  zero .
I f  t h i s  i s  no t  the f i r s t  HHOLD m atrix  from the tape  then the  f i r s t  card of the  
n ex t household i s  he ld  by the  computer (see  1.43) and HID=1; HID and DID have 
t h e i r  v a lu es  changed so t h a t  the same household card i s  no t read  re p e a te d ly ;  
the  computer i s  d i r e c te d  back to  (1.28) to  handle the  card . <*as d e sc r ib ed , 
(1 ,114-9) w i l l  be reached i f  t h i s  i s  the  f i r s t  s e t  of household ca rds ;  HHOLD 
and the p a i r  and person countera  are  s e t  to  0 .
(1,120) i s  reached while a household card i s  being read ; each card holds  in fo ­
rm ation f o r  th ree  peop le . There are  th ree  s e ts  of l a b e l s  used,one fo r  each 
person; the  p r in c ip le  i s  the  same in  each case , so we s h a l l  o u t l in e  only
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the t re a tm en t of one except f o r  the s p e c ia l  case of handling  the end of 
the  l a s t  person when we s h a l l  be a t  a new card . The v a r ia b le  H i s  the  
person number; when t h i s  eq u a ls  0 th e re  a re  no more people on the  card 
so we a re  a t  the end of the  household and a new card i s  read  (v ia  (1 ,204 -  
5 ) .  I f  the  person i s  n o t  m arried  (1,122) we go to  the  n ex t person i . e .  
the  second s e t  of l a b e l s  s t a r t i n g  1 .148 .
(1.123) i s  superfluous in  t h i s  v e rs io n ,
(1.124-7) i s  a loop  which ta k e s  us to  the  next person i f  t h i s  i s  a s ing ­
l e  person household; i t  compares column 43, the  fam ily  u n i t  number, w ith 
fam ily  u n i t  numbers he ld  in  the  HHOLD m atrix  so t h a t  i f  the  two match we 
have found the second member o f  an e l i g i b l e  p a i r .  In  the l a t t e r  case we 
pass to  ( 1 , 131) where t h i s  member’ s d a ta  i s  en te red  on the  same row of 
the  HHOLD matrist as h is  or her p a r tn e r .
I f  t h i s  i s  the  f i r s t  member of a p a i r  we a re  passed out of the  loop 
to  (1.128) where the  p a i r  coun ter  i s  incremented; (1.130) s e t s  M, the  
row value of HHOLD, equal to  t h i s  so t h a t  each new p a i r  occupies a new 
row. A ll  cases where HHOLD (M,X) i s  s e t  equal to  CARD(N) a re  simply the 
d e s ired  v a r ia b le s  being p ic k ed  up. The v a r ia b le  K (1 ,133-4) i s  s e t  to  3 
i f  the p re s e n t  card  i s  a husband and 4 i f  i t  i s  a w ife , IT i s  used through­
out to  p o s i t io n  husband v a r i a b le s  on the  l e f t  of the  m atr ix  and w ife v a r­
i a b le s  on the r i g h t ;  in  most cases  a sep a ra te  l a b e l - i s  used f o r  a l l  the  
o p e ra t io n s  on the  d a ta  of each in  o rder to  minimize time used ( i . e .  in  
t h i s  case 221 fo r  husbands (1 ,139) and 222 fo r  wives (1 .1 4 4 ) ) .  At the  end 
of th e se  runs of cards we t r a n s f e r  to  the  next person .
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(1,148-174) are an exact r e p l ic a ,  for the second person,of those we have ju s t  des­
cribed fo r  the f i r s t  person ap ar t  from the change in  numbers.
(1.175-200) are the same for the th ird  person. (1,201) reads a new card with 
the same u n i t  number, input format and term ination in s tru c t io n s  as the e a r l i e r  READ 
command (1 ,24) . The card cannot be read twice so i t  i s  handled by a re -d ire c t io n  
to (1 ,28) . (1 . 204) w ill  only be reached i f  a card has no information or the f i r s t
of second person i s  the l a s t  person on i t  (from 11,121,149) of there i s  no th ird  
per8on(1 . 176) .  (1.206-8) are inva lid  as they cannot be reached; th i s  should have
(but was not) been picked up as an e rro r  by the compiler.
(1 . 209) i s  the lab e l  for the f i r s t  card of individual information and w il l  be
reached i f  the appropria te  card i s  encountered a t  (1 .46) .  (1,209-40'*)handle the in ­
formation th i s  card gives on employment . (1.209-15) are a loop which discovens i f
the indiv idual in question belongs to a p a ir  th a t  w ill  be e l ig ib le  fo r  inc lusion  in  
the f in a l  data se t ;  i t  i s  only ; i t  i s  only a t  th i s  po in t, having read a l l  the hous­
ehold cards, th a t  we can find out i f  the married p a irs  held were, in f a c t ,  both work­
ing or no t. The in d iv id u a l 's  person number appears on th i s  card (but not h is /h e r
family u n i t  number; th is  i s  picked up (1.210) and compared with the husband's pers­
on number (1.211) and the w ife 's  person number (1.212) for each row of the HHOLD 
matrix u n t i l  we find the person /pair  th i s  card belongs to .  When the re levan t row 
i s  located  (1.213-4) we leave the loop and, as R(the pa ir  counter) w il l  have the 
value i t  had on leaving the loop, sh a l l  not need to make any other a l t e r a t io n s  to 
counters on reaching (1.218) to continue recording the p resen t in d iv id u a l 's  data .
I f  the present card belongs to an indiv idual who does not fea tu re  in  our HHOLD 
matrix then , on leaving the loop, we s e t  LV=2 (1.216) in order to be able to skip 
the cards fo r  th is  ind iv idual (1.217).
I f  the ind iv idua l was not a t  work ( l .  218), despite  belonging to the HHOLD mat-
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r i x ,  the socio-economic group variable i s  se t  equal to 6 and (1.219) the card is  
passed by. The l ines  up to (1,241) are simply the co llec tion  of individual data 
in the household matrix; when the re levant information has been collected we re turn  
to (1.24) to read a new card (v ia  (1.229) i f  we have a w ife , via  (1,240) i f  we have 
a husband), (1.241-56) follow the same pa tte rn  for cards with in column 2 which 
hold job sa t is fa c t io n  questions; a reversion to the KARD array is  necessary (1.252- 
4) because alphabetic codings are required to form the s a t i s fa c t io n /d is s a t is fa c t io n  
dummies fo r wives.
(1.257-83) follow the same pattern  as the previous cards except for the d i f f ­
erences outlined below. The label 40 Nvill be reached when Cards with *E' in col­
umn 2 are encountered; these contain education information. There may be more than 
one of these cards for a person as the information about ch ild ren 's  schooling i s  
given on one of the parents schedules. The continuation cards do not duplica te  
the information specific  the respondent so we need to be able to d is t ingu ish  
these cards in order th a t  the blank spaces in the columns re la t in g  to the respon­
dent spec if ic  information do not lead to the accidental destruction  (through re ­
coding as a l l  zero) of the pa ren t 's  information. The variable  DUB=1 i s  created 
(1.259) i f  the present card i s  a continuation card; DUB i s  se t  equal to 0 i f  the 
p resent card i s  the f i r s t  card for the indiv idual. I f  DUB=1 we move (l,260) to 
the l in e s ( 1.263-70) where information on children i s  co llected; i f  DUB=0 and there 
are no children in the family, or th e ir  information i s  on the other p a re n t 's  sch­
edule, we pass (1 . 262) to the co llec tion  of the respondent spec if ic  information 
(1.273-282).
(1.266-70) i s  a loop to locate the presence of children under 5 who a t t ­
end day/nursery schools; as soon as we have found one such we leave the loop ( l .
269) .  I f  the loop terminates without any such children being located we a rr ive
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a t  (1.271) which d i r e c t s  us to a new card i f  the p re s e n t  card i s  a c o n tin u a tio n  
card (so t h a t  respondent s p e c i f ic  inform ation  i s  no t o b l i t e r a t e d ) .  Lines up^to 
( 1 , 284) fo llow  the p a t te r n  described  fo r  o th e r  cards .
(1 . 284) i s  reached when cards with ' I '  in  column 2 a re  encountered ;
th e se  cards con ta in  h e a l th  in form ation  . This in form ation  i s  handled ( i . e .  up t(
( 1 . 297)) as f o r  the b a s ic  p a t t e r n ,  w ithout ex cep tions , fo r  the  e a r l i e r  ca rds .
(1 . 297) i s  reached when cards w ith 'O’ in  column 2 a re  encountered; th ­
ese cards con ta in  income and ea rn in g s  inform ation  . Exceptions to  the b a s ic  pa t  
ern fo r  p rev ious cards a re  given below. As we have s a id ,  in  the  d iscu ss io n  of 
v a r ia b le s  used, p a i r s  w ithout weeks paid inform ation  a re  r e ta in e d .  The v a r ia b ­
le  'NAN' i s  the number o f  weeks fo r  which income was re c e iv ed ,  from the ' main' 
source i f  employed on more than one job , from employment. This w i l l  equal 99 
i f  the  inform ation  i s  n o t  a v a i la b le  as 99 i s  the ap p ro p r ia te  in te rv iew er  cod­
ing  fo r  t h i s  event. We can use HH0LD(M,18) or HH0LD](M,34) equal to 0 or 99 (see 
( I . 3O8&313) to  d is t in g u is h  p a i r s  w ithout a f ig u re  to proxy weeks worked.
( 1.310 &315) a re  used to  take us back to  ( l . 57-102) where the rows o f 
the  HHOLD m atrix  w i l l  be t r a n s f e r r e d  to the f i l e  r e le v a n t  to  t h e i r  socio-econ­
omic group. The f ig u re  fo r  R has been obta ined  from the household cards (1 ,120- 
200) and 0 has been incremented each time a member of these  R p a i r s  has been 
found (1 . 219) .  I f  C i s  n o t equal to  twice R then th e re  a re  s t i l l  more in d iv id -  
schedules to be examined in  o rder to  complete the HHOLD m atrix  so we r e tu r n  (v ia
(1 .311) or ( 1 . 316) ) to  (1 . 24) .
(1 . 317) w i l l  only be reached i f  the e n d - o f - f i l e  co n d it io n  occurs on ( 1 . 24) 
(1 .318-20) w i l l ,  i f  the f i l e  ( i . e .  the in p u t tape o f the  survey) i s  f in i s h e d ,  pr 
i n t  out the t o t a l  number o f  p a i r s  t r a n s fe r r e d  and the number o f  p a i r s  t r a n s f e r r e  
in  each socio-economic group. U ^ it  6 i s  the  paper p r in t - o u t  from the programme
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(1 .321-2) are  superfluous in  t h i s  vers ion  as no de-bugging i s  in  o p e ra t io n .
This programme only  d e a ls  w ith one q u a r te r  o f  the survey. A l te r a t io n s  
were req u ired  as in  the 1974 survey the  second q u a r te r  d i f f e r s  from the  t h i r d  and 
fo u r th  q u a r te rs  which a re  i d e n t i c a l  to  each o th e r .  The m ain^d ifferences  a re  th a t  
some o f the in d iv id u a l  schedules have d i f f e r e n t  l e t t e r s  in  column 2 in  the sec­
ond q u a r te r  than in  the o ther two q u a r te rs  and th a t  the  answers to some o f the  qu 
e s t io n s  on the  in d iv id u a l  schedules occupy d i f f e r e n t  columns in  the second quarte  
from those occupied by the  same answers in  the o th e r  two q u a r te r s .  In  some areas 
the re  are d i f f e r e n t  qu es t io n s  asked in  the second q u a r te r  from those asked in  the 
o th e r  two q u a r te r s .  We have only c o l le c te d  inform ation  from answers to  questions
which were id e n t i c a l  _in a l l  th ree  q u a r te r s .
The programme had to be run th ree  times (one v e rs io n  once and the  o th e r  twic 
I t  was im p rac ticab le  to run a l l  th ree  in the same job and the reby  add the out 
pu t from the q u a r te r  being run on to  the f i l e s  from the  q u a r te r ( s )  a lre ad y  run as 
t h i s  would have involved running the job on Class 'D* a t  S.W.U.R.C.C. ^ . The Cl 
a ss  of job determ ines i t s  p o s i t io n  in  the queue of jo b s  w aiting  to  be run; any jc 
of a h igher c la s s  (A,B‘,C) I . e .  r e q u i r in g  l e s s  u n i t s  o f  computer time would take f
cedence over such a job which would, th e re fo re ,  be pushed back down the queue. I t
would not be unusual fo r  a 'D' job  to  take a t  l e a s t  two days to  be run . This i s
very  expensive in  terms of re sea rch  time foregone (a lthough  i t  would have been cl 
eaper in terms of the  money co s t  o f  doing the work) e s p e c ia l ly  as the r e s u l t  may 
have been simply a two-day wait fo r  the d e te c t io n  of a t r i v i a l  e r r o r  in  the  job .
1. South-Western U n iv e rs i t ie s  Regional Computing Centre
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APPENDIX IV. ESTIMATES OF THE FAMILY LABOUR SUPPLY MODEL FOR HOUSEHOLDS 
WHERE WIVES EARN'ABOVE OR BELOW THE TAX EXEMPTION LIMIT
In  t h i s  appendix we consider a problem concerning 
ta x a t io n  which was mentioned, bu t no t d e a l t  w ith , in  Chapter 7.
Due to  lower hourly  r a t e s ,  g r e a te r  s p e c i a l i s a t i o n  in  home a c t i v i t i e s  and 
the  o f f e r  of more p a r t - t im e  jo b s  women a re  g e n e ra l ly  capable of a choice 
n o t  open to  men. That i s ,  by a c o r re c t  choice of wage r a t e s  and hours they 
can avoid paying any taxes  a t  a l l .  In  1974 the tax  exemption l i m i t  f o r  an 
in d iv id u a l  was £625, so th a t  a women working a l l  year fo r  f o r ty  pence an 
hour would face a sudden jump from a m arginal tax  r a t e  of zero to  one of 
35% when she inc reased  hen hours from 30 to  31 hours per week.
I t  fo llows then th a t  th e re  are  two d i s t i n c t  groups in  our sample, one 
where wives are  untaxed and o th e r  where they a re .  Some would argue th a t  
t h i s  d i c t a t e s  the n e c e s s i ty  f o r  sep a ra te  e s t im a tio n  of the model fo r  the 
two groups so t h i s  appendix r e p o r t s  the  r e s u l t s  of so doing.
I t  must be borne in  mind t h a t  the proceedure, which we fo llow , of s p l i t t ­
ing  the sample a t  the  exemption l i m i t  fa ces  c e r ta in  problems. These problems 
a re  as fo llow s; some couples in  the sample w i l l  f i l e  as s in g le  tax  u n i t s  with 
t h i s  no t being in d ic a te d  in  the  d a ta ,  fam ily  composition and the r u le s  govern­
ing  e l i g i b i l i t y  f o r  allowances and b e n e f i t s  w i l l  e x e r t  an in f lu en ce  on the 
n e t  marginal tax  r a t e ,  some women may t r y  to  aim a t  a wage below t h a t  req u ired  
to  s tay  below the exemption l i m i t  aiid f a i l  to achieve i t  due to  m isc a lc u la t io n  
and u n c e r ta in ty .
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Given the  na ture  o f  the tax  system we might expect to  f in d  c lu s t e r i n g  of 
women a t  earn ings l e v e l s  j u s t  below the exemption l i m i t  w ith  th e re  being  a 
s p a r s i ty  of observa tions  fo r  some d is ta n c e  above the  l i m i t .  To in v e s t ig a te  
t h i s  we l i s t e d  a l l  female ea rn in g s  in  the  sample in  a frequency ta b le  us ing  
one pound in t e r v a l s  and annual ea rn in g s .  In sp e c t io n  o f  the ta b le  rev ea led  
t h a t  the  bulk of the  sample i s  found a t  l e v e l s  of earn ings  which a re  m ult­
i p l e s  of £52 with th e re  being very few people between these  m u l t ip le s .  As 
£52 p .a .  i s  equal to  £1 per week i t  seems t h i s  i s  due to  e i t h e r  convention 
in  w ag e-se t t in g  or rounding-up by respondents  and /o r in te rv ie w e rs .
The d i s t r i b u t i o n  of earn ings  i s  shown in  Table 1; unequal c la s s  i n t ­
e rv a l s  are  used in  order to  p re sen t  the  inform ation  in  a compact fa sh io n .  
The ta b le  shows th a t  the earn ings  6f  a s u b s ta n t ia l  number of wives in  the 
sample a re  very sm all. There i s  some evidence of a c lu s t e r in g  of o b se rv a t­
ions  around the persona l tax  allowance l i m i t .
In  Tables 2 and 3 the  model of chap te rs  4-7 i s  r e p l i c a t e d  on the same 
d a ta  fo r  households where wives are  above the tax  exemption l i m i t  and 
households where wives are below the tax  exemption l i m i t .
As can be seen the r e s u l t s  fo r  these  two s e ts  of e s t im a te s  d i f f e r  markedly 
from those in  Chapter 7 but a re  f a i r l y  s im ila r  to each o th e r .
The e f f e c t  of c h ild ren  i s  roughly s im ila r  fo r  taxpayer and non-taxpayer 
wives w h i ls t  f u l l - t im e  wives d isp layed  a p o s i t iv e  impact and only p a r t - t im e  
wives a nega tive  im pact. The only s ig n i f i c a n t  wage impact i s  the  n eg a tiv e  
response of WHR$ to  MINST fo r  taxpaying wives w h i ls t  fo r  the  non-taxpaying  
wives le isure/hom e production  time proves to  be an i n f e r i o r  good.
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The p a r tn e r s ’ hours prove to  be s ig n i f i c a n t ly  c o r r e la te d  in  the non- 
taxpaying  wives re g re s s io n s  bu t no t so in  the  taxpaying  wives re g re s s io n s .
Apart from t h i s  th e re  i s  very  l i t t l e  d i f fe re n c e  between the  two groups as 
reg a rd s  the  husbands' fu n c t io n .  The two d i f f e r e n c e s  of note  concern wives' 
h e a l th  and so c ia l  s t a t u s .  Wives' lo n g -s tan d in g  i l l n e s s  adds anc’ es tim ated  
th re e  hours to husbands’ working week where wives pay tax  bu t has no e f f e c t  
w&ere they  do no t pay ta x .  Husbands o f  taxpaying wives in  Socio-economic 
group 4 work approxim ately four hours l e s s  c e t e r i s  p a r ib u s  than o th e rs  w h ils t  
husbands of non-taxpaying wives in  socio-economic group 2 work approxim ately  
four hours l e s s  than o th e rs  in  the  group.
O v era l l  the r e s u l t s  are  d is s a p o in t in g  in  t h a t  they  re v e a l  very l i t t l e  
in  the  way of meaningful d i f f e r e n c e s  between households where wives pay 
tax  and those where they do notf pay ta x .
TABLE A .IV .l . DISTRIBUTION OF WIVES EARNINGS
RANGE(£d.a.) % OF SAMPLE RANGE (£ p .a . ) I0 OE SAMPLE
<C 364 22.7 1,170-1222 1.9
364-416 3 .9 1 , 222-74 1.7
416-468 3 .8 1 , 274- 1,326 2.2
468-520 4 .7 1,326-78 1.7
520-72 4 .5 1,378-1,430 1.2
572-624 2 .4 1 , 430- 1,534 3.2
624-50 2.6 1,534-1 ,638 2 .4
650-76 2.2 1 , 638- 1,742 1 .3
676-702 2.1 1 , 742- 1,846 1 .8
702-728 2.5 1 , 846- 1,950 1.8
728-54 2.2 1 ,950- 2,054 1.6











TABLE A .IV .2. HOUSEHOLDS WHERE WIVES 'EARNT LESS THAN THE:BASIC TAX-FAYING 
THRESHOLD






















-3 .1 4 (0 .2 )
1 .02(0 .03) 
-0 . 00006(0 ) 
0 .0 1 1 (4 .7 )  
0 .2 8 (1 .5 )  
-0 .0045(2 .6 ) 
-4 .3 (2 2 .2 )  
5 .9 5 (1 .2 )  
-1.1(1 .2) 
-0 . 8(0 . 7) 
-1 .9 6 (1 .3 3 )  
-1 .3 4 (0 .9 5 )  
-6 .1(0 . 8) 
6 .9(1) 
0 .7 7 (1 .2 )  
- 1 . 66(0 . 8) 
2 .8 4 (4 .1 )  
0 .3 7 (0 .1 )
0 . 096( 6 . 7)
1 3 . 4
HHRS
-8 .6 (1 .3 4 )
-2 .1 (0 .1 5 )
-0 .008(8)
0 .001(0 .05)
0 . 64( 7 . 8)
-0 .86(10 .1)
1 . 22( 2 . 15)
-1 5 .4 (9 .3 )  
0 .17(0 .04) 
-0 .99(1 .2) 
-3 .2 4 (5 .9 )  
- 1 . 62( 1 . 6 ) . 
-5 .3 (0 .7 )
3 .8 (0 .4 )  
0 .7 3 (1 .3 )  
-3 .7 (4 .4 )  
-0 .5 (0 .1 4 )  
1 .4 4 (1 .5 )




0.05 0 .0 9
N=1090
ZERO ORDER CORRELATION' COEFFICIENTS
MINST WHRS
FINST 0 .4 7
HHHS 0.098
-252-
THAN THE BASIC TAX-PAYING
THRESHOLD
Dependent V ariab le :  WHRS HHRS
MINST -1 1 .9 9 (5 .9 ) -7 .6 (1 .9 )
FINST 0.25(0 .005) -3 .3 ( 0 .8 )
HNLI 0 .001(0 .3 ) -0 .0 0 1 (0 .3 ) ’
WNLI - 0 . 004(1) 0 .0004(0.01)
OAGE 0 .1 8 (1 .1 ) 0 .5 2 (7 .7 )
EXP -0 .0 0 3 (1 .7 ) -0 .007(10)
KID -4 .0 2 (5 0 .1 ) 0 .8 2 (1 .9 )
SKL -5 .8 ( 1 .1 ) 1 6 .5 (7 .9 )
HSIK -0 .3 3 (0 .2 ) 0 .006(0 .01)
WSIK' -0 .5 5 (0 .5 ) 2 .97(12 .5)
HMOON -0.002(0) -2 .5 9 (3 .3 )
WMOON - 3 .8 ( 5 .6 ) - 0 . 24( 0 . 02)
HCOL -0 .07(0 .001) 1 .9 6 (0 .5 )
WOOL 2.88(1 .05) -1 .8 2 (0 .5 )
DUMA 0.01(0 ) 0 .8 8 (2 .1 )
DUMB -3 .9 ( 9 .3 ) -1 .6 ( 1 .4 )
DUMC -0 .06(0 .004) -3 .8 (1 3 .1 )
DUMD -1 .4 2 (2 .4 ) 0 .0 5 (2 .4 )
HHRS 0 .0 4 (2 .2 )
WHRS 0 .0 5 (2 .4 )
INTERCEPT 32.52 34.4
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